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This thesis discusses how imagined geographies are made real through structures of political 
and legal governance. Using a method of historical literary analysis, this thesis analyses how 
geographic space was imagined by European voyagers, explorers, and political agents during 
the first encounters between European and non-European people in the mid-fifteenth century. 
It traces how this – owned, bounded, culturally-divisible – notion of geographic space was later 
operationalised through political and legal structures of governance in the colonial and 
postcolonial setting. I use the term Occidental Legality to refer to these spatialising tendencies 
and demonstrate how they produce a vision of space that we now associate with ‘territory’.  
This thesis reveals how an owned, bounded, and culturally-divisible notion of space emerges 
time and again through contemporary cultural geographies, in particular the Aboriginal 
Reservation, the ‘protected areas’ of national parks, and the public/private divide.  Over the 
course of this work I trace how geographies are the product of jurisdictional struggles between 
normative communities, and demonstrate how colonial geographies continue to have an 
influence on how we manage cultural pluralism today. In so doing, I draw a connection between 
the exclusionary history of the colonial experience and contemporary forms of minority 
protection.  
By drawing attention to the mutually-constitutive relationship between law and geography, I 
argue that a focus on territorial forms of autonomy tends to displace the issue that is at the 
heart of minority demands for cultural and legal recognition. This is the demand for coeval 
recognition. This thesis concludes by developing the notion of coeval recognition and 
introducing crucial modifications that need to be made to liberal law and forms of governance if 
contemporary societies are to ensure better protection for their minority communities.  Coeval 
recognition must be pursued through an acknowledgement of hybridity, a focus on sustaining 
conditions for self-reflexive intercultural dialogue, and more robust policies to reduce 
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Introduction 
The Spatial Tendencies of the Colonial Gaze 
Occidental Legality and the Territorialisation of Geographic Space 
If myth and fantasy touch on levels outside the conscious mind, then simply to point out the 
falsity of one’s imagination leaves untouched the psychic investments which determine the 
formation of the fiction that sustains the world we live and act within. To recognise the 
instability of the divide between fantasy and reality, fiction and facts is to begin the difficult 
and painful task of constructing alternative futures.1 
1. Occidental Legality and the Production of Territory 
The greatest measure of a social group’s political power is predominantly perceived in terms of 
its territory - the space in which it exercises its autonomous decision-making capacity. Territory 
is traditionally imagined as a demarcated geographic zone within which a particular group is said 
to have exclusive governing capacity.  By determining the features and qualities of those that are 
included within, excluded from, and contained by a space (and the relationships and resources 
that it contains) groups are able to operationalise their governing power.2 Conceptually, 
therefore, territory is partially understood as a political and legal construct that is underwritten 
by specific rules of access and diversity, and designed to keep some people out and others within.   
As a concept, territory materialised during the colonial period and was the product of European 
attempts to lay claim to newly discovered land. The concept arose through the mapping of 
political and jurisdictional boundaries upon conquered lands as a way of claiming possession, and 
gave the impression of sovereign and complete political rule even in those instances in which “an 
empire’s spaces were politically fragmented; legally differentiated; and encased in irregular, 
porous, and sometimes undefined borders.”3 As Benton writes, while “empires did lay claim to 
vast stretches of territory,” imperial power was “exercised mainly over narrow bands, or 
corridors, and over enclaves and irregular zones around them.”4 In some way, then, territory not 
only contained and differentiated the power of one social group from another (one colonising 
                                                             
1 Gail Ching-Liang Low, White Skins/Black Masks: Representation and Colonialism (London: Routledge, 2004), p 2. 
2 Robert D. Sack, "Human Territoriality: A Theory," Annals of the Assocation of American Geographers 73, no. 1 (1983): p 
21-7. 
3 Laura Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p 2. 
4 Ibid. 
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power versus another; or the colonising power versus the colonised peoples), but actually 
seemed to materialise this power by locating it in space and encasing it within boundaries.    
But territory is more than simply borders and enclosures backed by legal and political power. It is 
an imaginary as well. Underlying the political and legal possibilities that territory makes possible 
lies a historical lineage of social thought and literary practice that cuts across centuries of 
European contact with non-European peoples and ideas. Territory is a social construction that 
relies on European ways of imagining social difference and exercising cultural domination; 
territory is a way of classifying, dividing, and, in many ways, judging our social world and the 
relationships that take place within it. And it is this feature of territory, that is, the use of territory 
analytic for imagining, and putting into force perceptions of inferiority and exclusion, that this 
thesis is concerned with further analysing.  
Territory starts of as ‘space’; a space that, through social praxis, rule-making, and narrativising is 
conceived as bounded, possessed, and culturally-divisible.  The processes through which this 
occurs are subtle in their operation; the realities that they give rise to, are cultivated over 
centuries of, sometimes imprecise and unintentional, ways of thinking and behaving. Since 
territory is the culmination of a multitude of micro-level processes and behaviours that take place 
over a long period of time, its political nature (by which I mean the ways in which it categorises 
and excludes) become less visible to us.  Over the course of this thesis I argue that territory is a 
cultural artefact, produced through the colonial encounters. It was constructed through 
narratives and literary representations that were inspired by how colonising agents viewed the 
lands they ‘discovered’ and the peoples they conquered. My aim is to demonstrate how these 
cultural representations of territory underlie, even inspire, the legal and political ramifications 
that territory has for contemporary social relations in liberal societies.  
Accordingly, the thesis traces a relationship between the historical construction of territory out of 
conquered lands, and the contemporary models of territory as it structures State-minority 
relations today. As a political and legal concept, territory is widely understood as a representation 
of a political community’s possession or claim to land, typically under the doctrine of discovery. In 
this way, territory is naturalised, as the political and legal product of a linear and benign process 
of European travel, discovery, possession, and ultimately sovereignty.5 However, my aim is to 
                                                             
5 Benton, for one, challenges this linear conceptualisation of the relationship between territory and sovereignty in A 
Search for Sovereignty. In this book she argues that, during the colonial period, territorial and sovereign claims often 
failed to align with one another.  Empires frequently lay claims to land over which they were able to exercise very -little 
sovereign jurisdiction. She suggests that this idea that territory represents the limits of absolute and unencumbered 
governing power is a misconception, and to this end she discusses how colonisation was marked by legal plurality; 
several groups exercising jurisdictional authority within the same parcel of land. Her work, therefore, challenges the 
dominant view that the exercise of political and legal power requires territory. In reality, the notion of sovereignty, as 
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demonstrate how ‘territory’ is a particular vision and ordering of space and its contents. Territory 
was made through the exclusion, differentiation, and dehumanisation of Others who presented an 
equal (and often greater) moral claim to conquered lands. And this was justified through the 
linking of spatial possession to ideas about the right to exclusive political and legal control in land 
and, ultimately, over people. In this thesis I discuss how this occurred, and demonstrate how the 
legal doctrines and principles developed through these encounters continue to have significant 
implications for the contemporary processes of reconciliation and recognition in divided 
societies.   
This thesis argues that the notion of territory undermines the pluralistic endeavours of modern 
liberal societies, and their aims to build more diverse, equal, and inclusive political and legal 
institutions. One particularly significant way in which territory has traditionally operated to 
manage social difference is by serving as an optic through which the self and the Other are 
imagined as being separated in time and space.  For example, in Chapter Two and Three I discuss 
how the legal justification of territorial possession is based on the doctrine of terra nullius, a space 
emptied of its normative content. The native or indigenous Other is extracted from space by being 
placed ‘back in time’ and understood as being unable to utilise and develop his land to the 
standards appropriate for possession. Territory was therefore a method by which native 
communities were dispossessed and colonising forces were empowered to make decisions about 
how to use and allocate the land that they ‘discovered’.  In Chapters Three and Four I study how 
territorial strategies – the conception of space as bounded, owned, and culturally divisible – 
continue to operate as mechanisms of native disempowerment within the contemporary world. I 
submit that territorial strategies materialise through struggles for power between distinct 
normative communities.  
However, since territory is, at least partially, a cultural artefact it represents a particular vision of 
space and ordering of people, but most certainly not the only vision of space and ordering of 
people. In Chapter Three I draw attention to non-European, specifically Aboriginal conceptions of 
land and geography, and analyse how Aboriginal peoples’ understanding of their relationship to 
land, conflicts with the dominant Euro-Western conception of territory. This proves problematic 
given that territorial possession, occupation, use of, development in, and protection of land, 
serves as the basis of Aboriginal peoples’ claims for recognition of their right to self-government 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
exclusive jurisdiction over a delimited area of land, is an illusion that has been constructed for the purposes of justifying 
imperial power and the dispossession of indigenous peoples. See, Ibid.   Her views have been further supported by 
MacMillan, who argues that rule through systems of legal pluralism was not only characteristic of the Imperial-
Indigenous counters, but were quite common within England and Europe more broadly. He believes that the systems of 
legal plurality ‘at home’ helped to pattern similar modes of regulation within England’s colonies. See, Ken MacMillan, 
Sovereignty and Possession in the English World: The Legal Foundation of Empire, 1576-1640 (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), p 
18-19.  
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and cultural autonomy. Territory is the primary analytic through which demands for cultural 
recognition are mediated. And yet, it is an analytic that has been developed through a history of 
native and Aboriginal marginalisation and dehumanisation. Contemporary Aboriginal rights 
litigation also suggests (and which I discuss at length in Chapter Three) that the analytic of 
territory cannot and often does not produce forms of recognition that are favourable to the 
aspirations of Aboriginal peoples because they have a different relationship to land than is 
possible to convey through the modern notions of ownership or property law. Despite this 
significant defect, territory has become integral to Aboriginal claims to self-government because 
possession and title to land is perceived as a precondition to the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction. 
Territory and sovereignty have become fused within the political arena.   
However, Benton has argued that this idea that territorial claims represent the existence of 
sovereign jurisdictional authority is a fallacy, and that territory operates to give the illusion of 
legal/jurisdictional singularity when, in fact, the societies living within any given territory are 
regulated and protected by multiple legal and political institutions that are consistently 
interacting with one another and delimiting each others’ capacity to control.6 Though Benton’s 
analysis is limited to the colonial encounters between the fifteenth and twentieth century, I 
extend her conclusions to the contemporary period and use them to analyse how contemporary 
legal geographies – such as the Aboriginal Reservation, the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and the 
imaginary public/private divides of the law are themselves classified as cultural spaces created 
for the purposes of minority exercises of normative autonomy. Yet, I reveal these spaces as sites 
of legal excess, characterised by a range of intersecting and interpenetrating legalities that operate 
to regulate minority communities in ways that are not immediately visible to us.  
Building on these ideas, this thesis argues that contemporary quests for cultural or minority 
recognition are not entirely about the accumulation of territory, but about the power and rights 
that territory apportions. Native or indigenous struggles for recognition are demands that the 
State recognise their inherent right of self-rule and sovereign governing potential. The 
conventional understanding is that the exercise of sovereignty cannot exist independently of 
territorial autonomy. However, in demonstrating that this relationship between territorial 
autonomy and exclusive self-government has been overly exaggerated, I open the conversation up 
to how native self-government can be actualised without territory, by which I mean 
independently of demonstrating their connection to land in a way that fits the ‘bounded, owned, 
culturally-divisible’ notion of space that emerged through the colonial encounters. 
                                                             
6 So my discussion of Benton’s work in FN 5. 
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Ultimately I argue that liberal societies can better respect demands for cultural autonomy by 
recognising the native peoples as coeval partners in the making and exercise of a joint 
sovereignty.  My idea of coeval recognition shifts attention away from the current fixation with 
territorial conceptions of space which force native or indigenous peoples to define their rights of 
self-government by pointing to an unchanging, pre-contact, relationship to the land they occupy 
and wish to exercise their rights of self-rule upon. Drawing on pre-existing theories of recognition 
I highlight how my conception of coeval recognition is unique because of its focus on the 
convergence between native-settler identities and interpenetration between their normative 
practices and institutions. In the first four chapters I demonstrate the various ways in which 
territory has been produced through anxieties about the merging of native-settler relations and 
the intermingling of previously distinct normative systems. In the last chapter of this thesis I 
explain how the recognition of hybridity, identities and political and legal processes in-between, is 
precisely what can move legal recognition from being a unilateral and effectively empty promise, 
to a more robust and pluralistic conceptual framework for acknowledging minority rights of self-
rule and cultural autonomy.  
2. Chapter Outline 
This thesis can be sub-divided into two parts. In the first part, comprising of Chapter One, Two, 
and Three, I develop three main ideas. First is the idea that space is political. I draw on the social 
science literature in the areas of human, social, and legal geography to map the ways in which 
space has been socially constructed and how our social space is a composite of different interests. 
Spaces are created in order to make possible certain forms of behaviour and types of 
relationships while impeding others. Second, I argue that through the Imperial-Indigenous7 
encounters, beginning from the mid-fifteenth century, a very particular conceptualisation and 
organisation of political relationships and cultural interaction emerges. According to these 
emergent views, geographic space is naturally bounded, owned, and culturally divisible. This view 
of how our land and environmental is organised has significantly influenced social and political 
relations from the time of the first encounters between European and non-European people in the 
fifteenth century. I analyse a number of different European cultural narratives to analyse why 
                                                             
7 I use the term ‘Imperial-Indigenous’ encounter rather than ‘colonial’ because the latter has negative connotations and 
power-related attachments that I think unfairly characterise the early encounters between European and non-
European peoples. I do, however, use the term ‘colonial’ when I speak of the periods in which we witness the 
implementation of European political and legal structures of governance. This is because I find colonial to be an 
appropriate term at this point, given the aims of European administrators (that of establishing European models of law 
and governance in these areas).  However, during the early periods of the Imperial expansion these aims were largely 
absent, and much of the ways in which native communities were settled, managed, and conversed with demonstrates a 
degree of political ‘laxity’ when compared to later periods. See, L.A. Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in 
World History, 1400-1900 (London: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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geography and cultural identity have become so fused in the way that we understand the 
organisation of our social and political world. I argue that the geographies produced during the 
colonial period radiate European discomfort with the possibility of European and native bodies 
coming into closer contact with one another.  This discomfort manifests itself in pestilential, 
corrupted, and diseased interpretations of foreign topographies, climates, and environments. 
These observations often extend to classifying the environments’ occupants as culturally inferior 
and politically under-developed. The effect of juxtaposing these moral judgments alongside 
observations about nature is that the former is naturalised. We are given the impression that 
these commentaries represent an objective reflection of what is actually being witnessed; these 
colonial geographies, or colonial orderings of people in space, appear apolitical.   
In the third chapter, I advance the idea that the geographies produced through the colonial 
encounter acquire greater authority by being continuously reproduced through political 
arrangements and forms of legal regulation. The idea that space is naturally bounded, owned, and 
culturally divisible becomes further pronounced as these cultural geographies are attached with 
greater legal and political ramifications. ‘Territory’ is the term I use to describe geographies that 
have rules mapped onto them. These rules control other peoples’ access to space and define the 
level of diversity that exists within a given space. As such, there appears to be a mutually-
constitutive relationship between law and geography. This relationship is revealed most acutely 
during instances of jurisdictional dispute, and the spatialisation of power struggles between 
different normative communities vying for greater control over one another. These disputes, as 
much of Chapter Three clearly elucidates, are based on the belief that divided geographies can 
offer normative communities some sort of protection from external intervention. In so doing, the 
normative plurality of space is neutralised and the geographies that are produced (in the form of 
territory), appear to us as being culturally-distinct and normatively consistent.  
Accordingly, the first three chapters of this thesis collectively reproduce a social and political 
narrative of territory, and they do so by analysing techniques of Imperial witnessing8 that 
emerged through the Imperial-Indigenous encounters. I analyse two important techniques 
through which European experiences of non-European places and peoples were produced and 
disseminated: cartography and ethnography (in the form of travel-journals and letter-writing). In 
particular, I examine the ways in which space is structured, represented, misrepresented, and 
distorted through these various narratives. Imperial maps, letter-writing, and travel journals 
reveal a culturally and racially inferior image of non-European. However, when grounded in 
                                                             
8 I use the term ‘witnessing’ to refer to how foreign people and landscapes are observed, imagined, and narrated by 
European voyagers and political agents. 
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landscape, climate, and topography, native personalities and practices appear to us as natural 
observations, as if they are simple and objective documentations of what is ‘out there’. I use the 
term ‘Occidental Legality’ to describe these spatialising processes.  The view of space that is 
produced through Occidental Legality has the effect of linking geography to identity and 
geographic difference to cultural difference, emptying space of its social content, and 
temporalising geographies of difference. I refer to these consequences as the effects of 
territoriality.  The aim of Chapter Two is to demonstrate how the origins of territory are deeply 
embedded in European cultural practice aimed at exercising control over never-before-
encountered peoples and lands. Therefore, territory, from this perspective is imagined as being as 
being natural, or as simply lying there, awaiting European arrival and possession. It is a cultural 
space, in the sense that it is produced through perceptions of cultural difference and feelings of 
European racial and cultural superiority. 
Chapter Three demonstrates how law and legal discourse has the effect of normalising an owned, 
possessed, and culturally-divisible representation of geographic space. This, I argue, is the 
emergence of ‘territory’ as we understand it today. Using my analysis of colonial and postcolonial 
law and governance, I trace how the effects of territoriality can be identified in many of the 
imagined geographies that emerge through the legal and political discourse of contemporary 
societies, as they attempt to manage issues of social (and legal) pluralism. Territorial readings of 
space, I argue, reproduce the inferiority of native identities and cultures. This process perpetuates 
visions of space and social ordering similar to those that emerged through the Imperial-
Indigenous encounters, and the European attempt to temper and regulate alterity. I further go on 
to make the case that this bounded and owned conception of space stands in stark contrast to 
non-dominant, Aboriginal perspectives of space and geography. I trace how jurisdictional 
challenges between Aboriginal and European communities produce varying cultural geographies 
using the land and environment that they jointly occupy. 
What does the construction, and continued persistence, of space as ‘territory’ reveal about 
contemporary processes of protecting social diversity? First, I argue that the continued 
persistence of a territorial vision of space reveals that contemporary liberal democratic societies, 
though structured through the discourses of liberal multiculturalism, social inclusion, and respect 
and recognition for cultural diversity, continue to be as preoccupied with identifying, classifying, 
and containing social difference as the first overseas voyagers who arrived on European ocean 
fleets to set foot in foreign places. Second, I suggest that a territorial vision of space has very little 
to do with the recognition of autonomy and diversity, and is better understood as a process for 
preserving and recreating the referential distance of the first encounters between the self and 
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those perceived as Others. Moreover, this way of defining space has the further effect of 
marginalising non-dominant indigenous conceptions of space and geography, and produces 
modes of governance that remain inconsistent with the demands and desires of indigenous 
groups. The resulting practices and processes continue to place normative systems along a linear 
trajectory, creating hierarchical forms of governance that not only diminish the social and legal 
plurality characterising these societies, but entirely minimize the interactions and 
interrelationships between them. 
I discuss law’s implication in reproducing and circulating a bounded, owned, and culturally 
divisible view of geographic space by reference to several political and legal geographies that 
operate on a territorial model of space (including the Reservation, the public/private divide, and 
the protected-areas of national parks). This complex relationship between law and territory calls 
into question whether liberal law can act as a vehicle for native emancipation.  Chapters Two and 
Three suggest that we should focus more closely on the legal categories of culture and identity, 
specifically in the context of managing social and legal pluralism, to uncover how a territorial 
ordering of space may not always be an empowering discourse, but can actually work to further 
differentiate, subjugate, and distance perceived Others. Liberal law, in this instance, is revealed as 
a mechanism for further perpetuating the domination and subordination of native communities in 
the contemporary period. 
As stated earlier, the last section of Chapter Three considers Aboriginal perspectives on land and 
territory in order to demonstrate how liberal law misrepresents Aboriginal claims for recognition 
of their sovereignty as if they were claims for territorial autonomy. I argue that a territorial 
categorisation of their struggle fundamentally alters their claims and forecloses opportunity for 
dialogue between the Canadian State and its Aboriginal communities. By referring to Aboriginal 
perspectives on the significance of land, space, and territory I draw out precisely why the notion 
of territory – space that is bounded, owned, and culturally divisible – needs to be unpacked and 
rethought. It is important to note that I do not argue in favour of deterritorialisation per se. Indeed 
land, and the resources that it provides, are essential components of the exercise of self-
determination and a community’s right to define the cultural, political, and economic trajectory of 
social life. Instead I suggest that the notion of territory be widened to include non Euro-Western 
relationships with, and to the land so that the self-government aspirations of native communities 
can be better realised. 
This brings us to the second half of the thesis, which works towards developing an approach for 
how contemporary societies can counteract the divisive and subjugating tendencies of Occidental 
Legality and its production of territory.  I begin this section with a case study of the Tribal Areas 
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of Pakistan. This case study was selected for two reasons. First, it is the perfect example of how 
cultural spaces are socially constructed and how landscapes and topography play an important 
role in developing Other-identities. In essence, geography naturalises processes of 
dehumanisation by giving the appearance that it is the natural environment, rather than its 
people, that is shaping the identities on which discriminatory forms of regulation are being based. 
The case-study, as such, bridges the ideas expressed in Chapters Two and Three and its analysis 
clearly reveals both the cultural and political and legal dimensions of territory. 
While the first two chapters appear to be critical of liberal law, given that many of its doctrines 
and principles can be sourced to the Imperial-Indigenous encounters and the dispossession and 
oppression of native peoples, I still believe that liberal law has the potential to be emancipatory. 
And this is the second reason why I elected to discuss the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Since the 
Pakhtun people living within the Tribal Areas have been granted (what appears to be) absolute 
normative autonomy, these areas can be characterised as bearing an absence of liberal law. Yet, 
despite the fact that the Tribal Areas exemplify the conventional relationship between territory 
and sovereign jurisdiction, one would be hard-pressed to argue that Pakistan’s recognition of 
Pakhtun cultural autonomy has improved the day-to-day lived realities of the people that call this 
region of Pakistan ‘home’. Is the absence of liberal law, therefore, the answer we should be 
seeking in protecting normative diversity? 
Altman has suggested that the recognition of normative pluralism never entirely protects against 
the encroachment of liberal law.9 Similarly, Griffith has argued that since recognition of native 
culture and juridical autonomy must emanate from the State, such recognition already adopts the 
‘ideology of centralism’.10 Others have noted that the recognition of juridical autonomy is never 
absolute, and is almost always followed up by persistent intrusions of liberal law to determine the 
exact contours of the relationship between ‘official law’ and ‘custom’.11  Pakistan, by its decision to 
not extend its law or legal institutions to its Tribal Areas, may possibly represent the closest that 
any government has come to excluding liberal law from native (in this case, tribal) space. 
And yet, in Pakistan, this has failed to produce more inclusive forms of governance for those living 
in the tribal areas.  Instead, this right of autonomy has had the consequences of limiting the 
                                                             
9 For example, the rule of law principle effectively ensures that the State does not remain neutral in relation to other 
existing normative systems. See, Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1993).  
10 John Griffiths, "What Is Legal Pluralism?," Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law 24(1986). 
11 This is an argument that Kukathas makes, but claims that a more appropriate theory of diversity would compel 
liberal law to accept the possibility of normative plurality (in forms that liberal law may very well find offensive).  See, 
Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New York: 
New York University Press, 1997). 
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Pakhtun community’s enjoyment of their citizenship rights. Moreover, it is doubtful whether this 
is the type of pluralism which liberal societies are genuinely seeking – a compartmentalisation of 
numerous normative orders that are limited in their interactions with one another. The 
conditions within the Tribal Areas, therefore, strengthen my conviction that cultural recognition 
does not require the allocation of separate and divided territories within which to exercise 
sovereign governing potential. It does not necessitate the rejection of liberal law. What cultural 
recognition requires is that States affirm the political and legal parity of indigenous institutions 
and political ideologies, and allow them the possibility to employ those institutions and ideologies 
in negotiating more inclusive and just systems of governance.  
In concluding Chapter Four I discuss the possibility of a deterritorialised conception of culture, by 
which I mean a move away from attempting to locate and fix culture and cultural communities in 
place, space, and geography. While access to land has been a fundamental component of minority 
demands for self-government, my earlier analysis of Aboriginal literature reveals that these 
demands may have been misunderstood as appeals for exclusive jurisdiction and the 
unencumbered control over areas of the State’s territory. Instead, as the concluding sections of 
Chapter Three clearly demonstrates, what Aboriginal communities’ desire is not exclusive 
jurisdiction, but the opportunity to negotiate the use of land and the exercise of their relationship 
with the environment in ways that correspond with their own distinct normative institutions and 
worldviews. Yet, to be clear, these are not ways of being and knowing that are entirely insulated 
from the European liberal perspective that predominates in these societies. Rather, they are 
hybridised normative systems that assume aspects of Aboriginal tradition, but also draw heavily 
on European political ideology and legal principles. As such, liberal law’s focus on basing 
Aboriginal rights on the presence of some pure, pre-contact, culture is not only unfair, but 
unrealistic. Consequently, what I argue is needed is the recognition of this hybridity, and a 
genuine fostering of equal participation and negotiation between the State and native 
communities seeking autonomy, recognition, and accommodation. One way in which this 
interaction can be better organised is by building our legal and political institutions with 
alternative of space and geography visions in mind. This, I submit would go some ways towards 
finally deterritorialising culture and accepting the possibility of intercultural interaction and 
dialogue.  
Chapter Five sets out some initial ideas about how liberal law can counteract the effects of 
Occidental Legality by encouraging potential prospects for change and a respect for the 
complexities and dynamicity of human interaction, identity, and history. This concluding chapter 
is founded upon the view that Occidental Legality conceals or displaces what lies at the root of all 
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demands for cultural autonomy and political recognition, which is the idea of coeval recognition. I 
further develop the idea of coeval recognition which, on my terms, represents an 
acknowledgement of the dominant and minority groups’ active co-existence in space and time. I 
argue that Occidental Legality, with its preoccupation with situating, locating, and limiting social 
groups to discrete, discontinuous, and divided spaces gives the impression of a 
compartmentalised world in which semi-autonomous social groups co-exist but never intersect. 
This first impression, however, needs to be re-evaluated and I go on to argue that this re-
evaluation needs to be sensitive to the realities of the postcolonial world-order, characterised by 
conditions of hybridity, institutional overlap, and legal and political inter-exchanges between 
communities that have historically been defined in incommensurable terms. 
I draw on the pre-exisiting conceptions of recognition to advance my design of coeval recognition. 
In particular I make use of recent debates in the area of pluralistic constitutionalism12 and the 
incorporation of native and Aboriginal law into national legal systems,13 and provide some 
preliminary ideas about what a framework of minority protection framed through coeval 
recognition may look like. I develop this schema by, one again, referencing Aboriginal legal 
literature about the meaning and value of space and land to Aboriginal cultural practice and 
identity.14 In the process, I demonstrate how a modified conception of territory can continue to be 
a useful concept for the organisation of political and legal autonomy, but only as a supplement to 
the more deeper forms of communication and dialogue that need to take place between 
perceived-to-be different normative orders.  
3. Methodological Considerations 
In arguing that territory has important legal and political consequences for native communities, I 
draw on Foucault’s notion of discursive power to suggest that power is the product of an ability to 
produce, perpetuate and circulate a particular representation of reality as reality itself (a ‘truth’). 
The exercise of discursive power is underwritten by institutional structures (i.e. government, 
courts, the hospital), pre-existing bodies of knowledge (i.e. comprehensive doctrines, legal 
statutes, medical knowledge), and other less formal forms of social interaction (i.e. literary 
                                                             
12 J Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge Univ Pr, 1995). 
13 John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). 
14 While I often refer to these views as the ‘Aboriginal perspective’ I want to make clear, from the outset, that I am 
aware that ‘Aboriginality’ is not a monolithic concept. There is as much differentiation between Aboriginal 
communities, even in a territory as limited as Canada, as there is between, European communities. I employ such terms 
only for the sake of simplicity (in the same way that I refer to ‘European perspectives’). My analysis, however, attempts 
to uncover and draw attention to the perspectives of a number of different Aboriginal bands in making its more 
generalized statements.  
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sources), which collectively work to authenticate subjective experiences as objective facts. Thus, 
power is said to be dispersed in social and political networks and relations.15 
A. The Concept of ‘Territory’ 
Over the course of this thesis I demonstrate how territory is constructed – through social 
interactions, through a process of one’s imagination, and through the mapping of political and 
legal rules. Consequently, the analysis which I undertake through this thesis disrupts the 
enduring perception that territory is a natural and prepolitical background upon which social 
interactions take place. Furthermore, many of the claims advanced through this work also 
problematise the view that territory is both neutral and inclusive. People do not simply find 
themselves in territory; they are made to be in them. And, for this reason, I argue that territory 
represents an exercise of power that helps to, on the one hand, contain and define some, and on 
the other exclude certain other groups of people. Territory is, therefore, a method of classification. 
A bounded, owned, culturally-divisible construction of space emerges first within our 
imagination. We see the natural landscape and topography as giving rise to certain types of 
people and explaining certain forms of behaviour. At a most rudimentary level, untrammelled and 
undeveloped land appears to us as a symbol of inactivity. This is perhaps best showcased by the 
awe we express at the ‘pristine wilderness’ of national parklands. We understand groups that 
occupy these spaces as traditional, embodying cultures that continue to ‘live in the past’. 
Conversely, land that has been cultivated, developed, built upon, is viewed as land that is being 
appropriately exploited and fully utilised. Its occupants are imagined as technologically advanced, 
economically differentiated and, because of these advancements, forming organised, political 
societies.  Accordingly, to some extent, territory is an extension of our imagination.  
Territory is also a cultural enterprise.  How we perceive and experience the natural landscape is 
encoded through cultural practices like maps, travel narratives, art, and story-telling. These 
cultural artefacts provide explanations based on the observations being made, and convey moral 
judgements about people-in-land through stories, lines, colours, and dots. The mapping of 
territory through these sources relays information not only about those being observed, but also 
those doing the observing. Self- and Other-identities are forged through these narratives as 
people try to make sense of their place in the world around them, and attempt to articulate their 
relationship to the environment and its many resources.  
                                                             
15 Michel Foucault, "Powers and Strategies: An Interview with Michel Foucault by the Revoltes Logiques Collective," in 
Michel Foucault: Power, Truth, Strategy, ed. Meghan Morris and Paul Patton (Sydney: Feral Publications, 1979), p 55. 
Foucault also further discusses his power/knowledge dynamic in Archaeology of Knowledge, where he elaborates 
power as an artefact of the ability to organise knowledge as ‘truth claims’, the capacity to determine what lies within a 
particular discourse (ie. oeuvre). Also see, M. Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (Routledge, 2007). 
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Over time, however, our perceptions, experiences and representations of the land and our 
environment are further encoded through the forms of social and political organisation, and the 
legal rules that we, as a society, develop. These can be simple and localised. An example of this 
would be, the potlatch ceremonies used by Aboriginal communities in North America to resolve 
boundary-disputes by an invitation to negotiate through feast and the exchange of gifts.16 Or they 
can be more complex and geographically-dispersed, such as legal enactments under international 
law which delimit States’ maritime boundaries.  
Territory, in this sense, becomes an artefact of power. Our image of it is reproduced and 
preserved by the institutions, forms of organisation, and the rules that we produce to prevent that 
image from being eroded. One of the ways in which we safeguard our conception of our space is 
by enclosing it through the implementation of boundaries that are meant to keep undesirables 
(i.e. those that challenge our conception of space) out.  Sometimes these boundaries are not 
material but imagined.17 Another way in which our conceptions of our environment are protected 
is by enabling enforcement bodies, like the military which protect and preserve the boundaries of 
our space, or authorising State agents to reinforce our conception of space through political 
rhetoric which pivots on the idea that ‘our space’ is a sacrosanct and natural component of our 
sovereignty.   
Accordingly, we can say that territory is also an expression of jurisdiction, meaning that it 
provides us with a material representation of the legitimacy and limits of our political 
community’s power; the limits of our law’s expression, and the proximate location where our law 
and power ends and another political community’s begins. McVeigh and Dorset put forth an 
interesting dual conception of jurisdiction, arguing that in one sense jurisdiction can be 
understood precisely in the way that I described above, as “part of a rival metaphysics of law.”18 
Jurisdiction represents the ‘worlding’ of law, “encompassing the tasks of the authorisation of law, 
the production of legal meaning and the marking of what is capable of belonging to law.”19  On the 
other hand, they claim that jurisdiction represents the “exercise of a technology of law,”20 which 
produces a “relation to life, place, event, through processes of codification and marking.”21   
                                                             
16 John Borrows, Canada's Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2012), p 41. 
17 As in the case of national identity that is coterminous with the territorial borders of the State.  Our national identity 
keeps our territory, imaginatively, from being accessed by people like aliens, non-citizens, refugees.  
18 Shaun McVeigh, ed. Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction (Abingdon, Ox: Routledge-Cavendish,2007), p ix. 
19 Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, "Questions of Jurisdiction," in Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, ed. Shaun 
McVeigh (Abingdon, Ox: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), p 5. 
20 Shaun McVeigh, ed. Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction (Abingdon, Ox: Routledge-Cavendish,2007), p ix. 
21 Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh, "Questions of Jurisdiction," in Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, ed. Shaun 
McVeigh (Abingdon, Ox: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), p 5. 
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It is this second understanding of jurisdiction, jurisdiction as an exercise of a technology of law, 
that captures the essence of what this thesis has set out to illustrate. As an expression of 
jurisdiction, territory does not only make material the exercise of legal and political power, but it 
is also a composite of historical events, relationships, processes, and arrangements that have 
taken place through struggles for power between diverse normative communities that have found 
themselves in the same place, at the same time. In this sense, we can say that territory has 
emerged out of a community’s struggles for recognition against competing normative structures 
and institutions; recognition of, at different times, their humanity, their capacity for sovereign 
self-government, and their right to cultural autonomy.  
Territory, as we understand it today – as bounded, owned, and culturally-divisible - is one 
expression of how these conflicts have played out. Dorsett and McVeigh’s edited volume present 
numerous other expressions of jurisdiction. These range from Haldar’s view that the regulation of 
‘sublime’ pleasure legitimised the common law’s intrusion into its overseas colonies and made 
possible the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction,22 to Godden’s and Dorsett’s work, which 
analysed the expression of jurisdiction as it emerged through the regulation of bodily sexual 
desire23 and death.24 Societies exercise their power and give meaning to their law by expressing it 
through a number of different mediums Godden, Dorsett, and Haldar consider the ‘body’ as one 
such medium. This thesis, on the other hand, considers space in the form of land and geography as 
a second medium through which political and legal power is given meaning. 
While territory is conventionally conceptualised as a bounded area of land under the authority of 
a single governing entity (the State) and composed of a singular politico-cultural community (the 
nation),25 this thesis seeks to understand the micro-level processes through which this 
representation of space takes form. Territory is the product of multiple different forces at work – 
from literature, to art, to science, to law and politics. Relations of power inform each of these 
sources as they struggle to give land and environment meaning.  The subject of this thesis is to 
analyse some of these sources, and demonstrate how they inspire the political and legal making of 
territory and how this, in turn, shapes the expression of political and legal jurisdiction. The 
technologies of territoriality, which I discuss at great length in Chapter Two, provide the basis for 
jurisdiction by imagining, narrating, and providing visual documentation of territory. Territory, 
                                                             
22 Piyel Haldar, "Jurisdiction and the Colonisation of Sublime Enjoyment," in Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, ed. Shaun 
McVeigh and Shaunnagh Dorset (Abingdon, Ox: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
23 Lee Godden, "A Jurisdiction of Body and Desire: Exploring the Boundaries of Bodily Control in Prostitution Law," in 
Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, ed. Shaun McVeigh (Abingdon, Ox: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
24 Shaun McVeigh, "Subjects of Jurisdiction: The Dying, Northern Territory, Australia 1995-1997," in Jurisprudence of 
Jurisdiction, ed. Shaun McVeigh (Abingdon, Ox: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
25 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London: 
Verso, 2006). 
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therefore, emerges not as a natural and concrete setting that is simply ‘lying there’, but the 
product of a number of different technologies that aim to situate, locate, position, and fix 
jurisdictional authority.  
My analysis, throughout this thesis, reveals territory as a heterogeneous, multi-dimensional 
conceptual framework, which is produced through a variety of social, political, literary, and legal 
devices. I use the concept of territory as an optic through which to study the geographic 
dimensions of colonialism and the contemporary marginalisation of indigenous communities. At 
the same time, however, I portray territory as the product of Imperial-Indigenous struggles. This 
means that territory does have an ‘indigenous component’. While it may appear that I spend a 
good part of this thesis unravelling the ways in which European perceptions and experiences of 
their overseas colonies shaped the concept of territory, my aim is to highlight how territory is the 
product of contestation between normative communities seeking recognition. At the moment, a 
European structuring of our social and political environment -  the ways in which we envisage 
political and legal jurisdiction - is best expressed through the current concept of territory, but I 
argue that this can and may change. 
To this end, I also devote time and space to discussing Aboriginal and native conceptions of space 
and geography, and highlight the political conflicts that underlie these varied visions of space. I 
dispute the argument that territory is produced through coherent and unidirectional exercises of 
power (the ‘West’ defining and narrating the ‘East’), and refer to how territory has the potential to 
be both a mechanism of regulation, but also a vehicle for empowerment and emancipation.26 This 
is because, as a particular representation of space and people, dominant perspectives are open to 
multiple, and often contesting alternative representations of space and identity (counter-
exercises of power).27 As a result, the penultimate chapter of my thesis uses this discussion of 
dominant and minority conceptions of space to theorise a potential solution to contemporary 
struggles for recognition. In this chapter I suggest that we may overcome the divisive tendencies 
of territory by adopting the idea of coeval recognition. 
i. Place, Space, Geography and Territory 
Over the course of this thesis I use space, geographic space, and geographies to mean very 
different things than territory. Space signifies the material openness of our environment, an 
                                                             
26 See, for example, my discussion of recognition and Aboriginal title jurisprudence in Chapter Three. 
27 Felix Driver, "Power, Space and the Body: A Critical Assessment of Foucault's Discipline and Punish," Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 3(1985). Thus, when we speak of the production of knowledge being a technology of 
power, there is (and should always be) the possibility of a counter-production, a reality that contradicts and defies that 
production; for power cannot be exercised in the representation of something objectively real, but only through 
attempts to distort reality. 
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environment unmapped and bearing no symbols of social meaning. On the other hand, geographic 
space represents the environment understood as part of the terrestrial world, as Cartesian space. 
It is an environment that is understood as being ‘located’ through the application of symbols of 
latitude and longitude, directionality (e.g. north, south), through notions of contiguity and 
distance, and imagined in relation to other parts of the terrestrial world (e.g. ‘landlocked’, 
‘bordering the sea’). Geographies, on the other hand, are ‘mapped’ spaces, spaces that have been 
saturated with meaning through their incorporation into a variety of political/legal/cultural 
discourses.  
Territory, therefore, is a very specific expression of geography. It is composed of the natural 
physical features of environment – land, topographic formations, and natural resources – but it is 
also a political and legal concept and a jurisdictional exercise imbued with symbolic and cultural 
meaning. When I speak of ‘territory’, therefore, I consider the ways in which societies have 
imagined it and drafted it. I explore the methods by which societies have ‘exercised territory’ in 
Chapters Two and Three, when I investigate colonial of markers of ownership and postcolonial 
attempts to construct and enforce specific boundaries. And, conversely, I also look at the inverse 
relationship in Chapter Four, how space and geography have been used to legitimate the exercise 
of political and legal power. 
The thesis also draws attention to other geographies that are modelled on ‘territory’, such as the 
Reservation and the protected areas of national parks. These are modelled on similar ideas about 
social interaction and organisation because they represent geographies that have been ‘claimed’ 
through various markers of possession and ownership and through occupation and settlement. 
These are geographies that are thoroughly mapped through the use of boundaries and enclosures 
which are meant to regulate outside access to the claimed space, and often these claims of 
ownership are projected by material and immaterial means (e.g. border-control checkpoints and 
cartography).  
In my analysis, I further reveal that the moment when the political and legal manifestations of 
territory appear most powerful, is the precise moment in which their discursive power is 
weakest.  For example, in Chapter Four I discuss how Pakistan has accorded its Pakhtun 
community a unique right of territorial autonomy. This is in the hope that a degree of autonomy 
will subdue their demands for secession and thus allow the State to maintain its territorial 
integrity. The Pakhtun’s people’s right to uninterrupted cultural practice has been granted subject 
to conditions that the Pakhtuns of the Tribal Areas have no access to domestic courts. As courts 
have been identified (in Chapter Three) as one of the primary modalities through which 
territorial visions of space are reproduced, the inability of the Pakhtuns to engage with the State 
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using the domestic court system threatens the discursive power of territory by foreclosing 
opportunities for negotiating a shared vision of space through which to determine important 
questions about the political and legal authority of both normative communities. In the absence of 
courts as a setting for dialogue and mutual-decision-making about the contours and details of 
territory, its ordering of social relations remains extremely fragile. 
B. Imagined Geographies 
The power of spatial representations as distortions of reality is perhaps best illustrated through 
Said’s work on Orientalism. Said’s reading of the imagined geographies of the Occident and 
Orient28 has served as the basis for countless other cultural studies of discursive power. 
Examining English and French literature and drawing on Foucault’s power/knowledge dynamic,29 
Said develops the argument that Orientalism, and the identities and mentalities mapped on to it, 
is a cultural project initiated by the West in order to categorise, classify, and contain the East.  In 
so doing, he argues, the project of Orientalism reveals to us much more about the preoccupations 
and anxieties of the Occident, than it does about the identity and personalities of the Orient. 
A reading of Said’s work reveals two interesting insights. One, as Wigen and Lewis note, is the 
absence of a geographic critique.30  The second is a need to integrate law and legal 
representations of alterity and difference in his analysis of the process of Orientalism. A study of 
the geographic dimensions of Orientalism is important for several reasons. For one, it is the 
compression of geographic distance, brought about by technological advancements in overseas 
travel that made societies more cognisant of social difference, including the presence of different 
cultural, linguistic, and religious practices. It was this European intrusion into foreign places and 
communities that put in motion the processes of Orientalism. What is more, the tendency to 
culturally differentiate and to inferiorise became necessary in order to legitimise these relations 
of property, spatial possession and ownership, and how this literal ‘taking’ of space led to the 
displacement of occupying people and the resettlement of emigrating populations. Thus, to leave 
the geographic element unexplored fails to draw the necessary attention to how relationships 
were cultivated or limited through the notion of property and ownership. Specifically, it leaves 
unchallenged the idea that space can be apportioned and possessed, and continues to uphold the 
                                                             
28 Edward Said, Orientalism, vol. 1 (London: Vintage Books, 1988). 
29 Through which Foucault argues that control over the ordering and organisation of knowledge about an object is to 
exercise power over that object. See, Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, ed. 
Colin Gordon (New York: Random House, 1980), p 109-34. Also see, ———, "'The Order of Discourse'," in Untrying the 
Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge, 1981). 
30 See, Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critical Metageography (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1997), p 47-9. Wigen and Lewis claim that this can partially be attributed to Said’s background as a 
literary theorist, and also to the fact that perhaps he never meant for the Orient and Occident to be defined as 
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view that this division of our environment is natural. This, as I more clearly explain in Chapter 
Three, is certainly not the only way in which communities envisage and imagine their land and 
environment.  This thesis draws on Said’s methodology of literary analysis (see Chapter Two) to 
appraise structures of legal and political governance, but it also supplements this analysis through 
a focus on geography and on the relationship between legal representation and the process of 
creating an inferior non-Western Other. 
Said’s analysis also sometimes reduces the complexities of the colonial encounters to a relation 
structured by European domination and non-European oppression.31 In analysing the spatial 
simultaneity of the Orient/Occident, as I do in Chapter Four with my case study of Pakistan, it is 
possible to draw out the interconnections between the Orient and Occident. This approach also 
becomes essential for arguing the possibility of hybridity and drawing further attention to how 
the Orient and Occident may be aspects of one another.  The Orient, is no longer something over 
there. Our postcolonial and multicultural world has made it so that both the East and West 
comingle within the same political space, often producing subjects characterised by hybridity.32 
At the same time, however, the co-presence of the East and West in the same location has given 
rise to new tendencies to temporalise cultural difference, and to imagine areas of space as being 
stuck in time. This may, perhaps, represent modes of overcoming the dislocation of the self/Other 
binary through which societies develop their self-identities. And thus a geographic analysis of 
Orientalism reveals new tendencies of difference-making, new discursive strategies for exercising 
power and control in the present and despite the new paradigm of a liberal politics of equal 
minority rights. As I demonstrate in both Chapter Three and Four, this has had some very 
interesting consequences for how States imagine and protect their minority communities. 
                                                             
31 He notes, “in quite a constant way, Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority 
[European superiority over Oriental backwardness], which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible 
relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand.” Edward Said, Orientalism, vol. 1 
(London: Vintage Books, 1988), p 7-8. 
32 Bhabha and Young’s work develops the notion of hybridity, as a dislocation of identity, the possession of ‘self/Other’ 
tendencies that disrupt our unified and coherent conceptions of self-identity. In particular the notion of hybridity 
becomes pronounced within postcolonial discourse, through examinations that reveal the ambiguities between the 
colsoniser/colonised binaries through which we understand the colonial experience. See, Robert J.C. Young, Colonial 
Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race (London: Routledge, 1995). Also see, Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: 
The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," October 28(1984). Bhabha’s theory of liminality – which proposes a shift away 
from essentialising and reifying identity - can be described as a new way of thinking about identities and social 
transformation that moves beyond what we currently understand as a series of separate and compartmentalised ‘posts’ 
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– one that stretches from primitivity to progress – and rejects approaches that separate theory from practice. ———, 
The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). practice, and undertakes a more holistic investigation of cultural 
and national identity-formation. See, ———, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). To some extent we 
can also find evidence of hybrid identities in Fanon’s work, particular when he discusses the native’s desire and longing 
to be recognised as a ‘White man’, suggesting the colonial subject’s contempt for the culture which writes him off as 
inferior, simultaneously with an envy that underwrites his desire for inclusion. See, F. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 
(Pluto Press, 1986). 
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This thesis also focuses on the way in which, not only the processes that Said discusses in 
Orientalism,33 but also the legal narratives that I discuss in Chapter Three and Four, are important 
representations of identity and history. In this way, the thesis contributes to our understanding of 
the role of law in reproducing the Oriental/Occidental characterisation of culture and cultural 
difference.  
Piyel Haldar’s Law, Orientalism and Postcolonialism compensates for some of the gaps in Said’s 
analysis of law and legal representation as part of the process of Orientalism. In this book Haldar 
discusses the shaping of legal subjectivity through the regulation of pleasure, particularly 
trangressive expressions of pleasure (i.e. where the Orient or East ‘becomes the scene of 
excess’).34  Like Said, Haldar undertakes a literary analysis of European travel documents and 
journals to reveal how the experiences of the colonial encounter resonate within contemporary 
definitions of legal subjectivity.  Through this analysis Haldar problematizes the process through 
which law makes claims to universal validity, suggesting that the urge to do so emerges only in 
those instances when “Occidental legal cultures seek to assimilate those who are initially outside 
its jurisdictional reach.”35 Accordingly, Haldar reveals the colonising tendencies of a particularist 
law which projects itself as universal. At the same time, Haldar draws attention to how these 
places of excess were also a cause for European marvel, and how this realisation of envy disrupts 
European notions of subjectivity by bringing into sharper focus the potential for hybridity. These 
‘crises in identity’, an awareness of the tension between European desire and disdain for 
excessive enjoyment is rectified through the temporal dislocation of the civilised subject, as a 
‘modern’ subject in which this urge for excess is tempered through the rule of law.36  Haldar, 
therefore, develops a detailed and persuasive narrative of the complexities of the colonial 
encounter and reveals to us how these subjugating discourses are reproduced through the 
language of law. 
C. Critical Legal Enterprise 
In discussing how law encodes and further circulates subjective experiences and partial 
perspectives this thesis also unsettles the legal categories that emerge through this encoding of 
space and the emergence of territory. Like Haldar I also question how the legal categories of 
identity and culture have the effect of privileging certain ideologies, perspectives, and interests 
                                                             
33 Said broadly examines a range of “intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, and cultural energies” that operate to construct 
the Orient. Specifically he studies the Orient as produced through European anthropological and historical accounts, 
sociological studies, and literary narratives.  See, Edward Said, Orientalism, vol. 1 (London: Vintage Books, 1988), p 9-
28. 
34 P. Haldar, Law, Orientalism and Postcolonialism: The Jurisdiction of the Lotus Eaters (London: Routledge Cavendish, 
2007). 
35 Ibid., p ix. 
36 Ibid., p 127-50. 
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and how liberal law has the tendency to operate simultaneously as a vehicle of emancipation (for 
some groups) while also existing as a form of regulation for others (see Chapter Five).37  
Thus, the current thesis also draws inspiration from the critical legal enterprise, rooted firmly in 
poststructuralist thinking. Claiming that critical scholarship typically steers away from entangling 
itself in “unwarranted claims to truth and correspondence to reality,”38 Hunt describes the critical 
project as questioning the value and underpinning interests of theories about social institutions 
and processes, including law. Critical legal theory concerns itself with highlighting the ways in 
which the law and dominant legal discourse work to oppress mainstream society by reinforcing 
the ideologies and structures that maintain the authority of those in positions of power.  
Drawing on a number of disciplinary perspectives, i.e. sociology, literature, geography, and using 
(amongst others) political, ethical, and epistemological analysis, critical legal theorists are able to 
capture uneasiness with, and resistance to, the state of legal scholarship and practice. Thus, much 
of the work of critical legal theorists is focused on unsettling the often impartial and universal 
claims of law, emphasising the ways in which the law and legal categories work to reproduce the 
subjugation and domination of less powerful groups, and to authenticate certain representations 
of identity and history. Many of the most vocal advocates of critical legal theory write broadly 
within the discourse of postcolonial theory,39 feminist critiques of the law,40 legal geography,41 or 
the sociology of law.42 Much of this literature uncovers the ways in which law reproduces 
inequalities of race, culture, and gender by shaping notions of subjectivity,43 and often reveal law 
to be a cultural process shaped by economic, social, and political forces operating within 
contemporary societies. The critical paradigm becomes useful for my analysis because this thesis 
frequently draws attention to the unstable character of categories in both law and geography 
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39 P. Haldar, Law, Orientalism and Postcolonialism: The Jurisdiction of the Lotus Eaters (London: Routledge Cavendish, 
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40 Boaventura de Sousa  Santos, "Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law," Journal of Law 
and Society 14, no. 3 (1987).  Anne McClintock, "The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term 'Post-Colonialism'," Social 
Text 31/32(1992). 
41 Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, and Richard T. Ford, eds., The Legal Geographies Reader (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing,2001). Also see, David Delaney, The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-Making (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2010). Also see, Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, and Anne Griffiths, eds., 
Spatialising Law: An Anthropological Geography of Law in Society (Surrey, UK: Ashgate,2009). Also see, Sherene Razack, 
ed. Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the Lines,2002). 
42 Eugen Ehrlich and Nathan Isaacs, "The Sociology of Law," Harvard Law Review 36, no. 2 (1922). Also see, Franz von 
Benda-Beckmann, "Who's Afraid of Legal Pluralism," J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 47(2002). 
43 P. Haldar, Law, Orientalism and Postcolonialism: The Jurisdiction of the Lotus Eaters (London: Routledge Cavendish, 
2007). Also see, Brenna Bhandar, "Plasticity and Post-Colonial Recognition: 'Owning, Knowing, and Being'," Law Critique 
22(2011). 
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which are assumed to be coherent and stable. For example, my analysis in Chapter Three 
questions the legal definition of culture, subjectivity, and identity and compares it to how people 
self-perceive to reveal inherent inconsistencies. Similarly, in Chapters Two and Four, I question to 
what extent topography and climate are constant descriptors of reality, and suggest that they may 
be malleable categories that can be manipulated to reveal or conceal different human 
relationships. Since the thesis proceeds from the premise that space is political, and that it is a 
social construct, many of the critiques that I employ draw inspiration from the critical project and 
its scepticism of permanent and ‘scientific’ categories of social difference.  
D. The Use of ‘Postcolonial’ 
The term ‘postcolonial’ is contentious, and is typically employed in two different ways. The first is 
that it describes the end of a historical set of relationships that led to the exploitation and 
dispossession of native groups encountered during the European commercial expansion into non-
European lands.44 ‘Postcolonialism’, from this perspective, is about analysing how these native 
communities are coming to terms with their histories of marginalisation and its longstanding 
effects on political, economic, and social life during the process of decolonisation. In this sense, 
‘postcolonialism’ is used interchangeably with ‘imperialism’, signifying the military and economic 
might of European empires. Childs and Williams write that, in understanding the postcolonial 
condition from this perspective, the question then becomes ‘whose colonialism’ are we referring 
to? Are we to adopt a Euro-centric view, in which we analyse the discontinuation of 
English/French/Spanish/Portuguese/Dutch Imperialism? Or, do we go back even further to Incan 
and Ottoman conquests, which relied on similar conceptual frameworks?45  Childs and Williams’ 
query brings to the forefront the reality that the colonial mentality was never unique to Europe, 
and that for many centuries before European colonialism, Empires have attempted to acquire 
resources and implement their forms governance through violently suppressing groups that they 
perceived as being an impediment to these desires.   
Second, ‘postcolonal’ refers to a contemporary intellectual movement that has grown out of the 
colonial encounter, and by which we assess the cultural, political, and economic ideologies and 
institutions that now regulate, discipline, and shape our world.  In recognition that colonialism led 
to the decimation of indigenous histories and knowledges, postcolonial theorists are intent on 
exposing how colonial modes of seeing and patterns of understanding continue to inform 
contemporary political, legal, and social discourse. For instance, authors such as Said believe that 
the ‘West’ continues to exercise intellectual and discursive power over the ‘East’ by constructing 
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45 Ibid., p 1-2. 
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and circulating an ‘Oriental’ identity which stands in stark contrast to Euro-Western self-
perceptions.46 From Said’s work we are able to draw out the significance of cultural knowledge 
and representation to the exercise of colonial power. Being able to speak for the native has 
profoundly enhanced the West’s ability to control the native in ways that are more enduring and 
less visible than the exercise of political and/or military power. 
Postcolonial studies is grounded in the view that colonialism was not simply a political project to 
extend European power across oceans in the form of territorial and political expansion. It was 
also a cultural project that aimed to recreate non-European societies in the mould of Europe.47 
Often this took the form of subjecting native populations to widespread physical violence. 
Sometimes it was expressed via the destruction of native culture through calculated policies of 
acculturation through European-styled education,48 religious conversion,49 and a displacement of 
native forms of dispute resolution and institutions of governance in favour of European ones.50 
The use of colonialism as simply a descriptor of European overseas travel and settlement, 
therefore, diminishes the tragedies of the encounter; it entirely effaces the acts of conquest and 
domination that were essential components of this encounter.51 But, it also conceals from us the 
significance of colonialism as an event marked by knowledge transmission, ideological 
domination, and institutional transplantation. 
To, therefore, use the term ‘postcolonial’ as a descriptor for the discontinuance of European 
Imperialism falls short of taking into account the enduring consequences of this expansion, some 
of which include the economic and political depression of indigenous communities through the 
widespread dispossession and appropriation of indigenous land;52 the longstanding social 
problems brought about through the devastation of indigenous forms of political and legal 
ordering;53 and feelings of social alienation and non-belonging perpetuated by the subjection of 
indigenous groups to alien forms of social and political organisation and education, and the 
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inferiorisation of their cultural institutions and identities.54 Equally important, and perhaps less 
visible, is the ways in which colonial knowledge has become embedded within the politico-legal 
structures which shape postcolonial life. Colonialism has produced groups of indigenous people 
with fractured identities; identities that have been partly shaped by their self-perception, but also 
by colonial signification. For many of these people these fractured identities have left them feeling 
out of place in settled communities, while also inspiring a sense of detachment from their own 
cultural groups.55  
Conversely, however, the term ‘postcolonialism’ has also been described as an empowering 
discourse. It can suggest a more nuanced and pluralistic way of thinking about the world that 
encompasses the events and effects of imperialism and decolonisation. The ‘post’ of 
postcolonialism has been described as signifying a ‘disorder’, an intellectual denunciation of the 
colonial project and a joint “investment in a politics of anti-colonialism.”56 From this perspective 
‘postcolonialism’ describes the continued “contestation of colonial dominance and the legacies of 
colonialism.”57 It can represent new ways of thinking about the self that takes into account and 
continuously challenges singular (or singularising) colonial representations of gender, culture, 
race, and ethnicity,58 to embrace oneself as a unique hybrid of cultural interaction and 
miscegenation.59 Postcolonial thinking, therefore, can and often does reflect a dynamic mosaic of a 
“related set of perspectives, which are juxtaposed against one another, on occasion 
contradictory.”60 During argues that postmodernism is the intellectual enterprise through which 
the postcolonial condition is challenged. He describes it “as that thought which refuses to turn the 
Other into the Same. Thus [providing] a theoretical space for what postmodernity denies: 
otherness.”61  And yet, there is also the critique that the postcolonial condition heavily 
circumscribes the Other’s speech so that the subaltern is never genuinely able to speak using his 
own language and modes of signification.62 
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It is in this vein that I employ the term ‘postcolonial’. Rather than signifying the temporal 
aftermath of colonialism, postcoloniality should be perceived as an autonomous reality of its own 
that is partially contingent on the consequences of the colonial encounter, but uniquely different 
from it as well. To see the postcolonial as merely an extension of colonialism, or to see it as a 
rupture or break from colonialism, is to devalue non-European and indigenous contributions to 
the era of both coloniality and postcolonality. This, I argue, diminishes the analytical potential of 
postcolonial thinking. At the same time, however, we must understand that the postcolonial 
condition is also marked by ways of trammelling subaltern subjectivity and expression. The 
subaltern’s voice is continuously tempered by forcing the Other to express his/her sense of self 
through the language, knowledge, and institutions of colonialism. The transfer of European 
knowledge and culture is a legacy of the colonial encounter that continues to have significant 
influence over how the postcolonial subject is able to represent and express himself.  
Consequently, I employ ‘postcolonial’ as a way of drawing attention to conditions of cultural and 
intellectual intermixing, a situation characterised by deep ambivalence.  The postcolonial 
condition is marked by the presence of identities that can no longer be easily differentiated along 
the coloniser/colonised dichotomy. It represents a reality that is equally shaped by subaltern 
challenges to enduring European political and legal discourses, as it is by subaltern desires to be 
recognised as possessing a moral status equal to that of their once-colonisers. As Fanon argues, a 
lasting effect of colonialism is an eternal longing of the Black man to be recognised as White.63 
As a result, in adopting terminology like ‘postcolonial law’ and ‘postcolonial legal and political 
structures’, I use the term to describe political life and legal systems constructed through 
moments of contestation between dominant European frameworks of law and legality and their 
indigenous counterparts. Postcolonial law is characterised by deep hybridity, a hybridity that this 
thesis argues, contemporary governments seem to downplay, and liberal law seems to discount. 
Accordingly, one of the aims of this thesis is to reveal this interrelationship, and to develop better 
methods by which they can coexist equally rather than hierarchically. Over this course of analysis, 
‘postcolonialism’ is therefore understood as a stage in history characterised by the disruption of 
previously accepted categories of culture, race, and ethnicity, and signifies the production of legal, 
political, and social systems that borrow heavily (though not always equally) from both European 
and non-European sources. 
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i. Contributions to Postcolonial Thinking 
The current thesis contributes to the pre-existing literature on postcolonial theory by drawing 
attention to the geographical and spatial dimensions of colonialism. Consequently, this work lies 
at the interface of cultural geography and postcolonial studies. It aims to provide insight into how 
the colonial encounters were structured by particular conceptions of the world as an open space, 
awaiting European arrival and inviting European possession. This view that foreign lands were, 
essentially, ‘for the taking’ immensely influenced how European peoples understood their 
relationship to indigenous peoples and, ultimately, how that relationship was reflected through 
European cultural narratives. In this thesis I evaluate several of these narratives in the form of 
cartography, ethnography, and travel writing. According to these accounts, the European 
appropriation of native lands was legitimate given the former’s higher level of civilisation. This 
level of development was evidenced by pointing to the presence of relatively comprehensive and 
advanced legal and political arrangements and institutions.64 These accounts, therefore, 
reproduced foreign lands and peoples according to a very distinct, and not always inclusive, 
ordering of colonial space, which structured native-European relations in such a way so as to 
continuously deprive native peoples of voice and capacity for self-rule. 
A symptom of the postcolonial condition is the questioning of colonial classifications and 
mappings of foreign lands and people, and the rethinking of legal and political principles that have 
been based on these colonial geographies. Sidaway writes that the “impulse within postcolonial 
approaches [is] to invert, expose, transcend, or deconstruct knowledges and practices associated 
with colonialism.”65 He aptly notes that: 
Any postcolonial geography ‘must realise within itself its own impossibility’, given that 
geography is inescapably marked (both philosophically and institutionally by its location and 
development as a western-colonial science. It may be the case that western geography bares 
the traces of other knowledge...but the convoluted course of geography, its norms, definitions 
and closure (inclusions and exclusions) and structure cannot be dissociated from certain 
European philosophical concepts of presence, order and intelligibility.66  
It is this relationship between the geographic dimensions of colonialism and the contemporary 
presence of postcolonial cultural geographies that this thesis sets out to critically assess.  Some of 
the cultural geographies that it considers is the Aboriginal Reservation and the Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan. I examine how these geographies have been produced through colonial conceptions of 
space and social relations. In so doing, this work questions the value and significance these 
geographies have for the protection of cultural pluralism and social diversity. At the same time, 
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this thesis contributes to the field of postcolonial studies by drawing attention to the political 
nature of geographic knowledge, and highlighting the ways in which colonial representations of 
space continue to have significance for the way in which contemporary societies imagine and 
operationalise native-State relations.  
E. Situating the Current Research 
This thesis uses a methodological approach similar to those of Said and Haldar, using literary 
analysis to develop a narrative through which to critique contemporary legal practice and 
discourse. Like Haldar I develop the idea of law as a narrative that reflects colonial conceptions of 
native identity, history, and subjectivity.  However, rather than highlighting pleasure (and its 
regulation) as a site of Occidental power, I argue that Occidental power is also exercised through 
representations of landscape, climate, and topography, all of which have the effect of naturalising 
ideas about native cultural and racial inferiority. This is perhaps most powerfully discussed in 
Chapter Four, where colonial conceptions of Pakhtun identity, developed by reference to their 
turbulent and challenging landscape, are later used to legitimise the postcolonial State’s 
unwillingness to extend its law to the Tribal Areas. 
Through this thesis I analyse how imagined geographies, modelled on fantasies about and 
anxieties related to the unfamiliarity of space, are incorporated into and authenticated through 
political and legal discourse. I go on to say that, through this process, these imagined geographies 
begin to have very important consequences for how contemporary societies understand and 
manage social pluralism. Equally importantly, these geographies also influence how dominant 
groups in society come to understand their relationship with the Other through the invocation of 
binaries such as civilised/savage and modern/traditional.  In particular, I examine the 
geographies of the Reservation and the protected areas of public parks. The Reservation often 
work to reproduce the myth of State sovereignty by, for example, giving the impression that the 
land outside of the boundaries of the Reserve or to which there is no underlying native title, were 
essentially terra nullius and open to the colonial State’s claims of possession.  The space 
incorporated into the Reserve is imagined as locked in time, a space filled with the traditional and 
archaic practices of a community uninterested in modernisation.  
Similarly, in my discussion of the imagined geographies of national parkland I reveal how spaces 
inhabited by native communities are imagined as pristine wilderness in need of State protection. 
These zones are neutralised of all human content, and are naturalised as spaces simply ‘lying 
there’.  The value of these pristine areas (for contemporary society) emanates from the fact that 
they have not been ‘tainted’ by human inhabitation and contact, and so they must be protected for 
common enjoyment.  The irony of this discourse lies in the fact that this very concept of the 
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protected areas is, itself, a politics of exclusion, ‘tainting’ the environment by working to empty 
this area of its native residents. Through an analysis of these narratives, it becomes clearer that 
the politics of territory play a crucial role in excluding and othering populations. 
Chapter Two, Three and Four, therefore, draw attention to the intimate connection between law 
and the social imaginary. While revealing the emergence of European law in the colony as having 
the specific aim of rendering settler life more predictable, my analysis demonstrates how this was 
achieved by controlling the alterity and unfamiliarity of the landscape and its occupying 
normative structures through discursive reinterpretation. This process of control and power took 
place through a number of techniques of Occidental Legality:  first, through the techniques of 
Imperial witnessing and later through structures of governance and legal narratives. In both 
instances the colonial gaze has the tendency to distort not only the natural environment, but also 
the relationships that are imagined and operationalised within in. For example, I reveal through 
my analysis of the aesthetics of map-making how the settler/native relationship is understood as 
one of European benevolence and as an extension of its desire to bring ‘civilisation’ to the savage 
natives (see Chapter Two). The implementation of European legal and political structures within 
the colony helped to temper the anxieties that the strangeness of the new environment brought 
and, in many cases, helped to legitimise the questionable treatment of native peoples (see my 
discussion of Vitoria’s notion of jus gentium). 
In Chapter Five I move beyond critique to offer some initial suggestions for future reflection on 
how contemporary societies can move away from the oppressive tendencies of Occidental 
Legality and secure better conditions for more inclusive forms of pluralism. One of the 
fundamental criticisms of poststructuralist critique is that it often deconstructs prevailing 
theories, categories of analysis, and systems of thought without developing something in its place. 
For some authors, poststructuralist critiques like the one undertaken by Said often reproduce 
their own essentialised categories of identity and univocal histories (albeit from a reverse, 
minority perspective, rather than the traditional dominant view).67 To some degree then, these 
critical perspectives offer little optimism for a world believed to be structured through exercises 
of realpolitik. Going back to the quote from Low at the beginning of this thesis, which relays how 
evidence of the falsity of one’s convictions does not immediately erase the psychic investments 
which inform those beliefs, I acknowledge that pointing to territory as an imagined geography, 
underwritten by perceptions of racial inferiority, cultural difference, and European cultural 
dominance, does not automatically displace the value that territory has for enabling the exercise 
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of political, economic, and social power for minority communities. I recognise that the discourse 
of territory has become essential to demands for recognition of autonomy and rights of self-
determination. 
Thus, while the first three chapters of the thesis reveal territory as a spatial form that has the 
effect of excluding social groups while continuing to masquerade as space that simply ‘lies there’, 
my aim is not solely to expose territory as an imagined construct. While that is certainly 
important, it is a task that has already been powerfully undertaken by a number of influential 
theorists, adopting a variety of different methods.68  The aim of this thesis is two-fold. First, I 
demonstrate how territory is inspired by the timeless anxieties about racial and cultural 
difference, hybridity, and the proximity of racialised bodies to one’s own. In so doing this thesis 
disrupts and complicates many of the claims of a postcolonial liberal democratic society, 
structured through the discourse of political inclusion and respect for diversity, while continuing 
to hold on to the possessed and culturally-divisible view of space as sacred and fundamental to 
the exercise of power. In my thesis, I bring to light the many ways in which territory, as a political 
and legal construct and an intellectual architecture, problematises the aims of ‘post’-colonial 
States, intent on protecting pluralism, while also needing to safeguard their own claims to 
sovereignty and legitimate political authority.  
But this thesis also acknowledges that territory is a hegemonic discourse that is structured 
through law and politics to shape the way in which contemporary societies define and understand 
their relationships with one another. As a hegemonic discourse the notion of territory, despite its 
problematic and partial roots, is a discourse that is often mobilised and brought into existence by 
the Other, the subaltern who has traditionally been the subject of Occidental Legality’s oppressive 
processes. Territory is a powerful discourse of self- and Other-making that is so firmly rooted in 
how our world is organised that it becomes virtually impossible to ‘unthink’ it. For authors like 
Elden, territory must be ‘thought historically’.  From this perspective, the aim of critical discourse 
should be to reject ways of trying to undo territory. Instead, as Elden argues, we should undertake 
a reconsideration of the ways in which territory is created and reproduced, and understand the 
                                                             
68 Storey, Blomley, Delaney, and Agnew to name only a select few. David Storey, Territories: The Claiming of Space (New 
York: Routledge, 2012). Also see, Nicholas Blomley, Law, Space, and the Geographies of Power (London: Guildford Press, 
1994). Also see, John Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory," 
Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994). Also see, David Delaney, "The Space That Race Makes," The 
professional geographer 54, no. 1 (2002). 
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reasons why “when we accept the territorial trap...[we] buy into a state-centred narrative that 
naturalises and normalises this way of thinking.”69 
Consequently, the last part of thesis discusses steps that contemporary societies can take to 
address the consequences of Occidental Legality.  I introduce ‘coeval recognition’ as one 
constructive idea that can be a foundation for native demands for autonomy.  While building on 
the existing theories of recognition put forth by authors like Charles Taylor and James Tully, 
coeval recognition better acknowledges the fluidity and dynamicity of human identities. In 
developing this model of recognition, I suggest three ways in which coeval recognition can be 
operationalised so as to account for the ambiguities within and overlaps between the identities of 
two encountering communities. Coeval recognition requires an acceptance of the fact that 
minority communities exist on the same land at the same time, and thus have equal moral claims 
to self-government and legal autonomy. Territory, I argue helps to conceal this crucial appeal by 
giving us the impression that legal autonomy requires spatial differentiation (i.e. two laws cannot 
govern the same space). It is this linking of territory and autonomy which has, I believe, 
foreclosed many opportunities for negotiation and compromise between the State and native 
communities. 
It is for this reason that a politics of inclusion needs to move beyond the current arguments for 
‘recognition’, ‘equality’, and ‘multiculturalism’, much of which adopt a territorial vision of space 
and social relations, towards an acknowledgement of coeval recognition. Some of the ways in 
which coeval recognition can be achieved include reducing limitations on the movement of the 
native body, because it is precisely the immobilisation of the native body, its fixing in space and 
time, which has been the primary objective of the processes of Occidental Legality since the first 
Imperial-Indigenous encounters. Instead, I argue that more inclusive forms of governance would 
restructure legal and political forms of governance through a respect and recognition of hybridity 
and the pursuit of self-reflective intercultural dialogue.  
The narratives I set out and discuss in this thesis are not a complete and infallible account of 
imperial witnessing. Instead, this thesis is a very specific analysis of the colonial experience that 
draws out its implications for how contemporary societies and liberal law manage the presence of 
social pluralism today. In so doing, this investigation may generate further questions and lines of 
                                                             
69 Stuart Elden, "Thinking Territory Historically," Geopolitics 15(2010): p 757.  Here Elden is referring to Agnew’s 
article about the presumptions underlying interrelations theory and our conventional understanding of the modern-
nation State as rooted in ‘territorial’ relationships. Agnew highlights how three misconceptions that underpin this view: 
(1) that the nation-State is a clearly demarcated territorial unit; (2) that there is a clear distinction between domestic 
and foreign politics; and (3) that the borders of the State coincide with the border of the society that inhabits it. See, 
John Agnew, "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory," Review of 
International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994). 
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enquiry about the work and value of territory, the spatialisation of social difference, and the 
relationship between territory and power. These additional questions and lines of enquiry need 
to be examined because they reveal relationships and interactions that have, for much too long, 
been concealed from us.  
My inclusion of historical methods and sources is important to understanding the present 
because I draw attention to the parallels between the social and political realities of the ‘here and 
now’ and the colonial past.  This process is important because it allows us to understand the 
continuing significance of colonialism in the present, as well as encouraging a much needed re-
evaluation of what are often assumed to be ‘progressive’ contemporary political and legal 
institutions and solutions to encounters between the Orient and Occident in the present (i.e. the 
challenge of Aboriginal rights and multiculturalism). The continuing significance of ensuring 
justice for native communities, as well as the continued prominence of diversity models of 
recognition and autonomy, means that these remain urgent and important questions. The colonial 
encounters of the past, which continue to influence political structures and legal institutions, as 
well as legal concepts, representations, and modes of reasoning, have significant influence on 
Indigenous politics and the regulation of diversity. Occidental Legality and colonialism can no 
longer be thought of as something that happened ‘over there’ and ‘back then’, with no relevance 
for the present. The effects of the Imperial-Indigenous encounters continue to resonate within 
contemporary forms of governance.   
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Chapter One 
The ‘Spatial Turn’ in the Social Sciences 
Canvassing the Literature on ‘Space’ and ‘Place’ and the Legal Geography of Territory 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I draw attention to the politics of space and how geographic spacehas a history. 
Spatiality, by which I mean assigning spatial properties to events, phenomena, and 
relationships, locating them in space and through space, is how we reproduce the conditions 
that make certain forms of social interaction possible (or impossible). Space is an extension of 
the society in which it operates and is shaped by the society’s culture and social conventions. In 
turn, this has an effect on how people experience space. Enduring and stable geographies are 
ones that become incorporated into a variety of different discourses and are made real through 
material (legal and political action). In this thesis I show that territory is an enduring and stable 
geography. Territory has the effect of naturalising our spatial experiences so that they come to 
represent passive and pre-political events. In so doing, territory makes certain relations and 
forms of discipline less visible to us and “hides the consequences of things from us.”70  
In this chapter I analyse some of the existing literature in the area of socio-spatial studies and 
legal geography to defend two ideas. First, that space is political. By this I mean that space is 
constructed with a view to organising social and political life according to a particular, not 
always inclusive, vision. Second, that law has had a prominent role to play in the production and 
regulation of space, and this poses some very real impediments to liberal law’s claims of 
neutrality, legitimacy, and universal application. At the same time, the relationship between law 
and space is dialogical and mutually constitutive.  While law encodes particular human 
experiences and cognitive visions of space, space becomes an inert and passive setting for the 
crystallisation and reification of law and legal discourse.  In critiquing ‘the legal’, this thesis 
typically uses the term ‘law’ in the conventional sense, meaning the rules and narratives that 
emanate from the State and its institutions. However, I am of the opinion that norms that have 
legal value for human communities need not be derived from a central governing authority. 
Conceptually, I understand law in a wider sense than positive law. This includes non-State forms 
of regularised social practice, as well as their underpinning enforcement mechanisms and 
modes of dispute resolution. Consistent with this broader conceptualisation of the legal, I will 
                                                             
70 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989), 
p 6. 
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sometimes refer to ‘native law’ or ‘tribal law’.  This is an important caution that I want to state at 
the outset because often we perceive law as a closed and neutral system of rules that derives 
legitimacy and validity from the State. This thesis will demonstrate how grounding political 
authority in territory often reinforces this vision of State-power and has the consequence of 
minimising non-State forms legal normativity. At the same, law (in the traditional positivist 
sense) has had an important role in authenticating, reproducing, neutralising and circulating 
territory as a bounded, owned, culturally-divisible view of space.  
The socially-constructed nature of space does not mean that spatialities are not ‘real’.71 Very few 
people would deny the claim that territory has significant political and economic purchase, or 
that its material borders symbolise boundaries of cultural, legal, and political difference. As 
Forsberg notes, “constructions are always constructions of something; hence they are not 
entirely arbitrary and people are not able to design the world deliberately according to their 
wishes.”72 This thesis, therefore, calls attention to the reasons why certain representations of 
space appear to us as seamless geographies.  My aim is to uncover the types of social 
interactions, ideas of thought, and the forms of discipline that underwrite the geographies and 
how legal norms, processes, and institutions are able to hide this from us. 
In this chapter I examine geographical and sociological accounts of geographic space, and draw 
attention to how these accounts contest and reinforce prevailing notions of space and 
geography. This chapter develops a theoretical frame of reference that will inform the analysis 
undertaken throughout this thesis. This chapter will also introduce, clarify, and elaborate key 
terms that I have used and developed to study the phenomenon of territoriality, including key 
terms such as hybridity, liminality, imagined geographies, space-time and spatio-legal 
constructs. 
A. Charting the Course 
Growing interest in understanding how spatial perspectives73 have the tendency to distort or 
conceal relationships of power within social, political, and economic life, has given rise to a body 
of literature that has collectively been referred to as reflecting a ‘spatial turn’ in the social 
sciences. In their view, collective action is conditioned by the spatial context and constitution of 
these various processes. In the first part of this chapter I investigate this ‘spatial turn’ in the 
                                                             
71 What Thomas Osborne refers to as a ‘macho constructivist view’. See, Thomas Osborne, "Constructionism, 
Authority, and the Ethical Life," in The Politics of Constructionism, ed. Irving Velody and Robin Williams (London: 
Sage, 1998), p 232. 
72 Tuomas Forsberg, "The Ground without Foundation? Territory as a Social Construct," Geopolitics 8, no. 2 (2003): p 
8. 
73 By which I mean perspectives about the activities that occur in space and thus have, attached to them, properties 
like location, distance, and orientation. 
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social sciences, particularly within the discipline of critical sociology and human geography, to 
examine the politics of space. In the second part of this chapter I investigate this ‘spatial turn’ as 
it applies to legal discourse, critically analysing the work of legal geographers to highlight how 
law works to construct and naturalise models of space and what effects this has on the ordering 
of social and political life. I also raise some prominent critiques about spatial research in the 
social sciences, and elaborate how this thesis works to fill the gaps and oversights in the existing 
literature. 
This thesis emerges out of an analysis of the two parts of this chapter, in that it adopts the view 
that meaningful spatial critique involves not only studying the “actual locations, extensions, and 
patterns of things”, but also “how these are described and conceived of in different social and 
intellectual perspectives.”74 Models of space have a material and cognitive component. The same 
spatial context has the potential to be interpreted differently across societies, giving rise to 
diverging, and often competing, visions of social ordering and regulation. To study space, 
therefore, is to study how groups understand their relationship to one another and how they 
construct and maintain their sense of self. My aim in this analysis is to expose and give voice to 
contested, and often silenced, forms of spatial meaning. Despite their absence in dominant 
spatial and legal discourse, however, contested views of space are equally involved in exercises 
of solidarity-building and identity-making. Accordingly, their exposure is of value in assessing 
how communities that have been silenced by being located, contained, and excluded in and 
through dominant conceptions of space, can nonetheless use space as a site of resistance and 
cultural expression.  
2. The Politics of Space 
Social processes occur in space and over time, meaning that they can be spatially and 
historically located. While social scientists have long been intrigued by the socially-constructed 
nature of time as a category of analysis, the same level of scrutiny has, until very recently, rarely 
been devoted to the work of space.  It was Foucault who largely inspired the spatial turn in the 
social sciences in claiming that the twentieth century was “the epoch of simultaneity: we are in 
the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side of the dispersed.”75  
Foucault imagined space as a potential paradigm for assessing and evaluating human 
trajectories, and saw the over-emphasis on the temporal contextualisation of social life as 
                                                             
74 Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p 
25. 
75 Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, "Of Other Spaces," Diatrics 16, no. 1 (1986): p 22. 
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having consistently marginalised the importance of geography to social theory. Socio-spatial 
theorists building on Foucault’s initial instincts argued that the ‘spatial’ cannot be properly 
separated from the ‘social’ and express scepticism towards claims which are resilient to or 
evade the spatial nature of social processes.  
The most dominant theories of space can be categorised along two, frequently overlapping, 
trajectories.  Literature that adopts a power view of space, discuss space as an instrument of 
ideological, cultural, and political power and domination. This curve of spatial analysis can be 
identified in Foucault’s writing, but also the work of urban geographers such as Henri Lefebvre 
and Edward Soja, political geographers such as John Agnew and David Harvey, and literary 
theorists such as Edward Said and Benedict Anderson. A second set of literature adopts a 
relational view of space. This literature connects the making of space to social relations more 
broadly, and discusses relational and corporeal aspects of space and spatial experience. We find 
evidence of this relational view of space within Merleau-Ponty’s writing, the work of human 
geographers such as Doreen Massey, the body of writing produced by non-representational 
theorists, sociological researchers such as Sherene Razack, and legal geographers such as David 
Gregory, Nicholas Blomley, and David Delaney.  There is significant overlap between these two 
trajectories, particularly when these authors discuss the link between space and identity. While 
I discuss both streams separately, the thesis often draws on the intersections and overlaps 
between these two bodies of literature.  
A. The Power View of Space 
Significant interest in spatial analysis emerged in the early 1960s, finding its voice within the 
postmodern project of critical social theorists. Critical theorists adopting the power view of 
space argued that for much too long history had commanded the social imagination to the 
detriment of geography. As Soja asserts, “[a]n already made geography sets the stage, while the 
wilful making of history dictates the action and defines the storyline.”76 While human societies 
were perceived as active participants in the making of history, geography appeared as a 
relatively stable and pre-political complement of the social imagination. Yet, for most social 
theorists writing with the aim of provoking an intellectual turn towards space, life stories could 
not only be told as narratives of history, but as geographies as well. This realisation caused 
some commentators to remark that the trajectories of human existence “have a milieu, 
immediate locales, provocative emplacements which effect thought and action.”77 They argued 
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77 Ibid. 
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that if the aim of critical social theory was to reveal new sites for mounting emancipatory 
challenges then space and geography needed to be taken more seriously.  
Despite this early segue into politicising space, it is not until the early 1970s that we can identify 
a distinct and fundamental shift in favour of theorising space as a socio-political construct – 
what we now refer to as the ‘spatial turn’ - and it was Foucault’s work on space and power that 
sparked this renewed interest. Though typically referred to as a historian, Foucault’s 
preoccupation with spatial tendencies was reflected early on in his writing in Madness and 
Civilisation (1961), and was a preoccupation that intensified in his later work in the History of 
Sexuality (1978).78  Rejecting social theory’s fetishisation of historicity and its monopolisation of 
the nature of critical contextualisation and interpretation, Foucault claimed that: 
[t]he great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its 
themes of development and of suspension, of crisis and cycle, themes of the ever-
accumulating past, with its great preponderance of dead mean and the menacing 
glaciations of the world.79 
Foucault’s work connected spatial analysis to exercises of power and the organisation of 
knowledge, particularly within the context of surveillance and governmentality.80  However, the 
subtlety with which spatiality is interwoven into his analysis of power has caused some 
commentators to remark that spatial analysis signaled a glaring ‘blindspot’ in Foucauldian 
philosophy.81 Despite its definitional vaguesness, it is certain that the category of space occupied 
an important position in Foucault’s work, particularly in how he analysed structures of 
domination through techniques of routinisation and how they worked to construct disciplinary 
spaces.82  His fascination with the spatialisation of power embraced an awareness of the 
immaterial and imagined nature of spatiality. This significantly challenged the prevailing 
geographical discourse which had, until then, perceived geographic space as the physical and 
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81 Nigel Thrift, "Overcome by Space: Reworking Foucault," in Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geograph, ed. 
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natural environment in which social life unfolds.83 Criticising social theory’s blindness to the 
political, contingent, and active nature of space, Foucault’s work has been indispensable for 
drawing attention to how space operated to contain social relations by organising, dividing, and 
disciplining human populations. Constructions of space therefore became the product of 
relationships of power.  
B. ‘Spacing’ Time 
The critical social sciences have, till very recently, preserved the very “privileged place for the 
‘historical imagination’ in defining the very nature of critical insight and interpretation.”84 While 
this analysis provided much information about changes in social and political structures and 
interactions, the ‘progressive’ stance of history meant that structures and interactions had to be 
location in linear terms, and analysed through the use of temporal hierarchies. Historical 
trajectories were frequently understood through the linear tropes of progressiveness and 
primitiveness.  This meant that social institutions (including legal and political structures) were 
often examined by placing them along one fixed historical trajectory, typically structured by 
Anglo-European timelines. 
The relationship between history and geography has been a salient feature of contemporary 
socio-spatial literature, and some authors have gone as far as to refer to time as the 
‘counterpart’ of history.85  Others have described time as being ‘spaced’,86 in the sense that the 
abstract domain of time appears to acquire its relational structure from human experiences of 
the more concrete domain of space.87 This idea resonates with the ideas presented in this thesis, 
particularly when I discuss how political and legal geographies, like the Reservation represent 
spaces that have been temporalised, imagined to exist ‘back in time’.  
                                                             
83 Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, "Of Other Spaces," Diatrics 16, no. 1 (1986): p 23. This is illustrated quite 
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no. 3 (1969): p 418.  As Buttimer notes, “[i]n many cases objective and subjective ‘spaces’ failed to coincide – 
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84 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989), 
10, 15.The folding of time into spaces symbolises, for Soja, “an overdeveloped historical contextualisation of social life 
and social theory that actively submerges and peripheralises the geographical or spatial imagination.” 
85 D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). Also see, Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of 
Society: Introduction of the Theory of Structuration (Los Angeles: Univ of California Press, 1984). 
86 Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989). 
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Building on this relationship between space and time, theorists like Merleau-Ponty have pointed 
to the human body as a possible ‘bridge’ between these two categories of analysis, claiming that 
human experience of objects in space is invariably linked to time because to locate or to see 
imposes temporal constraints on the object that is being observed. To say that an object ‘exists’ 
means to say that it ‘exists at the same time as I exist’; it is to confirm “that simultaneity is the 
very meaning of perception belonging to the same temporal wave.”88 In perceiving objects we 
always draw on the elements of space and time, though often, we are more acutely aware of one 
over the other. This means that, if time remains active within our perception, space becomes 
static and passive (and vice versa). Space, therefore, becomes significant because it fixes a 
particular meaning of time, so much so that this meaning of time in space (the spatio-temporal 
or the ‘space-time’) comes to stand in for space itself.89    
This idea of corporeal emplacement and the recognition of simultaneity of corporeal existence is 
an interesting one, particularly as it informs interactions that I highlight throughout this thesis. 
While the act of observation is often understood as placing temporal and spatial restraints on 
the observed object (i.e. I know the object exists at the same time and in the same space as I do 
because I can see it), my analysis in Chapter Three and Four suggests that imagined geographies 
often work to displace that recognition of simultaneity. For example, in Chapter Four I consider 
how the Tribal Areas are understood by the State of Pakistan as a regressive geography, of a 
space fixed in time long ago, and that is despite the fact that the Pakhtun community most 
certainly exists in the here and now, because they are visible and perceptible beings.  
The distortion of reality that the Pakhtun example highlights may be explained by the work of 
authors that draw attention to how it is not the very act of perception that becomes important to 
the relationship of space to time, but how the perceived object or phenomena relates to one’s 
perception. Thus, perceptions of objects or phenomena can be described as relative, in that our 
attachment of the features of space and time are subjective – in relation to ourselves – and a 
perceived object has the possibility of being interpreted differently when perceived by different 
people. Objects, phenomena, and events experienced or perceived in space are frequently made 
sense of through their positioning within, what Massey refers to as, an ‘historical queue’. We 
relate simultaneously co-existing events, things and phenomena in relation to their (perceived) 
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appearance in time. People understand some events as occurring before others, and certain 
things as emerging after other things. Our perceptions of objects in space are continuously 
conditioned by our conception of time. This allows us to relate events, objects, and phenomena 
by placing them before or after each other, and thus making some sort of decision – however 
rudimentary it may be – about their relative ‘progressiveness’ and ‘stagnancy’ (or simplicity and 
complexity) in relation to one another.90 We are thus, able to compare two objects or 
phenomena by locating them in relation to each other in space and in time. 
More importantly, in comparing similarly situated objects and phenomena we make moral 
decisions about them. These are relational moral decisions – we attach moral judgments based 
on how they compare to other objects within our comparator group. For example, in locating all 
social communities through the space of geography allows us to compare the ways in which 
they have used their landscape and environment. We can then make judgments about some 
social communities having made better use of their land and some having made poorer use of 
their land. These decisions then become important for determining the moral worth of a 
community as ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ or ‘traditional’ and ‘primitive’.  Geography, in this 
instance, is made to exist as a ‘neutral’ background within which these determinations can take 
place.  However, as Merleau-Ponty argues, “any movement to focus on an object inevitably 
results in the clos[ing] up of the landscape and the opening of the object...” we tend to see “our 
surroundings vaguely in order to see the object clearly.”91  In stabilising geography as the 
primary medium through which interaction takes place, we foreclose the potential of other 
landscapes of analysis. Thus, in our preoccupation with time as the primary category of analysis 
throughout much of the last half century, the politics of space has remained largely invisible in 
our appraisals of relationships, events, and objects. 
Thus, in Chapter Five, when I suggest the idea of coeval recognition, the recognition of 
simultaneous existence in space and time, a crucial step in pursing forms of coeval recognition is 
that societies accept the potential of multiple simultaneous historical trajectories as well. 
Contemporary societies need to acknowledge and accept that their histories are not the only 
histories, and so coeval recognition requires processes which give voice to competing histories 
that unfold in shared spaces. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the body as an active agent 
in doing and experiencing space, further underwrites my idea of both Occidental Legality and 
coeval recognition precisely because, while the former is interested in locating and containing 
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the native body (in order to maintain distance between the native and settler), a realisation and 
awareness of the plasticity of the human body,92 and the body as a modality of protest, becomes 
crucial for coeval recognition 
While the social sciences are becoming more interested in examining historical analysis to 
reveal new contingencies that previously evaded researchers too focussed on time, there is the 
argument that what is really necessary in this ‘backtracking’ of history, is that we understand 
the relationality of space and time. Geographic or spatial analysis need not be ‘anti-history’. 
Foucault suggests that the opening up of the spatial field should be seen as an opportunity to 
spatialise history – to produce a historical narrative that takes into account the social 
production of space in order to create a ‘historical geography.’93 For example, in Chapter Three I 
discuss how unconventional or divergent conceptions of space and geography have an influence 
on the forms and types of political and legal relationships that emerge as two distinct normative 
communities come into contact with each other. As such, these histories and landscapes of 
analysis have implications for one another. In using the methods of historical literary analysis, 
this thesis builds on Foucault’s idea of historical geography to study the imaginative, legal, and 
political manifestations of space as owned, possessed, and culturally-divisible.  
The very act of defining, delimiting, and giving meaning to space imposes limits on it. The 
modern tendency to see space as discontinuous and fragmented can partially be attributed to 
the time-space compression that characterised the Industrial Revolution. In this thesis I refer 
specifically to how this tendency emerged as a result of European overseas technologies and the 
fact that once isolated and invisible communities were suddenly perceptible and near. The 
‘spatial turn’ in the arts and sciences draws particular attention to how many of the stable 
categories of space and time are produced through “single-voiced narratives” and thus have the 
effect of minimising the fact that “position and context are centrally and inescapably implicated 
in all constructions of knowledge.”94  
  
                                                             
92 I borrow the term of Brenna Bhandar’s work. But the idea of the body as ‘plastic’, as given meaning through 
cultural inscriptions, from which the body itself is indistinguishable, can be found in the work of Judith Butler. 
However, Bhandar and Foucault adopt the idea that there exists a pre-inscriptive body, and that the body’s potential 
for agency can allow it to act in ways that transgress the cultural labels that have been mapped upon it. See, Judith 
Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), p 8. Also see, Michel 
Foucault, ed. Neitzsche, Genealogy, History, The Foucault Reader (New York: Random House,1984), p 83. Also see, 
Brenna Bhandar, "Plasticity and Post-Colonial Recognition: 'Owning, Knowing, and Being'," Law Critique 22(2011). 
93 Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, "Of Other Spaces," Diatrics 16, no. 1 (1986). 
94 Denis Cosgrove, "Introduction: Mapping Meaning," in Mappings, ed. Denis Cosgrove (London: Reaktion Books, 
1999), p 7. 
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However, the location of people in different time-spaces is not something that simply happens. It 
is a political project and Lefebvre, who I discuss in the section below, addresses this political 
aspect of space. People and phenomena are located in separate and competing time-spaces to 
make comparison unnecessary or impractical. For example, the division of the world’s 
geography into the hemispheric divisions of ‘East’ and ‘West’ is one such political project. But I 
discuss several others like the Tribal Areas, the Aboriginal Reservation, and the national 
parklands as other time-spaces that, in many ways, minimise the fact that these geographies are 
manifestations of jurisdictional struggle; the struggle between communities to have their right 
to exercise political and legal power recognised. These geographies operate to minimise the 
moral equivalence of native political and legal regimes and institutions, and portray competing 
normative communities as incommensurable. This allows for the creation of distance even 
under conditions of close proximity. For instance, if we look at Pakistani case-law, particularly 
within the context of constitutional law, it is possible to find frequent mention of Rawlsian and 
Kelsenian equality principles. Despite a long, rich, legal tradition – composed of tribal law, 
Hindu laws, and the Shariat - that prevailed in India before the arrival of the Europeans, many 
Pakistani courts draw on European philosophical traditions in adjudicating fundamental rights 
cases.95  In Chapter Four, I discuss how postcolonial Pakistan, as a prototypical ‘Eastern’ society, 
seems to define itself as entirely originating from the colonial experience; it sees itself as an 
extension of Europe. Thus, despite the fact that Pakistani society has a long history of tribalism 
and ethnic factionalism, the co-existing tribal communities within the shared geographic space 
of the new State are very clearly perceived as ‘Eastern’ - primitive and belonging to a different 
time (back in time), a different space. They are perceived as not having modernised like the rest 
of the State. The positioning of tribal and kinship communities in separate spaces and historical 
moments than the rest of the State renders the two incomparable by giving the illusion of a 
fragmented, non-converging, and uncommon history. 
C. Lafebvrian Space and Space as a Political ‘Strategy’ 
While Foucault can be credited with ushering space to the forefront of social science critique, 
Henri Lefebvre was essential for inspiring views of space as an integral tool or strategy of 
political enterprise. In his pioneering book, The Production of Space, Lefebvre argues that space 
is political and that geography, as a specific spatial representation must be thought of as 
reflecting very specific interests and objectives.  Space is a discourse of power that has taken on: 
 a reality of its own, a reality clearly distinct from, yet much like, those assumed in the same 
global processes of commodities, money and capital...it serves as a tool of thought and 
                                                             
95 T. K. K. Iyer, "Constitutional Law in Pakistan: Kelsen in the Courts," The American Journal of Comparative Law 21, 
no. 4 (1973). 
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action; that in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control and 
hence domination…[and this is a reality of space that] escapes in part from those who would 
make use of it.96  
According to Lefebvre, spatial analysis should therefore seek to study the techniques that have 
been employed to produce a given space and must also include an appraisal of its “contents, that 
is the contents which resist form or strategy: namely its users.”97 
Using a dialectical method of analysis, Lefebvre designs a view of space similar to Foucault, in 
that it incorporates both the formal and relational (or objective and subjective) properties of 
spatial formations.98 Space becomes politicised precisely because there are multiple, and 
sometimes conflicting, ways of imagining it, constructing it, and dominating or mastering it.99 
Strategies used to maintain a given production of space over time rests on the orientation, 
authority, and ideological power of its strategists. Lefebvre’s work, therefore, draws attention to 
the inter-discursive production of space; space as geographies, underwritten by, for example, 
political and legal discourse. His work examines how these discursive strategies naturalise 
space. He argues that by linking political projects (like urban planning) to science and the 
natural environment gives space a “natural character...Space passes as being innocent, or in 
other words, as not being political.”100   
Like Foucault, Lefebvre refers to how power relationships underpin spatial productions, 
arguing that, apart from the formal and institutional apparatuses of power that produce and 
circulate their vision of space, the people whose lives and interactions are controlled through a 
particular spatial form also have tremendous influence over its staying power.101 The value and 
power of a particular spatial form comes from a consensus in meaning between its users, who 
must see a given production of space as essential, inevitable, or impossible to overthrow. Spatial 
forms must, therefore, be produced and reproduced through social interaction, and these 
interactions have tremendous potential to both sustain and destroy certain views and 
constructions of space. I illustrate this idea in Chapter Three and my discussion of Aboriginal 
                                                             
96 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991), p 26. 
97 ———, ed. State, Space, World (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis,2009), p 171. 
98 Indeed we see this subject/objective notion of space pop up in the writing of many social theorists, including David 
Harvey who replaces the binary division with the triad of absolute, relative, and relational space. Arguing that 
absolute is space as a ‘thing in itself’ (e.g. Newtonian space), relative space is a space defined as a “relationship 
between objects which exists only because objects exist and relate to each other”, and relational space are spaces 
produced in terms of one another. See, David Harvey, "Space as a Key Word," in Marx and Philosophy Conference 
(Institute of Education, London2004).   
99 Henri Lefebvre, ed. State, Space, World (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis,2009), p 172. 
100 Ibid., p 168. 
101 See, for instance, Lefebvre’s discussion of the State as the ‘centre of spatial discourse’, in which the modern State 
emerges, in the Hegelian sense, as both the end and meaning of history. As the pre-eminent spatial form, the State 
entirely obliterates eliminates – ‘crushes’ – the meaning and passage of time. See, The Production of Space, p 23. 
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title jurisprudence, where native communities accept and reproduce a territorial vision of space 
in making claims for autonomy and greater self-governing powers. 
As we speak of the concept of territory over the course of this thesis, the Lefebvrian conception 
of space is materialised through the various power relations that give space specific meaning – 
essentially space that is bounded, possessed and culturally-divisible. These can include material 
markers such as borders and boundaries, but also intellectual ones like jurisdiction. This can 
also include cultural geographies like the Reserve and the national parklands. Space becomes an 
artefact of the exercise of power precisely because it can be used to ‘contain’, exclude, and 
define Others.  
D. The Relational View of Space and Socialising the Spatial Form 
Lefebvrian space is strategic; space emerges through the process of putting certain interests to 
work; it is both the product and driver of socio-cultural and political practice. For authors 
drawing on Lefebvre’s work the idea of space as a strategy has, in turn, provoked curiosity 
about the possibility of socialising the spatial form; the idea that space can be interpreted as a 
social relation and that the stability of any spatial form relies on its enactment and re-enactment 
by human communities. Apart from corresponding to some grand institutional design of social 
and political ordering, space can be understood in terms of micro-level actions that can be 
examined as expressions of self-identity and products of perceived social difference (e.g. 
racialised spaces, cultural spaces).  
This ‘relational’ view of space has recently been drawn on in the work of researchers within the 
discipline of geography in advancing two important ideas.  The first is how institutionalised 
spaces – territory, the prison, the clinic, the school – are underwritten by a series of smaller-
scale social practices and social rules that either affirm or refute (or resist) the dominant 
conceptions of space.  Often, different communities will have different criteria for determining 
the rules that govern access to a location and its contents. Competing rules will give rise to 
competing spatialities which may be determined in relation to one another, or in defiance of one 
another. The dialogical process which gives rise to constructions of space can thus be said to 
produce contested activities in space; different ways of doing or performing space based on 
competing perceptions of geographies that have been produced. From this perspective, the 
focus of spatial analysis becomes social practice, highlighting human agency and how societies 
fix certain ways of seeing and experiencing land and the natural environment. For example, 
some authors highlight how Aboriginal communities perceive land as sacred to their sense of 
self and thus industrial development is perceived as offending this relationship that they have 
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with the land.102 At the same time European voyagers, as I argue in Chapter Two, perceived a 
lack of development and infrastructure as wasteful.  
The second idea that relational theories of space draw attention to is how societies construct 
‘place’ out of space. In other words, they are interested in investigating the sorts of practices 
people engage in to personalise their immediate environment and what may be some of the 
underlying motivations for their doing so. The focal point of spatial analysis, in this case, 
becomes the relationship between spatialisation (certain representations or constructions of 
space) and identity-formation. I address this idea further in section (2)(i) below. 
Conceptions of ‘space as a relation’ are most eloquently theorised in Massey’s For Space, where 
she argues that relational thinking requires us to redefine space according to three new strands 
in spatial thinking.103 First, space needs to be seen as emerging from networked social 
interactions. Space becomes a “product of interrelations.”104 Secondly, multiplicity or ‘co-
existent heterogeneity’ should be understood as an intrinsic feature of space.  And third, 
coalescence between these spatialities is an open process; spatialities are continuously being 
negotiated and renegotiated; space is constantly evolving and in the process of becoming.105 
Central to her design of spatial analysis is the importance of process rather than product.106  
Massey echoes other critical theorists in speaking to the co-existing heterogeneity (and future 
potentialities) of a thoroughly disordered107 and non-essentialist view of space and suggests 
that we imagine space as “a simultaneity of stories-so-far.”108 Putting forth a spatial perspective 
centred on restoring the value of human agency and the ability of human communities to be 
masters of their destiny, Massey’s view of space informs my discussion on hybrid geographies 
and coeval recognition, where I argue for a continuously open idea of space that takes seriously 
the human capacity for action. Using her work, I challenge liberal discourse and its assumption 
that the Reservation is a sufficient guarantee for recognition and diversity. I do this by 
examining how the Reservation forecloses opportunities for dialogue and places too much 
                                                             
102 Bruce Rigsby, "Aboriginal People, Spirituality and the Traditional Ownership of Land," International Journal of 
Social Economics 26, no. 7/8/9 (1999): p 964-5. 
103 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005), p 9-11. 
104 Ibid., 9-11.  This idea of inconnectivity also finds resonance within Thrift’s work, whereby he argues that we can 
no longer see space as a ‘nested hierarchy’.  Instead, the new focus of spatial studies should be the interconnections 
between spaces. See, N Thrift, "Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect," Geografiska Annaler: Series 
B 86(2004): p 59. 
105 An idea that appears to borrow from Deleuzian views of space in which spatialities are understood more as 
interconnections, and “conceptual assemblages” rather than “applications.” Charles J Stivale, "Introduction: Actuality 
and Concepts," Sub Stance: a Review of Theory and Literary Criticism 20, no. 3 (1991): p 9. 
106 David Harvey, "Space as a Key Word," in Marx and Philosophy Conference (Institute of Education, London2004). 
107 A view of space that has been particularly salient in the work of Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos. See, 
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, "Law's Spatial Turn: Geography, Justice and a Certain Fear of Space," Law, 
Culture and Humanities 7, no. 2 (2011). 
108 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005), p 9. 
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importance on the ‘product’ of recognition, rather than the process of interrelations that 
produce these legal geographies. 
i. Making Spaces into ‘Places’ 
The implication that geographies are socially constructed has sociologists and geographers 
reflecting on how we ‘invent’ places. In better conceptualising alternating and competing visions 
of space, theorists have referred to the process of organising and representing space as place-
making. 
A place is a unique spot in the universe. Place is the distinction between here and there, and 
it is what allows people to appreciate near and far. Places have finitude, but they nest 
logically because the boundaries are (analytically and phenomenologically) elastic.109 
Place always involves ‘appropriation and transformation of space and nature that is 
inseparable from the reproduction and transformation of society in time and space.110 
 
Places, as “constellations of ‘culturally-specific ideas’ about the world and lived experiences of 
being embodied in it”,111 emerge as a result of people’s “social, material, and semiotic 
investments in their immediate environment.”112 As a result, places – as particular constructions 
of space – are reflective of a community or individual’s sense of self, and their perceived 
relationship to people, things, and relationships around them.113 Places become particular 
orderings of our environment,114 which “determine to a large extent the space of agency and the 
mode of participation in which we act as citizens in a multi-layered politics to which we 
belong.”115 Consequently, places become integral for not only how we perceive others, but also 
how we express ourselves and, for that reason, they are underwritten by rules that define 
‘normal’ versus ‘transgressive’ behaviours and activities. In Chapter Two I discuss how 
constructed places are structured and defended through, for example, markers of possession 
(i.e. constructing fences, marking of boundaries, and building homes as expressions of an intent 
to remain that reflect ideas of ownership).  From this analysis it is possible to argue that 
                                                             
109 Thomas F Gieryn, "A Space for Place in Sociology," Annual review of sociology (2000): p 463. 
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113 Anssi Paasi, "Bounded Spaces in the Mobile World: Deconstructing 'Regional Identity'," Tijdschrift voor 
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114 Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1977), p 5-6. 
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‘territory’ was a specific ‘place-making’ strategy of European settlers and voyagers that has 
taken on a universal character. As a place-making strategy, therefore, territoriality is bound to 
exclusive, as it encodes space with the European cultural symbols, signs, and markers. 
Place-making has an important function. It reduces the anxieties that people feel about the 
unfamiliar and open environment by mapping that environment with ideas, institutions, and 
practices that are familiar.116  Massey notes that place-making evolves from perceptions of 
threat and alienation and that places thus provide communities with a secure hideaway from 
“new invasions...a locus of denial, of attempted withdrawal from invasion/difference.”117 In 
Chapter Two and Three I consider how the imaginative geographies produced out the Imperial-
Indigenous encounters were mainly the product of European anxieties, brought on by the 
proximity of White and native bodies, and the fact that the environments that they were 
encountering were new and strange. The reproduction of these imaginative geographies 
through maps and in journal-writing, and later their institutionalisation through legal and 
political processes, were all part of the process of European place-making in new environments 
Yet, places are not only spaces of comfort and protection. They can also become spaces of 
confinement.118 Thus, place-making has both an exclusionary and inclusionary aspect,119 which 
often involves directing our gaze as much outward as inward. This is why places constructed at 
different “spatial scales may be stacked, overlapped, or nested, sometimes by 
design...sometimes more haphazardly as overlapping and even competing jurisdictions...”120 The 
durability of a ‘place’ is contingent on the degree to which it is able to procure both internal as 
well as external acceptance. Place, then, precipitates from social experiences of space, and thus 
space and place have been conceived by theorists like Relph as dialectically structured within 
the domain of human environmental experience.121 
                                                             
116 Tuan remarks that space as the abstract, the unknown, undifferentiated “becomes place as we get to know it 
better and endow it with value.” , Space and place are aspects of one another and it is from the “security and stability 
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ii.  ‘Performing Space’ 
The grounding of the body in space, to speak of space in terms of corporeal emplacement, has 
been explored by a variety of phenomenological theorists who believe that the body acts as a 
bridge between personal and physical identity and gives rise to the idea that place, the space in 
which the body is situated,122 should be considered “constitutive of one’s sense of self.”123 Some 
theorists have suggested that the body may act as a medium through which time is materialised 
in space, arguing that the abstract conceptual domain of time is organised through our sensory 
perception of the ‘more concrete’ domain of space.124 Thus, the human body fixes and reifies 
space as a way of conceptualising the passage of time.  As space becomes inert, organic, and 
concrete, time becomes active, evolving, and disorderly. Clearly there is the counter-argument 
that our sensory perceptions of space are themselves conditioned by already internalised 
models of spatiality (representations of space) and unequal distributions of power. Yet, perhaps 
that is precisely the point that theorists like Boroditsky and Tuan assert; that in our 
concretisation of space these histories of asymmetrical power relations become less visible, less 
perceptible.  
But the reverse relationship may also be true, that stabilising spaces help reify and immobilise 
the body. For example, in producing the political and legal geographies of the national parkland 
and the Reserve, societies are able to, in the first instance, displace native presence from sacred 
common spaces like the park, and in the second instance, remove native presence from 
mainstream spaces to contain and immobilise them within the Reservation. In Chapter Three I 
explore this idea further to argue that place-making strategies often make social difference 
more visible to us in some cases (i.e. the Reservation), and less visible to us in others (i.e. the 
protected areas of parkland).  
                                                             
122 Tuan, for instance, argues that our sensory perception of space has a profound role to play in “enriching our apprehension of the 
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This, however, does not mean that the native body has no agency to resist and counteract these 
processes of place-making. For example, a range of theorists have discussed the possibility of 
viewing space as a performance of continuous enactment and re-enactment. Authors speaking of 
spatial performativity focus less on discursive and non-subjective constructions of space and 
spatial identities, and instead interpret space through subject-driven processes. These theories 
focus on the idea of how human communities do space.125  Gregory puts forth a design for spatial 
analysis that considers space to be “as much a repertoire as it is an archive.”126 One of the ways 
in which native communities do the Reservation is by, for example, continuing to engage in legal 
processes by adopting a territorial vision of space in which exclusive access to space equates to 
autonomy. In mobilising the discourse of territory through these processes they reproduce the 
Reserve as an owned, possessed, and culturally-divisible geography. In this way spatial 
performances can be understood as enactments of power,127 and have sometimes been declared 
critical to the communication of cultural politics.128  
iii. Place-Making and the Natural Environment 
Many studies of the relationship between space and identity argue that the material features of 
an environment play an important role in how we understanding self- and group-identity. 
Landscapes – different combinations of the visible physical features of a section of land, its 
climatic conditions, overlaid with the cultural elements of human presence – have been 
described as an important component of human identity. The structures and buildings that are 
erected and the methods of land-use that are adopted are visible markers of transforming one’s 
space into place. Human societies associate their development of space - the ways in which 
space responds to, encompasses, or resists the natural features and conditions of the 
environment - as essential to their understanding of self. In some instances, elements of the 
natural environment are imagined as linked with the particular history of a social or political 
community. For instance, Storey describes how the remote, mountainous region of the Canadian 
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Rockies reinforces Canadian independence, or how the Dover Cliffs in England are perceived as 
“the embodiment of nation in a place.”129  
Conversely, other writers argue that it is not borders and belonging that are contrived, but the 
landscape in which these exercises and intuitions take place. Trudeau’s work on landscapes 
argues that the discursive and material boundaries that couch particular territorial landscapes 
give the impression that “particular arrangements of values, aesthetics, and behaviour are 
considered normal or natural.”130 He gives the example of zoning by-laws, which he argues have 
traditionally been used to establish and communicate, not only “spatial categories of acceptable 
social behaviour and visual aesthetics,” but to exclude certain social groups from certain areas 
as well.131 In this way landscapes themselves become cultural artefacts. 
Some critics of spatial theories have suggested that the processes through which spatial 
analyses sometimes takes place has the effect of essentialising views of space and place and the 
identities that they give rise to.  The division of space has always been about making clearer 
distinctions between ‘here’ and ‘there’ and ‘us’ and ‘them’.  By their very nature spatial practices 
are polarising. Yet, we can certainly recognise that the contents (i.e. inhabitants) of space clearly 
occupy several places at once. For instance, both my body and my actions are governed by the 
State-space, the private sphere, my home-space, and gendered-spaces characterised by 
preconceived roles about correct female behaviour.  Despite the continuous overlaps between 
the imagined geographies that constitute one’s identity, spatial theories do not go far enough in 
recognising the hybridity of that identity. There is lack of acknowledgement of the deep and 
complex interconnections between relationships and phenomena that occur in space. 
Articulations of space tend to “displace[...] those dualities in which [...] space is traditionally 
divided: nature/culture, chaos/civility...”132 As Bhabha notes, this is a particularly salient aspect 
of the ways in which colonial space is understood, and he argues that a failure to recognise the 
hybridity of spaces leads to similar failures in acknowledging the hybridity of identities and 
subjectivities.133 For writers like Whatmore, isolated spatial analyses that study ‘aspects’ of 
nature, one at a time, miss the point. She argues that, instead, we need to be considering the 
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possibility of ‘hybrid spaces’.134 The significance of rethinking space in this way becomes 
important to my discussion in Chapter Three and Four, when I consider how the legal and 
political geographies of the Reservation, public parks, and Tribal Areas conceal crucial human 
interactions and social networks when we understand them as ‘non-overlapping’ and 
compartmentalised spaces and places. 
Authors like Latour have argued that spatial analysis needs to focus less on ‘polar’ spaces, 
spaces that are coherent unities and focus on overlapping spaces and ‘liminal’ spaces.135 Latour 
argues that: 
Critical explanation has always began from the poles and headed toward the middle, which 
was first the separation point and then the conjunction point for opposing resources...In this 
way the middle was simultaneously maintained and abolished, recognised and denied, 
specified and silenced...How?...By conceiving every hybrid as a mixture of two pure forms.136 
In the study of human geography this tendency manifests itself in the nature/society binary, 
where geographical imaginations are always turned towards distinguishing the ‘natural’ 
environment from the ‘social environment’ – or the idea that Whatmore refers to as the ‘built 
environment’. As she demonstrates, much of the professional and political world has the 
tendency to “impress this binary imaginary on the fabric of the world.”137  The aim, she argues, 
has to be the “building [of] theories whose ‘geometries, paradigms, and logics break out of 
binaries...and nature/culture modes of any kind.’”138 Frontier-literature within a variety of 
disciplines develops this idea of liminality, particularly in relation to how law manages these 
spaces.139 They highlight how these are spaces in which human agency and individual 
subjectivity flourish and are most pronounced precisely because the members’ lives depend on 
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their ability to be flexible with their identities, to take risks in the choices that they make, as 
they negotiate the spaces between two stable spatialities. 
The study of these liminal spaces and an understanding of how these spaces interact and are 
reproduced through the natural environment is an idea that this thesis specifically explores and 
relates to law in Chapters Two, Three and Four. In these three chapters I draw attention to the 
ways in which common assumptions of stable and coherent spaces are in fact derived from 
incoherent, consistently fluctuating imagined geographies. For example, I study the pristine 
wilderness, as a discourse and a judgment made about the natural environment, and discuss 
how it operates to, at one moment, define the land as insufficiently used and thus a ‘wasteland’ 
(i.e. terra nullius, or the primitive lands of tribal groups), while in other moments has the effect 
of structuring it through notions of traditionalism and mysticism (i.e. protected areas of 
parkland).  
E. Imaginative Geographies 
Spatial knowledge, what we know (or think we know), about space is partly determined by 
what we imagine space to be.  In this context “the imaginary [becomes] a form of awareness, as 
a knowledge that does not owe its place simply to the constitution of reason.”140  While 
imagined geographies may symbolise one’s ‘fanciful’ reconstruction of space, they demonstrate 
a degree of durability because they are reinforced through a series of discursive practices and 
histories of scholastic inquiry through which they are misrepresented as pre-given and organic 
realities. For example, over the course of this thesis I discuss how the imaginative geographies 
of parkland, the wastelands of the desert, the Princely States, and the public/private divide take 
on moral categories, and often become defined through binary tropes of modern/primitive, 
civilised/ savage, tropes that are consistent with Said’s dichotomy of the Orient/Occident. 
i. The Imaginative Geographies of ‘Orientalism’ 
Perhaps no other work has been as widely associated with the notion of imagined geographies 
as Edward Said’s Orientalism. Building on the foundations of the Foucauldian ‘knowledge is 
power’ dynamic, Said’s theory of Orientalism argues that social power is exercised through the 
‘manufacture’ of knowledge. Writing within the context of Imperialism, Said defines 
‘Orientalism’ as “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction 
between the ‘Orient’ and (most of the time) the ‘Occident’.”141 Europe invents the Orient as a 
geographical reality, and ascribes to ‘Orientals’ particular (and often incompatible) ideologies 
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and aspirations.142 European hegemony is reinforced through its representation of the Orient as, 
not only different, but inferior to the European Occident. The ability to produce and circulate 
knowledge about the Orient is tantamount to controlling the Orient, and is thus perceived as an 
exercise of Occidental power. 
Orientalist discourse draws attention to the pervasive intellectual power of an imagined 
geography (i.e. the Orient) that has been produced through the constant representation of non-
European cultural difference, exoticism, and unmitigated passion (pleasure), emotion 
(vengeance) and overindulgence.143 The Occident’s political and ideological power rests on the 
ability to portray an Orient that embodies habits, ideals, and philosophies entirely irreconcilable 
with those of Europe. In constructing the European self-identity the Orient had to be made into 
a society of excess – uncivilised, uncouth, exotic, and infantile. Said’s work draws attention to 
the discursive power of Orientalist discourse.  Monopoly over the production of knowledge 
about the Orient, the dissemination of images and its representation of subjective experience as 
objective truth, had the effect of collapsing European cultural experience into objective fact. The 
Occident was thus able to represent the Orient in ways irrespective of how the Orient defined 
itself. This practice, according to Said, pervaded Western literary, historical, and political 
discourse about the Orient and its people.144 From Said’s work it becomes possible to trace the 
process through which imagined geographies have the potential to become moral geographies, 
and how they begin to represent judgments that societies make about proper and improper 
behaviours. 
The discourse of Orientalism is further significant because it draws attention to how the native 
internalises this external-construction of his world, and projects back the demeaning image that 
has been imposed upon him by the Occident. This is a view that was first advanced by Fanon in 
his ground-breaking book, Black Skins, White Masks.145  He expresses how black identity is 
fashioned in contradistinction to the white man, so that even when the black man believes in 
racial equality, he is unable to express himself outside of the racialised Otherness of the white 
man’s gaze. Fanon notes: 
And then we were given the occasion to confront the white gaze. An unusual weight decided 
on us. The real world robbed us of our share.  In the white world, the man of colour 
encounters in elaborating his body schema.  The image of one’s body is solely negating. It’s 
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an image in the third person.  All around the body reigns an atmosphere of certain 
uncertainty. I know that if I want to smoke, I shall have to stretch out my right hand and 
grab the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table.  As for the matches, they are in 
the left drawer, and I shall have to move back a little. And I make all these moves, not out of 
habit, but by implicit knowledge. A slow construction of my self as a body in a spatial and 
temporal world – such seems to be the schema. It is not imposed on me; it is rather a 
definitive structuring of my self and the world...146 
The black man, therefore, becomes a caricature of the white man’s imagination, unable to fully 
represent himself independently of the schema created for him by the white man. For Fanon 
this splits the black body from his self-perception so that “out of the blackest part of my soul, 
through the zone of hachures, surges up this desire to be suddenly white. I want to be 
recognised not as Black, but as White.”147  The native craves recognition, and therefore seeks it 
through imitating the identity prescribed to him by the colonised.  In this thesis, I discuss how 
this ‘black schema’, this blueprint of inferiority, is represented by the conceptual design of 
territory. Moreover, in the third chapter I explain how native communities are trying to frame 
their demands for recognition using the schema of territory in the hopes that their status as 
sovereign nations will be recognised. However, the problem with this is that the concept of 
territory was historically developed so as to legitimise native dispossession and European 
cultural superiority. Consequently, ‘territory’ gives native communities false hope by, on the one 
hand claiming to enhance their prospects for recognition, while on the other, continuing to 
maintain the unfettered sovereignty of the nation-State. 
3. Examining the Intersection of Law and Geography 
In this thesis I make important connections between imagined geographies and the law, as well 
as exploring how they are involved in shaping one another. Law underwrites space to make 
certain relationships and events possible, and space operates in order to make legal regulation 
(particularly the unequal application of the law) invisible to us. This relationship between law 
and space is made particularly visible in later discussions of Vitoria’s jus gentium where native 
resistance to a reciprocal right of travel legitimises European conquest. The thesis draws on the 
ideas presented in this literature to argue that law conditions social reality at the same time as 
being produced through social relations.148 As a result of this intimate relationship between law 
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and space, we need to take seriously the work of critical legal geographers who argue that law 
and geography cannot be studied in isolation, but in tandem and as aspects of one another that 
co-operate to produce social phenomena and shape social action.149  
A. Legal Geography and its ‘Critical’ Turn 
Earlier approaches to the study of law and geography, collectively organised under the umbrella 
of legal anthropology and the sociology of law, adopted a comparative law perspective where 
the territorial organisation of the globe was a taken-for-granted presumption. These studies 
typically examined the various features that proximally located cultures shared, and highlighted 
the ways in which they differed from those located at a distance. Tied to this were geographic 
analyses of law, which investigated the influence of climate and physical environments on the 
development of legal cultures,150 and later studies of the transnational mobility of legal 
models,151 which attempted to determine the potential success of legal transplants. Law was 
treated as if it belonged in a “detached, asocial realm from where it can ‘act’ upon space,”152 and 
frequently social space, itself, was conflated with physical space.153  
More recently, however, geographers have draws on the spatial turn in social science discourse, 
and have adopted new approaches to researching the intersection between law and space (or 
law and geography). A number of critical legal geographers have questioned how societies 
‘create’ space, and what role law has to play in facilitating, impeding, and influencing spatial 
practices. From this perspective, law is understood as unequivocally bound to ‘the social’. The 
analysis of critical legal geographers adopts as its focal point, the relationship between law, 
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space, and the exercise of socio-political power. This allows us to understand the materiality of 
law (how law is expressed and made manifest) as it relates to the effects of space.154 Unlike the 
sociology or anthropology of law, critical legal geography sees law and social space as mutually-
constitutive, inseparable, and as continuously performed elements of social life. As Delaney 
notes, this innovative shift within the literature transpires from a new vision of how law 
operates in the everyday realities of social life, “[t]he legal is continuously and creatively done 
and redone.  The legal is always happening [emphasis in original].”155  
What is most distinctive about the project of critical legal geography is its integrated view of law 
and space as the ‘spatio-legal’, what Blomley refers to as the ‘splicing’ of law into space.  Delaney 
captures a similar idea when he discusses the ‘braiding’ of law as “worldly, pragmatic processes 
of their mutual constitutivity across each analytically distinct modality (the imaginary, the 
performative, the material)”156 Thus, academic literature in the area of law and space looks at 
how the spatial and legal are “imagined, performed or materialised in terms of each other 
[emphasis in original],”157 along with how other aspects of social existence may influence these 
performances, imaginings, and materialisations (i.e. identity, labour, sexuality, citizenship). This 
move to world law has been a particularly significant element of the CLG movement which has 
defined as its central ambition, the exploration of how the legal and spatial ‘happen’ in order to 
reveal “the pragmatics of world-making.”158  
Critical Legal Geography (CLG) provides an approach which helps us to understand the reasons 
why certain geographic distributions emerge in the way that they do. For example, Ford has 
studied the intersection between legal jurisdiction and race to reveal insights about the 
distribution of race and ethnicities in space.159  In Chapter Three I also explore Peters work on 
Aboriginal migration in Canada to examine some of the reasons why mainstream Canadian 
society becomes more anxious about Aboriginal presence when migration out of the 
Reservation is at its lowest and net out-flow of Aboriginals out of urban centres is at its 
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highest.160 The perception of Aboriginal migration gives the impression that the Reserve system 
is ‘not working’, and steps must be taken to prevent this outflow. Accordingly, some of the 
insights of CLG become important in the context of examining Indigenous rights, diversity and 
minorities in liberal societies because they help reveal illogical connections between social 
perception and spatial distribution and, thereby, focus much needed attention to how the 
spatial and the political are interlinked. 
i. The ‘Law-in-Space’ Approach 
Studies of the spatio-legal tend to adopt one of two different modes of inquiry, what Delaney 
refers to as either the ‘law-in-space’ approach or the ‘space-in-law’ approach. Work that can be 
grouped under the umbrella of ‘law-in-space’ looks at how spatialised legal practices work to 
produce and reproduce our social space, with a specific concentration on how legal and social 
actors become involved in transforming and shaping the legal meaning of spaces.161  For 
example, and I discuss this further in the third chapter of my thesis, the Canadian State has been 
heavily involved in giving native cultural practices in geographic settings legal recognition as 
expressions of native custom and law.162 Similarly, in Chapter Four I analyse how spaces 
concentrated with native presence and regulated through native custom have been interpreted 
as lawless. The legal value of these places has been diminished by boundaries drawn between 
the cultural and political.  
The law-in-space approach investigates the ways in which legal processes and regulation create 
spaces of exclusion and exception (in terms of membership, but also spaces of exception from 
having ‘benefit’ of the law),163 give the impression of ownership or possession of space,164 or 
create an entitlement of exclusive access or power over a particular space.165 In shaping our 
lived-in world, especially territory, in particular ways, the law has a tremendous degree of 
influence over the interactions that take place, or are allowed to take place, in these areas. 
Scholarship in this area examines the myriad ways in which the law is involved in dividing and 
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enclosing our lived-in environment by mapping rules onto geographic space that have the effect 
of reducing people’s mobility into and out of divided areas, and limiting the scope of interaction 
between those located on different sides of these spaced divisions.166 There are also related 
studies that survey the ways in which the law restricts free movement within spaces through 
geographies of incarceration, both formal and informal, and how these places of confinement 
are then overwritten by other discourses of oppression such as race and gender.167 I specifically 
discuss the Aboriginal Reservation as one expression of law-in-space – a geography constructed 
through an interaction between State and native law - which has significant implications for the 
opportunities available to Aboriginal communities in Canada and Australia. 
This analysis (of CLG as it relates to space and law and, in turn, to categories of exclusion such as 
race and gender) becomes crucial for studying how law perpetuates processes of exclusion 
while misrepresenting them as exercises of power. I draw on these ideas in Chapter Four and 
my discussion of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, which examine how the idea of territorial 
autonomy has had the consequence of compartmentalising cultural difference and separating 
the Pakhtuns from mainstream Pakistani society. Yet, at the same time, this right of autonomy 
appears to have empowered the Pakhtun community, giving the impression that the State 
perceives them as nations of ‘equal’ political and social standing. 
The law also shapes and partitions our environment in ways that affect our sense of self and 
perceptions of belonging to a political community. The national border is one political 
construction that is ‘loaded’ with the law, manned by competing (sometimes adversarial) 
systems of governance on either side, and frequently perceived as the transitory point for 
potential ‘corroders’ of national identity.168 As a construct inscribing the territorial limits of the 
State, and where potential entrants are ‘cleared’ for access, the border is a space constructed by 
and through law. The way in which the border is legally constructed and socially performed (by 
a number of local agents, including the border agent and the potential entrant, but also law 
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enforcement personnel) has a significant impact on identity-construction.169  The fact that 
patrolled borders are underwritten by a formal set of codes that lay out the criteria for access, 
conceal the officer’s potential for bias or use of subjective reasoning, and provides their 
decision-making an aura of objective legitimacy.170 This work, then, reveals to us the 
particularly powerful position of law-enforcers as performers of space (i.e. in that they 
reproduce space through their specific action).171  
This is most clear in the case of those who seek entry past the border – such as refugees and 
migrants – but these demarcations and performances are also relevant to some minority 
communities within the State, such as Indigenous groups living on the Reservation. In these 
instances, the courts become performers of space, compelling Indigenous groups to behave in 
very specific ways in order to maintain their treaty rights (i.e. to remain on the Reservation and 
not move into mainstream spaces). In Chapter Three I discuss how courts performances of the 
Reserve-space have a negative impact on native communities’ enjoyment of their citizenship 
rights. I also look at how these performances have the effect of distorting Aboriginal identity by 
compelling Aboriginals to shape their sense of self in ways that may be inconsonant with how 
they self-define. 
Studies of the border expose the ways in which law, and particularly the routinisation of legal 
activity, helps to neutralise legal decisions. For example, in studies of Aboriginal title 
jurisprudence, the laying down of standard criteria for demonstrating possession (i.e. 
continuous occupation and use of land since time immemorial) suggests that a ‘productive’ use 
of space is what controls these interactions between liberal law and Aboriginal communities. In 
reality, however, what constitutes ‘productive’ has a Eurocentric bias towards industrial and 
commercial development that has existed since the first Imperial-Indigenous encounters and 
has been encoded through imperial and colonial law. 
But critical legal geographers have also explored the ‘spatio-legal’ as sites of resistance. These 
authors have examined, for example, native resistance to colonial regimes of power,172 and 
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racial and gendered transgressions of space which often work to disorient and complicate the 
prevailing gender/racial hierarchies and ‘order of things.’173 I draw on their insights in my 
discussion of the Aboriginal women from the Yankunytjatjara, Antikarinya, and Kokatha regions 
of Southern Australia. Through this analysis I reveal how these women not only contest Anglo-
European visions of space through their own terrestrial identities, but also demonstrate how 
their relationship with the earth is further strengthened by their femininity and role as 
‘mothers’.    
ii. The ‘Space-in-Law’ Approach 
Conversely the space-in-law method of inquiry looks at how legal discourse is structured 
through spatial metaphors and how these spaces attempt to perform, while simultaneously 
concealing the influences of, law. Perhaps the most frequently discussed spaces within law are 
the abstract public and private sphere. While public space is defined as a place where the law 
can be found, the private domain is marked by law’s absence. Three important implications arise 
in this categorisation of the public and private. The first is, in defining the private sphere as 
lawless, certain structures of authority (e.g. the State) give the impression that its law is 
distinctively different from the law of other normative orders. I discuss this implication in the 
first part of Chapter Three and my study of colonial India, where I suggest that this presumption 
leads to the idea that separate ‘laws’ need separate spaces in which to operate. Moreover, this 
also implies that ‘the legal’ and ‘the social’ are two separate categories of interaction and creates 
the illusion of law being a closed, objective, and impartial system of regulation that is beyond 
the influence of social norms and culture. Abstracting legal validity from social interactions that 
take place within the private sphere fails to recognise that these interactions may hold legal 
meaning for participants. This, in turn, produces hierarchies of law, in which the normative 
dominance of the law in the public sphere overrides that operating within the private realm.  
Secondly, the public/private distinction removes behaviours that the political authority does 
not wish to engage with (or finds threatening) by relegating them to the private sphere. This has 
the effect of trivialising ‘private’ behaviours and it also encourages us to think that these 
behaviours do not belong to the ‘real world’.174 Some authors argue that the public/private 
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distinction works to contain or conceal the multidimensional nature of identity-construction.  
Studies related to this issue look at the idea of ‘meta-space’, spaces of hybridity and ‘in-
betweenness’ that are concealed from us by virtue of their being “domains ‘between’ or ‘beyond’ 
spaces and places that we generally accept as unambiguously public or private.”175 The idea of 
in-between spaces, or liminal spaces, becomes particularly valuable in assessing the North-West 
Frontier and its historical place as a buffer-zone between British India and Russian Afghanistan. 
In creating the Frontier as a buffer zone its people are understood as either extensions of 
Afghanistan or India, but never as fully autonomous agents. As I suggest in Chapter Four, this 
has had some very problematic consequences for their later inclusion into the national identity 
and political community of Pakistan. 
The third important implication of the public/private dichotomy is that it allows law to use 
space as a way of making invisible its effects and some of its most subjugating tendencies. The 
notion of legal jurisdiction, for example, artificially dichotomises human interactions, creating 
the impression that simultaneous actions are actually happening in separate spatial and 
temporal domains. So, for example, legal jurisdiction comes to reflect the idea that religious 
practices are confined to the ‘private sphere’, and that they have no place in the public domain. 
These actions are understood as ‘traditional’ (back in time) and must be confined to the home 
(though often places of worship are not private at all). In creating these separate spaces for 
action, legal geographies like the private sphere give the impression that “we operate within a 
protected sphere of autonomy, free to make self-willed individual choices, and to feel secure 
against the encroachment of others.”176  In Chapter Four I evaluate these assumptions and 
suggest that these claims are based on a misconception. Often these spaces do not represent an 
absence of official law, but spaces of legal excess.177 The private space is often where law 
operates in abundance, implicitly controlling some of the most intimate aspects of our lives. 
There are recent examples that point to how State-law is encroaching on the private sphere to 
regulate social interactions for the ‘good of the public’, for example tapping our phones and 
recording our internet activity. Governments have invaded the private space of the home by, for 
example, enacting laws against domestic violence and certain types of sexual relations (i.e. 
incestual or paedophilia).  In some instances, this encroachment takes the form of State 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
which nonetheless has tremendous significance for human beings. See, Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch, "The 
Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life," Buffalo Law Review 36(1987): p 239.  
175 Mary Ann Tétreault, "Frontier Politics: Sex, Gender, and the Deconstruction of the Public Space," Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 26, no. 1 (2001): p 53-4. 
176 Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch, "The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life," Buffalo Law 
Review 36(1987). 
177 Cooper discusses this in terms of excessive governance by both State institutions and civil bodies. See, Davina 
Cooper, Govering out of Order: Space, Law and the Politics of Belonging (London: New York University Press, 1998). 
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regulation over family privacy and issues related to our reproductive choices.178  At other times 
the private sphere represents areas of legal excess because, apart from State intrusion, our 
social interactions are also influenced by the presence of religious laws and cultural norms, 
which shape, for example, our gendered identity and determine how we behave with those 
around us.  
Various forms of social regulation intersect within the private sphere to shape how we relate to 
others and, as Freeman and Mensch note, law’s encroachment on the private domain generates 
legal consciousness, an awareness about the law, even in those instances when we are engaged 
in the most intimate and personal private behaviours.179  This ‘awareness of the law’ is made 
more evident when transgressive performances of space take place, by which I mean ways of 
doing space that are unexpected or, out of the norm. For example, in Chapter Three I discuss 
how the treaty rights of Aboriginals are suspended if they migrate off the Reserve. As a space of 
‘Aboriginal containment’ those that defy these legal geographies and their regulation of social 
interaction face the possibility of having their legal rights curtailed. In these instances the 
‘public’ space outside of the Reserve is revealed as not public at all if you are an Aborigine. The 
Reserve becomes a space made by the law for the very purposes of withholding legal 
entitlements, or shaping legal action.180 
Interestingly, Sutherland work explores how a ‘lack of space’ within which the law can visibly 
extend its thumping fist of regulation creates spaces of unpredictability, alterity, and danger. 
Sutherland considers the legal regulation of nomadic lifestyles and settlement patterns, and 
draws attention to how these practices are problematic because of our conventional 
understanding of “social and legal forms of societies being organised around individuals being 
fixed in place.”181  This literature argues that part of the analytical difficulty arises from the fact 
that sedentary societies have ‘fixed’ identities, in the sense that those identities are spatialised, 
materialised in property, and thus give rise to a permanent address and location. However, with 
                                                             
178 Carla Makhlouf Obermeyer, "Reproductive Choice in Islam: Gender and State in Iran and Tunisia," Studies in 
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179 Alan Freeman and Elizabeth Mensch, "The Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life," Buffalo Law 
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181 Anne Sutherland, "Complexities of U.S. Law and Gypsy Identity," The American Journal of Comparative Law 45, no. 
2 (1997): p 393. 
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the shifting places and spaces that gypsy populations occupy, it becomes to virtually impossible 
to ‘verify’ their identity. As Sutherland notes, the law has difficulty with people who cannot be 
located in space because those people become “hard to control.”182 Constant mobility and 
impermanent settlement cause problems for a law that is entirely rooted in controlling social 
interactions in and through space.  This concern with limits in law running parallel to limits in 
space is also raised by scholarship that discusses how certain legal spaces become ‘invisible’ 
because they defy the traditional expectation that the boundaries of law and territory should be 
coterminous. These themes are further explored in my examination in Chapter Three of the 
Australian government’s designation of areas as deserted desert-lands.  
4. Concluding Comments 
In this chapter I have mapped the trajectory of socio-spatial discourse by reference to two 
significant intersecting bodies of academic literature. In the first part of this chapter I discussed 
how theorists have disrupted fixed and passive notions of space to reveal how space is 
reproduced through social interaction and individual performance. Space is something that is 
done and redone. In ‘spacing’ social life, social scientists have drawn attention to the 
contingencies of space, and they have thereby exposed the myriad ways in which the wide-open 
spaces of our environment have been converted into places of meaning and belonging. This 
work highlights how spaces collude to shape and determine the social interactions we engage in 
on a daily basis.  Despite spotlighting the socially-constructed nature of space, this chapter 
argues that spatialities have the potential to hold deep meaning for their users, not least 
because they are often essential components of identity-building. 
In the second part of this chapter I built on this ‘spatial turn’ within the social sciences by 
examining some of the more prominent discussions in the areas of legal geography. Traditional 
investigations into law and geography reveal the ways in which law produces territory, and 
territory reproduces the law. However, a more critical variety of legal geographers have taken 
this a step further to show how law is materialised in space and also vice versa, space 
materialised in law. This, therefore, gives rise to situations in which the two cannot be properly 
disentangled from one another. This chapter also highlighted studies that explore some of the 
more contentious expressions of legal space in the form of racialised and gendered places and 
spaces of legal exclusion.  I also drew attention to the ways in which societies imagine and 
institute divisions in space to conceal the excesses of laws operation, and how these spaces of 
division trivialise certain interactions while privileging others. This idea is expressed more 
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clearly in my analysis of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, in Chapter Four, where the tribal space is 
not neutralised of liberal law (as it first appears), but it is rather a space characterised by an 
overabundance of regulation. 
The current body of scholarship has been explored and investigated with the aim of drawing 
attention to two important ideas that I will explore throughout this thesis.  The first is that space 
and law are related. We understand ‘the legal’ by being able to anchor it in the spatial, and we 
observe, perform, organise, and interact with our environment in ways that consistently, and 
constantly, draw on the law. Second, I draw attention to how the spatial turn in the social 
sciences affirms not only the simultaneity and disorderliness of space, but also the simultaneity 
and disorderliness of law. Dominant legal discourse has been, to a large extent, focused on 
maintaining a strict division between law and society, a division that is thoroughly complicated 
by the introduction of space into legal discourse.  According to these perspectives it becomes 
clear that we can no longer hold law to this objective and impartial standard that pervades the 
more conventional legal theories’. Chapters Two and Three will specifically examine this issue 
by studying the historical development of the notion of territory, as a spatial form that is 
constructed through the processes of Imperial conquest and colonisation. I draw on many of the 
concepts and claims discussed in this chapter to examine the socially-constructed roots of 
territory.  I will also explore the many ways in which the colonial relationship between legal 
regulation and the imagined geographies of territory complicates the operation and function of 
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Chapter Two 
Mapping the Imperial-Indigenous Encounters 
Occidental Legality and the Making of Territory 
1. Introduction 
The next two chapters need to be read as a consecutive narrative of Occidental Legality and its 
production of territory. Occidental legality signifies an impulse to employ geographic space as a 
mechanism for fashioning and structuring social interaction in a way that empowers certain 
groups over others. The conceptual product of this impulse is ‘territory’. As the pre-eminent 
container of social relations and political decision-making today, territory has come to 
represent a natural, passive background of social and political life.  However, in this chapter I 
question the established assumption that territory, as a representation of space, is apolitical. 
Through this chapter I expose the ways in which a territorial construction of space is cultural. 
Territory is the product of jurisdictional struggles between two normative communities that 
are, for the first time, coming into contact with one another. It is partially produced through 
European perceptions of non-European lands and peoples and the documentation of those 
perceptions in various types of cultural texts. 
In this Chapter I assess the underpinning machinery of intellectual thought and social practice 
to expose how the notion of territory is driven by the idea of cultural difference. By aiming to 
bring the work of these apparatuses into sharper focus, I reveal a strong correlative relationship 
between geographic, cultural, political, and legal power. Territory as a material construct 
emerges from dynamic intersections between cultural, geographic, and political and legal 
knowledge. Like time, space needs to be understood as a project of continuous becoming, and 
territory symbolises a powerful representation of space that is “the cumulative effect of past 
human action and thought.”183 
Rather than a tangible and material reality, we need to think of territory as an idea, an idea of 
how to best organise the social space so that it privileges certain values and interests. This idea 
has been put into practice through the erection of material enclosures and borders, the 
mobilisation of discursive knowledge, and the implementation of social rules that mould, 
manage, and discipline these processes.  Territory is made real, given meaning, and enabled as a 
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construct that produces certain consequences, through centuries of intellectual and political and 
legal enforcement. For some, territory is not merely a “political way of conceiving land, but the 
political corollary of a calculable…concept of space;”184 a conception of space that is ‘finite,’ 
‘material’, and ‘divisible’.  On a more practical level, territory is performed and enacted through 
everyday social interactions that both reinforce its power and contest it. Collectively these 
strategies are referred to as ‘territoriality’.185  
Today, when we think about geographic space we are overwhelmingly drawn to space as 
‘territory’ – bounded, discontinuous, enclosed, and underlain by claims of ownership.186 Over 
the course of these next two chapters I frame this conception of territory through an analysis of 
how and why territory has come to dominate our spatial consciousness. Occidental Legality is 
the term I use to collectively refer to the European impulse to spatialise power and its 
consequences.  I draw attention to how the environment represents the medium through which 
European voyagers and political agents from the fifteenth to twentieth century tried to exercise 
control over new lands and strange people. These processes of interpretation, classification, and 
control led to the production of geographic spaces structured by raciality and cultural 
difference. In particular I identify and focus on three key techniques through which these spaces 
were imagined and arranged – cartography,187 ethnography (i.e. travel writing and letter-
writing), and political and legal structures of governance. Through this analysis I trace how 
foreign places were constructed in ways that were often inconsistent with the publicly stated 
intentions of voyagers and colonisers. In uncovering these inconsistencies I demonstrate how 
these spatial techniques represent exercises of power meant to further oppress subject-
populations. 
Frequently the effects of each of the three techniques are difficult to separate. However, as I 
show in the next two chapters, this overlap is precisely what makes cartography, ethnography, 
and political and legal structures of governance such powerful strategies for imagining and 
structuring space. Cartography and travel writing reinforce one another so that the ‘objectivity’ 
of the map draws inspiration from the subjectivity of experience. In turn, political and legal 
                                                             
184 Stuart Elden, "Missing the Point: Globalisation, Deterritorialisation and the Space of the World," Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 30, no. 1` (2005): 8-19. 
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Mapping the Imperial Indigenous Encounters Page 74 
 
structures of governance rely on both cartography and ethnography to enact and legitimise 
certain forms of control and rules of social regulation. The partial gaze of each of these methods 
is made invisible by being reinforced by the others. Based on the reinforcement that these 
techniques receive from one another, I defend the idea that often the spaces of the Imperial-
Indigenous encounters were characterised by a collapsing of ‘what is seen’ and ‘what is known’, 
so that subjective experiences were transformed into objective truths.188 This, I argue, led to the 
development of a series of rules and regulations that were meant to protect and strengthen this 
conflation of knowledge with geographic experience. 
But what is the value of building this narrative of territory? Chapter Two focuses on analysing 
two forms of Imperial ‘witnessing’ - cartography and ethnography - to expose how they 
collectively produced places that were divided, enclosed, and possessed. In showing how the 
most characteristic features of territory were themselves constructed through subjective 
European experience I shed light on how this further complicates structures of governance 
developed within the colonial and postcolonial environment.  In Chapter Three, I undertake a 
more detailed analysis of the relationship between Occidental Legality and forms of law and 
governance that made the transition from the colonial to postcolonial period. The value of this 
project stems from its ability to show a connection between European spatial experience and 
postcolonial State-minority relations. One feature, inter alia, is that there is a dialogical 
relationship between colonial constructions of space and the development of colonial (and later 
postcolonial) law. 
In this chapter I focus on European ideological and intellectual modes of control that lay the 
foundations for later forms of political and legal governance. Some analyses of colonial and 
postcolonial contexts suggest that the Imperial-Indigenous encounters were an event 
characterised exclusively by a relationship of European domination and native oppression. This 
may, in turn, encourage the view that colonialism simply represents “the oppression, 
humiliation, and exploitation of Indigenous peoples.”189 However, this approach is reductive 
because it completely discounts the many instances in which these encounters gave rise to 
situations and identities marked by hybridity, liminality, and the crossing-over of ideas and 
perceptions. Thus, this narrative is as much about the prominence and paramountcy of 
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territorial interpretations of the world, as it is about practices of protest and processes of 
resistance to that vision.  
2. Overview of Chapter 
Section (3) of this chapter begins with a brief note of clarification, in which I discuss two of the 
key concepts that will be used readily throughout the following chapters. In Section (4), I set the 
stage for exploring European geographic experiences in the Americas, Asia, and Africa by 
examining an historical account that has deep relevance for international legal theorists 
studying the origins of the inter-State system.  The Treaty of Tordesillas, apart from 
documenting the first attempts made by Europe to exercise greater global control - “the seizing 
or comprehending of the world as a whole”190 - exemplifies the immateriality of ‘territory’ as a 
concept, as a jurisdiction, which involves the mapping of one’s laws onto geography. I spend a 
few moments discussing the Treaty of Tordesillas and Spain and Portugal’s struggle to carve up 
the totality of the world’s space between two, peripherally located, and geopolitically ignorant, 
Empires.  Following from this, Section (5) moves on to what is really the heart of this chapter, 
and examines the four effects of European attempts to regulate events, phenomena, and peoples 
by controlling the geographic area that they occupy (territoriality). I investigate how these 
effects create the bounded, enclosed, and owned spatiality that we now refer to as ‘territory’. 
The connecting theme that informs this analysis is that the notion of territory emerges from a 
history of Europe’s exercise of discursive, cultural, and political power through colonial space 
and in relation to colonised peoples. This chapter concludes with Section (6) and some final 
notes on the social production of territory before I move on to Chapter Three, which discusses 
the political and legal forms of governance that rely on (and further bolster) a territorial 
ordering of people and relationships. 
3. Concepts of Clarification 
The following two sections briefly discuss the concepts of ‘witnessing’ and ‘Occidental Legality’. 
As I use them frequently, and because they are highly dynamic and ‘loaded’ terms, it is 
necessary to more fully explicate my how I understand and use them. 
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A. ‘Witnessing’ Knowledge 
In tracing the development of territory from the Imperial-Indigenous encounters, it becomes 
apparent that experience and knowledge frequently converge within the European geographic 
imagination.  As such, what is witnessed by European observers often comes to represent the 
real.191  In speaking of ‘witnessing’ I refer to European sensory experience of foreign lands, 
expressed through cartographic processes and letter- and travel-writing which chronicle 
European voyages. These experiences are useful sources by which to evidence the process of 
reasoning that underlies the production of Eurocentric beliefs and practices. This, as I will 
demonstrate throughout this thesis, has an impact on the forms and structures of law and 
governance. Over the course of the European voyages, geographic anomalies - what Benton 
refers to as ‘singularity’ – are made sense of by the discourse of the ‘marvellous’192 and 
‘monstrous’, sometimes through the simultaneous invocation of both. Judgments about what 
counts as either marvellous or monstrous are made by using European referents of modernity 
and civilisation. Often this has the effect of construing any diverging traditions, practices, and 
histories as inhuman and savage. 
Within the European imagination, geographic singularity frequently translates into cultural, and 
later legal, singularity. Geography becomes integral to the development of Imperial law, 
whereby: 
[g]eographic tropes featured prominently as a shorthand way to describe some of the spatial 
variations of Imperial law. In somewhat haphazard and decentralised ways, a fluid discourse 
about geography urged associations between physical properties and qualities of law and 
sovereignty.193 
Most importantly, it becomes increasingly clear that the law which emerges within the colonial 
setting, in these distant places, diverges significantly from the law of the metropole. In 
contradiction to the widespread perception that colonial law unfolded as a uniform system 
spanning passive and stable geographies, the narrative of Occidental Legality that is developed 
over the next two chapters shows how the legal regimes that emerged within the colonial space 
borrowed heavily from local rule and tradition. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to unsettle 
the perception that colonial law was systematically ‘rolled out’ and evenly applied across the 
colonial world.  The law in Britain’s overseas colonies was most certainly an amalgam of 
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Imperial and native legal regimes, and this is a reality that is adamantly denied within 
contemporary Euro-Western legal discourse. Territory, I argue, plays an important role in 
creating this ‘singularity’ from what are, undeniably, pluralities within the law. I want to bring 
into sharper focus the innumerable instances during Imperial rule where both law and 
geographic knowledge relied on each other for stability and cover, and existed as co-
conspirators in tempering, and at time broadening, the fragmentation between new social 
communities encountering each other for the very first time.  
B. Occidental Legality 
The word ‘Occident’ has been employed by prevailing literary and geopolitical discourse to 
mean ‘the Western world’ (as distinct and separate from the Eastern world), or simply the 
‘West’.  The term has a spatial component, in that it aims to locate the object or phenomena to 
which it is affixed.  But, because ‘Occident’ is a relational concept it requires an ‘Orient’ against 
which it derives its own meaning, it is a term that locates in relation to something else. It can 
therefore be understood as a ‘direction’ as much as it is a ‘location’. What I mean by this is that it 
has a stable and relative component; while its location (i.e. ‘the West’) has the potential to 
remain fixed, its directionality may change depending on the varying positions from which it 
can be observed. This is important to keep in mind because, as the case study in Chapter Four 
will demonstrate, there are emerging situations in which ‘the Orient’ may be imagining itself 
(and may be imagined by other groups within the Orient) as ‘Western’ (i.e. espousing ‘Western 
values’). In my previous analysis of Orientalist theory, and the work of Fanon, I believe that this 
self-perception of ‘Westernness’ has much to do with the need for the self to be recognised as a 
legitimate political entity.194  
Building on the above idea, ‘Occident’ is also used to signify an entity – ‘the West’ – and all the 
ideological and intellectual biases that these determinations incur. Thus, I use the term with an 
awareness of both its relatively stable and consistently transforming, components of meaning, 
as well as the fact that it is frequently used to signify a particular set of ideologies, frameworks 
of knowledge, and types of practices.  
I introduce the term Occidental Legality as a label which captures the colonial impulse to locate, 
or spatialise, power and the consequences that this gives rise to. At the same time, however, it is 
worth emphasising that it is not an impulse that is limited to European colonisers. Rather it is an 
understanding of power that permeated the colonial experience and could frequently be 
identified and traced to European and non-European sources (and everything in-between these 
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strict binary descriptors). While in Chapter Two, the discussion that follows focuses mainly on 
the European impulse for regulating and categorising social relations through reference to 
geographic space, Chapter Three develops this analysis through a focus on the non-European 
adoption of this vision and, in some cases the non-European rejection of this vision, as well as its 
consequences for political and legal governance in colonial and later postcolonial societies.  
From the analysis undertaken over the course of these two chapters it is possible to argue that 
this is a highly charged and provocative use of Occidentalism precisely because it aims to 
dislocate the underlying expectations we have of it. Yet, Occidentalism is a term that perfectly 
describes the processes and sensibilities that informed the Imperial-Indigenous encounters, in 
the sense that the spatialisation of power was meant to fix subjective meaning in order to 
produce an objective reality. While the Imperial-Indigenous encounter was structured by 
hybridity – as a result of shifting allegiances, identities, and structures of governance – 
spatialising power gave the impression of stability, of permanence, of endurance. In essence, 
spatialising power worked to alleviate growing anxieties about the unpredictability and 
precariousness of the colonial environment and its attendant social relations. 
In Chapter Three I demonstrate how colonial and postcolonial forms of governance draw on an 
earlier Imperial coupling of geographic and cultural knowledge (which is what is being 
discussed in this chapter). The linking of geographic space with cultural difference had the 
tendency to minimise normative plurality and even more so, normative overlap, within the 
colony. That is, while looser patterns of politico-juridical relations characterised the early 
periods of European expansion, the growing focus on territorial possession prompted the 
standardisation and centralisation of political authority. This shift coincided with the even more 
ambitious project of European overseas settlement and land appropriation.  As the autonomy of 
the Imperial powers became connected to the exclusive control over and settlement of 
geographic space, visible markers of this exclusive control began to appear (e.g. boundaries, 
borders, policing).  These symbols of geographic ownership were critical for disciplining 
alternative performances and visions of space by native populations. As space and place became 
integral to not only European economic and cultural hegemony, but also political power, 
colonial governments became less receptive to maintaining conditions of normative pluralism, 
and instead structured the native-settler relationship as one of disproportionate levels of 
political and legal development. Native communities were perceived as the benefactors of 
European civilisation, and their own indigenous institutional structures were swept under the 
rug, as if they had never existed and intimately interacted with the development of colonial law.  
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In developing this argument in Chapters two and three, I draw particular attention to the ways 
in which Occidental Legality naturalised and institutionalised a culturally-divisive view of 
geographic space. At the same time, I consider the dialogical reproduction of this vision by 
analysing how this model of space was reinforced through the responses of many native peoples 
that were the objects of its most violent and oppressive tendencies. In this Chapter I focus on 
the complicated history of Occidental Legality, a history structured through map-making, travel 
writing, and their relationship with political and legal structures of governance. The history of 
Occidental Legality gives an account of territory that is brimming with exercises of power and 
counter-power, where colonisers and the colonised are equally involved (though not equally 
empowered) in producing a notion of space that is derived through perceptions of cultural 
difference.  
4. The Treaty of Tordesillas as an Envisioning of European Conquest  
The Treaty of Tordesillas was an agreement sought by the Spanish rulers Ferdinand and 
Isabella after Columbus’ voyage to the New World in 1494. Alarmed by the Portuguese’s 
growing ocean power195, the Spanish sought Papal support to secure their claims of possession 
against the Portuguese and all potential future claimants. They were successful in convincing 
Pope Alexander VI to issue a Papal bull delimiting the Spanish and Portuguese spheres of 
influence,196  and the dividing line was set 370 leagues to the west of the Cape Verde Islands. 
Spain was given exclusive right to navigate the seas and possess all newly discovered lands to 
the west of the divide, while Portugal was given the same title to the east. By placing Europe in 
the ‘centre’ of the globe, the Papal bull issued a division of geographic space into two 
traversable hemispheres; a division that would underpin European political and cultural power 
for the next five centuries.  
A joint expedition was to be launched by the two rulers to map out exactly where the dividing 
line would exist, and a tower was to be erected as a boundary-marker. The expedition never 
came to fruition, as both became embroiled in discussions over the costs and benefits of fixing a 
boundary. Perhaps the placement of physical boundaries was never pursued as the potential 
benefits were difficult to gauge given that these were places never before visited and there was 
                                                             
195 Headrick writes that the Portuguese were the first kingdom to successful travel across the ocean - a feat 
attempted by many kingdoms (the Chinese, the Middle Eastern rulers, and the Polynesians) that had eventually failed. 
See, Daniel R. Headrick, Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), p 20-1. 
196 Steinberg has argued that the Pope’s interest was also motivated by how division and conflict between the two 
Iberian Empires could affect the spread of Christianity into the New World. See, Philip E. Steinberg, "Lines of Divisoin, 
Lines of Connection: Stewardship in the World Ocean," Geographical Review 89, no. 2 (1999): p 255. 
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little to confirm that they even existed. Interestingly, despite the boundary-marker never having 
been erected, Ferdinand ordered that the demarcation continue to be placed on all sailing charts 
to prevent Portuguese voyagers from accessing ‘Spanish space’.197 
A. Potential Spaces, Imagined Places 
There are several aspects of the Treaty of Tordesillas which would be a cause for concern to 
anyone examining these negotiations by contemporary standards. First, the agreement exhibits 
the obvious oversight that boundaries of influence were being established without any due 
consideration being given to the populations that were being divided and subjected to Spanish 
and Portuguese control. These spaces were already imagined as empty, its occupants imagined 
as little more than minor impediments to the expansion of Spanish and Portuguese influence. 
But apart from this, the terms of the Treaty were based on charting and dividing spaces that 
were entirely imagined,198 and they were further imagined to be passive, inert, and open to 
discovery and (eventually) available for possession. The two kingdoms appeared to be laying 
claim to not only distant geographic areas, but potentially non-existent ones. The Imperial map, 
in both this context and every context thereafter, existed as an: 
abstract vehicle that gave [the Europeans] the theoretical security that land existed along 
the westward course before [they] set foot upon it. By means of the map the European had a 
bird’s eye view of the world...the map uniquely charted the first face-off between the cultural 
grammars of two different hemispheres.199 
 Paradoxically, the map expressed a theoretical certainty that these places existed, at the same 
time as it presented potential opportunities to discover never-before visited spaces. The 
Imperial map was thus vested with a cultural significance because it claimed to provide the 
most accurate version of geographic reality, a reality conceived by Europeans for universal 
consumption. This pointed to the likelihood that lands discovered by virtue of the Imperial map 
would “take on the cultural form prescribed by the map [itself].”200   
The Treaty of Tordesillas brings to light – in a very profound and visible way – the problematic 
designs by which the world has been constructed by those in positions of economic and political 
                                                             
197 Though this stipulation, too, was not incorporated until nearly two decades after the Treaty was signed. See, Mary 
Wilhelmine Williams, "The Treaty of Tordesillas and the Argentine-Brazilian Boundary Settlement," Hispanic 
American Historical Review (1922): p 6.  Williams lists a range of reasons why the provisions of the Treaty were never 
met, mostly because Portuguese interest in the New World waned, but also because the terms of the Treaty were 
extremely ambiguous. 
198 A practice that was consistently employed throughout the early periods of Spanish conquest. See, Barbara E. 
Mundy, The Mapping of New Spain: Indigenous Cartography and the Maps of the Relaciones Geográficas (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2000), p 13-4. 
199 William Boelhower, "Inventing America: The Culture of the Map," Revue Française d'etudes Americaines 36(1988): 
p 211. 
200 Ibid.: p 212. 
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power. Space is mapped in a fragmentary fashion, presented as owned by either one controlling 
agent or another. The Treaty further offers us a rare glimpse into one of the first documented 
instances in which territorial possession and jurisdiction had little to do with having roots in, or 
a historical tie, to claimed lands.  While this is a standard that has been referenced in terms of 
how contemporary courts structure the postcolonial State’s claims of sovereignty, it is a 
standard that is not extended to native peoples’ making similar claims for title.201 Thus, the 
Treaty draws attention to the contradictory logic that underlies contemporary claims of 
sovereignty and Aboriginal title.  
Utterly disinterested in considering the possibility that these lands were not, essentially, ‘for the 
taking’, the Treaty of Tordesillas represents a conceptual emptying of distant territories (both 
real and imagined), and an overlaying of one’s legal and political frameworks onto imagined 
geographies. From this we see the immateriality of territory as a geography mapped through 
the imposition of an Empire’s law. The leap to later claims of terra nullius become less 
surprising given the view of the world that informs these treaty negotiations. In its depiction of 
imagined geographic areas, the Treaty could be said to have anticipated, and thus promoted, 
empire.202  The Treaty of Tordesillas, therefore, offers us great insight into how invaders were 
able to “parcel[...] the [conquered lands] among themselves in designs reflective of their own 
complex rivalries and relative power.”203  
Contemporary studies of the Treaty expose the absurdity of imagined possession, the 
problematic assumptions underlying its claims, and reveal the political nature of map-making in 
the process of Imperial conquest.204 While these negotiations suggest that territory was an 
important aspect of European conceptions of power, this was a view that was not extended to 
the populations that potentially inhabited these ‘imagined’ lands. The relative ease with which 
the boundaries were negotiated, and the fact that the dividing-line was mapped more-or-less 
                                                             
201 This suggests that European possession is held to a different standard than native possession. For example, as I 
show in Chapter Three, the Canadian court’s renunciation of the doctrine of terra nullius has done little to quash 
existing European claims for sovereignty over non-European land.   
202 Bassett discusses this potentiality of map-making by reference to Empire-building in 19th century West Africa. 
Thomas J. Bassett, "Cartography and Empire Building in Nineteenth-Century West Africa," American Geographical 
Society of New York 84, no. 3 (1994): p 316.  
203 J. B. Harley, The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore, Maryland: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2001), p 59. 
204 Stuart Elden, "Missing the Point: Globalisation, Deterritorialisation and the Space of the World," Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 30, no. 1` (2005): 12-3.  Figueredo mentions how the geography was altered in 
Portuguese maps so as to include certain areas within the “zone of Portugal’s possessions.” See, Fidelino de 
Figueredo, "The Geographic Discoveries and Conquests of the Portuguese," The Hispanic American Historical Review 6, 
no. 1 (1926): p 56. 
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equally between the two, suggests each Empire’s recognition of the other’s coevalness;205 a 
recognition that was seldom accorded to the peoples that these Empires eventually conquered. 
Lastly, the Treaty illustrates an important theme that informs many of the key debates 
presented within this thesis, and that is the idea of how European overseas voyages entirely 
exploded the prevailing concept of distance and the logistical and material barriers that had, till 
that moment, prevented European presence in faraway places like Africa and the Americas. In 
crossing oceans, European travellers and political agents were confronted with a whole new, 
and previously unanticipated, set of economic and political possibilities. The meaning of 
distance radically shifted when Europeans came into contact with previously unexpected 
populations and practices. This unexpected ‘newness’ gave rise to anxieties that, as I show in the 
chapters that follow, inspired new ways of ‘building-in’ that distance, of controlling space and 
location in order to ideologically and intellectually recreate a perceived separation and to give 
the impression of remoteness and singularity in order to tame the alarming reality of proximity 
and plurality. 
5.  Techniques of Territoriality and European Experiences of Overseas Travel 
I begin this next section of the chapter with a discussion of how much of the Treaty’s underlying 
intuitions can be identified in how European voyagers and political agents processed and 
managed the diverse landscapes and peoples they encountered during their overseas voyages. I 
draw on Imperial cartography and ethnography in the form of travel writing and Imperial 
correspondence to draw attention to the ways in which both forms of European witnessing had 
the tendency to conflate perception with epistemology through the linking of geographic 
experience with cultural knowledge. I suggest that this tendency arose as a result of the belief 
that the spectacle of foreign lands and people could be understood and managed through the 
careful chronicling and categorisation of geographic and social difference. However, somewhere 
during the complex process of conveying geographic knowledge these chronicles of European 
experience reflected judgments of cultural incommensurability between the European agents 
and their native subjects. This, in turn, had the effect of justifying European possession of 
foreign lands, and the exercise of political authority over non-European peoples. 
                                                             
205 In using the term ‘coeval’ I refer back to the way in which Massey employs the term in For Space. For her, coeval 
existence implies temporal and spatial synchronicity; social groups exist in simultaneity (in space and time). She thus 
disrupts a linear view of history, suggesting instead the co-existence of multiple histories and multiple spaces, with 
each having value that cannot be determined in relation to another (time or space). See, Doreen Massey, For Space 
(London: Sage, 2005), p 8-9, 68. 
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I will explore how spatial experience led to the production of socio-geographic knowledge by 
organising my analysis in terms of the form effects that Imperial witnessing had on foreign 
space and its people: emptying geographic space of its normative content; mapping cultural 
knowledge onto geography; grounding identities in geographic space; and temporalising 
geographies of difference. I will explore how spatial experience led to the production of socio-
geographic knowledge by organising my analysis in terms of the four effects that Imperial 
witnessing had on foreign space and its people. In so doing I expose a mutually-constitutive 
relationship between European travel writing – a largely subjective experience – and European 
cartography – a ‘scientific’ process that nonetheless draws heavily on the observations and 
ideas of ocular testimonies.  
A. Emptying Geographic Space of its Normative Content 
In this section I demonstrate how European techniques of territoriality created a conceptually 
emptied colonial space. In employing European referents of commercial, economic, 
infrastructural and political development, not only were explored areas represented as lacking 
European industriousness and ingenuity, but they were effectively sterilised of their non-
European history and identity. These effects of Imperial witnessing made it possible for 
European voyagers to reproduce conquered areas according to the Imperial vision.  
i. Witnessing the Pristine Wilderness 
Through the Treaty of Tordesillas it is possible to identify the underlying sentiments of 
European conquest, namely that the globe appeared to the Spanish and Portuguese as awaiting 
European exploration. Based on this, it was not entirely unpredictable that tropes of discovery 
would figure prominently throughout Imperial ethnographic and cartographic processes. In 
many accounts of European witnessing it is possible to identity space being explained in terms 
of polarities – the pristine wilderness versus the humanised landscape.206 In juxtaposing the 
pristine and the manufactured side-by-side, these narratives often conveyed a sense of wonder 
and amazement: 
The approach to the City of Palaces from the River is exceedingly fine; the Hooghly at all 
periods of the year presents a broad surface of sparkling water, and as it winds through a 
                                                             
206 For instance, in Humboldt’s witnessing of the Amazonian jungle we are drawn to the “vast solitude” of the pristine 
landscape. He notes, “here in a fertile country adorned with eternal verdure, we seek in vain the traces of the power 
of man.” We are given the distinct impression that Humboldt and his crewmen were the first to set foot upon this 
area. See Humboldt quoted in Neil Safier, "The Confines of the Colony," in The Imperial Map: Cartography and the 
Mastery of Empire, ed. James R. Akerman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p 134.  Yet, as Safier notes, his 
description of the Rio Negro is replete with human conflict, pointing to the disorderliness of the landscape, the 
desolation of the wilderness juxtaposed with the territorial politics of the tribal communities living within these 
areas. 
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richly wooded country, clothed with eternal verdure, and interspersed with stately 
buildings, the stranger feels that banishment may be endured amid scenes of so much 
picturesque beauty.207  
Sometimes, however, European perplexity is replaced by an anxious confusion of having to 
come to grips with a level of diversity that made literal description and ideological containment 
all the more difficult.208 Often times this anxiety was expressed by way of two contradictory 
observations about the climate and geography of the exact same place.209 These depictions 
produced an environment that was simultaneously drab but untrammelled, lush but barren.  
Narratives of Imperial witnessing were often organised in terms of common environmental 
tropes and models of nature and culture, making it possible to better “locate India, or its 
constituent regions, within a larger scheme [emphasis added].”210 This need to categorise and 
locate was further expressed through the naming of space.  This had the effect of converting any 
given space into a place bearing the (‘anglicised’) imprint of European discovery.  The history of 
this space was thus divided into two separate, non-intersecting, epochs – one characterised by 
native habitation and local knowledge, and the other by European arrival and representation.211 
The naming of spaces also had the added effect of implying that the area was empty, ‘unnamed’ 
and thus non-existent, before the Europeans appeared.  
ii. Tropes of Discovery and European Benevolence 
While narrations of Imperial witnessing in themselves are little cause for consternation, given 
that they represent the personal observations and experiences of the European viewer, often 
these accounts served as the basis for purportedly ‘objective’ forms of representation, including 
map-making.  In early mappings of potential overseas territory, many areas of the globe were 
left intentionally blank because they had yet to be verified through European discovery. 
D’Anville’s influential mapping of Africa in 1749 relayed a continent mottled by unfilled areas 
(see fig. 2.1). Similarly, his map of India was also crafted using exhaustive precision in 
portraying centres of European activity, while other parts of the subcontinent remained 
                                                             
207 Emma Roberts, Scenes and Characteristics of Hindostan: With Sketches of Anglo-Indian Society (London: W.H. Allen, 
1837), p 1. 
208 “He struggled to come to terms with a landscape that was bright, verdant, and bursting with life after the 
monsoons, but seemingly barren and ‘naked’ for much of the rest of the year.” See, David Arnold, The Tropics and the 
Traveling Gaze: India, Landscape, and Science 1800-1856 (London: University of Washington Press, 2006), p 132.   
209 Compare Roberts’ description in n.20 above with the description of India as a jungle of pestilence and disease. See, 
Ibid. 
210 Ibid., (2006), p 33. 
211 As Pratt notes, this ‘representation’ was often expressed through tropes of discovery, which involved “converting 
local knowledges (discourses) into European national and continental knowledges associated with European forms 
and relations of power.” See,  Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), p 198. 
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sparsely detailed.212 While d’Anville is famed for employing very unusual techniques of 
mapping, which relied on travel narratives, along with poetry, philosophy, and literature to 
confirm the location of places, his method relied on places being repeatedly documented in a 
medium and language accessible to d’Anville in order for them to be considered factual. As the 
presence of these areas was verified through European discovery, documentation, verification, 
and representation, they became little more than images produced through the European gaze.   
Moreover, while the truth was that the maps illustrated very select places of European 
expansion and enterprise, they were a material confirmation of European possession.213 The 
effect of the blank spaces, particularly when juxtaposed with the very specific charting of places 
of European activity, was that its audience was persuaded of the illustriousness and 
improvement of conquest.  Maps provided a visually and widely-accessible image of Europe’s 
‘modernisation’ of places (Africa, Asia and the Americas), an image that could hardly be verified 
by its primary consumers, who lived thousands of miles away.  Blank spots on the map 
suggested that these places were of little value, with the sparse detailing representing a visual 
communication of having ‘nothing to report’.  
A map composed of vast voids not only brought the detailed sections into sharper focus, but also 
had the effect of homogenising the unmapped. While places that were already discovered and 
comprehensively recorded could easily be compared and differentiated, given the meticulous 
surveying of the land, mapping of terrain, and charting of topographic and climatic features, the 
barren spaces were visual cues reporting uniformity or sameness. Sparse detailing on a map not 
only standardised the geography of two differently located areas, but also the personalities and 
sensibilities of its inhabitants, who may have had very different linguistic, historical, and 
cultural identities. These ‘non-places’, now emptied of their normative content, could now 
become containers for entirely invented geographies like the fabled Kong Mountains in West 
Africa - fantasised as being rich in resources but an impediment to cross-border imperial 
                                                             
212 Lucy P. Chester, "The Mapping of Empire: French and British Cartographies of India in the Late Eighteenth-
Century," Portuguese Studies 16(2000): p 257.Interestingly, d’Anville points to a politics of geography when he notes 
that spaces on the Indian map had been intentionally left blank on the request of the French East India Company. See, 
Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India 1765-1843 (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990), p 5.  
213 Barbara E. Mundy, The Mapping of New Spain: Indigenous Cartography and the Maps of the Relaciones Geográficas 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000), p 13-5. 
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trade214 – or the ever-mythical ‘India-Tertia’, a land where “there be dragons in the greatest 
abundance, which carry on their heads the lustrous stones which be called carbuncles.”215 
 
Figure 2.1 – d’Anville’s map of Africa (1749). Retrieved from: http://www.bentleys.co.za/africa/y06.html 
 
In representing social difference as discretely bound and spatially fixed, Imperial maps had the 
tendency of stretching European benevolence by minimising native dispossession. If we look at 
the 1763-1775 map of the British Colonies in North America we can find a section of the map 
labelled ‘Crown Land Reserved for Indians’ (see fig. 2.2). It is a relatively small strip of land, 
wedged in-between the borders of British colonies in Quebec and separated from British 
colonies in the east by the Appalachian Mountains.  This minute band of greyed-out space – an 
                                                             
214 Thomas J Bassett and Philip W Porter, "‘From the Best Authorities’: The Mountains of Kong in the Cartography of 
West Africa," The journal of african history 32, no. 03 (1991). 
215 Catalani Jordanus, Mirabilia Descripta: The Wonders of the East, trans. Henry Yule (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), p 41-5. 
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island of ‘non-Europeanness’ amidst a sea of European possessions – visually reflects an ‘act of 
good will’ that works to camouflage the fact that the entirety of the surrounding land was once 
inhabited (or inhabitable) by the very Indigenous groups that are now sequestered in a tiny 
area set apart from the rest of the settled population. Though it may appear that the cultural 
integrity of the Indigenous space has been preserved by the Crown prohibiting European 
settlement in areas earmarked for Indigenous use, the spaces reserved for the Indians already 
bears the marks of Imperial conquest, with its constitutive area internally divided and bordered, 
and its places bearing Anglicised names: ‘Nashboro’, ‘Harrodsburg’, ‘Pt. Pleasant’. The map’s 
legend itself refers to the spaces as ‘possessions’ of Britain, Spain, and France, and the inclusion 
of the ‘1763 Proclamation Line’ appears to reinforce the idea that the space has had a long 
history of European ownership (first the French, now the British). The naming, division, and 
mapping of Indian land effectively silenced the Indian, giving the impression that the European 
was better situated to speak for the Indian than she/he was to speak for himself. Interestingly, 
this is a view that has carried forward to contemporary forms of managing diversity, whereby 
native claimants are forced to adopt the language of the dominant political and legal discourse, 
and to convey their demands through concepts like ‘sovereignty’, ‘jurisdiction’, and ‘autonomy’. 
As I show in Chapter Three, these principles have the tendency to distort native claims, often 
translating question of access to opportunities and the distribution of resources as demands for 
cultural autonomy and territorial segregation. 
Though maps that depict areas set apart for Indians may insinuate European benevolence, these 
spaces have already been scarred by an Imperial assault that will forever shape Indigenous 
life.216 Indeed this ‘act of good faith’ is made all the more dubious by the fact that the ‘White’ and 
Indian lands are physically separated by the Appalachian Mountains, which act as a natural 
barrier between spaces of social difference.  By obscuring the reality that the very group now 
confined to a tiny section of the land that they were once able to roam freely, these maps helped 
to legitimise European conquest and Empire through a projection of European goodwill.  
                                                             
216 Indeed the distinctions outlined in the 1763 Proclamation had a profound impact (and continue to have a 
profound impact) on Indian and First Nations’ status in Canada and the United States, and their claim over ancestral 
lands. 
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Figure 2.2 – The British Colonies in North America 1763-1775. Image retrieved from: 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/british_colonies_1763-76.jpg 
 
While maps were a powerful representation of reality, in the sense that they were material 
representations of perceived or imagined difference, they were only one of the techniques by 
which perceptions of cultural difference were expressed and circulated. Insofar as 
representations are processes by which we give an object, person, or event meaning, the power 
of words and images can be further bolstered by the association of emotions. As such, Imperial 
correspondence was an even more powerful method of conveying subjective experience as 
knowledge, because it was a representation that tended to recreate reality in accordance with 
particular moral and social hierarchies in mind.217  Accordingly, one of the most important 
advantages to studying travel writing is that, unlike cartographic processes, travel narratives 
give the audience a glimpse into the subjective attitude of the writer. The narratives relayed 
through travel journals convey a sense of awe, dangerousness, and adventure that could not be 
captured through the lines, dots, and dashes of a map. Travel accounts could more conveniently 
incorporate, and even more easily convey, moral judgments, and they could do so without 
needing to hide behind claims of objectivity.  
                                                             
217 Richard Harvey Brown, "Cultural Representation and Ideological Domination," Social Forces 71, no. 3 (1993). 
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The theme of European benevolence could also be found within ethnographic accounts of 
Imperial witnessing, particularly within those narratives where European arrival is portrayed 
as being welcomed by the natives. In the opening pages of his book, Marvellous Possessions, 
Greenblatt cites a notable letter from Columbus to the Portuguese King which illustrates this 
theme. The letter was written during Columbus’ first voyage to the New World in 1492. In this 
particular entry, dated, December 18, 1492, Columbus relays a meeting he had with a young 
native ‘king’ that he encounters while his ship is docked off the Spanish Island of Tortuga. Over 
the course of the lengthy passage, Columbus envisages an entire dialogue between himself and 
the native despite neither of them being able to understand the language of the other. 218 The 
sentiments and emotions that he associates with the visitor are derived from visual cues that he, 
unsurprisingly, interprets to his advantage.  
And he [the native visitor] and his tutor and counsellors were very troubled because they 
did not understand me nor I them. Nevertheless, I gathered that he told me that if something 
from this place pleased me that the whole island was at my command...I told him how Your 
Highnesses commanded and ruled over all the best part of the world, and that there were no 
other princes as great. And I showed him the royal banners and the others bearing the cross, 
which he esteemed greatly. What great lords Your Highnesses must be, he said (speaking 
toward his counsellors), since from so far away and from the heavens they had sent me here 
without fear; and many other things passed between them that I did not understand, except 
that I saw very well that they took everything as a great wonder.219 
As Greenblatt notes, Columbus moves from “knowing nothing (‘they did not understand me nor 
I them’) to imagining an absolute possession (‘the whole island was at my command’).”220  
Readers are given the impression that the venture is legitimated through a native invitation of 
possession, and European arrival is both welcomed and celebrated. The appearance of the 
Europeans signalled the salvation of the Aborigine. If we look at Zamora’s reading of Columbus’s 
correspondence with the Spanish monarchy, we are treated to a spectacle of Indian gratitude.221  
                                                             
218 This appears to be a common trend in how Columbus interprets Imperial-Indigenous communication. Throughout 
his diaries we are exposed to encounters where the Indigenous community’s use of hand ‘signs’ and ‘symbols’ are 
represented as if it was a language that the Imperialists were able to objectively and accurately interpret. In other 
instances, ocular witnessing was enough to determine Indigenous perceptions of Imperial advancement – “I had 
refused to receive the cotton from the native whom I sent on shore, although he pressed it upon me. I looked out after 
him and saw upon his landing that the others all ran to meet him with much wonder. It appeared to them that we 
were honest people, and that the man who had escaped from us had done us some injury, for which we kept him in 
custody.” See diary entries of October 14, 1492 and October 15, 1492 at Christopher Columbus, "Christopher 
Columbus: Extracts from Journal (1492)," Fordham University, 
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/columbus1.asp>. 
219 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
p 13. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Margarita Zamora, Reading Columbus, vol. 9 (Los Angeles: University of California Pr, 1993), p 16. 
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This reality of sovereign possession, therefore, is an imagined reality, a distortion of 
experienced events; a reality that has no real objective basis.  At the same time, the imagined 
dialogue acts as a muzzle, prohibiting the native from speaking, and allowing the European to 
speak his behalf. Through this curtailment of native subjectivity, we are once again given the 
feeling that spaces of conquest were awaiting discovery and its people longing for an outside 
voice to recognise and pronounce their existence. In these instances the Imperial agent saw his 
role as one of linking the native to the ‘outside world’. It was through the agent’s accounts, 
stories, and experiences that the native – as an idea, an image, an Other – was mined. Imperial 
cartography and ethnography reveals an attitude of European deliverance, as if it was the 
careful chronicling of the ‘sites and sounds’ of the conquered world that gave these places 
meaning, voice, and value.  These narratives appear to be suggesting that an external recognition 
of one’s uniqueness or exoticism is an essential aspect of one’s cultural identity, and this, as I 
will show in the following chapters, is an inclination that all but disappears from the colonial to 
postcolonial transition.  
B. Mapping Cultural Knowledge onto Geographic Space 
Part of the reason that witnessing narratives were such a common practice during European 
expansion and conquest was because of their therapeutic value. In penning encounters, and 
communicating experiences, voyagers could come to terms with the irregularity of the event. In 
recording the curiosities of foreign lands, travel writers often demonstrated an ‘ethnographic 
impulse’.  While this began with detailed descriptions of the physical scenery it frequently 
phased into political discussions of the language, social order, religion, morality, and 
government of foreign societies. Often these narrations homogenised native communities and 
represented them as “landmarks of the natural environment.”222 
i. Maps as a Method of ‘Coming to Terms with’ Difference 
Europe’s overseas voyages in the fifteenth century were the first encounters of their kind.  Apart 
from coming face to face with climatically and geographically diverse landscapes, these voyages 
challenged conventional conceptions of distance by compressing duration. Thus, the first 
Imperial-Indigenous encounters were the product of a contraction in time and space that could 
not have been previously anticipated. The alterity of the confronted landscapes was tempered 
and made sense of through the application of European referents. As Greenblatt explains, “in the 
face of the unknown, Europeans used their conventional intellectual and organisational 
structures, fashioned over centuries of mediated contact with other cultures, and that these 
                                                             
222 Ricardo D. Salvatore, "North American Travel Narratives and the Ordering/Othering of South America (1810-
1860)," Journal of Historical Sociology 9, no. 1 (1996): p 87. 
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structures greatly impeded a clear grasp of the radical otherness of the American lands and 
peoples.”223 By examining the unknown (foreign land) by reference to what was known 
(European land), European voyagers could normalise the singularity of the colonial encounter. 
It was furthermore a way in which the Other was rendered more palpable and the foreign 
landscape was made less daunting and more familiar. 
Perhaps it was the newness of the event that inspired witnessing narratives that had a tendency 
to exoticise foreign landscapes while, at the same time, normalising them. It was as if foreign 
places had to be bizarre because to minimise the importance of distance was to, in many ways, 
evidence the ordinariness of one’s existence. If communities separated by such vast expanses, 
nonetheless, turned out to be similar, what does that say about the uniqueness of cultural 
identity and group solidarity?  From this, it is somewhat expected that travel writing would aim 
to communicate only those aspects of the environment that challenged the traveller’s 
preconceptions. Indeed it would be those aspects of the encounter that one perceived as 
particularly strange and atypical that made the experience worth reporting.  
However, what is interesting about these narratives is not that they make mention of difference 
or draw attention to the unfamiliar, but that they impute to it a quality of ‘lack’ or ‘deficiency’. 
Narratives about the plush jungles of India are underwritten by claims of death and disease, and 
the oppressiveness of the climate.224 Travel writing conveying the architectural grandeur of 
encountered structures deride the chaos of a landscape in which the imposing and palatial 
palaces are made to stand side-by-side with “mud hut(s), or rows of native hovels, constructed 
of mats, thatch, and bamboos...”225  In each of these scenarios the splendour of what is 
encountered is represented as a lack, as espousing some sort of deficiency, a disorderliness that 
makes it somehow less than the European culture in which the experience is being framed. 
Exoticism, therefore, stands-in for inferiority.  
This trope of ‘the exotic’ is further extended to how the Europeans experienced the people 
inhabiting these places. We see mythical accounts of “savage cannibals who ‘wage unceasing 
war on the Indians, who are meek and fearful, for culinary purposes,’” alongside biblical 
portrayals of native bravery.226 There are graphic depictions that merge fact with fiction by 
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using animal references in portraying native appearance - “red skins like lions, their entire 
bodies hairless, and ugly of feature...”227 Against the bestial representation of the native Other, 
the viewer stands as the defender of  European scientific rationality.228   
In many early accounts the value and agency of the native within cartographic processes is 
denied. Cartographers, travel writers, and European scientists all demonstrate scepticism 
towards the spatial testimonies of native inhabitants. In each instance European witnessing 
often carries greater weight than the ‘word of the Indian’.229 Even over the course of ‘authentic’ 
and ‘objective’ processes of recording landscape, the native appears as ancillary to the process.  
For instance, Hooker laments that, other than the physical discomfort of palanquin travel, one of 
the further disadvantages of this method of studying the landscape, is the fact that “you pass 
plants and cannot stop to gather them; trees and don’t know what they are; houses, temples, 
and objects strange to the traveller’s eye, and have no one to teach where and what they may be; 
no fellow-traveller with whom to exchange curious remarks.”230 Despite the palanquin being 
drawn by several native men, Hooker continued to feel isolated in his study of the landscape, 
completely overlooking the possibility that these men may be able to respond to his curiosities 
about the terrain and its unusual treasures. Similarly, Rennell also demonstrated an 
unwillingness to allow natives a contributory role in providing information for the purposes of 
map-making. Though he used native know-how several times during the course of his 
cartographic work in India, he was often cited as commenting on the unreliability of native 
knowledge.231  
The reproduction of native knowledge and know-how as objects of European discovery and 
mastery is a theme that resonates throughout the Imperial-Indigenous encounters and, later, 
within colonial models of governance (which I discuss in the following chapter). Often 
translating into a claim that Europeans were better equipped to ‘know’ the landscape than the 
people who have always inhabited them,232 the linking of European knowledge to geographic 
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mastery is a prelude to later exercises of power that are expressed by associating European 
geographic knowledge and the proficiency of European forms of governance.  What we begin to 
see is that the Imperial agents’ knowledge about foreign landscapes and climate is frequently 
imagined as strengthening their ability to govern the inhabitants of these foreign places.  
ii. The Discourse of Tropicality 
The European production of knowledge about the native Other also took the form of locating 
foreign lands and people within a particular cultural discourse. Through a discourse of ‘the 
tropics’, voyagers were able to circulate very specific images of encountered places and to 
attribute to them a very specific and different set of aims.233 Expressed through the tropes of 
science and disease,234 tropicality involved the designation of places and peoples as part of a 
tropical environment, equally characterised by an intemperate and moist climate, lush 
vegetation, and the presence of disease and decay.  “Designating a portion of the globe the 
tropics became a ‘Western way of defining something culturally and politically alien, as well as 
environmentally distinctive, from Europe and others parts of the temperate zone.’”235  
Tropicality, therefore, reinforced a hemispheric separation of the globe that was underwritten 
by a cultural difference that, at times, posed a physical threat (in the form of disease) to the 
traveller.236  Often this was expressed through narratives that “brought to [the witnessed space] 
a host of scientific and scenic ideas that ranged from the paradisiacal to the pestilential, from 
the impressionistic and Romantic, to the narrowly technical characterisation of plant and 
animal species.”237 The power of tropicality emanates from an ability to represent spaces in a 
particular way, regardless of their actual ‘scientific’ positioning. Arnold notes that in the case of 
the tropicalisation of India “much (but by no means all) of the subcontinent lay within the 
tropics, though paradoxically, some of its most ‘tropical’ locations lay north of the Tropic of 
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Cancer in the foothills of the Himalaya, and yet it failed in many scenic and scientific respects to 
conform to the idealised notion of the tropics...”238 While India could certainly not be classified 
as ‘tropical’ by reference to its climatic or geographic conditions, the discourse of Indian 
tropicality nonetheless served as a very powerful representation of Indian difference and 
atrophy.  
iii. The Aesthetics of Mapping 
European cultural representation took on many forms. While travel writing and cartography 
were particularly powerful European portrayals of non-European places and peoples, the fact 
that almost forty-percent of the British population was still illiterate by the eighteenth century 
made these representations inaccessible for a large section of the British population. Visual 
imagery and aesthetics worked to fill this gap in knowledge-production and circulation, and 
were thus an effective means by which these accounts could be made available to a wider 
audience.  Apart from documenting and circulating ideas about European benevolence and 
political and economic accomplishments, the use of visual imagery on maps also conveyed the 
aesthetics of European culture. 
It was by being juxtaposed with the death and ugliness of the tropics that the European capacity 
for beauty and artistic talent was constructed. Nowhere was Europe’s receptiveness to beauty 
conveyed more persuasively than through the aesthetics of mapping, what to some, was a ‘dark 
decaying space’.  In the preface of the second volume of his Historical Records of the Survey of 
India, Phillimore writes, “I spent nearly three months in Dehra Dūn examining the early maps of 
the department, and was amazed at the wealth of beautiful drawings and artistic talent...of the 
early surveyors.”239 Noting his amazement that the prevailing conditions in British India did 
little to impede the ‘marvel’ of the “work [being] turned out,240 Phillimore goes on to remark 
that it is typically the most artistic maps that attract the greatest attention and thus “see the 
light of print.”241   
The Imperial map becomes a powerful cultural symbol, defined equally as ‘an art’ and a 
‘technology.’242 Not only did these artistic impressions represent an archive of geographic 
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relationships, produced in a widely accessible and aesthetically pleasing format, but also an 
influential testimony of European cultural hegemony. Rennell’s 1782 mapping of Hindoostan is 
flourished with a most interesting cartouche in the bottom right corner.  In it we view British 
Imperial prowess reflected through the figure of the lion and British military power represented 
through the drawings of the Indian sepoys.  The viewer is struck by the benevolence of British 
authority, conveyed through the figure of Lady Brittania, who is being gifted the Hindu law book 
‘the Shastra’ by natives  who appear to be bowing to her glory (see fig. 2.3).243 Visions of 
European cultural and military superiority are easily relayed through the strategic placement of 
the emblem upon a map that was literally fashioned amidst Anglo-French rivalry.244 From this 
we can see that Imperial maps are cultural artefacts of a certain kind; they are social 
constructions that represent a particular cultural perspective.  
 
Figure 2.3 – Cartouche from Rennell’s Map of Hindoostan (1782). Retrieved from: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/map_item.pl  
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C. Grounding Identities in Geographic Space 
In the process of chronicling the bizarre and the extraordinary, European voyagers and political 
agents frequently collapsed geography and identity. Recognising geographic singularities 
became tantamount to discovering differences in the socio-cultural identities and sensibilities 
between European and non-European communities. The physical environment, as such, was a 
setting that could both open up and foreclose certain types of relationships between Europeans 
and natives. 
i. Identity and the Natural Environment 
In many witnessing accounts there is a conceptual linking of distance and social difference, 
whereby the presence of communities separated by vast distances and across oceans 
automatically implies cultural incommensurability. In many instances “geographic distance 
from the European/Christian centre implied a progressive degeneration and a loss of ‘cultural, 
moral, and linguistic integrity.”245 Witnessing narratives, in this respect, were not routine 
observations, but politico-cultural appraisals.  
The island is verdant, level and fertile to a high degree; and I doubt not that grain is sowed 
and reaped the whole year round, as well as all other productions of the place. I saw many 
trees, very dissimilar to those of our country, and many of them had branches of different 
sorts upon the same trunk; and such a diversity was among them that it was the greatest 
wonder in the world to behold. Thus, for instance, one branch of a tree bore leaves like those 
of a cane, another branch of the same tree, leaves similar to those of the lentisk. In this 
manner a single tree bears five or six different kinds. Nor is this done by grafting, for that is a 
work of art, whereas these trees grow wild, and the natives take no care about them. They have 
no religion, and I believe that they would very readily become Christians, as they have a good 
understanding. 246 
Spliced within these accounts of geographic witnessing are moral judgments made about the 
uncivilised and untamed character of the Indigenes, a personality that is borne out by the 
landscape itself.  The singularity of this particular landscape became a space of marvel and 
wonder at the same time as representing a space in need of civilising. In claiming that the 
natives have the ‘good understanding’ to embrace Christianity, Columbus confirms their 
humanity, but continues to speak to their difference by labelling them inattentive and careless. 
In portraying the native Other in this way, Columbus assigns them a subhuman status, 
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endowing them with the capacity to be ‘saved’, yet making it very clear that they are not the 
same as him. 
Sometimes this linking of geography and identity is expressed through accounts that portrayed 
the native Other as an extension of the unruly and intemperate environment that he 
inhabited,247 with some writers suggesting a direct connection between topography, climate, 
and the “forms and habits of organised beings.”248 Thus, in many ways geography was 
represented as a living, breathing, acting entity.  It is therefore hardly surprising that later 
narratives and forms of contemporary governance minimised the humanity of encountered 
populations by according autonomy to space rather than people. We see this particular 
association between space and liberty become stronger as foreign places become further 
territorialised.249 I expand on this idea in greater depth in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
In some of these accounts we see the agency and autonomy of native communities being 
perceived as being linked with the impenetrable terrain, and unstable and fetid climates, that 
they occupy.250 But other times the conflation between geography and identity is expressed in a 
slightly different form and we are brought face-to-face with the idea that European domination 
over native communities depended heavily on the explorer being able to ‘take on’ the identity of 
the native;251 that mastery over foreign land translated into mastery over a foreign identity. 
Narratives of this sort bring to the forefront issues related to the possibility of disembodied 
identities – identities that are independent of the historical and psychological continuity of 
embodied experience. This ‘hijacking’ of native identity was the result of many voyagers being 
convinced that cultural identity could be adopted through the cursory practice of learning a 
particular language or being accustomed to certain traditions, or simply by living in isolation 
amongst a cultural group for several months or years.  In some instances the European 
acquisition of non-European linguistic and cultural traditions was perceived as marking a break 
in native history, whereby the European was understood as rescuing a decaying culture by 
Europeanising it.  As Singh eloquently explains:  
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Learning Indian languages and forming the Asiatic Society of Bengal, for example, they [the 
British civil servants] attempted to recover India’s classical past as a golden age, while 
setting it in contrast to images of disarray and decadence of a ‘fallen’ eighteenth century 
India – an India that had, in effect, corrupted the moral rectitude of the Company officials.252 
From Singh’s analysis we see a European preoccupation with rediscovering native cultural 
purity, unsullied by political and economic development. This fixation in creating distinct and 
separate cultural communities all but disappears from the colonial to postcolonial transition. As 
I illustrate in Chapter Three, this search for an untainted and authentic native culture has also 
become an obsession of liberal law and its processes of legal recognition of cultural minorities. 
Witnessing narratives rely heavily on the experiences of the European body. Bodily 
emplacement has been described by authors like Merleau-Ponty as crucial to spatial 
experience.253 In physical space the body and sight are often the first points of identification and 
cites of interaction between people. We can identify this quite clearly in the earlier passage 
where Columbus interpreted an entire dialogue between himself and his native visitor through 
bodily gestures. Therefore, to suggest that identity is independent of bodied experiences is to, in 
fact, desocialise and dehistoricise cultural identity; it is to suggest that the pain and happiness of 
the past, much of which have marked the body through physical experiences of violence and 
pleasure, have no influence over how we perceive and understand our sense of self and our 
relationship to others. To make the claim that European intervention is necessary to ‘recover 
India’s classical past as a golden age’ is to point to the superficiality of identity, it is to extract 
Indian identity from the body of the Indian and to hold it up as having some objective reality of 
its own.  This then suggests that Indian identity is fixed, static, and that it lacks human agency.254  
More interestingly, however, in assuming native identities, European Imperialists problematise 
the surveilling and disciplining of the body and identity in physical space. Embodying a native 
identity displaces threats to the European body in non-European space. The European explorer 
becomes banal, altruistic, and ‘culturally sensitive’.  He is able to more readily critique the native 
body, psyche and behaviour because he appears as ‘one of them’, as someone willing to embrace 
and learn about the more primitive culture, embracing all its idiosyncrasies. However, in his 
hybridity – possessing a cultural identity that is neither authentically European nor native – the 
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explorer is, at once, revered and threatening; perceived as the bastion of European culture, but 
suspected as being in a constant state of defection.255 From this reading of hybridity, coupled 
with the European obsession with rediscovering and protecting the authenticity of native 
culture, suggests that the processes through which territory emerges are, intrinsically, fearful of 
human miscegenation and any degree of intermixing (institutional, cultural, social), which could 
destabilise European claims to cultural superiority. Territory, therefore, can be attributed to 
European quests for maintaining a level of cultural integrity which could allow them to speak, 
not only on behalf of native peoples, but for native peoples. 
ii. Foreign Geographies as Sites of European Identity-Formation 
Apart from foregrounding native identity, colonial geography also served as an important site 
for the formulation of the European sense of self. Through the tropes of discovery and rescue, 
the European was constructed as a civiliser, a saviour that would transport the native from 
barbarism to civilisation. This was evident in the narratives that saw the European bringing 
Christianity to foreign spaces and places, and those accounts that spoke of European schemes 
for industrial and agricultural development and the worth of these ventures to the barren, 
desolate spaces of native settlement.256 Merchants writing about the exploitable wealth of 
colonised space speak of the potential that these lands have for increasing “their own nation’s 
‘strength, wealth, and treasure,’” and they often had the tendency to iterate these advantages by 
“collapsing all of the ‘Nations of the Eastern World’ into a single source of rich wares.”257 The 
native becomes nothing more than the exploitable wealth of the geography he inhabits. 
But it is not only the content of the narrative that disparages the native. In relaying geographic 
and cultural experience in the form of a monologue these accounts represent a univocal 
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construction of native and European cultural identity. By foreclosing dialogue, most travel 
writing denies subaltern agency and subjectivity by excluding the native’s self-perception and 
reducing him to an inactive feature of the scenery. As the foreign land is portrayed through the 
use of the “discovery motif of finding ‘treasures/commodities’ to which the English had both 
natural and moral claims,”258  the peoples inhabiting these areas becoming nothing more than 
landmarks of a space perceived to exist for the purpose of European consumption and 
exploitation. 
But, as scholars interested in Orientalist discourse argue, in their representation of Oriental 
identity and personality, the Occident reveals more about himself than he does about the Other.   
As Haldar states, “[t]he relationship between East and West has been structurally maintained so 
that the East performs a transgressive function necessary to the constitution of Occidental 
legality and subjectivity.”259 Native identity and personality is constructed in reference to the 
preoccupations and anxieties that informed the viewer’s own self-identity as someone that is, 
temperate, moral, patriotic, and industrious. His focus is, therefore, directed not only at 
identifying and recording those practices and behaviours that diverge from his own, but at 
attaching to those modes of conduct, attributes and personalities that run counter to his self-
definition. The viewer’s function, at least the way he imagines it, is to curb those behaviours, to 
‘tame’ the native, so that he becomes less unlike the voyager.  At the same time, this is a form of 
being that is entirely unattainable for the native because the native must exist as an inferior in 
order for the voyager to exist in the way that he imagines himself to be. 
Space operates to contain identity by fixing it. While human behaviours, motivations, 
sensibilities may shift, geography remains stable, unchanging, unyielding. By drawing on the 
familiar to distinguish and describe unfamiliar landscapes, Imperial witnessing narratives 
establish European identity by comparing European and non-European space. Particularly 
when the readership is European, these narratives immediately invoke a sense of wonderment 
because, they at once, reveal something new and exotic by, simultaneously affirming the old and 
familiar. We know who we are not by knowing who we are. In their stabilisation of the complex, 
multidimensional and consistently evolving nature of human identity Imperial witnessing 
narratives were not merely accounts of the distant, bizarre and peculiar, but signified powerful 
reaffirmations of what being European was all about. 
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D. Temporalising Geographies of Difference 
The re-writing of history was a key component of the European response to the Imperial-
Indigenous encounter, and narratives of Imperial witnessing often had the effect of positioning 
natives at the heels of European modernity.  Earlier in this chapter I discussed how maps 
reflected intricate details to mark European arrival and gave the impression that legitimate 
attempts had been made to ‘modernise’ these places.  In leaving entire areas of the witnessed 
space unmapped, European cartographers gave the impression of an undeveloped pristine 
wilderness, which worked to foster the notion of a socially empty space, and later helped to 
reinforce claims of possession via the doctrine of terra nullius. But ethnographic accounts, in 
transmitting stories of native wantonness and bestiality, were also important ways in which 
foreign geographies (and its occupants) were temporalised. 
i. The Re-writing and Erasure of Native History 
Imperial witnessing involved not only the recording of cultural traditions and native behaviour 
in the form of ethnography, but also the re-writing of native history through the European 
imagination. In his witnessing of the trans-Pacific voyage from the Philippines to Mexico, Italian 
voyager, Giovanni Francesco Gemelli-Careri, describes the Indigenous inhabitants of the 
Mariana Islands as embodying inhuman features, suffering from incapacitating superstitions, 
and notes that “[b]efore the coming of the Spaniards they lived under a chief, naked, wandering 
about the mountains.  They knew not what fire was, or the use of iron...There never was, nor is 
there at present, any selling among them, but only exchange;”260  From these accounts we are 
given the impression of a history ‘stood still’, marked by native heathenness and aimlessness, a 
society characterised by a lack of social, political, and economic organisation. Gemelli-Careri’s 
witnessing narrative thus invokes admiration for the Imperial enterprise, a project that led to 
the civilisation of these communities.  The Spanish were understood to have brought the natives 
out of their self-imposed ignorance by introducing religion and commerce. Thus, not only was 
this tale of witnessing a political narrative, entailing the measurement of native development 
and organisation through the use of European referents, but also a moral narrative in which 
native-life is understood as being deficient and passive.  
Many of these narratives produced a vision of geography ‘unfolding’ before the traveller’s gaze, 
with “points along travel routes correspond[ing] to moments within a sequence of events.”261  
Since the witnessing of an event required the voyager to be there to observe them, these events 
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became intrinsically temporal within the European social imagination.  As ethnographic 
representations were largely written in the form of a monologue, the observer became both the 
starting- and focal-point of these accounts. Benton refers to this witnessing of space as a lens 
through which events were filtered and interpreted as ‘travelling epistemologies’ and describes 
it as a condition in which “knowledge becomes collapsed with movement through space”, where 
‘naming’ events and spaces produces that space as a reality, as a fact, precisely because it 
becomes identifiable.262 But more importantly, it gives the impression that the space did not 
exist prior to the act of naming it, prior to it being witnessed by the European.    
ii. The Fluidity of Space and the Potential for Native Civilisation 
For some authors the Imperial-Indigenous encounters significantly transformed 
understandings of evolution. Within these accounts the fluidity and mutability of nature takes 
root. As Gerbi asserts, the colonial encounters in the Americas – through tropes of ‘immaturity’ 
and ‘degeneration’ - replaced the “biblical and Aristotelian tradition [of]...the fixity of the 
species, nature as immobility, or as variety fully unfolded in space, unmarked by the ‘silent and 
unending march of time.’”  These categories, though they represented native Americans as 
infantile and uncivilised, were nonetheless important precisely because “they left some hope for 
the future, or at the very least, in insisting on an irreversible degeneration, cast a ray of light on 
the continent’s remotest past.”263  Nature is further brought to life in later accounts of travel, 
particularly Vitoria’s work, where natives are understood not as a ‘degenerate’ class, but as an 
immature class that have the potential to reach European standards of morality and politico-
economic development.264 In these narratives the native does not inhabit a separate temporal or 
historical domain, but occupies a position that is located earlier along the same historical 
trajectory.  
In some cases, it was argued that European expansionism and settlement in non-European 
places provided an even greater impetus to engage in ethnographic and travel writing. Arnold 
explains that as the British “began to exhibit a new sense of ownership toward India...It became 
common for travel writers to justify their accounts in terms of a need for the British public to 
know more about our ‘Eastern Empire’...stress[ing] the value of first-hand experience of 
                                                             
262 Ibid., p 16-7.  Particularly in the early periods of Spanish conquest ‘naming’ was a particularly important aspect of 
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the Relaciones Geográficas (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000), p 29, 34-5. 
263 Antonello Gerbi, Nature in the New World: From Christopher Columbus to Gonzalo Fernandez De Oviedo, trans. 
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India.”265 Witnessing narratives, in this sense, worked to circulate knowledge about colonies. 
But it was a very specific body of knowledge that was being disseminated, fashioned primarily 
around British interests and preoccupations.  For instance, advancements in travel, particularly 
locomotives replacing the man-drawn palanquins (see fig. 2.4) made the chronicling of Indian 
countryside far less attractive for European travellers and scientists. Thus, in the later periods 
of Indian colonialism (nineteenth century), witnessing accounts tended to focus on urbanised 
geographies and bustling cities.  As stations on the railroad network were largely located in 
urban centres, European writers were more likely to bypass areas and communities located at a 
distance from the nearest station. Not only did this limited level of focus widen the theoretical 
gulf between the urban and rural areas of the subcontinent266 - suggesting that it was the urban 
areas that had greater epistemological value - but the absence of the more remote areas from 
the European historical record had the effect of erasing their existence all together. 
 
Figure 2.4Human-drawn Palanquin Used for Travelling during the Earlier Periods of British India – Retrieved from: 
http://delhidiary.in/whats-new_detail.php?wid=nGw 
The proliferation of European power throughout British India, coupled with the advancements 
in travel brought about through the railroad, led to a more stringent ordering of colonised 
space.  Railroad networks linked centres of trade throughout the subcontinent and virtually 
transformed existing conceptions of distance and remoteness. At the same time, however, the 
railroad significantly shaped emergent economies, creating both material and conceptual 
divisions between commercial centres and ‘the wilderness’.  This, in turn, had an enduring 
impact on the ruralisation and urbanisation of geographic area, and had the effect of widening 
economic and political inequalities between differently-located communities.267 The previously 
unanticipated divisions of space that these technologies either brought about or 
                                                             
265 David Arnold, The Tropics and the Traveling Gaze: India, Landscape, and Science 1800-1856 (London: University of 
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compounded,268 coupled with a growing belief in the European ownership of geographic area 
and the new relationships that came about as a result, had a tremendous influence on the 
structures and forms of governance that emerged within these areas and between these 
communities. As a consequence of these technological advancements, the focus of Imperial 
cartography shifted to identifying not strange and unanticipated landscapes, but modernised and 
possessed territory. 
Cartographic processes served to further broaden the disparities between the rural and urban 
areas. In flattening spatialities and presenting them as discontinuous formations, Imperial maps 
were a superficial representation of the colonial experience that failed to capture and convey 
relationships of power. As ‘objective’ blueprints of ‘existing’ geographies, these maps concealed 
exploitative relationships by presenting urban and rural geographies as pre-given, static, and 
passive spatialities. They neglected to report on how industrial centres may, themselves, have 
been underwritten by experiences of extreme exploitation and violence, and how they may have 
emerged through a degradation of the colonised populations’ environment.269 In mapping 
European centres of activity with precision, and making other areas minimally distinguishable, 
cartographers were able to guide the interest of the reader.  Readers of the colonial map become 
less interested in the ambiguous and obscure spaces which may have, nonetheless, been 
important sites of alternative histories.270 Furthermore, in maps providing demographic 
information – such as population density, the religious/age/gender breakdown of the 
inhabitants, and the distinction between hostile and friendly villages271 – maps had the effect of 
heightening anxiety by making visible the class and ethnic distribution of colonised spaces.272 
                                                             
268 Sometimes through their involvement in producing agricultural technologies triggered by the emergence or 
availability of new markets. See, David Arnold, "Europe, Technology, and Colonialism in the 20th Century," History 
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270 For instance, Bassett notes that sometimes maps were left blank so as to keep areas of European commercial and 
strategic interest a secret. See, Thomas J Bassett, "Cartography and Empire Building in Nineteenth-Century West 
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See, Neil Safier, "The Confines of the Colony," in The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire, ed. James 
R. Akerman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).   
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European cartography, as such, made ethnic and religious distribution more salient, enticing 
European settlers into the less densely populated suburbs in some instances,273 or the more 
politically and commercially rich centres which provided colonists with “ready-made bases of 
power.”274 The geographic space, in this way, was imagined and ‘performed’ as culturally-
divided places. 
6. Conclusion: the Social Production of Territory 
Much of this chapter has focused on the different ways in which European travellers and 
voyagers came to terms with the newness of distant places through the application of what was 
familiar. Nonetheless, such documentation and study of the environment was not merely a way 
in which European travellers conveyed information about the bizarre and exotic, it was a way in 
which they were able to shape interactions, events, and social phenomena. Manipulations of 
geographic space made it possible to regulate (and conceal the regulation of) Imperial-
Indigenous interaction. Geography, as such, became a representation of European power. It laid 
the groundwork for the legal and political machinery of colonial law and justified its 
jurisdictional reach upon the conquered peoples of these regions. 
Imperial map-making was essential for drawing attention to specific spaces, while making 
others invisible. Cartographers were able to guide the viewer’s attention to particular places by 
adding greater detail and colour-coding the map. In naming spaces and creating visual 
representations of sharply divided and bounded geographies, these maps give the distinct 
impression of ownership and possession. In being widely-accessible records of European 
experience, Imperial maps have tremendous epistemological value. Yet, they are a highly visible, 
extremely political representation of reality that has been made available for mass 
consumption. Maps give the impression that spaces can (and should be) differentiated, 
separated and distinguished from one another. Cartographic processes are shot through with 
relations of power, in which “whole ways of knowing and seeing, magnifying and displacing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
ghettoization of neighbourhoods inhabited by a particular ethnic or religious group and the development of the 
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tensions and anxieties of the expansive societies”275 had the effect of producing cultural 
knowledge about the places and populations being witnessed.  Through the Imperial map we 
are able to ‘locate’ social difference; we are able to identify places of ‘European’ enterprise (e.g. 
highly detailed centres), and point to spaces of native ‘impoverishment’ (e.g. blank spaces on the 
map). The specifics of the Imperial map tell us about the rectitude of culturally diverse 
communities and this was very powerfully conveyed through the aesthetics of mapping, where 
the inclusion of ornate cartouches conveyed European benevolence and righteousness.  
Narratives of Imperial witnessing also had a similar effect. Tropes of European discovery and 
the associated imagining of Imperial-Indigenous dialogue not only suggested European 
possession and ownership of foreign land, but legitimated that possession through native 
invitation. In comparing geographies of the pristine wilderness against humanised landscapes 
of European enterprise, these narratives communicated European industriousness and 
reproduced sharply divided spaces as markers of cultural difference. In this way, witnessing 
accounts did not merely record cultural difference, but produced it. In cataloguing these 
differences in landscape, fauna, climate, and terrain, witnessing narratives easily “enabled the 
establishment of detailed typologies of geographical, cultural, and moral categories, [which] in 
turn, became a crucial aspect of the project of colonial meaning-making from the earliest 
European encounters.”276 Frequently these testimonies blended myth and reality, ‘fact and 
fiction’, and the geographies and identities they constructed were developed in relation to, and 
against, European conceptions of their own cultural superiority. As repertoires of cultural 
‘knowledge’, eyewitness testimonies represented both experiences and observations, as well as 
incorporated personal “social, political, or moral commentary.”277  
In using the discourse of tropicality witnessing narratives emphasised corporeality by 
presenting the foreign climate and ecology as a threat to the European body. Against such a 
construction of decay and pestilence, the native body – accustomed to these conditions – 
becomes diseased. At the same time, those witnessing narratives that conveyed the potential 
that Europeans had for recovering an illustrious native past that had fallen into disarray as a 
result of native decadence, brought cultural difference into sharper focus by juxtaposing the 
static, diseased and corrupt body of the native alongside the European capacity for regeneration 
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and evolution. The native becomes tied and locked into the body, while the European appears 
able to eschew his corporeality, and all the limitations that it poses.  
In turn, these tropes of discovery and tropicality provided Europeans with a privileged 
epistemological position. As discoverers of ‘new knowledge’, Imperialists often circulated these 
ideas “via intractable binarisms: civilisation and barbarism, tradition and modernity, and 
Christianity and heathenism, amongst others.”278 Through Imperial correspondence and 
European travel writing we can see a certain convergence between experience and 
epistemology. With cultural knowledge being mapped onto geographic space, ‘territory’ – as an 
Imperial appropriation of space - becomes a progressively more rational formulation of 
geographic area.  
Through these various processes European travellers and political agents were able to control 
and regulate Imperial-Indigenous interaction. Far from being ‘anti-conquest’279, “innocent 
interpreters of nature,” travel writers and cartographers were thoroughly implicated in the 
practice of “colonial dispossession even when there were not, themselves, agents of the 
colonising nations.”280  In presenting space as sharply divided, discontinuous, bounded, and 
culturally-divisble, cartographic and ethnographic processes were crucial for the positioning of 
conquered populations as morally and culturally inferior. In this way, European voyagers were 
able to legitimise native dispossession and subjugation. In focusing on the geography of foreign 
lands, rather than its people, these narratives gave the impression that it was the space and not 
people that were doing the controlling. Through these practices, geographic space was emptied 
of its normative content and reconstructed by reference to European history.  
In reproducing the wide-open space as discrete, apportioned, and owned place, Imperial maps 
were able to ‘contain’ identity. Geographic space fixed the personalities and characteristics of 
native people, allowing those doing the controlling to immobilise “the trajectories of 
others...while [they] proceed with our own.”281 Additionally, in locating social difference within 
geography (in racialising space), maps and ethnographic accounts helped to also contain the 
native body.  We were able to identify difference through identifying the spaces in which it 
occurs.  The racialisation of space also helped to create distance between communities coming 
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into contact with one another for the first time, and thus reduced the fear of ‘black and white 
bodies’ touching one another. 
This chapter, however, explains only one part of an interdiscursive mapping of social difference 
and the exercise of European cultural hegemony through geographic domination. At the 
beginning of this chapter I suggested that Chapter Two and Three be read as a narrative of 
Occidental Legality and its production of territory. While European cartographic and 
ethnographic processes clearly reveal an Imperial impulse to spatialise power, and though they 
certainly give rise to an organisation of space that we, today, describe through the label of 
‘territory’,282 this vision of space has acquired greater relevance through its institutionalisation 
and formalisation. Therefore, when I use the term ‘Occidental Legality’ I am referring to a model 
of regulation, an ordering of law, that incorporates these visions of space and attaches 
consequences to them; consequences that manipulate and shape social and political action. Thus, 
the concept of territory has a social and imagined component, a connection that I revealed 
through this chapter. It also has a political and legal component. ‘Territory’, as a ‘political way of 
conceiving land’, is the product of Occidental Legality, and in the next chapter I will further 
discuss this relationship between ‘the spatial’ and ‘the legal’ by analysing how territory is 
produced and reproduced through legal discourse and structures of governance.  The 
endurance of territory as a socio-political construct has, as I show in Chapter Three, survived 
the colonial to postcolonial transition.  
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Chapter Three 
The Political and Legal Construction of ‘Territory’  
Occidental Legality and the Colonial to Postcolonial Transition of Space  
1. Introduction 
In this Chapter I continue the narrative of Occidental legality and demonstrate how ‘territory’ is 
excavated through a merging of the narratives that were developed during the first Imperial-
Indigenous encounters, with structures of political and legal governance as they materialised in 
European colonies. I argue that the processes of Occidental Legality are able to better conceal a 
contentious politics of difference-making when a territorial vision of space acquires widespread 
political acceptance and legal reinforcement.  
The notion of territory exhibits a dialogical relationship between law and geography, what 
Delaney refers to as the ‘spatio-legal’.283 In this relationship, geography represents a setting for 
the encoding of legal ideas, and works to mask the unequal application of the law to different 
communities. Similarly, law acts as a framework through which cultural geographies – 
geographies that are underwritten by race, ethnicity, and religion - are constructed, legitimated, 
and rationalised. In the first section I analyse how law and geography manipulate and shape one 
another during the early periods of colonialism.  In the second section I examine how 
postcolonial law and structures of governance reproduce space as bounded, owned, and 
culturally-divisible. 
What is interesting about the juxtaposition of these two stages is the fact that, while the colonial 
setting demonstrates a fluid arrangement of legal orders, with religious and indigenous 
normative systems often operating side-by-side, this is certainly not the case in the postcolonial 
setting. As law becomes hierarchically organised, with State-law operating ‘above’ other 
indigenous normative systems, pluralistic systems are structured through State law’s 
authorisation and legitimation of indigenous legal systems.284 The reality of colonial-native 
relations casts doubt on the claim that a hierarchical system of law-making is necessary for the 
smooth functioning of society. As Benton’s work on legal pluralism clearly demonstrates, the 
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simultaneous operation of colonial and indigenous systems of law was conducive to the 
maintenance of social order within colonised territories. 285 
My method of employing a historical and critical legal perspective becomes valuable for 
demonstrating the persistence of Occidental Legality since the first Imperial-Indigenous 
encounters, to contemporary ways in which colonial societies manage issues of cultural and 
legal pluralism. While the initial impulse to spatialise power became quite visible during the 
early years of the European expansion, it is now understood as a ‘rational’ and natural way of 
ordering political and social relationships. In this Chapter I evaluate how dominant and 
minority communities interact with one another through the notion of territory, and what 
consequences this has for the protection of minority rights (specifically, Aboriginal rights).286  
Territory persists as an optic through which social difference is distinguished, categorised, and 
ultimately contained. These processes tend to immobilise the histories, identities, and even the 
bodies of those perceived as Others. If contemporary societies are, as they often claim, 
interested in protecting the heterogeneous character of their political community, then an 
understanding of the role of territory in promulgating and justifying racialised politics and 
violence becomes crucial.  Rather than continuing to revere territory, or to accept its presence 
as a pre-given and passive reality, contemporary societies should become more aware of its 
marginalising tendencies.  
The history of territory is often of less concern to modern political relations (as compared with 
the discussions of rights and legal jurisdiction). This can partially be attributed to the fact that 
territory is, for one, understood as an organic setting for social and political action that is simply 
‘lying there’. It is imagined as a neutral background upon which societies map political and 
social rules. Second, territory is a representation of how social communities understand and 
enable political and economic power. It is the product of how multicultural societies arrange 
their struggles for power against one another. 
But this is precisely why unpacking the notion of territory is so crucial. As a symbol of political 
power, and a representation of an entity’s political and legal autonomy, we need to ask 
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ourselves, why territory exemplifies these types of ideas. While it can certainly be argued that 
the ‘land-based’ component of territory is essential for sustaining the economic prosperity of 
social groups, and providing them with the ‘space’ to exercise their autonomy, this mode of 
thinking does not capture the full relevance or impact of the notion of territory.  For one, it 
becomes imperative for us to ask why groups need space for the exercise of authority, why must 
political and legal jurisdiction be spatialised. Benton explains that this ‘turn towards’ territory 
may have been perpetuated by a fluid colonial legal order which was easily exploited by 
indigenous groups. The consolidation of territory as an analytic through which the State was 
able to define the contours of its own versus indigenous legal and political authority, may very 
well have been an inevitable effect of the playing out of ‘jurisdictional politics’.287  
Despite the fact that territory may have partially been the product of indigenous action against 
colonial control, it is still necessary to determine in what ways this emergent analytic works 
against contemporary challenges to State authority. I submit that one of its problematic effects 
is that it conceals the presence of hybridity and potential for dialogue, and perpetuates the 
misconception that the presence of normative diversity necessitates the division of social space 
as a condition of its fair and equal operation. This view, I argue, is precisely what reproduces the 
power and importance of territory and other legal geographies that accept its bounded, owned, 
and culturally-divisible organisation of space. 
During the course of this analysis, I draw attention to how spatio-legal discourse is structured 
through conceptions of social difference and relationships of power. By examining how the law 
operates through and in space, I reveal how allegedly neutral forms of political and legal 
ordering are underwritten by judgments of racial and cultural inferiority. In developing this 
analysis I focus on legal and political sources of governance to analyse how the processes of 
Occidental Legality produces the partitioning of cultural communities by giving the impression 
that cultural autonomy ought to equate to territorial autonomy; essentially, that normative 
communities cannot operate in cooperation with one another, though this is precisely what is 
happening when one analyses the situation ‘on the ground’.  This failure to accept 
interpenetration, I argue, has important consequences for how cultural identities are 
constructed, and how the agency of minority communities is imagined. Over the course of this 
chapter I uncover the ways in which contemporary legal discourse and practice works to 
reproduce the previously discussed effects of Occidental Legality, namely the anchoring of 
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identity and cultural difference in geography, the temporalisation of geographies of difference, 
and the normative emptying of geographic space.  
2. Colonial Possession & the Linking of Legal Regulation to Geographies of Difference 
In this section I explore how the later years of the Imperial expansion fixed geographies through 
the erection of material boundaries and symbols of spatial ownership. As societies previously 
isolated from one another started to come into greater contact and began to comingle, starker 
boundaries of separation and symbols of possession became necessary. The development of 
more visible boundaries was partially undertaken to prevent intermixing between settlers and 
those perceived as racially and culturally inferior. Additionally, however, these boundaries were 
also crucial for making visible the prevailing relationships of power. Material boundaries made 
manifest European claims of ownership over foreign spaces and, by extension, its inhabiting 
populations. 
In this section I also highlight how these representations of space as divided, owned, and 
possessed, produced new ways of thinking about and structuring Imperial-Indigenous 
interaction. I draw on Vitoria’s work on jus gentium in the area of colonial geographies and 
universal law, and discuss how legal discourse has become an essential representational 
framework for the encoding of these subjective geographic practices.  I argue that, like the other 
methods of Imperial witnessing that I discuss in Chapter Two, law and political governance are 
also implicated in the process of translating European experience as neutral and universal 
knowledge. Consequently, this process brings together the techniques of cartography and travel 
narratives, with legal and political processes of governance, to show how relationships of power 
and domination are concealed through the notion of territory. 
A. Markers of Colonial Possession 
The imagined geographies of the Imperial-Indigenous encounters produced an ‘owned’ and 
possessed view of space. This was, as I discussed in Chapter Two, revealed through the tropes of 
‘discovery’, the symbolic gestures of naming places, and the imagining of dialogue and native 
invitation. These demonstrations of ownership are supplemented by the use of religious 
symbols and ceremonies, including the planting of crosses, the reading of sermons, and the 
erection of flags and emblems.288 Occupation of foreign lands takes place through grand 
presentations of gift-giving and colonial-native communication meant to give the impression 
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that the native welcomed the arrival of Europeans and that the possession of colonised land was 
justified because it was congenial. However, as Europeans began to migrate to and establish 
permanent settlements in foreign lands, spatial possession is conveyed through less subtle and 
more restrictive markers of ownership. Greater European (economic, material, political) 
investment in foreign spaces gives rise to more stringent devices for demonstrating ownership. 
Soon possession takes the form of building fences, roads, and gardens, all of which exhibit a 
strong European presence on the land. 
The once imagined geographies of divided and temporalised spaces are materialised through 
the physical apportioning of land into owned plots of property and the building of homes. 
Markers of ownership are no longer symbolic but have attached to them a whole series of 
sanctions and regulations that, at times forcefully, defend the claim that ‘this space is taken’.  By 
building and fixing homes, European settlers were demonstrating their “intent to remain,” and 
claiming an “unassailable [legal] right to own the place [under English law].”289 Alongside the 
use of space to establish houses and other places of dwelling, were decisions made about the 
allocation of land to establish the plantations through which settlers would make their living. 
Colonised space was regionalised through the identification of varying patterns of vegetation, 
climate, and topography. These features of geographic difference began to take on a political 
and economic relevance as the environments more suitable to agricultural and industrial 
development were more readily settled, and became the centres around which the rest of the 
colonised space was developed. This was expressed most prominently for instance, in the 
division of the urban and rural, and the designs of townships and cities.  
As part of this process of claiming the land, settler societies were structured through forms of 
social exclusion and regulation. These materialised in the form of fences, gardens, city grids, and 
roads, all of which carried the weight of ‘the law’ behind them in the way that they were policed, 
enforced, and defended.290 In some areas this involved the regulation of outside access to, and 
control over, activities in space. For the Dutch travelling from South East Asia to the New World, 
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and the Portuguese establishing colonies in America, Africa, and Asia, this meant the 
construction of heavily fortified trading posts.291  Conversely, for the colonists who permanently 
settled the lands, the policing of space also took on the function of cultural ordering, with 
garrisons, military personnel, and forts strategically installed between European-settled and 
native-occupied space. This often had the effect of displacing Indigenous communities and 
relocated them to less desirable tracts of land.292  Sometimes these demarcations were 
established through the use of topographical features – like mountains and rivers – which acted 
as natural barriers to native penetration. As Mar and Edmonds note, “land and the organised 
spaces on it, in other words, narrate[d] the stories of colonisation.”293  In these instances we 
begin to see the designation of cultural spaces taking on a politically-oppressive and 
economically-depressing character. 
These markers became more numerous and gave rise to more restrictive measures and 
consequences in settler-colonies, where European emigration marked a permanent transition.  
Typically these colonies were comprised of settlers from the most marginalised social groups in 
European society (e.g. refugees, convicts,294 or people from lower socio-economic classes), for 
whom the colony represented a ‘fresh start’ to replicate the societies they left behind.295  In 
order to ‘make space’ for the newly arriving emigrants, settler-colonies were often underwritten 
by ideological and legal forms of social distancing, supplemented by widespread violence, aimed 
at exterminating larger native communities and displacing smaller ones.296   
Accordingly, the regulatory machinery charged with protecting and reinforcing these divisions 
of space was often drawn upon to mediate transgressive performances of space by normative 
communities who sought to extend, or prevent the extension of, authority into the other’s space.  
This was meant to ensure that a minimum level of distance was maintained between those 
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perceived as a threat to the cultural integrity and political interests of European settlers. 
Transgressive performances of space, by which I mean the mobilisation of alternative patterns 
of social and political ordering, were disciplined, regulated, and punished through colonial law. 
Colonial law managed issues of cultural and social pluralism by producing legal geographies 
that had the effects of further chaining identity to geography, emptying space of its normative 
content, and temporalising geographies of difference. Apart from maintaining political stability, 
I demonstrate how these legal geographies were important for further entrenching cultural 
difference and regulating identity. Space and law in these instances worked together to conceal 
the oppressive tendencies of one another. This insidious relationship between law and 
geography is elaborated in Anghie’s reading of de Vitoria’s notion of jus gentium, which sheds 
light on some of the colonial sentiments that inspired the move to a universal model of legal 
regulation.   
B. Legitimising Colonial Possession: Vitoria’s Notion of Jus Gentium 
European Imperial expansion was marked by the duality of economic advantage and political 
control, expressed through territorial acquisition and the conquest of non-European people.297 
The accumulation of geographic space as part of the project of Empire brought with it the 
application of a uniform system of law, meant to apply to the entire population irrespective of 
their historical, cultural, and linguistic particularities.  This was partly the result of natural law 
ideologies being replaced by legal positivism and the universalisation of international law as a 
body of principles “understood to apply globally as a result of the annexation of ‘unoccupied’ 
territories...”298  
Anghie identifies a problem with this historic shift legal thinking towards universal equality, 
particularly as it relates back to the processes of colonialism; how could a single regime299 be 
justified by the colonial project which had spent centuries isolating, dehumanising, and 
inferiorising non-European places and peoples?  In answer to this quandary, Anghie turns to 
Francisco de Vitoria’s rationalisation of the colonial conquests of the nineteenth-century for an 
interesting illustration of the sensibilities that underwrote European Imperial expansion and 
which eventually inspired a universal system of international law. Anghie explains Vitoria’s 
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reasoning most eloquently in his exegesis of two of Vitoria’s most prominent works on jus 
gentium and international law.300  
In expanding to the New World, Spanish colonists replaced the culturally divisive religious law 
of the Pope with the natural law of jus gentium, claiming that it was people’s membership of the 
community of men, rather than their identity as Catholics, that bound them to the same laws. By 
defining New World Indians as part of the same human fabric, Vitoria was able to assert the 
European right to travel and sojourn, and demand that the Indian respect this right by 
permitting European access to their land so long as they did not harm the native communities 
encountered over the course of their travels. This right of travel was a reciprocal right based on 
the fact that both groups were bound to the same laws as part of their membership of the 
human community. As Anghie argues, “jus gentium naturalise[d] and legitimate[d] a system of 
commerce and Spanish penetration. Spanish forms of economic and political life [were] all-
encompassing because they are supported by doctrines prescribed by Vitoria’s system of 
universal law.”301 
Based on this reciprocal entitlement, any native resistance to European arrival and penetration 
could be interpreted as an act of war, which would permit Europeans to retaliate in self-defence 
and thus rightfully expand their territory through conquest. Through his reading of Vitoria’s 
work, Anghie reveals the extent to which law and the principles of sovereignty relied on 
emphasising the subaltern’s membership within the human community, while simultaneously 
drawing attention to his radically different nature. The subaltern was allocated an ambivalent 
identity; an identity that was neither here nor there, but both at the same time, leaving the 
native open to being incorporated within and excluded from the law depending on the 
prevailing contexts. The job of the Imperialists, therefore, became one of reforming the cultural 
difference of the Indian, taming his alterity; their job became one of Europeanising the native 
Other for, purportedly, the ‘welfare’ of the Indian community itself.  
Anghie’s critical interpretation of Vitoria reveals the fact that, alongside the pursuit of economic 
development there emerged a paternalistic tendency amongst European colonists, who began to 
see themselves as the preservers of native culture; a culture that was, nonetheless, entirely 
articulated in European terms and through European categories. This tension between the 
European proclivity for economic progress on the one hand, and its tendency to see itself as the 
bastion of Indigenous identity on the other, is a persistent conflict that underwrites the 
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development and preservation of colonial (and now postcolonial) political authority. Attempts 
to moderate challenges and forms of resistance to European economic exploitation of the colony 
led to the construction of imagined geographies of social interaction, which had the effect of 
separating the interests of the colonial regime along binaries like the public/private divide.  
Colonial modernity, therefore, appeared to ground itself in the view that economy and culture 
were “exclusive, a priori, ethico-political arenas.”302 This conception of modernity can, therefore, 
be seen to underlie the dual conflict of colonialism (and later the postcolonial liberal order), that 
which is between European economic progress and native cultural protection.  
The history of Imperial expansion, as my earlier discussion of colonial markers of possession 
and Vitoria’s notion of jus gentium indicate, is a history thoroughly involved in the spatialisation 
of social difference. European voyagers went to great lengths to demonstrate that non-European 
geographic area inspired cultural features and personalities that were antithetical to European 
self-identity. However, in the process of appropriating foreign lands as European territories, 
there appeared to be a rising consensus that native alterity could be tamed, that the colonisers 
had a duty to rescue the native Other from his spatially-incurred303 primitivity. The process of 
territorialising geographic space, therefore, led to the simultaneous hybridisation of native 
identity.  At the same time, however, it opened up important opportunities for Europeans to 
foreclose the application of a standardised system of law by pointing to the threat of native 
resistance. The notion of jus gentium misuses the category of universalism by both extending 
the benefits of a shared system of legal regulation to the natives, yet simultaneously prohibiting 
its equal application through the invocation of standards that suit European (and impede 
native) interests. Vitoria’s vision of spatio-legal rule highlights the intuitions that underpin the 
ageless conflict between stable political rule and perceptions of social difference. His work 
points to the fact that the ‘humanity’ of native communities has always been open to reshaping 
based on prevailing political interests, and the idea of territorial integrity has always served a 
pivotal role in confirming, reproducing, and containing the native’s subaltern identity and 
masking (or naturalising) power asymmetries.  
But, more importantly, Vitoria’s work also points to an irrevocable connection between law, 
geography, and cultural difference. In particular Anghie’s reading of Vitoria exposes the 
paradoxes of a law that is at once universal and particular, able to bring the native into the folds 
of humanity, but equally capable of casting him out. Indeed one could argue that the law was 
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universal in form, given that native communities also had the right of reprisal if their 
entitlement to sojourn was breached by Europeans. The right of sojourn is one that is presented 
as being mutual, yet with the knowledge that many of the native communities encountered did 
not possess the requisite travel technologies that would make the reciprocal exercise of that 
right practicable. Thus, while the right was universal in substance, it certainly was 
particularistic in application, and this theme of a universal law applied unequally to the 
‘culturally different’ is a theme that will emerge throughout my analysis in this chapter. 
It is these very ideas that I want to draw attention to, how law and geography, as 
epistemological structures, collude to make certain consequences of social relations invisible to 
us. This spatio-legal conspiracy is revealed time and again throughout this chapter, particularly 
when discussing issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty.304  Specifically, I show how jurisdiction 
and sovereignty are spatio-legal concepts that portray political and legal authority as ‘having 
borders’, as being enclosed, and produce the idea that this orientation of power is natural and 
pre-political. However, this is a view of authority that deflects attention away from the reality of 
unequal social relations and the uneven application of a purportedly ‘universal’ regime of law.  
Conventionally, the notion of sovereignty emerges to legitimate the extension of a universal 
system of law to native communities. The sovereignty of any governing authority is also linked 
to territory, in the sense that one entity’s exclusive governing potential is limited only by the 
presence of another ‘sovereign’ governing power on the other side of its territorial borders. 
Sovereign entities are able to restrict access to their territory and regulate movement through 
their territory. Sovereign power, therefore, is intimately linked to territorial possession and the 
inability to independently control interactions within one’s territorial space significantly limits 
one’s exercise of power. In the following sections of this chapter I use the case studies of 
colonial India and postcolonial Australia and Canada to help elaborate how jurisdiction and 
sovereignty are spatio-legal constellations that have the dual aim of regulating social difference 
while concealing the unequal relationships of power that emerge through a particularist 
application of an allegedly universal regime of law. A historical approach brings into sharper 
relief the continuity of the spatialising reflex of colonialism and suggests that the steady 
operation of Occidental Legality is producing an idea of space that is inextricably linked to the 
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production of cultural difference.  As the notion of territory, and territorial sovereignty, are 
widely accepted principles in international law and are implicated in the current arrangement 
of the world order, many of the key debates that I present in this chapter have wider application 
across contemporary societies, and I demonstrate this connection later, in Chapter Four, when I 
broadly consider questions of cultural and normative diversity in the contemporary setting. 
C. Legal Narratives as Expressions of ‘Imperial Witnessing’  
In Chapter Two I discussed how narratives of contact and discovery were important 
accompaniments of European power during the early years of the Imperial-Indigenous 
encounters. As encounter-narratives revealing European judgments about the native Other, 
these narratives provided important insights into the development of the witnessing agent’s 
own identity.  Additionally, narratives of Imperial witnessing were also important mechanisms 
for coming to terms with the alterity of the foreign setting. This was achieved through the use 
fantasy to construct a distorted reality about the landscapes and people being experienced and 
observed.  As such, narratives become important cultural representations of space and place, 
they are important in not only “position[ing] people in relation to each other,” but also in 
communicating how “[humans] come into existence...as embodied beings, processing the partial 
fragments of sensory experience, sorting them into patterns of consequence, patterns of 
meaning.”305 
Since narratives are ways in which we sort, arrange, and produce patterns”306 between different 
subjective experiences of the world, there is always the possibility of competing narratives 
surfacing, which contest our arrangement or patterning of an event or phenomena.307 
Accordingly, we can also say that narratives have the tendency to ‘moralise’ reality, “that is, to 
identify it with a social system that is the source of any morality that we can imagine.”308  
Counter-hegemonic narratives, therefore, can represent acts of resistance to certain normative 
frameworks that are rendered universal, neutral and naturalised (through, for instance, the 
processes of narrating and mapping) by providing alternative sources of morality and by 
proposing competing interpretations of reality. Accordingly, ‘narrativising’ – the use of 
narratives as a way of constructing reality - is an important strategy employed by both 
dominant and peripheral communities in communicating their personal and intimate accounts 
of history and, in the process, challenging the alternative accounts put forth by others.  
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One way in which conflicting narratives are legitimised is through jurisprudential 
incorporation.  The law is an essential vehicle through which competing accounts of political 
community and individual and group-identity are authorised and institutionalised as histories, a 
set of “coherent narratives” that “recount events in time, in place, involving specific actors.”309  
Thus, judicial decisions are, themselves, narratives which legitimise (or delegitimise) certain 
interpretations of events, phenomena, and people. As a setting for the production, circulation, 
and authentication of competing narratives, courts serve an important function in creating 
knowledge. They do this by influencing the epistemological value of certain accounts of history 
and identity and, in the process they help to shape social relations according to a particular 
social system or normative framework.   
Thus, in the following sections this chapter, I draw attention to how legal discourse and 
judgments are themselves narratives of Imperial witnessing.  Like maps, these legal processes 
position spaces and histories, enclose and contain identities, and discourse and impede 
movement and interaction. Through this positioning certain relations are rendered 
‘comparable’, while others incommensurable. Rather than a source of objective fact, liberal law 
(i.e. the prevailing legal regime in liberal societies) is thoroughly implicated in a retelling of 
Imperial experience, traditionally using European referents of discovery, development, and 
rescue. That is not to say that legal discourse is not a valuable tool frequently used to deploy 
counter-hegemonic narratives (just as is cartography and ethnography can be). As we will see, 
jurisdictional challenges that make their way into the courts often present competing versions 
of history and sometimes these versions have been successful in the rewriting of dominant 
narratives. As Chapter Two and Three have been split between, on the one hand, Imperial 
narratives of cartography and ethnography, and on the other, structures of political and legal 
governance, it should be made clear that the intention is not to hold law up as an example of 
some objective truth against which to judge the subjective realities of map-making and travel 
writing. Instead, the aim is to demonstrate how liberal law is, itself, implicated in the 
reconstruction of subjective reality as objective truth. The making of space, the mapping of 
history, the grafting of identity, and their institutionalisation through forms of social regulation, 
are all important aspects of Occidental Legality, and operate in conjunction to produce an 
owned, enclosed, and culturally-divisible view of space.  
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3. Tracing the Idea of Territory through Native-Imperial Conflict in British India 
The colonisation of India presented many quandaries for British rule as it was a setting that sat 
at odds with Europe’s colonial project in other parts of the world. Part of this could be 
attributed to the fact that European interest in India was, first and foremost, sparked by the 
subcontinent’s enormous wealth of resources.  Accordingly, Britain’s first venture into India 
came in the form of the British East India Company (BEIC) in 1612, a private trading company 
that was given wide-sweeping powers by the Crown to make govern, make laws, and transact 
business with the aim of profiting its shareholders. During Company rule, from 1757 to 1857, 
the operation of law was haphazard, arbitrary, and loosely patterned to facilitate Anglo-Indian 
trade without the BEIC taking on too strong of an administrative role.310 The primary aim was 
the maintenance of law and order, rather than a large-scale institutional and ideological 
overhaul of Indian society.311  
However, this focus shifted as the British Government officially took control of India in 1858312, 
and replaced the private interests of the Company with the territorial interests of the 
metropole. Several reasons explained the Crown’s assumption of control over India, not all of 
them unfavourable. Crown intervention could partially be attributed to the growing number of 
complaints against Company officials and English settlers related to violence and injustice 
against native communities.313 Accordingly, the standardisation of legal procedure that came 
with the metropole taking charge was partially established in order to hold the settled 
population accountable for their excessive brutality against Indians. Many authors also argue 
that the British Raj (Crown rule) brought about many positive changes within Indian society. 
For example, Crown rule brought changes to the educational system in India, restored law and 
order to a society wracked by civil war, and prohibited inhumane Indian traditions, like the 
practice of sati.314  
Colonial India personified the dilemmas that had provoked Vitoria to previously advance the 
doctrine of jus gentium. India represented a colonial society, living in territory that was now 
administered by the Crown, but being simultaneously governed by a whole range of localised 
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legal networks, a plurality that made colonial interactions tenuous and unpredictable.315 To 
complicate these issues further, British India could also be characterised by a degree of cultural 
hybridity and complex social relations that defied easy classification316 and often gave rise to 
native allegiances that were quickly pledged and just as quickly revoked.317  These wavering 
loyalties challenged the colonial power over the course of its first half-century of rule, which 
was marked by the bloody Sepoy rebellion in 1857, and the day-to-day tedium of indirect and 
proxy rule in the most unruly areas of the subcontinent. 
In order to administer settler-native relations more effectively, British political agents were 
encouraged to learn the local languages and immerse themselves in the local culture. In 
recognising India as a long-enduring and rich civilisation, colonial administrators were quick to 
note that, while having no overarching central government, India incorporated institutions and 
functions resembling a State system.  India had also further integrated lasting forms of local- 
and self-governance structures that were deeply embedded in social and political life.318 These 
realities of Indian social and political life meant that India could not be managed in the same 
way as Imperial colonies elsewhere. This realisation was further bolstered by India’s sheer 
geographic magnitude (making centralised governance highly unlikely) and the size of its 
population (which made the thought of an Indian revolt all the more disturbing). The 
administration of India, as Cohn notes, “could not merely be analogised by reference to existing 
colonial experience.” The governance of India demanded innovative legal solutions.319 
To this end, the colonial response was to administer relations by drawing on English legal 
norms, but integrating them with Indian cultural traditions and beliefs.320 For metropolitan 
statesmen this ability to ‘impersonate’ the Indian was sometimes a cause for alarm because it 
was thought to make colonial agents more sympathetic to native concerns or less resilient to 
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native deceit.321  As concern over social disorder abroad and at home mounted, partly on 
account of heightening Anglo-French tensions,322 a uniform ‘spirit’ and system of regulation 
across the Empire was sought. This meant that, as the aims of British expansion became 
ideological and territorial, stricter categories of identity and more stringent extrapolations of 
space became necessary.  
A. Ordering Relations through the Public/Private Distinction 
One way in which the British tried to manage the simultaneous application of colonial and 
native law was through the promulgation of the public/private divide, which was a first step in 
separating judicial punishment from other types of (religious/cultural) sanction. As an imagined 
geography of difference, the public/private divide segregated and hierarchically organised 
human interaction into artificial domains, each constructed along different visions of social 
ordering. While the law of the public domain was seen as “enlarging and safeguarding the 
freedoms of the individual in the market place,”323 the private domain was understood as being 
interested in restricting ‘free’ activity for the sake of maintaining the particularistic interests of 
the community. In this sense we begin to see the public and private domains corresponding to 
the enduring division in European political rule: that between social regulation and cultural 
protection.  
The British government instituted parallel systems of law, a criminal and civil procedure based 
on the English Common Law, alongside Hindu and Islamic personal law to administer issues 
related to caste, religion, limited property law disputes, and family law relationships - “arenas 
that were understood to constitute Indigenous culture.”324 The classification of issues as either 
‘private’ or ‘public’ matters were left to the English courts,325  which made these decisions based 
on judicial interpretation in conjunction with advice from local pundits. Disputes that engaged 
the common law, prevailing within the ‘public domain’, would be decided on the basis of the 
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(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p 58. 
325 Nandini Panda-Bhattacharya, Appropration and Invention of Tradition: The East India Company and Hindu Law in 
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principles of equity and policy.  On the other hand, disputes activating the private law domain 
would be subject to rules ‘discovered’ through existing customary and religious norms.    
By this spatialisation of ‘the political’ versus ‘the cultural’ the Anglo-Indian system of law not 
only cemented cultural difference, but defined cultural practice as inherently non-political. 
Personal laws became static, fixed in space, only subject to certain types of interactions taking 
place in certain places (the home, the sacred, between the family).  In comparison, the public 
domain was presented as affecting the entirety of the political order, engaging issues that were 
claimed to effect the entire population (though, in reality, they served the interests of an elite 
minority).326 
The classification of these interactions along the public/private binary was, of course, the 
prerogative of colonial courts. Often this produced a distortion of native identity by producing 
legal categories that did not necessarily coincide with cultural or religious identities.327  In how 
the personal laws are organised, we are given the distinct impression that a secular identity is 
incommensurable with a religious identity. Since the courts were to decide non-religious private 
law matters using the principles of ‘justice, equity, and good conscience’, it appears as if 
religious disputes engaged a law that was, specifically not ‘just, equitable, and of good 
conscience’ (i.e. Hindu or Muslim law). In this pairing of the common and personal law it 
appears that each regime has a trajectory that is antithetical to the other. The native identity, 
therefore, appears janus-faced – incorporating a religious and secular component, each 
incommensurable with the other. The use of personal law, as I discuss in greater detail in 
subsequent sections, not only obstructed evolutions in native identity but also linked that 
identity to primitivity by “reversions to long dead or unfashionable conventions.”328  
While native law appeared spatially contained through the implementation of an imagined 
private domain, this sphere was still subject to European legal intrusion. The English reverence 
of legal positivism permeated the private domain, where issues were decided by reference to 
scripture, and thus written legal norms were more valued than localised, non-scriptural 
practice. This, in turn, had a crucial impact on Muslim and Hindu law traditions that primarily 
relied on convention. Furthermore, the courts also determined that the sources of Hindu law be 
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organised hierarchically so that written legislation would trump all reference to important 
religious texts such as the dharmaśāstra.329 In 1864, British administrators also dispensed with 
native legal advisors, learning Persian, Sanskrit and Urdu so as to administer the personal laws 
with a view to adjudicating in ways consonant with English principles and procedures.330 The 
traditional division in English philosophical thought between the secular and religious, mapped 
onto the public/private, was not shared by members of Indian society, many of who saw 
religion and social life as part of the same ethico-political arena. For many Indians religion 
thoroughly permeated social life, and this neat division that was inspired by the European 
Enlightenment had little resonance for the way that Indians understood social relations.  This 
distortion of social behaviour took place through a paradox between proliferating jurisdictions 
that concealed the fact that one set of legal norms was attempting to regulate or prevent 
behaviour that the other was promoting and safeguarding.331 As we will see in the following two 
sections of this chapter, this made colonial regulation in India a messy, often inconsistent, 
enterprise. 
B. Legal Difference Anchored in Cultural Difference 
The parallel system of legal regulation implemented in India was predicated on the belief that 
cultural difference legitimised legal difference, or an unequal application of English Common 
Law. While Indian colonialism was often projected as a ‘rejuvenation’ of an illustrious 
civilisation, the imagined geographies of the public and private suggest that India’s history was 
perceived as very different from and inferior to European civilisation. More than anything, 
colonial policy and practice in India points to an intense fear of a merging of social and political 
structures, and the ‘spacing’ (i.e. differentiating through space) of those relations becomes an 
important aspect of colonial governance. 
The first important misconception of Indian colonialism is the idea that the operation of Anglo-
Indian law involved intermixing. It did no such thing. Laws operating simultaneously in time 
were isolated to different spaces and places. The discussion of the public/private divide is one 
example, but there are other more tangible expressions of this as well. For instance, the British 
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330 Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1928), p 25-6. 
331 David A Washbrook, "Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India," Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 03 (1981): p 
653-4. 
The Political and Legal Construction of ‘Territory’ Page 126 
  
Raj permitted the operation of many forms of localised self-government. It allowed the tribal 
communities living in locations far removed from the centre of British control to live in 
accordance with their own customary traditions. These areas were administered by setting up 
forms of proxy and indirect rule, where mullahs and maliks took on the dual task of acting as 
native spokesmen and colonial brokers. The Princely States of India, which were administered 
through Hindu religious law and had remained autonomous throughout Mughal rule, were also 
allowed to retain their semi-autonomous status.332  While these regions of normative diversity 
were allowed to remain, their power was reined-in by the settled law, which entitled the 
Imperial power to enact legislation across the Empire, including in the Princely States if it opted 
to do so. Thus, rather than a right, self-government was constructed as a privilege granted to the 
conquered by the benevolent colonial power.  
In recognising Princely India’s rights of self-rule, the Crown was permitting these areas to retain 
their strong relationship between religion and political authority. However, these areas are then 
defined as traditional and restrictive because the strong connection between religion and 
political power suggests that changes to one’s religious convictions leads to significant political 
and economic disempowerment. The actual reasoning for preserving the autonomy of the 
Princely States (i.e. the fact that they possess a cultural identity anchored in religious political 
authority) also becomes the basis for their inferiorisation. Against this view of the Princely 
States, the secular colonial government becomes progressive and liberal. This classification of 
Princely rule, however, demonstrated a clear distortion of reality given the level of tolerance the 
Hindu Maharaja had shown towards Christian converts living within the Princely States.333   
An analysis of colonial legal processes reveals how the use of space contributed to colonial 
misrepresentations of Princely rule, and aided in the production of a more tolerant European 
identity. In Dasapa,334 the English Court in Mysore, located within Princely India, deprived 
Christian converts of their citizenship and guardianship rights, claiming that the protective laws 
of (the more tolerant) British India did not extend to these Hindu spaces. The Court thus 
presented itself as having little choice but to decide the case in a way that divested individuals of 
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their right to change their religious beliefs because of the space colonial law was operating in.  
This ruling thus suggested that it was geography rather than the law itself that was doing the 
controlling and giving rise to an unequal and discriminatory application of legal norms. Legal 
diversity, in this case, was attributed to the cultural division of space. Yet, even in these ‘Hindu 
spaces’, where the colonial self-identified as an ‘outsider’, colonial courts took it upon 
themselves to be the protectors of Hindu identity and culture. This expressed itself through the 
ruling in Dasapa335 that disfavoured conversion to Christianity for the sake of protecting the 
Hindu character of the Princely State. Yet, the courts performed this protective role by 
juxtaposing the progressive and tolerant modernity of British rule against the conservative and 
intolerant rule of the Hindu Maharaja. In this way, Indians who saw culture and political power 
as one and the same were cast not only into a separate spatial domain, but a different historical 
epoch (i.e. back in time). The Princely States became essential to the projection of European 
modernity because they provided both a tangible ‘counter’-reality against which the latter’s 
progressiveness could be confirmed, and an imagined geography by which the illustrious Indian 
past was chronicled and critiqued through forms of English rule throughout the region.336 
More importantly, however, patterning the operation of law to fit a culturally-divisible view of 
territory helped to deflect attention away from the fact that the British had always supported 
Hindu rule and worked to protect it through a series of political actions, including the 
development of Hindu personal law.337 The rights of self-government accorded to the Princely 
States were strategic in the sense that it was hoped that these particularly powerful rulers of the 
Princely and tribal areas would limit their exercise of power to spaces located at a distance from 
the settled areas. Self-governance was a way of creating and maintaining distance between 
those parts of Indian society that posed the greatest threat to European political and cultural 
domination.  Colonial law’s preoccupation with space, particularly in preserving notions of 
distance and limiting proximity will become all the more clearer in Chapter Four, in which I 
discuss colonial governance within the North-West Frontier of the subcontinent.  
Despite the intention to maintain distance these patterns of quasi-/semi-sovereignty proved 
difficult for the legal management of conflict within the colony. The entanglements of 
proliferating jurisdictions became most apparent in cases involving Indian claimants ‘resisting’ 
                                                             
335  Ibid. 
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the unequal application of the law by bringing disputes to the courts which challenged the 
colonial view that native identity was static and unyielding. For example, in Madura v. Motoo 
Ramalinga Sathupathy338 and an earlier Privy Council ruling of 1872,339 it was determined that 
Hindu custom was only able to override the written legislation if claimants were able to 
demonstrate a continuous, stable, and coherent usage. This meant that the right to rely on a 
personal law for the resolution of a dispute that fell within the private sphere depended on the 
claimant’s ability to point to a fixed and unchanging identity. This ruling implied that the private 
law and thus, by extension, native religious/cultural identity was located ‘backwards in time’, 
which meant that the private sphere, as an imagined geography was both culturally-divisible 
and temporally located. As section (4) of this chapter will demonstrate, this is a view of space 
that also emerges within postcolonial law and cases involving Aboriginal title. 
This fixing of native identity was frequently challenged by cases that brought up the possibility 
of evolving and active identities. In Abraham v. Abraham an Anglo-Indian claimant demanded 
that the courts recognise the hybridity of identity. The facts of the case involved two 
untouchable brothers, one of whom who had married an Anglo-Indian woman, who had gone on 
to become affluent distillery owners. After the death of one of the brothers, dispute over family 
assets arose between the widow and her brother in-law. In the appeal, the Madras courts tried 
to determine whether the property in question was part of a ‘self-acquired estate’ (bringing it 
within the scope of secular English law), or whether it was of ancestral origin (bringing it under 
the rule of Hindu law).  Interestingly, however, an unequal application of colonial law was 
masked by reference to property. According to the reasoning of the English Court it would be 
the pedigree of the property in question which would determine the type of law that would be 
applied to the case, rather than the specific actions and customs of the parties involved.340 Over 
the course of the trial, the Court relied on witness testimonies that used very superficial 
features of ‘Englishness’ to formulate a uniquely ‘East Indian’ identity, that represented an ‘in-
betweeness’, as something less than European but more than Indian. Abraham, along with many 
other inheritance cases that drew on Anglo-Hindu laws of succession significantly challenged 
colonial law’s relegation of religion to the private realm, but also revealed colonial law’s deep-
seated uneasiness with the cultural ambivalence that had become so characteristic of native-
settler social relations. In these instances space was projected as a stable and unchanging 
category that could be used to stabilise incoherent religious and cultural identities. 
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C.  ‘Territoriality’ and the Ethicalness of European Rule 
Throughout the period of the British Raj we can find evidence of territory, and its allocation and 
distribution as property, being used to demonstrate the ethicalness of British rule.  From the 
early eighteenth century the British were preoccupied with distinguishing lawful ownership of 
land. This was partly to hold the rightful proprietor responsible for paying land revenues to the 
Crown. However, determinations of land ownership were also cultural processes. For example, 
Warren Hastings, the first Governor General of Bengal, aimed to recognise ownership through 
the implementation of an Anglo-Indian system of land administration. What is particularly 
noteworthy about this undertaking is that Hastings aimed to do so by encouraging young 
servants of the Crown to learn aspects of ‘native’ culture, including Persian, Urdu, and Sanskrit 
languages. Hastings’ envisioned this joint system as one in which the English revitalised native 
traditions. As Cohn explains, 
as part of a scholarly and pragmatic project aimed at creating a body of knowledge that 
could be utilized in the effective control of Indian society…[Hastings] was trying to help the 
British define what was ‘Indian’ and to create a system of rule that would be congruent with 
what were thought to be Indigenous institutions. Yet this system of rule was to be run by 
Englishmen and had to take into account British ideas of justice and the proper discipline, 
forms of deference, and the demeanour that should mark the relations between rulers and 
ruled.341  
Native identity, was once again, understood as ‘disembodied’, ahistorical, and separable from 
the corporeal experiences of everyday life. Just rule was rule through the embodiment of native 
culture with the aim of revitalising it, modernising it.342  Hastings’ system of administration, 
therefore, determined land ownership by virtue of connecting native and European culture. 
European cultural and legal principles came to mediate the relationship between native 
communities and their land, and their rightful ownership depended on the extent that native 
forms of administration could be made ‘intelligible’ through the intrusion of European legal 
principles.  
Property relations were integral to the exercise of British rule in India, and helped to categorise 
the connected yet distinct patterns of interaction that characterised colonial rule.343  While 
being the bedrock of the Common law system, property did not hold a similar standing in Hindu 
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law. As Panda-Bhattarcharya notes, this “extensive emphasis on ‘property’ was derived not from 
any study of local situations, but from a social ideology of English origin.”344 Property’s 
relevance to Hindu law was entirely different as “Hindus had protected their right to property 
because they had tenaciously held on to their religion,” and not the other way around.345 This 
reliance on property as a vehicle for legitimising British rule points to the continued 
prominence that owned conceptions of space enjoyed within colonial social thought, and 
defines space as an important component of European and native identities. The British sense of 
self was forged through relationships affecting access to and regulation of geographic area.  The 
apportioning of territory was an integral aspect of British rule, and it was an aspect of British 
identity that was frequently cultivated against Hindu laws of property & inheritance. These 
distinct cultural identities were being mined through the division of space, spaces that were 
sometimes understood as simultaneously persisting, and other times imagined as being located 
at different points along a linear history. The legal geographies that emerge through colonial 
law’s definition, division, and allocation of space suggest that different cultural traditions 
require different spatial locations to operate. This, as the following section on postcolonial law 
and its relationship to space demonstrates, has become a central defining feature of how 
contemporary societies manage issues of pluralism today.  
  
4. Reproducing Territory through Postcolonial Governance in Australia & Canada 
While it has been argued that colonialism represents a ‘rupture’ and new beginning in 
history,346 brought about by the previously unanticipated potential of overseas travel and the 
profound realisation of immense global plurality (cultural, religious, economic, and political), 
postcolonialism has been described as a period in history defined by “a politics of opposition 
and struggle, that problematises the relationship between centre and periphery,”347 and defies 
linear categorisations of time. The disintegration of global Empires and the coalescence of 
autonomous, sovereign, nation-States, appears to support this characterisation of the ‘post’-
colonial as an epoch scarred by dissonance, where previously stable and authoritative 
epistemologies were made susceptible to critique and discrediting.348 Postcolonialism appears 
                                                             
344 Nandini Panda-Bhattacharya, Appropration and Invention of Tradition: The East India Company and Hindu Law in 
Early Colonial Bengal, 1698-1772 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p 38. 
345 Ibid., p 49. 
346 In the sense of travel technologies but also, equally important, as new forms of (property-based) social relations. 
See, Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (USA: Harvard University Press, 
1997), p 2. 
347 Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge, "What Is Post(-)Colonialism?," Textual Practice 5, no. 3 (1991): P 399. 
348 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). 
The Political and Legal Construction of ‘Territory’ Page 131 
  
as a global ‘awakening’ to the injustices of colonial politics, and an appreciation for the pluralism 
that necessitates the protection of ancient cultures from Western encroachment. 
On the other hand, there are also writers who argue that the ‘post’ in postcolonial is simply a 
“prefix which governs the subsequent element,”349 and that, despite all our earlier optimism and 
enthusiasm, “[p]ost-colonialism came to signify something rather remote from self-
determination and autonomy.”350 Conversely, others are convinced that the disappointment of 
postcolonial ideology could partially be attributed to the fact that, “[b]y deploying categories 
such as hybridity, mimicry, ambivalence…all of which laced colonised into colonising cultures – 
postcolonialism effectively became a reconciliatory rather than a critical, anti-colonialist 
category.”351 This view has been criticised by literature that argues the division of the world’s 
societies into simplistic dichotomies like ‘colonising’ and ‘colonised’, fails to speak truth to the 
complexity of human nature and agency, and tends to reduce colonised societies into passive 
victims.352    
But the aim of this chapter is not to debate the worthiness of postcolonialism as an appropriate 
theory of analysis or critique.  Instead, in writing this section I point to the sensibilities that 
underpin the postcolonial condition, and the dialectical and often conflicting conceptions of 
justice and empowerment that underwrite the politics of postcolonial reconciliation. I do this to 
disrupt common assumptions about postcolonial State-Indigenous relations, structured by the 
belief that culture and cultural difference are natural and pre-political realities. In the course of 
this discussion, I examine the function of territory to the recognition of cultural pluralism, and 
its importance to contemporary quests for Indigenous rights. I suggest that the processes of 
Occidental Legality continue to operate in the present postcolonial condition, despite 
contemporary societies’ awareness and commemoration of multiplicity and its commitment to 
constitutional values such as equality and multiculturalism. While these principles suggest an 
acceptance and affirmation of the value cultural pluralism, the modern methods by which 
diversity continues to be managed convey a continued discomfort with the possibility of cultural 
miscegenation and hybridity. The strategies that States employ to manage cultural pluralism 
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appear to produce spatial distance between the dominant group and their perceived Others, 
even when both groups occupy the same political space of the State. 
A. Why Canada and Australia? 
Canada and Australia have been selected as jurisdictions for analysis because they share a 
common colonial heritage as British settler-colonies. Aboriginal policy in each jurisdiction is 
derived from a common legal basis in British common law, and each incorporates a minority 
Aboriginal population whose interests do not appear to fundamentally threaten State power.  
Additionally, there appears to be widespread consensus that both States demonstrate a degree 
of success in terms of how Indigenous rights-claims and protections are being managed. 
However, I disturb this assumption. My analysis of these two jurisdictions focuses on how the 
processes of Occidental Legality continue to shape the political and legal structures of 
governance in both countries.  The structures and systems of governance that are examined in 
this section include, but are not limited to: legal instruments and statutes (e.g. State 
Constitutions, the Indian Act), legal judgments related to Aboriginal rights-claims, and political 
schemes developed as a way of redressing the politico-economic depression of Aboriginal 
societies (e.g. the Reservation system).  
While the modern nation-State has been predominately imagined as incorporating an ethno-
culturally homogenous population (the ‘nation’),353 its constitution has been, and continues to 
be, challenged by various members of its population. These challenges represent a rupture in 
the constructed unity of its political community. Modern politics centres on the power struggles 
of different social groups within the shared social and political space of the State. Apart from 
contesting the political authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty of the State, jurisdictional disputes 
between minority/majority communities also represent objections to the dominant conceptions 
of legal normativity. As ways of articulating a right to define and introduce different forms of 
social ordering and regulation, jurisdictional conflicts have the potential to trigger more 
inclusive conceptions of ‘the legal’.   Moreover, we can understand these conflicts as comprising 
both rights-claims under the Common law of the State (involving questions of accommodation), 
and challenges which dispute the absolute supremacy of State-law (related to questions of 
autonomy and self-government). 
By way of contrast to the common perception that both Australia and Canada have been largely 
successful in balancing cultural pluralism with national unity, the processes of Occidental 
Legality continue to create distance between diverse members of Australia and Canada’s 
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political community. In particular I analyse the relationship between each State and their 
Aboriginal communities. This discussion, therefore, puts into doubt a number of common 
assumptions about State and minority relations in contemporary democracies such as Canada 
and Australia.  This approach challenges what is often presented as a ‘progressive’ view of 
modern legal institutions and informing theories of minority protection.  In turn, this challenge 
forces us to grapple with vital questions about the exercise of power, conceptions of political 
community, and how space and geography continue to underwrite contemporary experiences of 
political and cultural domination.  
The effects of Occidental Legality identified during the early years of the colonial expansion 
(namely the emptying of geographic space, the linking of cultural difference and identity to 
geography, and the temporalisation of geographies of difference) continue to persist within the 
ideological and institutional structures of both countries. As such, the politics of State-
Indigenous relations continue to display evidence of a conceptual emptying of postcolonial 
geographies, and a bounded, possessed, and culturally-divisible view of space.  This view of 
space now appears to be a taken-for-granted aspect of social and political life. Thus, while 
postcolonial sensibilities have the benefit of hindsight in terms of an awareness of the highly 
violent and extremely oppressive conditions perpetuated by the colonial encounter, State-
promoted policies for redress have yet to translate into any meaningful reconsideration of the 
epistemological traditions that perpetuated, reproduced, and sustained these conditions.  As a 
result of this failure to question the relationship between spatial discourse and colonial ideology 
and institutions, contemporary State responses to Indigenous claims for accommodation and 
autonomy continue to pivot on the notion that law and geography are culturally-divisible.  
I bring these problematic realities into sharper relief by devoting the last part of this chapter to 
a discussion of how the dominant conception of territory impedes Aboriginal conceptions of 
land and geography. While reaffirming the significance of land and territory to Aboriginal quests 
for self-government and greater political and legal autonomy, many Aboriginal scholars discuss 
how their conceptions of space and geography – particularly their understanding of how these 
contribute to Aboriginal identity and the structuring Aboriginal government – are entirely 
displaced by the dominant, colonial model of territory that tends to, more often than not, shape 
Aboriginal-State relations in ways that are unacceptable to Aboriginal communities. While I may 
often refer to this as ‘Aboriginal perspectives’ on territory and governance, I want to make clear 
that ‘Aboriginality’ does not signify a monolithic cultural category. Aboriginal communities are 
extremely differentiated. Census results in Canada have identified at least six hundred different 
Aboriginal bands and governments, each with their  own unique linguistic, artistic, musical, and 
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customary practices. My intent is to draw attention to issues of structural injustice broadly, 
rather than to deny complexity or to diminish the plurality and richness of Aboriginal culture 
and government.  
What is important about these perspectives is that they relay a general uneasiness, if not 
outright rejection, of the terms set by the dominant legal discourse as it pertains to Aboriginal 
rights, and their relationship with Aboriginal title in land. Authors like Borrows argue that the 
dominant legal system fails to appreciate the interconnections between land, ecology, 
environment and Aboriginal identity. For this reason, current State policies aimed at the 
protection and preservation of Aboriginal rights mistakenly differentiate between their rights in 
land and their rights on land. Consequently, many Aboriginal peoples feel that the ongoing legal 
and political processes do not meet the needs of Aboriginal communities and frequently work 
against them. One of the ways in which this occurs (and I discuss this in much greater depth in 
the sections that follow), is by focusing legal attention on the issue of property rights and 
relations rather than the topic of Aboriginal sovereignty.  While the prosperity of Aboriginal 
communities partially relies on having exclusive access to and use of their ancestral lands, a 
necessary precondition of this, is that they be able to use their land in accordance with their 
own normative frameworks.  This, I submit, requires that the State not only apportion land, but 
also recognise Aboriginal peoples’ status as self-governing nations.  
B. Constructing the Modern State: Embracing Plurality and Rejecting Difference 
Mar and Edmonds argue that the Imperial-Indigenous encounters of the last five hundred years 
have “produced a profound and extensive rearrangement of physical space and peoples.”354 
These processes of making and remaking space and the “intricacies of interaction – violent, 
ideological, and cultural – between colonising and colonised peoples,”355 gave rise to new social 
geographies in which perceptions of racial and ethnic difference had to be resolved and 
fractured identities had to be reshaped into a unified political identity of the national 
community.  A collapse of the hierarchical (ecclesiastical and aristocratic) forms of authority led 
to the emergence of a new democratic liberal ideology that transformed practices of governance 
in much of the postcolonial world. As the State began to emerge as a new ‘super-entity’ – the 
union of the political will of a spatially-bounded community – internal coherence and stability 
became crucial for sustaining the State’s political authority. 
                                                             
354 Tracy Banivanua Mar and Penelope Edmonds, eds., Making Settler Colonial Space: Perspectives on Race, Place, and 
Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2010), p 1. 
355 Ibid. 
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Processes of decolonisation typically involved the retention of colonial boundaries under the 
doctrine of uti posseditis, meaning that the purported ‘one nation one State’ headline of the 
withdrawing powers had greater metaphorical than axiomatic value. The transition to 
Statehood brought with it a further compression of space as new States rearticulated (material 
and immaterial) social and political boundaries, which often meant that inhabitants of the new 
‘State-space’ were organised so as to have closer interactions with other inhabitants, and 
sometimes hindered or discouraged from engaging in interactions with those residing outside 
of the State’s borders.356 Perceptions of ‘proximity’ and ‘distance’ were artificially regulated 
through the implementation of State-borders, and their associated limitations on access and 
rules of exclusion. Political and legal jurisdiction became coterminous with the territorial 
borders of the State. Frequently this had the effect of bringing into sharper, sometimes violent, 
focus the fact that material divisions of space were far more easily established than the 
remapping of places and peoples.357 
The common identity of ‘the nation’ – as the preeminent political community of the postcolonial 
world order – had to be reconciled with histories of brutality marked by difference-making, 
social and political exclusion, and spatial division and displacement, often perpetrated by the 
very communities to which the victims were now pledging allegiance. Similarly, the postcolonial 
condition gave rise to a situation in which the existence of ‘savage peoples’ on the same land as 
the emerging forms of political authority raised significant challenges to how these groups were 
understood and treated, and in turn, how they conceived their own position and relationship to 
the new political community of the nation-State. 
At the same time, academic study of the postcolonial condition was also marked by a similar 
shift in thinking, away from colonial oppression and towards the political possibilities of 
democratic sovereignty and the options that liberal ideology and practice now made available to 
Indigenous groups.358 Of particular relevance to this emerging focus in scholarship was how 
                                                             
356 Through, for example, the conditioning of strong bonds of nationality and national identity. See, Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London: Verso, 
2006).Malcolm Anderson refers to this is as the ‘psychological’ and ‘sociological’ significance of frontiers, and argues 
that often transgressive performances of border-behaviour have the effect of producing anxieties and hostilities. See, 
Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 
p 2-3. 
357 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p 80-100. 
358 The postcolonial writings of Fanon and Césaire can be considered influential not only because of their unique 
status as subaltern voices of native oppression, but because they provide alternative conceptions and designs of how 
the world could be made better. See, Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963). Also see, 
F. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (Pluto Press, 1986). Also see, Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan 
Pinkham (New York: Montly Review Press, 1972).  
The Political and Legal Construction of ‘Territory’ Page 136 
  
postcolonial settler societies359 (in which Indigenous populations were largely displaced and 
decimated) would handle the colony-to-State transition as they faced the difficult task of 
reconciling the State’s history of complicity in past exercises of colonial violence.360 For some 
States, the desire to maintain territorial integrity had, at times, superseded demands for the 
kind of political stability that would recognise and record historical injustices. In other 
instances, powerful non-State actors and interests have prompted States to acknowledge 
conditions of cultural pluralism and to pursue structures of governance by devolving power and 
patterns of territorial autonomy. Canada and Australia demonstrate both of these tendencies of 
postcolonial politics. 
i. Constitutional Developments and (dis)Locating the Political Community 
As settler-colonies, Australian and Canadian Governments have become aware that the State 
shares a large part of the burden of responsibility for colonial injustice and the systematic 
oppression and genocide suffered by their Aboriginal populations. Both Governments have 
acknowledged the past experiences of violence and injustice suffer/ed by the native 
communities of settler-colonies and, in some instances, have reintegrated under the rubric of 
reconciliation.361 This was partially inspired by the realisation that these incidents were not 
isolated to the far-removed ‘past’. The adoption of racialised discourses of difference and the 
use of discriminatory social policies were continued by both State Governments during the 
process of decolonisation.362 The authenticity of reconciliation was partially reinforced by the 
                                                             
359 Barker describes settler colonialism as “a distinct method of colonising involving the creation and consumption of 
a whole array of spaces by settler collectives that claim and transform places through the exercise of their sovereign 
capacity.” Adam J. Baker, "Locating Settler Colonialism," Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 13, no. 3 (2012). 
360 Glen S Coulthard, "Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the ‘Politics of Recognition’in Canada," 
Contemporary Political Theory 6, no. 4 (2007). Some argue that, States like Canada still remain complicit by their 
failure to acknowledge their colonial past. See, Jennifer Henderson and Pauline Wakeham, "Colonial Reckoning, 
National Reconciliation?: Aboriginal Peoples and the Culture of Redress in Canada," ESC: English Studies in Canada 35, 
no. 1 (2009). 
361 Brenna Bhandar, "Anxious Reconciliation(S): Unsettling Foundations and Spatialising History," Environment and 
Planning D: Society & Space 22, no. 6 (2004). Though Bhandar complicates this process within the Canadian context, 
questioning whether the development of one official history can ever hope to appropriate represent native 
experiences of oppression and subjugation.  
362 See, for example, Australia’s policy of cultural assimilation which, from 1910-1970, resulted in the forcible 
removal of Aboriginal children from their homes. This is best captured in the numerous ‘Stolen Generation’ debates. 
See, "The History of the Stolen Generation," National Sorry Day Committee, http://www.nsdc.org.au/stolen-
generations/history-of-the-stolen-generations/the-history-of-the-stolen-generations.<Accessed 1 Oct. 2013>  
Whether this is a policy that has been entirely abandoned is questioned by Armitage. Armitage also speaks of the 
discriminatory labour policies espoused by the Australian State against its Aboriginal population, whereby early 
Aboriginal labourers worked for rations and accommodation rather than wages. See, Andrew Armitage, Comparing 
the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), p 7, 17.   
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courts invalidating the sovereignty-doctrine of terra nullius,363 and recognising Aboriginal prior 
occupation.364  
For a large part of Australia’s history Aboriginal issues have failed to garner official 
governmental attention. It was only recently that Australia shifted away from conceptualising 
Australian-Aboriginal relations as a matter of local concern, which allocated responsibility over 
Aboriginal-Australian relations to each of its constituent states. In 1967 the State acquired 
concurrent powers to legislate for Aboriginals,365 thus placing Aboriginal relations on the 
Federal agenda. Conversely, Canada was quick to distinguish ‘Indian Affairs’366 as a concern 
solely of the Federal Government,367 allocating responsibility over Aboriginal issues to the State 
rather than the constitutive provincial legislatures. The Canadian Parliament established the 
Indian Act in 1876 under the provisions of the Constitution Act of 1867.  Interestingly, the Act 
declares its preoccupation with territorial space right from the outset when it accords the State 
exclusive authority to legislate over all issues related to “Indians and Lands Reserved for 
Indians.” The rights granted to Aboriginals under the Indian Act were later, in 1982, entrenched 
within the Canadian Constitution.  
Both the Canadian and Australian State have made important strides in promoting a more 
inclusive conception of the nation. In order to recognise the unique status of its Aboriginal 
constituents Canada has constitutionally entrenched First Nations’ rights as part of its 
acknowledgement of past injustices and in recognition that the First Nations form an integral 
component of Canadian history. Similarly, the Australian Government has accepted its part in 
perpetrating Aboriginal social-genocide and has gone some way towards compensating 
Aboriginals for the deprivation of their important social and economic entitlements.368 These 
processes have, at times, qualified the political authority of the State by the recognition of the 
messy and disordered history of its territory. For all intents and purposes, both Canada and 
Australia appear to have embarked on important projects aimed at greater Aboriginal 
                                                             
363 The initial denial by Australia of Aboriginal pre-contact title over colonised lands was overturned in 1992 by the 
landmark Mabo decision. Eddie Mabo V. The State of Queensland (No.2) 175 CLR HCA 23 1(1992). 
364 Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2001), p 4-5. 
365 Andrew Armitage, Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995), p 14. 
366 Indian’ in this respect is a highly controversial term given its past derogatory usage. As such, I use the word in 
quotes, and only to discuss aspects of politico-legal history that requires precision in terminology. In Canada the term 
has been replaced by ‘First Nations’. 
367 Constitution Act (1867), s.91(24).  
368 For an example of how Aboriginals were dispossessed under the political system of Australia see, Andrew 
Armitage, Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
1995), p 16-7. 
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empowerment by, in turn, qualifying (in theory) the State’s own claims of unfettered territorial 
sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, the successes of Aboriginal recognition and accommodation have not been entirely 
without impediment. Indigenous Australians continue to remain unrecognised by the State’s 
Constitution even today,369 and the Australian government’s initial refusal to issue an official 
apology for the genocide Aborigines suffered under previous governments has been a bone of 
contention for at least the last decade.370 Similarly, empirical studies of Aboriginal rights have 
been highly critical of the social and political inequalities plaguing Canada’s Aboriginal 
communities.371 Many such advocates have argued that a legal recognition of First Nations’ 
rights must be followed up by robust institutional mechanisms that deal with the unequal 
economic and political status of Aboriginal Canadians and the unique experiences of deprivation 
that this gives rise to.372  
Both Canada and Australia have also gone a long ways to defining Aboriginal identity.373 The 
Canadian Indian Act of 1876 defines ‘Indian’ legal status as emanating from an Indian father.374 
As the sovereign union of multiple competing interest and identities, the State has taken it upon 
itself to develop and impose its own conception of ‘Aboriginality’ onto its Indigenous 
population. This external shaping of identity has been challenged by members of the Aboriginal 
                                                             
369 Edward Johnson, "Abbott Seeks to Recognize Aborigines in Australia's Constitution," Bloomberg News(2013), 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-31/abbott-seeks-to-recognize-aborigines-in-australia-s-
constitution.html>  (Accessed: 1 January 2014). 
370 When Aboriginal children that had been forcibly removed from their parents during the early to late twentieth 
century (the ‘lost generation’) filed a federal class action suit against the government, a Royal Commission 
investigated their allegations and found that the State had engaged in ‘social genocide’. However, the Howard 
Government of 2000 continued to refuse an apology to the Aboriginal community, which sparked an international 
outcry in light of Australia hosting the 2000 Sydney Olympics.  An apology was, however, later issued by the Rudd 
Government in 2008. See, Elizabeth A. Povinelli, The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Meaning of 
Australian Multiculturalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), p 37-8. Also see, Ben Kiernan, "Cover-up and 
Denial of Genocide: Australia, the USA, East Timor, and the Aborigines," Critical Asian Studies 34, no. 2 (2002): p 164-
5. Also see, "Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates,"  in Hansard (13 February 2008), p 167-73, 
(the Hon K M Rudd MP, Prime Minister). Also see the Stolen Generation Case, Kruger V. Commonwealth, 1 CLR 
190(1997). 
371 Limited access to appropriate healthcare and fair access to education (and forms of education using cognitive 
styles that were consistent with Aboriginal worldviews) are two of the most prominent criticisms of the status of 
Aboriginals social rights. See, Marie Ann Battiste and Jean Barman, "First Nations Education in Canada: The Circle 
Unfolds." (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995). Also see, Sannie Y Tang and Annette J Browne, "‘Race’matters: Racialization 
and Egalitarian Discourses Involving Aboriginal People in the Canadian Health Care Context," Ethnicity and Health 13, 
no. 2 (2008).  
372 Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2001), p 26-8. 
373 New South Wales Aborigines Protection Act (1909). 
374 The restrictions on Aboriginal identity imposed by the Indian Act has caused some to remark that the Act has not 
only political significance, but also discursive and epistemological value, particularly because it serves as an 
“overarching discourse of classification, regulation, and control...[that]produces ways of thinking – a grammar – that 
embeds itself in every attempt to change.” Accordingly, its discursive value stems not only from its capacity to 
enshrine outside conceptions of Aboriginality, but also from its ability to shape how Aboriginal communities 
themselves understand and express their own identity and what sorts of political, cultural, and economic rights they 
envisage as being within the realm of possibility. See, Bonita Lawrence, "Gender, Race, and the Regulation of Native 
Identity in Canada and the United States: An Overview," Hypatia 18, no. 2 (2003): p 3-4. 
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community, some of whom have questioned the State’s self-proclaimed capacity to manage their 
most personal and private relationships, and have argued that this capacity has translated into 
intersectional racial and gender discrimination.375 Similarly, a series of early twentieth century 
statutes promulgated for the protection of Australian Aborigines had the effect of regulating the 
most intimate parts of their lives, including where they could and could not live, where their 
children could live, and where they could work.376  From this we can see that space, in 
particular, rights over it and access to it, has also been a major roadblock to improving State-
Indigenous relations. State-recognition of Aboriginal rights to land is typically of a limited 
nature, given that an acknowledgment of the illegitimacy of Crown title has not led to its 
immediate extinguishment, but has instead created a nested form of ownership in which 
Aboriginal possession becomes subordinate to European possession.  
The fact that Aboriginal peoples were often given exclusive access to space that was the least 
economically viable, encompassed inhospitable and challenging topography, and was usually far 
removed from urban centres, points to a deliberate State-policy of racial segregation.377  This 
was often underwritten by political and legal discourse and practice that prohibited cross-
cultural intermixing,378 and social conventions which reproduced Aboriginal displacement 
through the racialisation of public spaces like the classroom and hospital.379 As Byrne asserts, 
“[r]acial segregation, by its very nature, is a spatial practice.  It is about the separation of people 
in space and the rules and devices that are set up to achieve this. A segregated society 
necessitates segregated landscapes...”380  These landscapes were cultural spaces produced 
through the law, which had disparate impact on the Aboriginal peoples in both countries. 
Spatial techniques inform every aspect of managing the ‘Aboriginal problem’, and they do so in 
ways that further displace and isolate Aboriginal communities. The racialisation of space has 
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Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act (1901).  
377 Jean Barman, "Race, Greed and Something More: The Erasure of Urban Indigenous Space in Early Twentieth-
Century British Columbia," in Making Settler Colonial Space: Perspectives on Race, Place, and Identity, ed. Tracey 
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380 Ibid., p 103. 
The Political and Legal Construction of ‘Territory’ Page 140 
  
been a particularly insidious legacy of the colonial encounter and one that produces anxiety as 
space between “black and white bodies” reduces to ‘zero’ and “black and white bodies actually 
touch.”381 One of the ways in which modern political authorities have sought to reduce this 
anxiety is by engaging in processes which give the illusion of distance between closely located 
social groups. It is partially in assuaging these anxieties that territorial strategies for resolving 
issues of diversity have been pursued. 
In the following sections I specifically examine conflicts related to Aboriginal title, the 
Aboriginal Reserve System, and discourses of biodiversity, to study what effect Occidental 
Legality has had on the protection and promotion of Aboriginal cultural diversity. I argue that it 
is through methods of managing diversity grounded in Occidental Legality, that the Australian 
and Canadian State reproduce a bounded, owned, culturally-divisible and temporally-located 
model of space. In so doing, the politico-legal structures that have been deployed to ‘deal with’ 
native cultural difference have the effect of fixing Aboriginal identity and presenting it as 
something intrinsically different, and often antithetical, to the dominant identity of the nation. 
C. Situating Native Identity through Claims for Aboriginal Rights and Title 
In recognising that native dispossession was a large part of the European conquest of both 
Australia and the New World, both Australia and Canada have sought to rectify these past 
injustices by reinstating Aboriginal title over certain areas of Crown territory. In spite of 
recognising the illegitimacy of colonial claims of possession on the basis of the doctrine of terra 
nullius (land belonging to no one), Aboriginal title is not a proprietary right. This means that a 
granting of title does not automatically extinguish the Crown’s ownership of Aboriginal land.382 
By granting Aboriginal title, Governments allow title-holders to exclusive use and occupation of 
the land in question for the exercise of practices, customs, and traditions that are “integral to the 
distinctive culture of the Aboriginal group,” and which can be shown to have existed before 
European-Aboriginal contact.383  
Judicial decisions related to claims for Aboriginal title reproduce the model of space that 
emerged within the earlier explored techniques of Imperial cartography and ethnography.  
Australian and Canadian jurisprudence reinforces a bordered, culturally-divisible, and 
temporally located design of space that is heavily underwritten by claims of possession and 
ownership. I will discuss this claim further throughout the next three sections of the chapter. In 
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deciding Aboriginal claims through this vision of space, the courts not only force Aboriginal 
communities to rely on a form of social and political ordering developed by the dominant 
society,384 but also compel them to articulate those demands using an externally-developed 
conception of Aboriginal identity which often conflates European experiences of Aboriginal 
people with European knowledge about Aboriginal people.385 In some ways this mirrors the 
earlier discussion in Chapter Two, related to Columbus’ letter and his perception that European 
voyagers were being ‘invited’ to colonise visited places. Compelling the communities that are 
being marginalised to reframe their subjectivity using the language and institutions of the 
dominant legal discourse could very well be misinterpreted as a ‘consensual’ and voluntary 
reconstruction of Aboriginality; an invitation to possess and define. 
Within the Canadian context, Aboriginal title to Crown lands was sanctioned under the amended 
Constitution Act of 1985.  While the provisions allowed Aboriginals exclusive use and occupation 
of designated parts of Crown territory, it did not accord them the right to possess territory as 
‘private’ property, or to distribute or extract resources from it for private gain.  This meant that 
possession could only be surrendered to either the Band or the Crown, and not private 
individuals.  While European ownership was projected through the occupation and settling of 
land, Indian possession was substantiated through law, with the approval of the Minister of 
Indian affairs.  Ownership did not emerge from a performance of space, nor was it understood as 
an inherent right, like in the European context. Instead, Aboriginal title emanated from a right of 
access granted by a colonial government and evidenced through a ‘certificate of possession.’386  
In other provisions of the Act, Indian possession becomes dependent on claimants fulfilling 
“conditions [of]...use and settlement” prescribed by the Minister. This then produced the 
possibility of a right to only ‘temporary’ possession and occupation.387 Through these processes 
of granting title, a colonial construction of possession continues to persist, making Aboriginal 
title dependent on claimants being able to satisfy a European vision of what counts as 
appropriate ‘settlement’ and ‘use’ of land. These restrictions suggest an entirely different 
understanding of possession for Indians in comparison to Europeans, whose rights of 
possession were seen as permanent, inviolable, and self-perpetuating (through the legal 
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‘permanent improvements’ is at the discretion of the Minister. See, Ibid., s.22-3. 
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doctrine of sovereignty).  If the control and regulation of space is a measure of autonomy and 
power, then we can see these particular stipulations as perpetuating conditions in which Indian 
empowerment is limited to the extent to which they can adopt and employ a European spatial 
perspective.    
In many cases of Aboriginal rights that are decided through the courts it becomes clear that 
Aboriginal rights to cultural practice are intrinsically linked to space, in ways that the cultural 
practices of other communities are not. For example, the court’s ruling Adams suggests that 
Aboriginal cultural practice is a public rather than private right. The appellant in Adams, makes 
a successful appeal to the Supreme Court for a charge of unlicensed fishing on traditional lands 
(to which his band has no title). He appeals to the Supreme Court on the grounds that, under 
s.35 of the Canadian Constitution, his Aboriginal rights are protected, including the right to 
engage in traditional practice integral to his distinctive culture. The primary question up for 
debate is whether Aboriginal rights are inherently based in claims to land, or whether the right 
to title represents one aspect of a broader conception of Aboriginal rights. Deciding in favour of 
the appellant, the majority opinion states that Aborigines can make claims for rights to engage 
in traditional practices even on lands to which successful claims of title may not be possible. 
However, the courts further suggest that this right is not an abstract right, but a site-specific 
one, and could only apply to the tract of land in question.388 Hence, the exercise of cultural 
autonomy requires Aborigines to first seek permission by demonstrating a connection to the 
land in which these practices are to take place. This suggests that while culture is often 
relegated to the private sphere for most Canadians (and thus subject to less encroachment by 
the official law), Aboriginal cultural practice becomes part of the public domain. In linking 
Aboriginal cultural practice to geographic space the courts are able to conceal how the law more 
stringently regulates the exercise of Aboriginal cultural identity in comparison to mainstream 
Canadians. 
The problem in managing questions of cultural diversity through the invocation of a particular 
conception and connection with space is that it has the tendency to link native identity to 
geographic space rather than the human subject. In making successful claims for title, 
Aboriginal communities have to take on aspects of an identity defined by the dominant society 
and frequently have to confirm their otherness by pointing to a distinct racial identity.389  The 
courts have specifically set out a test for determining Aboriginal identity that is specifically 
‘backward-looking’ and compels Aboriginal groups to demonstrate their cultural identity by 
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pointing to the presence of pre-contact practices390 The fixity of time and space, therefore, 
become crucial ingredients in portraying the collective identity necessary for making 
contemporary claims for Aboriginal cultural autonomy.  
Often the requirement of an Aboriginal identity that is spatially and temporally fixed and 
culturally (rather than politically) defined, sits at odds with the self-identity of the rights-
claiming group. For example, Delgamuukw involved a case in which two different tribes in 
British Columbia were claiming ownership and jurisdiction over large tracts of the province’s 
land. The B.C. Court of Appeal ruled that the native communities could not use their oral 
histories as evidence of prior occupation of Crown territory, and claimed that a historical 
analysis of the colonial encounter revealed that Aboriginal title was a "pleasure of the 
Crown."391 The courts assume a definition of Aboriginality that stems from a history that only 
goes back as far as the colonial encounter. Further, the paternalistic characterisation of the 
colonial-native relationship carries forward into the Supreme Court’s decision, in which the 
Court adopts a ‘citizens-State’ paradigm of interaction that is inconsonant with the community’s 
self-definition as a self-governing Nation, and which also understands Aboriginality as 
stemming from Canadian citizenship with the ‘added plus’ of special group-differentiated rights 
being granted by the Government.392 Aboriginal rights, like Aboriginal title, were understood as 
being at the ‘pleasure’ of the governing authority. In addition, in rejecting the use of oral 
histories, the Appeal Court was suggesting that the appellant’s conception of their self-identity 
was ‘unintelligible’ to the dominant legal discourse.393 In fact, the courts ruled that the trial 
court’s “failure to appreciate or direct [itself] to, or have proper regard to relevant [Aboriginal 
oral] evidence” was not sufficient for the Appeals Court to intervene and review the trial court’s 
finding of fact.394 What is further interesting about the Appeal and Trial Courts’ rejection of 
Aboriginal oral histories as evidence of their connection to the land is that they understand 
these as subjective experiences that cannot be objectively verified. Yet, Chapter Two and Three 
clearly demonstrate how the notion of territory is also, borne out of subjective European 
experience, and yet the objectivity and neutrality of territory is rarely challenged. 
The court in Delgamuukw reasoned that since the plaintiffs’ claim hinged on pre-contact 
Aboriginal occupation of now Crown territory, it was necessary to determine whether the 
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Aboriginal community of British Columbia could properly be qualified as ‘self-governing’ prior 
to the arrival of European settlers. The interlacing of space with government and the overriding 
belief that governance was something that was exercised over space, rather than something 
borne out of interactions taking place within space significantly influenced both the Appeal ands 
Supreme Courts’ reasoning. In orientating claims for recognition towards a particular 
conception of space, it was space and not the community which became the locus of 
judgments.395 Culture became reduced to geographic area, and the authenticity of ‘Aboriginality’ 
became highly dependent on the ability of the appellants to demonstrate a continuous history of 
occupation and use of Crown land.  
However, even in those moments when the courts recognised the historic presence of 
Aboriginal peoples on Crown lands, it did not acknowledge their histories as coeval histories of 
spatial occupation and use. Aboriginal title jurisprudence relied on “linear, teleological forms of 
history…to continually reiterate the myth of a legitimate assertion of sovereignty,”396 which 
“mirrors an understanding of law as having a stable, knowable, origin from which it derives and 
continues to progress.” 397 In ‘spacing’ Aboriginal title the courts legitimise and enable liberal 
law’s closure by denying the transformative potential of alternative historical trajectories that 
may undermine the State’s claims of sovereignty. This tends to mute competing juridico-
historical narratives and prevents “challenges to the ideological and material boundaries of the 
State.”398 Aboriginal title jurisprudence therefore becomes crucial for encoding the State’s own 
claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction. For example, in Milirrpum v. Nabalco, Aboriginal claims 
for proprietary land rights triggered a legal debate centring on whether Australia was settled, 
conquered or ceded during the process of colonisation.399 In this particular instance, the 
Australian Supreme Court found that the conventional view that Australia was ‘settled’ rather 
than ‘conquered’, was a “matter of law which could not be overturned by a reconsideration of 
historical evidence,”400 meaning that the doctrine of terra nullius – which legitimised State 
sovereignty - overrode claims for Aboriginal title. What we see through this cluster of cases is 
                                                             
395 See, for example, how the Courts have become fixated on delineating boundaries of occupation in adjudicating 
Aboriginal rights claims. Rather than focusing on Aboriginal claims of normative difference and how that difference 
negative impacts their sense of self and their cultural identity the Courts have shown an intense proclivity for basing 
their claims of protection on historical orderings of space which appears as somewhat superfluous to the issues that 
lie at the heart of such claims. See, Delgamuukw V. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R 1010, pp 27-8 (1997).     
396 Brenna Bhandar, "Anxious Reconciliation(S): Unsettling Foundations and Spatialising History," Environment and 
Planning D: Society & Space 22, no. 6 (2004): p 831. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid.: p 832. 
399 Milirrpum V. Nabalco, 17 FLR 141(1971). 
400 Ruth Kerr, "Aboriginal Land Rights: A Comparative Assessment: Background Information Brief 23,"(1991), 
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/explore/ResearchPublications/BackgroundInformationBriefs/bib23
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that the courts’ reliance on history is consistent, and often liberal law and history are seen as 
antithetical. In one set of cases history is used to undermine liberal legal doctrines (i.e. 
sovereignty), while in others cases it is perceived to have no bearing on the legitimacy and 
validity of liberal law. We are given the impression that liberal law stands outside the paradigm 
of time, mobilised, and continuously progressing, while questions of ‘cultural’ or ‘native’ law 
must be resolved by referring to history, essentially, going back in time.  
While an analysis of the case law reveals that Canadian courts are becoming more open to 
recognising Aboriginal land claims, and acknowledging that conquest and discovery did not 
extinguish their pre-existing claims to land,401 the courts continue to accept the idea that 
Aboriginals land-rights are, in fact, a legal right and not an inherent right;402 a right accorded by 
the conquerors based on their particular legal system. This is demonstrated in some instances 
by the courts determining claims for title by trying to establish colonial boundaries.403 The law’s 
reliance on colonial history suggests that Aboriginal rights emerged from the mapping of linear 
and stable borders upon disordered and shifting social relations. This reasoning also suggests a 
paradox, in the sense that colonial borders and boundaries are referred to in determining a 
purportedly pre-colonial claim to land.404    
What is most clear through this analysis of Aboriginal title jurisprudence is that courts are 
refraining from acknowledging the racial undertones of property relations. Over the course of 
the colonial enterprise, property relations, and here I refer specifically to the possession and 
ownership of geographic space, were deeply racialised. To have control over space was to be 
human. This point was made quite clearly in my reading of Vitoria’s jus gentium, where access to 
space becomes a necessary precondition for the extension of a universal legal regime. From this 
perspective, the humanity of native communities is determined by the extent to which they 
extend a ‘reciprocal’ right of sojourn.405 In Chapter Two I specifically reveal how these notions 
of territory emerged through routine Imperial and colonial practices (i.e. the making of maps 
and the narrativising of colonial experiences in foreign places), which were, themselves, deeply 
racialised (e.g. they neutralised places of native occupants by reporting them as ‘blank spaces’). 
The courts, therefore, leave intact these partial relations of power, power vested in the notion of 
cultural and racial difference, when they interpret native demands for recognition as demands 
                                                             
401 Lovibond V. Governor General of Canada, A.C. 717(1930). Also see, Eddie Mabo V. The State of Queensland (No.2) 175 
CLR HCA 23 1(1992). 
402 Eddie Mabo V. The State of Queensland (No.2) 175 CLR HCA 23 1(1992). 
403 Calder V. Attorney General of B.C., S.C.R 313, p 316 (1973). 
404 Brenna Bhandar, "Plasticity and Post-Colonial Recognition: 'Owning, Knowing, and Being'," Law Critique 
22(2011): p 236. 
405 I say purportedly because it was a right that was known to be beyond the reach of Aboriginal communities given 
the absence of adequate transportation technologies. See p 118 of this Chapter. 
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for ‘more space’ to engage in cultural practices. These demands are not for space, but for 
‘property’. They are for rights of ownership over space and, by extension, recognition of their 
humanity and an absolute right to exercise that humanity in ways that have, from the time of the 
first Imperial-Indigenous encounters, been taken away from them on the basis of race. 
Accordingly, demands for native recognition are connected to an acknowledgment of the 
native’s coeval subjectivity in ways that were entirely effaced through the colonial encounter. 
This form of coeval recognition is a demand that, as I will show in the following sections, is 
continuously denied by the courts, and spatial discourse figures prominently in the ways that 
this appeal is rejected and concealed. It is also an appeal that, as I argue in Chapter Five, needs 
to be addressed if postcolonial States are to move on from the history of colonial domination 
and exploitation. 
D. Immobilising the Native Body 
Apart from fixing Aboriginal identities in space, Canada and Australia have managed Aboriginal 
cultural diversity in ways that continue to racialise space in order to fix and limit the movement 
of the native body. The postcolonial State is marked by places of ‘Aboriginailty’, where 
Aboriginal presence is contained, made more visible, and is often imagined as an expression of 
‘the past’. The Aboriginal Reserve system – as spaces set apart for the exclusive habitation and 
use by Aboriginal communities406 - is one obvious example.  The Reservation brings 
Aboriginality into sharper focus, all the while, presenting the polity with a distinct and very 
visible geography against which to develop its own identity.407  
However, racialised spaces need not always be institutionally defined, like the Reserve.  In many 
instances racialising space is a matter of social convention and takes place in a much more 
localised and informal manner, through interpersonal communications that are not always 
subject to political and legal scrutiny. Moreover the spacing of race – relegating the racial Other 
to a separate space - is not always an injurious practice. At times these places of Aboriginality, 
like the Reserve, inspire feelings of belonging and comfort, giving rise to unique experiences 
consonant with the Aborigines sense of self.  
                                                             
406 In the Canadian context the Reservation is understood as an essential component of Aboriginal cultural 
protection. Reynolds suggests that in the Australian context Reserves were traditionally implemented as forms of 
compensation for British dispossession. See, Henry Reynolds, The Law of the Land (Melbourne, Australia: Penguin 
Books, 1987). 
407 David Delaney, "The Space That Race Makes," The professional geographer 54, no. 1 (2002).Delaney explains how 
the study of the intersection between race and space brings to light important ideas related to the operation of power 
and the formulation of relational identities. 
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i. The Aboriginal Reserve System 
The Reservation has been described by Delaney as one of the “central places...[where] 
conventional geographies of race lie.”408 It is a space in which modern societies anticipate racial 
difference and cultural diversity. It is a place that contains, limits, and prevents the movement of 
racial bodies. As Harris notes, ‘‘the allocation of reserves...defined two primal spaces, one for 
Native people and the other for virtually everyone else’’. 409 The Reserve was predicated on a 
‘‘racialised juxtaposition of civilisation and savagery.’’410 Through these narratives the 
Reservation is revealed as a form of racial segregation, a divided landscape underwritten by a 
set of rules and devices that define and distinguishe the racialised Other in and through space. 
The Reserve system in both Canada and Australia arises from the view that a separate space of 
Aboriginality is necessary for protecting traditional groups against the hostility of the open 
environment.411 While the Reservation may have, indeed, been established with the aim of 
promoting and protecting Aboriginal culture, it is a space that is produced through unequal 
exercises of power and race-centred ideologies that may have the effect of moralising cultural 
difference and (perhaps unintentionally) producing racial hierarchies. For example, the 
Australian and Canadian Reservation has arisen out of a history of racial segregation, in which 
Aboriginal communities were confined to completely disconnected spaces such as offshore 
islands.412 Often Reserve lands were chosen based on their limited agricultural and commercial 
value and potential, and by their location some distance away from settled townships and 
cities.413 The Reserve emerges from a social desire to set apart the Aboriginal body from the rest 
                                                             
408 Delaney, ‘The Space that Race makes”, p 6. 
409 R Cole Harris, Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2011), p 265, 68. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Indeed, we can say that all forms of autonomy and protection  arise from a similar view – promulgated by the 
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Race, Place, and Identity, ed. Tracey Banivanua Mar and Penelope Edmonds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p 
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Century British Columbia," in Making Settler Colonial Space: Perspectives on Race, Place, and Identity, ed. Tracey 
Banivanua Mar and Penelope Edmonds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p 155. As Barman explains, in Canada, 
this took the form of neutralising the settled urban areas of Indian presence by more strongly targeting city-dwelling 
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The Political and Legal Construction of ‘Territory’ Page 148 
  
of the polity, and we can find evidence of racialised thinking in the way that Aborigines were 
treated within localised spaces like hospitals and schools.414  
Because the space in which the body is situated becomes “constitutive of one’s sense of self,”415 
the Reserve can also be described as a spatial performance that reproduces racialised identities. 
The Reserve has become a marker of Aboriginality, both in terms of how Aboriginals 
understand themselves, but also in terms of how non-Aboriginals define and understand them. 
For many Aborigines the Reservation represents a place of belonging, of spiritual, linguistic, and 
cosmological commonality, that induces feelings of comfort and well-being.416  This may be 
partly attributed to the fact that, as I discussed in Chapter Two, lands reserved for Aboriginal 
communities were sometimes closed in by European-settled areas.417 So, in some ways, the 
Reserve provided a sense of safety and familiarity when compared to the open spaces 
structured by foreign practices and oppressive institutions.  
But not all Aborigines see the Reserve as intrinsic to their sense of self.418 For those that migrate 
off the Reservation, the Reserve may represent only one of many places that inform their sense 
of self.  These experiences suggest a multidimensionality that is often effaced within the legal 
discourse that considers Aboriginal identity. Part of this may be attributed to the fact that those 
that move off the Reserve incorporate a hybrid identity. As I illustrated through the discussion 
of Abraham, the law has traditionally been troubled by imprecise identities, identities that defy 
pre-existing and clear categories of difference. Secondly, Aboriginal migrants challenge the 
dominant, territorially-defined, identity of the nation. By extending their identity across places 
to “maintain links with communities across borders and boundaries and formulate identities of 
belonging to more than one place,”419 these individuals contest the traditional view of territory 
as composed of ‘separately bounded spaces’ of cultural difference. If we understand the fixing of 
the body in space as a way in which human societies ‘conceptualise the passage of time’420, then 
the movement of the Aboriginal body out of place and into the open space contests the timeless 
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dualism of modernity and traditionalism, to which we have grown accustomed, and against 
which the Reserve is imagined and constructed.  As such, Aborigines who move off the 
reservation are believed to have forsaken their Aboriginality. We can see evidence of this view 
by referencing, for one, how Canadian Aborigines face a severe limitation on their treaty rights if 
they are to relocate to the city,421 and secondly, by their inability to participate in band elections, 
impeding their right to have a say on issues involving the use of band money and lands.422  
Though constitutionally recognised as citizens of one nation-State the rights of Aborigines are 
more stringently shaped (in comparison to non-Aboriginal citizens) by the space that their body 
occupies. Moreover, their right to mobility within the territory of the State is also more strictly 
regulated than non-Aborigines. In linking mobility to a rejection of one’s Aboriginal identity, the 
law is suggesting that being Aboriginal means remaining static and passive.  The Reservation 
inverts the conventional belief that human beings cultivate their space in ways that are 
consonant with their self-identity. Instead, the Reservation appears to devaluate human agency 
in suggesting that it is the space that the native body occupies which determines and gives 
meaning to his/her identity.  
Certainly there is the argument that the Reserve system is necessary for implementing an 
Aboriginal right to self-determination, which requires a particular space within which that right 
can be effectively enabled. The Reserve represents one of the most effective means by which 
States can permit competing orders to coexist in accordance with their own normative 
traditions and consistent with liberal law. A counter-argument to this is that States use 
Aboriginal Reserves and territory-based rights of self-government to justify an unequal 
extension of liberal law to Aboriginal citizens. For example, many women’s rights organisations 
have argued that, by granting territorial-autonomy or cultural communities the right of 
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exclusive jurisdiction over certain legal areas, the State often employs a hands-off approach in 
protecting their Aboriginal citizens’ constitutional rights.423 
But what is most problematic about the Reservation system is that it insinuates that these 
spaces represent self-invoked, voluntary forms of racial segregation based on an Aboriginal 
quest for self-determination and a desire to live in accordance with Aboriginal normative 
systems. Using the example of racial segregation in America, Ford analyses how political 
geographies that produce certain distributions of race in space (i.e. ghettos, ethnic 
neighbourhoods) are often interpreted as acts of racial solidarity, rather than the product of 
unfair or unequal distributions of political and economic resources or power. The assumption is 
made that members of a particular minority have freely chosen to set themselves apart from the 
majority, and that the State should respect and accommodate that choice. He notes that, “[r]ace-
neutral policies, set against an historical backdrop of State action in the service of racial 
segregation and thus against a contemporary backdrop of racially identified space – physical 
space primarily associated with and occupied by a particular racial group – predictably 
reproduce and entrench racial segregation and the racial-caste system that accompanies it.”424   
An unequal application of the law to communities living on the Reserve avoids political and 
academic reproach because it is believed that these jurisdictional boundaries simply represent 
pre-existing residential patterns and designs of pre-colonial occupation.  Consequently, these 
boundaries are naturalised and their active role in manipulating where native communities live 
and act is concealed.425 These policies have an effect similar to the colonial mapping of reserve 
lands in the late eighteenth century,426 in that they normalise (even commend the ‘benevolent’ 
nature) of State-instituted cultural boundaries, projecting them as natural and pre-political 
realities that have been recognised and protected by the State. 
ii. Aboriginal Mobility and the Australian ‘Desert-lands’ 
While there is some merit to the claim that place and identity are intimately related,427 given 
that our sense of self is partially determined by corporeal emplacement,428 linking Aboriginality 
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to space not only limits the movement of the Aboriginal body, but has the effect of erasing those 
spaces in which native movement does occur. For instance, the Aboriginal communities living 
within the Yankunytjatjara, Antikarinya, and Kokatha regions of Southern Australia subscribe to 
a nomadic lifestyle that has made permanent dwellings unnecessary. In addition, these 
communities used natural landmarks to determine location and direction, and so the practice of 
visibly ‘naming’ spaces became irrelevant. A lack of signage and domestic and commercial 
development, however, led the State to officially designate these regions as ‘desert-lands’, a 
label that had profound implications for a government-backed program for nuclear testing and 
nuclear-waste dumping in the area.429  
In the absence of European measures of possession and development, namely the establishment 
of business or commercial enterprises and the use of signage to indicate the names of places, the 
Australian government effectively designated the Yankunytjatjara, Antikarinya, and Kokatha 
regions as uninhabited wastelands, blank spaces on an Australian map, and thus a prime 
location to carry out extensive testing of atomic weapons.  After the Aboriginal community 
reported health-concerns from the radioactive toxicity of the testing, an inquiry found earlier 
studies had “failed to take into account the existence of people”430 in the area and no population 
survey had ever been carried out within the regions. Indeed the nomadic lifestyle of the 
Aborigines living in the area made it impossible to determine the boundaries of ‘tribal country’, 
which would have made the execution of a survey all the more difficult. 
While serving as a particularly stark example of Aboriginal erasure, the case of the 
Yankunytjatjara, Antikarinya, and Kokatha regions is also significant because it gives us a rare 
glimpse into the ways in which Aboriginal communities resist externally developed categories 
of difference by reinterpreting them to argue that their unique cultural and historical 
experiences connected them to the land that they now occupy in ways that are inconsonant with 
European conceptions of space. Thus, they resist the external determination of their identity at 
the same time as refuting the notion of space that is put forth by their colonisers in doing so. In a 
set of published statements about the effects of nuclear testing in the area, the Aboriginal 
women of the region proclaim: 
We are the Aboriginal Women. Yankunytjatjara, Antikarinya, and Kokatha. We know the 
Country. The poison the Government is talking about will poison the land...We were born on 
the earth, not in the hospital. We were born in the sand. Mother never put us in the water 
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and washed us...We really know the land. From a baby we grow up on the land. Never mind 
our country is the desert, that’s where we belong [emphasis added].431 
We see three important ideas emerge from this passage. First, geographic knowledge is 
understood as translating into political power. To know the land gives these women, as it did the 
European settlers, a certain degree of power over how that land is projected, interpreted, 
presented, and regulated. However, while they too perceived land as a symbol of political 
power, these women’s narratives represent an attempt to reconcile the prominence of territory 
to political and legal discourse by using their own cosmologies. To know the land is not the same 
as developing and exploiting the land.  While they too embrace a ‘knowledge is power’ dynamic, 
the way that that knowledge is acquired for the European in comparison to the Aboriginal is 
extremely different. The persistence of these differing cosmologies further exposes the socially-
constructed nature of space, and confirms that multiple, though sometimes overlapping, 
conceptions can exist.  
The second idea that becomes apparent through this passage is that we can clearly see that the 
Aboriginal women grasp and accept a model of space that is divisible, a distinct separation 
between settled space versus Aboriginal space – being born on the land and not in the hospital. 
Thus, their conception of space overlaps with the European model insofar as both conceive of 
space as culturally-divisible. Third, the passage makes us aware that the Aboriginal women 
understand the implications of designating their country a ‘desert’. They are fully aware that the 
label transforms that space into something less than the developed settled spaces of the 
Europeans, yet they also accept that ‘the desert’ is a place, and claim that it is a place where ‘they 
belong’.  Thus the ‘desert’ appears as an empowering trope. They protest the inferior-status 
accorded to the label, and reclaim the desert as a place that is their home. Consequently, their 
announcement is less a protest against a cultural division between Aborigines and Europeans – 
for they clearly make evident that they do in fact believe that such a division exists – but rather 
a retaliatory statement against the idea that such a division demonstrates Aboriginal inferiority. 
What is further interesting about this particular expression of protest is that space appears to 
have been not only racialised but also gendered. Pronouncements of protest were most strongly 
voiced by the Aboriginal women of the various tribes that populated the area, many of whom 
drew on their reproductive roles to further their claims on the land, and of the land. Tropes of 
regeneration and the Aboriginal relationship with ‘mother’ nature figured heavily in their 
statements of protest and opposition. Spatial relationships – the community’s relationship with 
the earth, its sacred connection to the land - were important themes that emerged through the 
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demands that were voiced, and they stood in stark contrast to the masculine tropes of discovery 
and rescue that underlay European claims to Australian land. These primordial connections 
were particularly potent representations of resistance because they challenged individualist 
and patriarchical Enlightenment thinking, reaffirmed the value of kinship identities, and raised 
objections to the State’s formulation of a pan-Australian national identity.  
However, the Aboriginal communities made an important trade-off over the course of this 
processes. While they resisted their erasure by confirming their difference, the idea of 
Aboriginal ‘difference’ is one that has been imposed on them by those external to the 
community. While many Aboriginal communities have always had a deeply terrestrial sense of 
self, in the sense of being strongly connected to the land that they occupy,432 from the passage 
quoted it is possible to identify their affirmation of a connection between space and 
“government”, and space and “country”, and their affirmation of the significance this 
relationship, in some ways, draws into European political ideology. Thus, though they may see 
their connection to land as being more natural, maybe even less contrived, they view this 
connection as a relationship of power that they articulate using the concepts and institutions 
developed by their colonisers. From this reading it is questionable whether these communities 
have left to them an authentic way of being different, or forms of resistance that are able to 
transcend the powerful forms of misrepresentation brought about through the operation of 
Occidental Legality. 
E. Protecting the ‘Pristine Wilderness’ 
Australian and Canadian Governments continue to draw on tropes of ‘pristine wilderness’ in the 
context of shaping native-dominated geographies. Through the mobilisation of these models of 
space, these governments have been able to empty places of their normative content, and 
effectively prevent Aboriginal communities from accessing these spaces. The impact of 
biodiversity discourse and the construction of ecological ‘protected areas’ is one such example 
of how notions of wilderness have disproportionately disadvantaged Aboriginal communities. 
While there are legitimate arguments to be made about protecting biodiversity, namely that it is 
a public matter for the good of the nation as ‘a whole’, the standards by which wilderness is 
‘discovered’ and conceptualised suggest the use of European referents of development and 
proper land usage, and sometimes emerge from a violent means of clearing the land so as to 
‘preserve’ the pristine landscape. Both of these forms of argument use ideas about ecology and 
biodiversity in ways that disproportionately limit areas of Aboriginal occupation and use. 
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In both Canada and Australia the collaboration between political and legal institutions and 
‘wilderness’ and biodiversity discourse has had the effect of converting Aboriginal land into 
‘protected areas’ controlled by the State, often without consultation with resident or affected 
Aboriginal communities.433 Mar investigates how the legal and political institutions and 
structures work together to preserve the view of certain spaces as pristine wilderness needing 
protection through the division and enclosure of the area as a national park. The Bunya 
Mountains National Parks represents one particular example of how the notion of ‘wilderness’ 
was “violently, legislatively, and spatially produced before it could be preserved [emphasis 
added].”434  The bunya forests were occupied by Aboriginal communities who had a millennia-
long tradition to gather and celebrate the harvest of bunya nuts every three years. The last 
known gathering was in 1902, after which large scale colonisation and settlement in the 
nineteenth century pushed these groups out of the area and into Reservations. In turn, the 
forests were defined as uninhabited wilderness, and were later protected as national parks.435 
Canada, for the most part, has pursued policies of ecological conservation by negotiating with 
Aboriginal communities living in protected-areas. However, as Stevenson notes, many of these 
agreements privilege the State-sponsored schemes for conservation and end up “marginalising 
and muting Aboriginal systems of management, knowledge, authority, and responsibility that 
have proven sustainable for generations.”436  The subordination of Aboriginal traditional 
practice to Anglo-European epistemological systems gives the impression that the State is in a 
better position to safeguard land that has been protected and managed by Aboriginal 
communities for thousands of years before European contact. Space is racialised through an 
emphasis on ecological crises, renewable resources management, and environmental 
degradation, and “Aboriginals are implicated in either creating or contributing to the problem 
through overhunting or misuse.”437  Consequently, co-management agreements tend to curb 
Aboriginal access to resources and impede their ability to engage in traditional land-use 
activities, as well as stigmatising them as a barrier to an important public good of ecology. In 
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juxtaposing the ‘science’ of ecological conservation alongside a ‘careless’ exercise of traditional 
practice, biodiversity discourse draws on conventional tropes of primitiveness to represent 
Aboriginal land-use. In some cases Aboriginal communities have been forcibly displaced in 
pursuit of ‘environmental protection’,438 demonstrating a manipulation of postcolonial space to 
not only ‘make room’ for others, but to neutralise it of all human inhabitation all together. Like 
colonial ethnography and cartography, the discourse of biodiversity conservation, itself 
underpinned by an entire corpus of environmental protection law, collapses European 
experience with epistemology and disempowers Aboriginal communities by limiting their 
capacity to control the land that they live on.  
Apart from limiting Aboriginal access to the spaces that they have traditionally occupied, in 
defining and safeguarding spaces as ‘protected areas’, biodiversity discourse and legislation 
suggests that certain spaces need to be protected form and cleansed of the native body.  We are 
given the distinct impression that the Aboriginal body contaminates space. Drawing on the 
tropes of degeneration and pollution, biodiversity discourse employs rhetoric similar to the 
previously discussed discourse of tropicality. In so doing, the creation of the ‘protected areas’ 
not only neutralises the space of its normative content, but works to construct a new imagined 
geography. The pristine wilderness encompassed within the legal construction of the ‘protected 
area’ appears as the ‘nostalgic’ history of colonialism that Gregory cautions us against.439 The 
invocation of a ‘pristine’ geography of the past, a geography untrammelled and unspoilt by the 
violence and injustice of the colonial encounters, is ironic given that its creation, in many cases, 
is one borne out of violence. 
5. Anxieties of Proximity 
Through the narratives discussed in Chapters Two and Three, it appears as if territory coalesces 
from the fear of hybridity and in-betweenness.  Thus, the bounded, owned, and culturally-
divisible notion of space that emerges through these narratives, draws on the idea of ‘distance’, 
and the need to maintain distance between culturally diverse communities in order to prevent 
hybridity and intermixing. We can recognise this preoccupation with distance through, for 
example, the severe tropes of modern/pre-modern, ordered/chaos, and civilised/savage that 
characterise many of these narratives. For example, witnessing narratives of the natural 
environment often represented natives as diseased and decaying facets of the ‘tropical’ spaces 
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they occupied. This theme of native contamination is further drawn on in narratives of 
biodiversity and ecological conservation, where native practices are understood as depleting 
and destroying the environment. Similarly, we also find evidence of colonial and later 
postcolonial forms of governance attempting to define and contain native identities and bodies. 
In colonial India we see this taking the shape of colonial agents ‘mimicking’ native culture in 
attempt to redefine and ‘tame’ native alterity. In the context of Canada and Australia, we see the 
courts adopting the role of defining native identity and containing native culture through 
geography, both in cases of Aboriginal title, as well as the development of the Reservation 
system. 
Every so often, however, these narratives produce contradictory images that describe the same 
scene, phenomenon, and identity in two irreconcilable ways. It is for this reason that we often 
find conflicting observations about the tropicality of a particular space.440 It is also for this 
reason that legal narratives, in the form of judicial decisions, embody a disjuncture.  On the one 
hand they demonstrate uneasiness with the ‘closeness’ of the racialised Other and thus use 
space to divide social groups and isolate their interactions. At the same time, however, the 
courts also affirm the political and legal equality of native and mainstream societies. These 
anxieties of proximity emerge from the compression of space, when time and distance become 
meaningless. And so, in the end, they trigger strategies to create distance between proximally 
located social groups.  
As Williams and Smith note, geographic space is limited and enclosures of space have 
historically had the specific aim of “maximis[ing] limited, available space.”441 As a consequence 
of modernity’s compression of space and time, social conflicts have the potential to become 
more fierce as the terrain on which they play out becomes smaller and smaller. As the 
preeminent political authority of modern times, the State’s existence depends, to a large extent, 
on its capacity to maintain its territorial integrity by limiting and mediating conflicts of diversity 
and accessibility.442 As a result, Colin Perrin believes that postcolonial politics can be 
characterised by “a certain excess...of modernity” which produces “ineffability and indecision” in 
                                                             
440 See my earlier discussion in Chapter Two p 93. 
441 Colin Williams and Anthony D. Smith, "The National Construction of Social Space," Progress in Human Geography 
7(1983): p 503.  Indeed there has been the counter-argument that geographic space is also expanding given marine-
based and interplanetary exploitations.  See, J. Gottman, The Significance of Territory (Virigina: University of Virginia 
Press, 1973). But, here, I am concerned with geographic space in the form of inhabitable space (i.e. land).  
442 What Williams and Smith call ‘shelter for security’ and ‘springboard for opportunity.’ See, Colin Williams and 
Anthony D. Smith, "The National Construction of Social Space," Progress in Human Geography 7(1983): p 503. 
The Political and Legal Construction of ‘Territory’ Page 157 
  
how political authorities manage these conflicts.443 He believes that these instances of 
indecision emanate from, what he calls, the political entity’s ‘anxieties of proximity.’ 
From this view, court judgments and politico-legal discourse become strategies of social 
distancing as well as narratives of witnessing, the ‘witnessing’ of diversity and plurality and of 
the ways in which societies have tried to come to terms with and process the closeness of 
alterity. As such, these narratives of witnessing reveal their own inconsistencies as they try to 
tame the alterity of the ‘legal space’.  Social difference is collapsed into normative difference and 
both are seen as linked to territorial space.  These narratives try to make sense of what is being 
observed by applying ‘what they know’. In that sense we can see common law principles being 
applied to Aboriginal rights claims, and particularly Aboriginal demands for unencumbered 
control over land. We also see the courts drawing on other forms of ‘European knowledge’, such 
as their use of researchers in anthropology, sociology, and genealogy to define and give voice to 
Aboriginal identity by using ideas intelligible to the common law and its notion of legal 
subjectivity (i.e. Delgamuukw).444   
At the same time, however, it is questionable whether any form of colonial signification can ever 
fully articulate the subject of cultural difference, or whether those articulations always emerge 
as “colonial nonsense...that displaces those dualities in which the colonial space is traditionally 
divided: nature/culture, chaos/civility...”445 Bhabha suggests that the subject produced through 
colonial signification – which “are intimations of cultural otherness” – is always hybrid, a subject 
in-between cultures.446 It is something ‘other’ than the European, and yet it bears the imprint of 
European witnessing by virtue of it being ‘represented’ by the viewer. And thus, to some extent, 
as Said would argue, these representations say more about the viewer than they do about what 
and whom is being observed. 
Accordingly, the ‘legal nonsense’ – by which I mean the law’s propensity for uncertainty, the 
constant vacillation between unity and differentiation, the continuous affirmation of progress 
alongside backwardness – may, in fact, symbolise the law’s “recognition of an anxious 
contradictory place between the human and non-human, between sense and non-sense.”447 It 
points to the idea that ‘culture’ remains an unstable category precisely because it is not based 
on reality, but a particular representation of it. Perhaps then what Bhabha is pointing to is the 
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idea that the ambivalence projected by colonial signification may in fact signify a dislocation of 
culture as a category. Accordingly, the problem of cultural difference is not caused by plurality.  
The actual problem lies in the fact that the object of culture [Europeanness] disappears 
momentarily, it is for an instant unrecognisable in that very moment of signification because the 
subject and object of culture merge.  Cultural difference is both alarming and fascinating 
because of our fear of synthesis, of becoming unrecognisable to the self.  Thus, in the attempt to 
manage our anxieties of proximity, one has to wonder if we recreate exactly that which we most 
fear – the hybrid. 
This, Bhabha notes, is the ‘enunciatory disorder of the colonial present.’ In the destruction of the 
category of culture, cultural difference becomes difficult to sustain. It is not simply that its 
significance is diminished, but that its claim of specificity is rendered entirely redundant. While 
these expressions of anxiety have been present from the time of the first European settlements, 
they were at first, managed through simpler forms of impressing distance on normative 
communities occupying the same social space. They later became progressively more restrictive 
to outsider access. Social distance was, at first, implemented through the imagining of separate 
temporal domains of interaction, and visualising the primitivity of the native. Sometime later 
this was replaced by symbolic markers of possession of space (flags, crosses, sermons)448 which 
impressed distance by claiming exclusive access and rights to space, and later these too were 
replaced by more forceful and more stringently regulated markers of possession, including 
forts, fences, and boundaries, which were policed and defended against transgressive 
performances of space (i.e. of Others crossing over and living amongst the settled population).  
From this reading, it appears that markers of possession, of ‘ownership’, become stricter when 
definitions of the self need to be more fully articulated because distance between the self and 
Other is shortened. Societies implement more rigid orderings of space when there appears to be 
a crossing-over of cultures, of racial or cultural miscegenation and intermixing. 
Thus, these anxieties of proximity are heightened by the dissonance that is made manifest 
through these demands for jurisdictional negotiations.  As societies are brought together under 
a shared political space, where they (theoretically) have an equal potential to influence social 
action and relations, new ways of creating distance become necessary to alleviate these 
anxieties of proximity.  This impulse to spatialise power by imposing distance in order to 
maintain cultural difference and prevent racial mixing, is something that the dialogical 
relationship between law and geography makes less visible to us. The processes of Occidental 
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Legality which take place through cartography, ethnography, and structures of political and 
legal governance reproduce legal geographies characterised by a bounded, owned, and 
culturally-divisible notion of space. The use of these legal geographies to manage issues of 
cultural and legal pluralism has the effect of further marginalising and distancing proximally 
located Others in order maintain the illusion of cultural purity. 
6. Aboriginal Perspectives on the Relationship between Law, Land, and ‘Territory’ 
One of the contemporary challenges of living in a society ordered by legal and political systems 
associated with European imperialism relates back to how multicultural societies can use 
existing models to better protect, encourage, and preserve non-European cultural practices, 
traditions, and modes of living. This becomes a further complicated exercise when one takes into 
account the reality that, historically, native ways of being and thinking have needed protection 
from precisely those systems that are now being employed to enhance their social, political, 
economic, and cultural standing.449 As Ivison, Patton, and Sanders contend, “where does this 
leave indigenous political thought and indigenous understandings of their rights to land, culture, 
and self-rule?” The question that they pose, and that also lies at the heart of the many debates 
presented in this thesis, is whether “liberal democracy [can] become genuinely intercultural.”450 
This has been one of the existing problems of colonialism that has been highlighted by a number 
of indigenous scholars, some of whom claim that colonialism has produced a situation in which 
North American indigenous groups “cannot even begin a conversation without referencing 
[their] words to definitions imposed or rooted in 1492 [Columbus’ arrival in America].”451 
Historically, modern political theory has trumpeted rights of cultural autonomy, collective 
freedom, universal human rights, and equality before the law while, at the same time, 
withholding these rights from Indigenous groups. The first two chapters of this thesis have 
demonstrated how the notion of territory has been specifically implicated in the simultaneous 
granting and withholding of rights.452 Through the territorial organisation of modern social and 
political relations, Western political and legal thought has “embodied a series of culturally 
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specific assumptions and judgements about the relative worth of other cultures, ways of life, 
value systems, social, and political institutions, and ways of organising property.”453 Despite a 
growth in egalitarian thinking these assumptions have, as Ivison, Patton, and Sanders note, 
produced unjust and inequitable political and legal institutions and practices.  
One way in which contemporary societies can try and address this conflict between thought and 
action is by drawing in these traditionally displaced cultural perspectives in developing modes 
of regulation and forms of governance. I consider some of these in the last chapter of the thesis, 
during my discussion on Aboriginal traditional knowledge and ecological protection, and Tully’s 
idea of pluralistic constitutionalism.454  Recently, in Canada, the Courts have served as an 
important forum in which these struggles have played out. They have taken the form of 
Aboriginal concerns related to the protection of their traditional ways of life, the restoration of 
their rights-claims in land, the recognition of their right to exercise Aboriginal self-government, 
and demands for compensation for the historical and continued wrongs that they have suffered 
under an alien government. Consequently, one can argue that land, while it may have been 
historically important for the development of indigenous identity and the practice of indigenous 
custom it has become even more so relevant for indigenous groups today.  This is because it 
forms an essential component of Aboriginal peoples’ legal claim for recognition of their 
sovereignty and right to self-determination, and a mechanism by which to ensure their economic 
and political independence. In this section I want to highlight and discuss Canadian-Aboriginal 
conceptions of geography, land, and territory, to map points of convergence that can serve as 
potential sites for future dialogue, and areas of divergence which need to be addressed by the 
contemporary legal and political institutions and processes of liberal societies.   
As I noted earlier in the thesis, it is not my intention to minimise the pluralism of Aboriginal 
communities by referring to these views as ‘Aboriginal conceptions’ or ‘Aboriginal 
perspectives’.455 I use the term, simply, as a way of categorising a set of non-European, 
indigenous, geographic and spatial views. Nonetheless, in order to provide some common 
(historical, political, and social) grounds upon which to analyse these perspectives, I have 
elected to focus this section of the Chapter on studying mostly Canadian-Aboriginal perspectives. 
It is not entirely unexpected that these views may have little resonance for Aboriginal groups 
elsewhere in the world, given their divergent political and social histories.  In spite of this, 
however, I think these ideas have currency in terms of outlining some of the common struggles 
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across the globe for Aboriginal groups claiming political and legal autonomy through the analytic 
of territory.456 
The analysis undertaken over the course of this section reveals some interesting insights that 
reinforce the argument that the concept of territory – as bounded, owned, and culturally 
divisible – structures State-Aboriginal relations in such a way so as to divest Aboriginal peoples 
of not only their land, but also their dignity and rights to political and legal autonomy. While the 
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and their land is uniquely different from the European 
model I have expanded on thus far – land, geography, and environment are still essential 
components of Aboriginal peoples’ identity and these relationships form the basis of their 
political and legal organisation. Certainly access to and control over land serves as an important 
rationale for Aboriginal peoples’ continued struggle against the Canadian State. But what is most 
interesting is that this struggle is wrongly construed in Canadian courts as being territorial in 
nature, with territory having all the connotations we conventionally apply to land as property, as 
enclosures of owned space. Since the dominant political view is that a State’s territorial borders 
are sacrosanct, the characterisation of Aboriginal peoples’ desire for greater autonomy in 
territorial terms forecloses discussion between the State and indigenous groups. Consequently, 
it is questionable whether a territorial vision of space can ever genuinely empower Aboriginal 
peoples when it simultaneously circumscribes their rights to land by continuously reiterating 
the myth of unencumbered Crown sovereignty. 
In analysing Aboriginal perspectives on land and the natural environment, and how their 
political and legal struggles today relate to their relationship to ancestral lands, it becomes 
apparent that the source of Aboriginal discontent cannot be entirely attributed to theft of 
land.457 Certainly, one can argue that much of their traditional lands were voluntarily ceded to 
the Crown in exchange for various forms of monetary and non-monetary compensation (which I 
will discuss in a moment). Instead, their resentment and frustration can be traced to the fact 
that the transfer of land to the Crown commenced a relationship of reciprocal obligation, which 
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Canada now refuses to uphold or outright denies.458  The perception amongst many Aboriginal 
people is that, now, as Aboriginal peoples’ bargaining power is significantly lessened by the fact 
that they no longer possess land, the original terms of their independence and protection of 
their cultural identity are being heavily circumscribed by the State. It is this unwillingness of the 
State to negotiate with the Aboriginal peoples of Canada as the self-governing nations they once 
recognised them to be, is precisely what many Aboriginal groups in Canada are seeking to 
rectify through litigation. Accordingly, contemporary claims for Aboriginal rights and title are 
not necessarily demands for land as property, but demands for the right to administer their 
lives independent from external intervention; they are demands for recognition of sovereignty, 
as “the inviolable expression of a people’s collective identity, transcending the particulars of 
time and space.”459  
A. Land, Aboriginal Identity, and Reciprocal Relations of Sovereignty 
The gathering and circulation of knowledge about land, as I demonstrated in Chapter Two, has 
been a paradigmatic marker of European political and cultural power since the early fifteenth 
century. Exercising control over space through not only material practices like building fences, 
homes, and military posts, but also discursive processes such as producing maps, surveys, and 
travel narratives, represented the exercise of European political and cultural authority over 
populations that were conquered. Witnessing narratives were one way in which European 
travellers and political agents were able to exercise greater discursive and political power over 
the newness of the colonised space and its unfamiliar occupants. It was a way in which they 
could not only categorise and regulate native populations, but also a method by which they 
could affirm, project, and circulate their own self-identity.  
Features associated with land – topography, climate, and ecology – have also been important 
markers for the development of Aboriginal self-identity. According to the cosmologies of many 
Aboriginal peoples, the natural environment informs their sacred, intellectual and ethical 
frameworks. As Vine Deloria notes “the structure of their [Aboriginal] religious traditions come 
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from the world around them.”460  Spatial awareness has always been a crucial component of 
Aboriginal philosophy and, as Deloria mentions, “all their statements are made with this 
reference point in mind.”461 He contrasts this with how Euro-Western society is more focused 
on history and time as the crucial narrative underwriting their perceptions and understandings 
of the world.462 Land has a religious and intellectual significance for Aboriginal peoples that 
cannot be distinguished separately from the political and economic arrangement of their 
society. As Deloria explains: 
The vast majority of Indian tribal religions, therefore, have a sacred centre to a particular 
place, be it a river, a mountain, a plateau, valley or other natural features. This centre 
enables the people to look out...and locate their lands, to relate all historical events within 
the confines of this particular land, and to accept responsibility for it.  Regardless of what 
subsequently happens to the people, the sacred lands remain as permanent fixtures in their 
cultural or religious understanding.463  
These ‘sacred centres’ then serve as ceremonial sites, and become forever forged with the 
development of special communal relationships amongst members.  
According to other Aboriginal cosmologies, land is perceived as if it were a living entity which 
informs and influences human activity and behaviour. According to Lindberg, the Earth is 
perceived as a ‘mother’, birthing and nourishing all people of the Earth.464 This gives rise to a 
unique relationship of non-ownership and mutual obligation between Aboriginal peoples and 
their environment.465 In some instances perceiving land as an animate entity has given rise to a 
duty to protect what some (like the hereditary Chiefs of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en People in 
Delgamuukw) have referred to as “a spirit in the land.”466 The land, as Coulthard explains, is:  
Understood [by Aboriginal peoples] as a field of ‘relationships of things to each other.’ Place 
is a way of knowing, of experiencing, and relating to the world and with others; and 
sometimes these relational practices and forms of knowledge guide forms of resistance 
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against other rationalisations of the world that threaten to erase or destroy our sense of 
place.467 
The Euro-Western vision of land as property to be owned, distributed, regulated, culturally-
divided, enclosed, and made inaccessible, undermines the very conception of land and its 
promotion of reciprocity, cooperation, and mutual obligation integral to the Aboriginal 
worldview. As Nadasdy explains, “[t]he legal (and cultural) concepts of ‘ownership’ and 
‘property’ recognised by Canadian courts and lawmakers cannot adequately represent the 
complexities of [the] relationship” that Aboriginal peoples have with the land and its living and 
inanimate resources.468 The forced and involuntary dispossession of Aboriginal peoples of their 
traditional lands is therefore perceived as a direct attack on their sense of place, belonging, and 
identity.  In response to lands that were involuntarily obtained, the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada feel that their right to access, use, and regulate the lands in question must be restored 
or, at minimum, renegotiated.469 The voluntary transfer of land from Aboriginal peoples to 
European settlers,470 which many could describe as a generous arrangement to shared access 
and regulation of their land, connects both the Canadian government and the Aboriginal peoples 
of Canada to one another in a relationship of joint obligation and mutual respect. In the Euro-
Western tradition this relationship has been epitomised in the drawing up of treaties. The issue 
that permeates both of these discussions, however, is the misrecognition, or failure to recognise, 
Aboriginal peoples’ sovereignty. In the first situation, there has been a failure to recognise 
Aboriginal peoples as self-governing nations with an interest in, and a right to land. In the 
second instance, while the initial recognition of their nationhood is clear given the drafting of 
treaties between the two parties, it appears that the government is justifying their failure to 
uphold their treaty obligations by compelling Aboriginal groups to redefine their relationship to 
land in Euro-Western terms. For many Aboriginal peoples’ this is an unsatisfactory constraint 
on their right as sovereign and equal nations, and a violation of their human rights under a 
number of international human rights instruments.471 
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i. Territory and its Denial of Aboriginal Sovereignty 
A key feature of the political and legal disputes that are currently arising between Canada and 
her Aboriginal peoples, is that territory has become the lens through which Canadian 
sovereignty is confirmed, and Aboriginal dependence explained. Territory operates to 
naturalise Canadian sovereignty.  Chartrand explains this relationship between territory and the 
denial of Aboriginal peoples’ independence when he states: 
...under common law the interest in land that Aboriginal peoples occupy is not a territorial 
form of sovereignty. This is an important distinction. Aboriginal title claims presuppose a 
lack of independent sovereignty possess by the Aboriginal nation in question. If sovereignty 
over the territory or a form of territorial interest akin to sovereignty was recognised, the 
legal interest in the land would then turn on the Aboriginal legal tradition as to how 
Aboriginal people legally relate to land and form interests therein or, more accurately 
responsibilities thereto.  The land interests familiar to the English legal tradition would be 
irrelevant. 
Chartrand goes on to argue that Indigenous peoples understand land and geography differently 
than the conventional Euro-Western conception. He writes, “in many cultures indigenous to 
Turtle Island, the land is not capable of ‘ownership’...[their relationship with the land] is more 
akin to one where the people maintain a reciprocal responsibility to care for the land so that it 
will care for them.”472 As the Courts rely primarily on Euro-Western meanings of land as 
territory, and because these views confirm Aboriginal peoples’ lack of sovereignty, “Aboriginal 
peoples are not entitled to articulate their legal relationship to land according to their own 
understanding.”473 This suggests that a territorial conception of space – space as bounded, 
owned, and culturally divisible – is not only inconstant with how Aboriginal peoples’ define and 
understand their relationship to one another, their land, and to the State,474 but also constrains 
their right to do so. The relationship between territory and sovereignty at it applies to 
Aboriginal peoples is a reversal of the way in which it applies to Europeans, in that the 
impermissibility to articulate their relationship to the land is precisely what they perceive as a 
violation of their sovereignty. For Aboriginal peoples it is not land and territory that determine 
Aboriginal independence (like in the European case), but the fact that they are a self-governing 
nation which confers to them a right to express their relationship to land in accordance with 
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their own worldviews. For them, this imposes a reciprocal obligation on the government to 
allow them this form of expression as a valid power derived from their status as sovereign 
nations.   
Drawing on a similar theme, Alfred and Corntassel argue that one of the most disconcerting 
aspects of the Indigenous-State relationship today is that: 
Contemporary Settlers follow the mandate provided for them by their imperial forefathers’ 
colonial legacy, not by attempting to eradicate the physical signs of Indigenous peoples as 
human bodies, but by trying to eradicate their existence as peoples through the erasure of 
the histories and geographies that provide the foundation for Indigenous cultural identities 
and sense of self.475 
Aboriginal peoples’ relationship to the land is not a propertied relationship in the same way that 
land and territory are conceptualised in the Euro-Western tradition. They perceive land in 
terms of communal ownership with joint rights of access. According to Colebrook: 
Claims for the sacredness of land by indigenous peoples are not just examples or instances 
of the various ways in which "we" (humanity) grant space significance. For the key 
difference is that space here is not "significant"--not seen as a marker, symbol, or image of 
cultural memory. Whereas western understandings of monument use space to mark an 
event, and do so in order to call future humanity to recognize and retain its past, sacred land 
isboth infinite--demanding recognition from others--and inherently affective.476  
In stark contradiction to the European doctrine of discovery, according to some indigenous 
traditions a section of land is perceived as being communally owned by a group even if its 
members are living a distance away.477  Aboriginal peoples’ attachment to the natural 
environment is shaped not by enclosures, boundaries, and private access, but by “principles of 
reciprocity, nonexploitation, and peaceful coexistence.”478  Nonetheless, similar to the way in 
which the organisation of land through property relations informs European cultural identity 
and is protected through the legal and political institutions of the State, Aboriginal peoples’ self- 
and group-identity has also been forged through land and its relationship to their modes of life – 
including traditional activities like hunting, gathering, and trapping. Similarly, the customs 
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through which Aboriginal peoples’ relate to and organise their environment have also had (and 
continue to have) significance for the development of their own legal and political structures.479 
The idea that Aboriginal peoples’ have always possessed forms legal and political organisation 
is, in some ways, contentious. For one it challenges Canadian legal literature that claims that 
Canada is “a settled territory, meaning that it is considered legally vacant at its foundation.”480 
Burrows explains how land and its resources are involved in the political and social structuring 
of a number of Aboriginal societies. Essentially, pre-contact Canada was understood as lawless 
or legally primitive, which diminishes (at best) or denies (at worst) Aboriginal contributions to 
the development of Canadian legal culture.481 For many Aboriginal authors the Courts’ 
unquestioned acceptance of the State’s supremacy has been further compounded by a continued 
failure to acknowledge Canada as an artefact of the intersection between Aboriginal and 
Canadian histories. This oversight has, according to authors such as Youngblood Henderson and 
Borrows, long-sustained the view that Canadian legal culture and institutions can solely be 
sourced to European history, principles, and doctrines, and that Aboriginal peoples only figure 
on occasion, as the helpless subjects of this system.  It is for this reason that I later argue, in 
Chapter Five, that liberal societies develop a new model of legal recognition that acknowledges 
this level of interpenetration between normative communities. Not only would this form of 
recognition give greater voice to Aboriginal contributions to liberal law, but it would more 
accurately depict the social and political realities of liberal multicultural societies. 
B. Treaty-Making between Sovereign Nations  
Chartrand’s introduction in The Story in Aboriginal Law succinctly explains that Aboriginal 
rights claims are grounded in the question of how “Aboriginal peoples [can] regain[...] our 
dignity.”482 One of the ways in which he says that Aboriginal peoples have been successful in 
doing so is by seeking justice through legal recognition and compensation for the historical 
wrongs perpetrated against their communities by those to whom they ceded land in 
confidence.483 The literature that traces the state of Aboriginal-Canadian relations appears to 
suggest that Aboriginal peoples’ dissatisfaction with the Canadian government cannot be 
entirely reduced to the issue of Aboriginal proprietary rights in land. Much of their resentment 
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may stem from the Crown’s failure to uphold the promises that were made to the Aboriginal 
peoples at Canada’s inception. These contractual obligations were incorporated in a number of 
treaties based on negotiations that took place between the British Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples as the two founding nations of Canada. For many Aboriginal people these treaties 
represent one of the only genuine (European) attestations of the sovereign status of Aboriginal 
nations, though they are often not perceived as such by dominant State-centred legal 
discourse.484  
During the early periods of colonialism in North America, the British, in the form of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company forged a number of different types of agreements with the pre-existing 
Aboriginal communities. Miller refers to one set of agreements as ‘compact treaties’, which were 
designed to allow Europeans access to and use of Aboriginal peoples’ land.485 These treaties 
were pursued to facilitate an exclusive right of trade between European settlers and the 
indigenous groups they encountered in, what was then referred to as, Rupert’s Land. Miller 
claims that, while the Company’s Charter named Europeans as the true proprietors of this land, 
the fact that Company men were instructed to continue to draft agreements with the indigenous 
groups for peaceful relations suggests differently. He argues that the continuance of this 
practice exemplifies that “the true proprietors of...Rupert’s Land were the First Nations who 
occupied the territory.”486 The Charter, therefore, symbolised merely “an exclusive right to 
negotiate” with indigenous peoples for a right of access to their land. According to this view, the 
resulting treaties, therefore, were nothing more than ‘commercial contracts’ with the local 
heads of First Nations groups. 
Later agreements established between European settlers and First Nations’ groups represented 
‘alliance treaties’.487 For the Iroquois and Mohawk leaders who were party to alliance treaties, 
these agreements served the dual function of maintaining European-Aboriginal trade 
affiliations, while also “perform[ing] diplomatic rituals of establishing and maintaining 
relationships with First Nations via fictive associations.”488  Newly arriving settlers had to adjust 
themselves into the relationships and rivalries that were inherited by European merchants and 
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traders through the political arrangements that were negotiated through alliance treaties. As 
Miller indicates this was not always a peaceful and non-violent process.489  
During the latter half of the seventeenth century the administration of colonies in North 
America was transferred from commercial trading companies to the Crown. In many areas, the 
Crown sought to maintain amicable relations with the First Nations by signing peace 
agreements, though this was by no means an easy task given the rising hostility between the 
French and English (and thus the First Nations’ groups allied with each).490 For Miller, these 
alliances between the British, French, and Aboriginal peoples’ symbolised a mutual recognition 
of each group’s sovereignty and autonomy.491 These relationships were produced through an 
awareness that favourable economic and political transactions depended on maintaining 
harmonised interaction between all parties. 
As Miller explains through his narrative of the Huron Feast of the Dead and the First Nations’ 
wampum ceremonies, Aboriginal-European relations were marked by high levels of cultural 
exchange. It was not simply the Europeans that transmitted their political systems and forms of 
organisation into North America. There were many pre-contact First Nations’ ceremonies and 
rituals that were integral to conducting diplomacy.492  
By the time European-Aboriginal relations were being organised through territorial treaties, the 
formulation of reciprocal commercial and political relations through the process of treaty-
making was a significant element of how these two communities were able to live in relatively 
stable arrangements and relationships with one another. In 1725, as part of the process of 
maintaining peace and friendship, the British signed the Mascarene’s Treaty with the Mi’kmaq, 
Penobscot, and Maliseet groups. According to the treaty, the English promised: 
the said Tribes all marks of Favour protection and Friendship and further engage and 
promise in behalf of the Said Government That the Indians shall not be molested in their 
persons, Hunting, Fishing and Planting Grounds nor in any other their lawful occasions by 
His Majesty’s Subjects or their Dependants. 
In return, the First Nations party to the treaty declared that “the Indians shall not molest any of 
His Majesty’s Subjects or their Dependants in their settlements already made, or lawfully to be 
                                                             
489 Ibid., p 34-5. 
490 Ibid., p 48. 
491 Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, "Reassessing the Paradigm of Domestication: The Problematic of Indigenous Treaties," 
Reivew of Constitutional Studies 4, no. 2 (1989): p 245-6. 
492 James Rodger Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009), p 38-40. 
The Political and Legal Construction of ‘Territory’ Page 170 
  
made or in their carrying on their trade & other affairs within the said Province.”493 The 
regulation of Aboriginal-European relations through territory became more pronounced with 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which delineated the rules by which Aboriginal land could be 
legally acquired.  
Like the Mascarene’s Treaty the Royal Proclamation’s section on Indian peoples also began with 
a promise to: 
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security of our 
Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and 
who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of 
such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by 
Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds. 
 
 ... And We do further declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure, for the present as 
aforesaid, to reserve under our Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion, for the use of the 
said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not included within the Limits of Our said Three 
new Governments, or within the Limits of the Territory granted to the Hudson's Bay 
Company, as also all the Lands and Territories lying to the Westward of the Sources of the 
Rivers which fall into the Sea from the West and North West as aforesaid. 
 
From these early treaties we see a forging of reciprocal obligations; a policy of non-intervention 
in European commercial affairs and a right of peaceful settlement, in exchange for a right of 
non-intervention in the exercise of Aboriginal traditional practices on land not physically 
controlled by English subjects. It is also possible to identify British recognition of Aboriginal 
rights in land not expressly settled by the British. 
There were other guarantees made through a number of subsequent treaties, some more direct, 
and other’s implied. For example, while not expressly provided for in the treaties, the promise 
of schools on these reserve lands and the promise of a medicine chest in one treaty has been 
interpreted by the Courts as illustrating a pledge made by the Crown for the provision of 
education and healthcare on reserve lands494 (a commitment that the government now denies 
given its absence from the express treaty provisions). Based on English customary law, and 
confirmed through political debates that took place during the early period of colonialism in 
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North America,495 the presence of these treaties were a testament of the Crown’s pre-colonial 
recognition of Aboriginal nationhood and sovereignty.  
In examining the early commercial and alliance treaties to the later territorial agreements, it is 
apparent that the First Nations never understood land as capable of being possessed. Land 
became the basis of organising European-Aboriginal relationships through fictive kinship 
associations. This is not surprising, given the earlier discussion of Aboriginal understanding of 
land and the natural environment. While the treaty-making process represented British good 
faith towards Aboriginal people, there were many other ceremonies and rituals – the wampum, 
for example – which helped to sanctify European-Aboriginal alliances. The process of treaty-
making was perhaps most crucial, however, because it evidenced European recognition of 
Aboriginal autonomy and sovereignty. The drawing up of agreements of peace, friendship, 
trade, and later territorial arrangements, signified an affirmation of Aboriginal peoples’ political 
significance. In order to maintain peace and stability within the region, it was necessary that the 
two parties maintain amicable relations. The colonial relationship, therefore, was complex, in 
that in many ways it recognised the political (if not social) equality of Aboriginal and European 
people.  
The significance of the treaty – as a marker of Aboriginal sovereignty - is not lost on the First 
Nations of Canada. Contemporary demands for recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty and 
cultural autonomy continue to be anchored in the process of treaty-making: the development of 
new treaties, the enforcement of old ones, and the review and modification of historically 
unratified ones.496 From studying the stance of Aboriginal legal literature and litigation in 
relation to Aboriginal rights it is the status of these contractual obligations between the Crown 
and Canada’s Aboriginal peoples that are a source of frustration for these communities.497 As 
Chartrand notes, by the contemporary period, “the power balance between the two sides had 
shifted so much that in 1969 a Canadian prime minister could declare that the historical treaties 
that recognised the Indians’ legal capacity to enter into treaty relations as distinct social and 
political peoples could be ignored.”498 Perceiving this failure to uphold a nation-to-nation view 
of treaty-relations as an affront to their dignity as self-governing nations, the Aboriginal 
communities are pursuing litigation in the hopes that the Courts will force the State to meet 
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their obligations under these historic treaties. While post-Charter court decisions have, on a 
number of occasions, recognised the Aboriginal peoples inherent right to self-government,499 
they have done so without questioning the doctrines underpinning Canadian sovereignty. These 
doctrines continue to shape Aboriginal-State relations in ways that diminish (or reject) the post-
contact sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples. Instead, their political status is understood as being 
derived from a type of “merged sovereignty”,500  with the “accommodation of their rights” being 
defined as “not a zero-sum relationship between minority rights and citizenship.”501   
The claim that an incorporation of Aboriginal sovereignty within the “broader framework of 
Canadian sovereignty”502 does not produce a zero-sum relationship between Aboriginal rights 
on the one hand and membership within the political community of Canada on the other, 
appears absurd when one considers the perceptions and sentiments of those that embody and 
work within these two traditions. In examining much of the Canadian legal literature penned by 
Aboriginal people the disquiet and unease with which they view the European common law 
system that they work within is clearly revealed. And it is most frequently exposed as fissures in 
their self-identity; of “liv[ing] with the implications of being part of the community that 
Aboriginal rights doctrine is intended to protect and yet only to find out that it does little if 
anything to protect me as an Aboriginal person. Instead it is offensive and harms me on a very 
deep and human level.”503 Their unease is further compounded by a growing factionalism 
amongst Aboriginal groups, and a distrust of traditional institutions which they view as having 
been transformed so as to reflect Euro-Western ideals and mainstream objectives.504 This has 
led some scholars, such as Monture-Angus, to come to the conclusion that Aboriginal peoples’ 
self-determination must begin ‘at home’, by “living as part of their community,” with the view 
that such communities be reformed so as to chiefly reflect Aboriginal principles and 
aspirations.505 For Monture-Angus this transformation begins not with legal institutions – which 
she views as “artificial creations” that have become part of the problem of Aboriginal peoples’ 
oppression – but with Aboriginal peoples themselves living Aboriginal law through their 
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interpersonal and collective relationships with one another.506 Self-determination for Monture-
Angus, is dialogical; it is personal and relational. It is this relational and conversational aspect of 
self-determination that is entirely displaced by the many institutions that societies erect to 
confirm and verify Aboriginal sovereignty. Territory, is a progressive symbol of the 
institutionalised pursuit of validating and authenticating sovereignty. To the extent that it 
continues to shape Aboriginal peoples’ quest for the recognition of their sovereignty, Aboriginal 
self-government becomes more “distant, professionalised, and removed from the people.”507 
What is remarkable about Monture-Angus’ opinion is that the process of authenticating 
Aboriginal peoples’ right of sovereignty is itself disempowering, because it presupposes that 
their right to self-rule is a legal right, in the sense that it must be a right that is verified and 
protected by the official law of the State. This practice therefore operates as a form of 
misrecognition because it fails to see sovereignty as an inherent right of Aboriginal peoples.  
C.  Misrepresenting Demands for Sovereignty as Demands for Property 
According to the dominant political and legal literature, the transfer of Aboriginal land to the 
Crown was undertaken through processes of treaty-making.  Aboriginal communities received 
monetary compensation and political and legal protection for relinquishing their title over land 
to the British Crown.508  While the dispossession of land was certainly one destructive 
consequence of these inequitable land-transfer schemes for Aboriginal peoples, the doctrine of 
discovery, which originally underwrote these transfers and later influenced case law in relation 
to claims for Aboriginal title and rights, had far greater deleterious effects for tribal 
sovereignty.509 Blumm argues that, while several landmark American cases reaffirm Indian 
proprietary rights by reference to the doctrine of discovery and European-Aboriginal treaty-
making, they do so at the expense of further reinforcing “federal control over Indian affairs,”510 
and thereby produce a “substantial erosion of the tribes’ sovereign authority.”511  
The legal system through which Aboriginal claims for autonomy and self-government are 
currently being filtered relies on a territorial vision of sovereignty. To make claims for self-
determination Aboriginal people are required to translate their relationship to, and 
understanding of, their land to a form intelligible by the dominant legal discourse. The problem, 
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of course, is that once this relationship is transcribed in the form of property relations512 – 
Aboriginal ownership of land – it ultimately fails given that it is held up to and judged via the 
doctrine of discovery and, by extension, an unquestioned acceptance of Canadian sovereignty. 
There is this perception that, surely two distinct communities cannot jointly own the same land. 
Through this process, what remains mostly invisible is that the Aboriginal peoples are not only 
making a claim for the return of their traditional lands, or the opportunity to exercise their 
customary practices on land that once belonged solely to them, but that the actual dispute is 
itself a struggle by Aboriginal peoples to shape the terms of negotiation. The process of litigation 
represents Aboriginal peoples’ demand for recognition of their sovereign right to control the 
language by which they articulate their relationship and obligation to land; a relationship that 
Section 5(A) of this Chapter clearly illustrated as being unlike the territorial vision of space 
espoused by Europeans.  
Thus, the courts wrongly construe Aboriginal claims for sovereignty as demands for property 
rights over land. The problem with representing claims for self-determination as if they were 
claims for property is that, as soon as we categorise: 
[n]on-European social relations as a set of ‘property relations’...we authorise politicians, 
judges, and other agents of the State to act on them as they would other more familiar forms 
of property. It gives them the conceptual tools and justification for imposing (yet again) 
their view of the world on Aboriginal people. To translate the ways in which Aboriginal 
people relate to one another and to the land into the language of property is, in essence, a 
tacit agreement to play by the rules of the game as set out by the State.513 
Moreover, in their misrepresentation of these claims the Courts are able to legitimise their 
withholding of an Aboriginal right to self-government. To illustrate, in R. v. Mitchell the 
Aboriginal peoples’ claim to special trade rights takes on a territorial character. Over the course 
of the judgement the Court claims that the Mohawk peoples’ claim of a right to cross-border 
trade is “strained beyond reason” because the evidence does not demonstrate, first, that pre-
contact northernly trade existed, and even if the Courts were able to trace its existence it does 
not represent a defining feature of Mohawk culture or an essential aspect of the Mohawk 
peoples’ collective identity.514 From this, the Court concludes that no Aboriginal right to transfer 
goods across the border for the purposes of trade can be recognised. What is interesting about 
the judgement is that, once again, an intense focus on a historical exercise of spatial borders and 
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boundaries naturalises the withholding of Aboriginal rights to self-government. Mitchell was not 
simply a case about the appropriateness of trade duties on Aboriginal transportation of products 
across borders, it brought to the forefront the issue of the Aboriginal peoples’ sovereignty; their 
capacity to make decisions about their livelihood and internal affairs free from State 
intervention. By grounding this dispute in an analysis of territorial borders and pre-contact 
trade routes, the Court sidesteps all discussion about the moral right of Aboriginal peoples to act 
as self-governing nations.515 
What is further significant about Mitchell is that the Court explicitly makes mention of the issue 
of Aboriginal sovereignty, presenting it as if it were antithetical to Canadian territorial integrity. 
The ‘territorial spin’ given to this particular dispute has the effect of treating Aboriginal quests 
for greater autonomy as unconscionable. The Court declares: 
Counsel for the respondent does not dispute Canadian sovereignty.  He seeks Mohawk 
autonomy within the broader framework of Canadian sovereignty.  The respondent's claim 
is not just about physical movement of people or goods in and about Akwesasne.  It is about 
the Mohawks' aspiration to live as if the international boundary did not exist.516  
The Court’s statement appears to suggest that the exercise of sovereignty by Aboriginal peoples 
invariably challenges the territorial boundaries of the State, and thus the basis for the State’s 
own claims of independence. For Alfred, the implication of the Mitchell decision was that 
Aboriginal peoples were believed to have no rights outside those granted by the Government of 
Canada. His reading of Mitchell expresses frustration at the Court’s failure to accept Mohawk 
sovereignty, and he admonishes First Nations groups for buying “into the false promise of 
steady progress toward a just accommodation of our existence as peoples with that of the 
Canadian State.”517  
The conflation of the spatial relationships of property and sovereignty is precisely what makes 
Aboriginal title and rights claims such a complex and challenging issue. Often a reading of 
Aboriginal rights and title litigation from those external to the process leads to the perception 
that Aboriginal communities are seeking an enhancement of their property rights – the right to 
do with their land what they desire and the capacity to exploit, develop, and alienate historic 
                                                             
515 The Court’s decision in Mitchell suggests as much when it claims that since the claimant was unable to 
demonstrate an Aboriginal right, in this case, “there is no need to comment on the extent, if any, to colonial laws of 
sovereign succession are relevant to the definition of aboriginal rights under s. 35(1)  of the Constitution Act, 1982.” 
See, Ibid., para. 6. 
516 Ibid., para. 9. 
517 Taiaiake Alfred, "Aboriginal Rights Are Meaningless,"(2001). 
http://www.peace4turtleisland.org/pages/bordercrossingtaiaiake.htm  (1 October 2014) 
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lands to their benefit. It is the land, rather than the Aboriginal person, that is perceived as the 
key feature of this struggle. However, a closer reading of much of the Aboriginal legal literature 
that comments on and analyses Canadian-Aboriginal relations and Aboriginal rights and title 
case law, reveals that political and legal sovereignty is a more pressing issue for Aboriginal 
communities in Canada. While economic self-sufficiency and autonomy are important features 
and rights of sovereignty, a disproportional focus on Aboriginal proprietary rights, over 
Aboriginal sovereignty, obscures the core of contemporary Aboriginal rights claims. While the 
legal and political systems organised in accordance with European intellectual and 
philosophical traditions may perceive territory and sovereignty as aspects of one another (i.e. 
there is no such thing as non-territorial exercises of sovereignty), this is not how Aboriginal 
peoples have traditionally understood the terms and exercise of their independence.518 These 
issues have themselves been revealed through a spattering of legal cases grounded in the 
presupposition that an Aboriginal right to engage in traditional practices on land cannot exist 
independently from a title to land.519 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Adams has clearly 
indicated that the Common Law can accept that proprietary rights in land are not necessary to 
the exercise of cultural autonomy.520 What is encouraging about this reality – that a society’s 
connection to land may be something entirely different than proprietary - is that it presents us 
with a greater opportunity for finding a workable solution that upholds the significance of 
territorial integrity to European conceptions of sovereignty, as well as the reciprocal obligations 
that Aboriginal people have with their land (to protect and preserve it), an obligation that is 
absolutely essential to the exercise of native sovereignty.  
7. Concluding Remarks: Law’s Reproduction of Space as Territory 
In this chapter I demonstrated how the effects of the earlier techniques of Imperial witnessing 
could be identified within the forms of diversity management that emerge in both the colonial 
and postcolonial setting. This analysis paints a more complex picture of Occidental Legality, 
suggesting that many of the subjective representations of the Imperial-Indigenous encounters 
have been institutionalised and authenticated through colonial and postcolonial forms of law 
and governance. In this chapter I examined British political and legal structures in colonial 
India, and the structures of governance in present-day Australia and Canada.  
                                                             
518 See my earlier discussion in Section (A). 
519 Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and Aboriginal Rights: What's the Connection?," Alberta Law Review 36, no. 1 
(1997): p 119. 
520 R V. Adams, 13 C.N.L.R, para. 26-7 (1996). 
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In the Indian context we see the preoccupation with space and ‘spacing difference’ carrying 
forward to the promulgation of the ‘public/private’ divide which helped to naturalise religious 
difference by giving the impression that personal and public laws operate in two non-
intersecting spatial (and temporal) dimensions. In linking law to geography, British colonial 
agents were able to conceal and naturalise the unequal application of the law to Indians and 
were able to create racialised enclaves against which they were able to better distinguish 
European identity and cultural superiority. Space was employed as a way of categorising 
colonial relations, and its regulation was frequently used as a way of exercising European 
political and cultural power.  
Australia and Canada present themselves as liberal and progressive societies, and cannot at first 
sight be characterised as categorically oppressive regimes.  In many ways political and legal 
developments in both countries have demonstrated a genuine interest in accommodating 
Aboriginal peoples and developing a more inclusive framework of Aboriginal cultural rights. For 
all intents and purposes Australia and Canada no longer represent the political and social 
visions once attributed to the settler-colony.  Yet, even within the very attempts at protecting 
Aboriginal culture and preserving Aboriginal rights, we can identify a colonial preoccupation 
with space and distance as crucial representations and elements of cultural difference.   
The model of territorial space that emerges through these contemporary legal and political 
narratives in Australia and Canada is reminiscent of the design of space that coalesced through 
the early technologies of Imperial witnessing during the fifteenth to twentieth century. 
Territorial space is a material portrayal of cultural difference, the borders of which trigger 
anxieties of proximity, and quests for distance-making. Determinations of cultural difference are 
underwritten by by spatial metaphors that imagine cultural diversity as incommensurable and 
present the Indigenous Other as having different visions of social and political life.  
The main preoccupation of Occidental Legality, through the implementation of divisions, 
domains, spheres, limits, lines, and boundaries, has always centred on preventing the movement 
of the native body and impeding cultural hybridity. The “legal enterprise is fundamentally about 
drawing lines, between the acceptable and unacceptable, between the normative and 
deviant.”521 For all the inclusive policies and democratic and liberal rhetoric, as well as claims of 
a shared identity and vision of the future, the modern State is still characterised by an intense 
fear of black and white bodies touching one another. The racialisation of space, the division of 
normative orders along imagined boundaries of sameness and difference, the definition and 
                                                             
521 Mark Kessler, "Free Speech Doctrine in American Political Culture: A Critical Legal Geography of Cultural Politics," 
Conneticut Public Interest Law Journal 6, no. 2 (2007): p 210. 
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containment of cultural difference through constructed temporal categories of 
modernity/traditionalism, order/chaos, signals a modern preoccupation with maintaining 
space and distance between those deemed culturally different and often, inferior.   
In the last section of this Chapter I bring the work of Occidental legality and its construction of 
territory back to the issue of Aboriginal self-government, and specifically how territorial 
conceptions of geographic space structure Aboriginal-State relations in Canada. Here, I draw on 
the perspectives of Aboriginal peoples to demonstrate how their struggle against the Canadian 
State, though often misrepresented as being territorial (in the sense of ‘propertied’), is actually 
grounded in their desire to be recognised as equal and self-governing nations. The sovereignty 
of Aboriginal people is undermined by Canada’s refusal to allow Aboriginal peoples to articulate 
their relationship to the land and its resources in ways that are consonant with their own self-
understanding and worldview, and further by a failure to uphold its treaty obligations to the 
First Nations people.  
Consequently, it is not simply the recognition of Aboriginal prior-occupation and title in land 
that is pressing and substantial for the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, it is the continued 
recognition and respect of their sovereignty as equal, self-governing nations. The fact that these 
treaties are rooted in the ceding of land that ultimately established the State’s monopoly on 
political and legal power and legitimacy is what makes space and geography so intimately 
related to the question of Aboriginal sovereignty and self-government. Since Aboriginal people 
believe in a reverse relationship between land and sovereignty in comparison to the dominant 
Euro-Western conception (i.e. political and legal independence accords a nation the right to 
determine their relationship to the land), their ceding of land most certainly should not be 
thought of as a simultaneous relinquishment of their sovereignty.  
The overreliance on territory as a precondition for autonomy and as a mechanism for the 
exercise of power obscures the issue that is really at the heart of Aboriginals’ claims for 
autonomy and recognition, which is the demand that the State recognise the coevalness of 
Aboriginal presence, traditions, identity, and history. This is a coevalness that rightly 
distinguishes Aboriginal peoples as nations who are as equally sovereign as the Canadian State. 
Jurisdictional conflicts are not about the acquisition of space, they are about determining the 
limits of authority within a shared space. As Read explains “every room in that house [the State] 
is not occupied but shared...but the decision about who shares which room is made by the 
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authority of the non-Indigenous alone.”522 Thus, the intense focus on territoriality displaces the 
issue of how social communities can develop ways in which to live in harmony with one 
another, sharing space and recognising each other’s reciprocal right and connection to that 
space. Constructions of space as ‘place’ and the production of imagined geographies like the 
Reservation, the national park, and the public/private divide, are therefore distortions of reality 
that conceal plurality. Imagined geographies modelled on an owned, enclosed, and culturally-
divisible space, give the impression of unity, stasis and immutability in the face of a disordered 
simultaneity of social interactions and processes. Consequently, when contemporary societies 
rely on these imagined geographies, they completely evade the issues most central to claims for 
jurisdiction and cultural autonomy.  
In analysing the effects of Occidental Legality on the ways in which contemporary societies 
manage issues of legal and cultural pluralism, it appears that minority communities are often 
produced and represented through a discourse which has traditionally been implicated in forms 
of racial and cultural marginalisation and oppression. In studying how this has played out in 
Canada and Australia, I reveal how liberal law is neither neutral nor universal. In response to 
this claim, it would seem that the obvious solution would be to allow Indigenous and minority 
communities the ability to define their own sense of self and to use that definition for the 
exercise of self-government. While both Canada and Australia have gone to some length in 
promoting rights to self-government, a right that many multiculturalists have declared 
necessary in terms of liberalism’s respect for autonomy,523 the territorial models of self-
government that have been pursued (i.e. claims for Aboriginal title and the Reservation system) 
have been shown to be problematic because they continue to promulgate and reproduce a 
racialised construction of space and, in turn, a very strict and reified conception of Aboriginality. 
Demands for recognition are construed as demands for ‘space’ to practice the traditions of one’s 
‘culture’ (which is constructed as ossified, static and essentialised). Moreover, a further problem 
with this approach is that it marginalises appeals for property, for ownership over space that 
safeguards autonomy by confirming the (genuine rather than imposed) humanity of Aborigines.   
In many ways this chapter is a strongly critical reading of the contemporary State system and its 
liberal courts. A focus on this critical perspective reveals that there are, indeed, many problems 
with the ways in which the rights of Indigenous groups are defined and determined in the 
Canadian and Australian context. Yet, at the same time, my analysis over the course this chapter 
                                                             
522 Peter Read, Belonging: Australians, Place, and Aboriginal Ownership (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p 2. 
523 W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, USA, 1996). 
Also see, Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (New Jersey: Princeton University 
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also demonstrated that there may some truth to the liberal commitment to providing autonomy 
for the Other that has previously been colonised or dispossessed. One of liberal law’s most 
celebratory aspects is that the Other is given space for opposition. Certainly the discussed 
liberal techniques for managing difference (i.e. Aboriginal title and the Reservation system) may 
not represent an ideal opportunity for opposition, given that in these instances liberal law 
appears to be unfairly encroaching on the cultural practices of minority communities.  However, 
it is an opportunity for negotiation and mutual-understanding that could not be possible in 
situations where native and liberal law were allowed to govern separate and non-overlapping 
spatial domains. 
In the next chapter I discuss one jurisdiction where Occidental Legality has had detrimental 
affects on a minority community, but where there is no liberal management of the consequences 
of marginality and the exclusion of racial Others.  In focusing on the case study of the tribal 
areas of Pakistan, I examine how its Pakhtun residents have been marginalised through the 
colonial discourse of Occidental Legality, which continues to operate despite the withdrawal of 
colonial forces and the end of direct British colonial rule. Despite the end of colonial governance 
and over fifty years of independence, the Tribal Areas remain on the periphery of economic 
development, and political and cultural life. I examine this continuing problem of exclusion, and 
focus on the unexpected ways in which the political and legal structures of governance in 
Pakistan have entirely foreclosed thepossibility of Pakhtun opposition. It is interesting, 
however, that the ways in which they have done so seems consonant with the aims of liberal 
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Chapter Four 
The Operation of Occidental Legality in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan  
Reimagining the Orient 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I analyse the political and legal governance of the Tribal524 Areas of Pakistan to 
reveal how Occidental Legality continues to shape State-tribal relations in accordance with a 
model of space that emerged during Britain’s colonisation of India. In my analysis I use an 
integrative approach that draws on the methodologies used in Chapters Two and Three. There 
are several novel aspects of this particular case study which, I argue, collectively produce an 
interesting system of governance with which to compare the Canadian and Australian model of 
Aboriginal rights. These features inform four broad ideas that I defend through this chapter. 
While I consider these arguments very briefly in the next few paragraphs, they suggest themes 
that will emerge within the following sections of the chapter and which I will return to 
throughout the course of this discussion. 
First, there is the issue of colonial governance in India. Unlike Canada and Australia, India was 
not a settler-colony. While the territories of the two former States were settled by European 
emigrants looking to build a new life outside of the European continent, the European presence 
in India, as I mentioned earlier in Chapter Three, was initially for the purposes of trade and 
commerce. After the Indian Partition in 1947, the British withdrew, leaving behind a bisected 
subcontinent, arranged into two religiously-defined States: Muslim-majority Pakistan and 
Hindu-majority India. As a non-settler colony, contemporary Pakistan’s anxieties over cultural 
heterogeneity do not serve the specific purpose of legitimising the colonising power to a newly 
decolonised, population. In revealing the continued relevance of spatial techniques to State-
Tribal relations in Pakistan, I dismiss the claim that Occidental Legality was a system of 
                                                             
524 I want to preface this chapter with one important claim. The idea of ‘tribal’ generally has many negative 
connotations to it, which suggest that it is a descriptor that is frequently used to denote pre-modern, static, 
traditional, and underdeveloped social groups. These are implications that have been attached to the term by the 
discursive practices of theorists and empiricists trained within the Western tradition. Recently, a growing awareness 
of its derogatory usage has made the term obsolete in Western academic discourse. However, I continue to use the 
term because in this chapter for two reasons. ‘Tribe’ is a term that is still used within the Indian subcontinent by 
groups who self-define as tribal. Its usage does not have negative undertones in these instances, and it is a label often 
invoked as a “marker of nobility.  Belonging to a tribe means to be of distinguished and old ancestry, to belonging to 
genuine people, to be dependable. As a tribal one is bound by a network of primordial obligations on the solid basis of 
well structured genealogical ties.” See, Bernt Glatzer, "The Pashtun Tribal System," in Concept of Tribal Society 
(Contemporary Society: Tribal Studies, Vol. 5), ed. G. Pfeffer and D.K. Behera (New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002), p 
265.  In addition, the ‘Tribal Areas’ is also a legal category, attached to the area by colonial and later Pakistani law. In 
this last sense, as I identify through this chapter, ‘tribal’ brings with a whole range of non-positive features, attributes, 
and imaginings about the Pakhtun people of Pakistan. 
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ordering developed by the colonisers and imposed on the colonised. Instead, I submit that 
Occidental Legality is a framework of ‘hegemonic knowledge’ that continues to persist 
irrespective of European physical presence. 
The second idea that informs this chapter is that, because India was not a settler-colony, the 
prominence of Occidental Legality within Pakistan points to a further ‘dislocation of culture’. 
Pakistan is an interesting example of the Orient imagining and constructing its own Orient or, 
perhaps more alarmingly, the Orient erecting itself as a new Occident of the once-colonised 
world. I say alarmingly precisely because Pakistan disrupts the conventional categories through 
which we structure our understandings the colonial experience.   As I will discuss later in this 
chapter, this last (of Pakistan as a new Occident) claim seems all the more likely given that 
Pakistani law and politics mimics a British model, and frequently invokes Anglo-European legal 
philosophies and doctrines to resolve questions of legal jurisdiction.  Two questions that will 
inform this analysis are: how does this clarify (or allow a critique of) the notion of Occidental 
Legality? How does a space that transgresses the identities and ideologies mapped onto it 
reshape our understanding of social and political ordering? 
Third, unlike Canada and Australia, the situation in Pakistan has failed to generate a 
conversation between the State and the Pakhtun people to the same extent as it has in the 
former two jurisdictions. This, I suggest, is largely because the Tribal Areas were constructed as 
a ‘liminal space’; a space ‘neither here nor there’ – both geographically and legally.  Its liminality 
arose from the fact that the areas were initially imagined not with the intent of protecting the 
ethnic minorities housed within it, but as a ‘distance-creating’ project meant to protect British 
possessions in India from Russian encroachment through Central Asia. While it may be claimed 
that the legally anomalous status of the Tribal Areas are a relic of the colonial occupation that 
the State must endure so as to maintain national cohesion, there is also the counter-claim that 
national unity is weakened by State-law’s unwillingness to extend a similar set of citizenship 
rights to its tribal community as it does other members of its polity. In this chapter I discuss 
what this means, not only for the Pakhtun people of the Tribal Areas, but also what this suggests 
about the relationship between territory and political community more broadly. 
Fourth, the situation in Pakistan, by which I mean the way in which normative autonomy is 
legally accorded to the Pakhtun tribes living within the Tribal Areas, appears congruous with 
the stated aims of liberal multiculturalism and its attendant notions of legal pluralism. The State 
has, in effect, given the Pakhtuns of the Tribal Areas wide-ranging freedoms of self-government 
by preventing the extension of the State’s legal jurisdiction into these regions. While, on the 
surface, this may appear consistent with the prevailing theories of minority protection and legal 
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pluralism, this chapter demonstrates how this construction of autonomy operates to undermine 
these liberties in practice. 
This case study provides interesting insight into the social construction of cultural space, and 
the role that the natural environment plays in the determination of Other-identities. The 
construction of the Tribal Areas, as a cultural geography, occurs through processes of 
dehumanisation and difference-making which render the Pakhtun525 people outside the 
boundaries of citizenship and its associated legal protections. The processes through which 
space, by which I mean both the natural and constructed environment, is experienced, 
imagined, and used to order relations, plays a significant role in how Pakhtun identity is 
envisaged and composed, and has a crucial part to play in the community’s continued economic, 
political, and social marginalisation. Over the course of the chapter I analyse how the colonial 
expansion produced the tribal areas of Pakistan through a European desire to maintain distance 
between its interests in India and its Russian enemies advancing into Central Asia. As such, 
while the area is understood as the historic homeland of the Pakhtun community, its ‘tribal’526 
character was introduced through the European social imaginary and incorporated into colonial 
(and later postcolonial) political and legal structures and institutions.   
The second important insight that is revealed through this case study is that, while Chapter 
Three has evidenced many of liberal law’s deficiencies, the cultural spaces of the Tribal Areas 
hardly represent a viable alternative. While these areas are regularly conceived as lacking 
liberal law, and being entirely shaped by native custom and practice, they certainly do not 
produce the robust structures of protection that liberal multicultural societies expect. Gender 
discrimination, lack of economic self-sufficiency, high levels of illiteracy, limited access to State 
institutions – these all characterise everyday life in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan.  And so, while 
Pakistan represents a particularly stark example of territorial cultural autonomy gone awry, it 
presents us with an opportunity to examine why we should be seeking intermarriage between 
liberal and native law, rather than a compartmentalisation of the two. 
The following sections of the chapter are organised so as to trace a historical continuity 
between the aforementioned themes. In so doing I suggest that colonial conceptions of space 
and the practices that they gave rise to, are connected to contemporary geographic imaginaries 
and the strategies which have been constructed by modern political society to hold these 
                                                             
525 In many of these historical narratives the Pakhtuns are referred to as Pathans or Pashtuns (the latter being an 
Indianised variant of the community’s name). However, I have chosen to employ the term ‘Pakhtun’ as that is how 
they self-identify.  
526 And all the negative connotations that Western discourse attaches to the term ‘tribal’, including societies that are 
traditional, static, unyielding, and primitive.  
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geographies in place. This means that, frequently, I draw on examples from the colonial and 
Partition periods to further bolster or explain a contemporary phenomenon or practice. This 
approach has been utilised to demonstrate the continued prominence of Occidental Legality and 
to disrupt the suggestion that the self-imposed limitation on the State’s legal jurisdiction is a 
form of protecting tribal diversity.   
2. The Space-Identity Matrix of Power 
Through Chapters Two and Three I have explored the ways in which the linking of geography 
and identity has been an essential accompaniment to the exercise of colonial power. In many 
ways the spatialisation of native identity has encouraged forms of social, material, and 
ideological containment. They represent ways in which the colonial powers have attempted to 
distance themselves from native communities for the purposes of maintaining their cultural 
integrity and superiority.  
In this Chapter I argue that the colonisation of India fit a similar pattern, and the relationship 
between geography, identity, and political power readily informed colonial-Pakhtun relations. 
The act of formulating a violent and unruly identity for the Pakhtuns was naturalised by 
referring to the precarious and turbulent landscape which they occupied. Not only did this 
misrepresent the act of identity-construction as a benign exercise, a mere observation, but it 
stripped Pakhtun people of their agency, suggesting that their retaliatory actions were not 
political in nature – they were not to be perceived as a rational response to conquest – but 
rather as an expression of their lawless character and irrational nature.  
What is further remarkable about this relationship is that it was the need to neutralise 
geography – extract from it all its normative content and reproduce it as a jurisdictionless space 
between Britain and Communist-Russia – that necessitated the representation of the Pakhtun 
people inhabiting this area in inhumane and irrational terms. Over the course of this discussion, 
I demonstrate how this characterisation of the Pakhtun people provided the necessary impetus 
for colonial law to extend its reach into this space of ‘legal exception’. Accordingly, the Tribal 
Areas were never, not even during the course of the Great Game, jurisdictionless, or politically 
and legally neutral. In fact, as I illustrate, this cultural geography was saturated by legal 
pluralism, a space of ‘legal exception’ that was, in truth, a place of ‘legal excess’. 
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European interest in India had always been one of a commercial nature527 rather than about the 
subjugation and possession of native peoples.528 European economic enterprise in India first 
came in the form of the British East India Company (BEIC) in the early parts of the eighteenth 
century. The Company was given the right to exclusive trade in India, and to make laws for the 
political and commercial administration of the area.  Official Company rule began in 1757, after 
the Battle of Plassey, but lasted for only a year before the commercial venture was extended to 
include formal legal and political administration by the British Crown.   
There are two reasons for this broadening of the British mandate to include legal and political 
control. Firstly, the government was fielding many complaints about the treatment of natives by 
Company officials and the inability of Company courts to resolve disputes amongst its agents.529 
These complaints were taken more seriously after they culminated in the Indian Rebellion in 
1857.530 More importantly, however, British political and military interest in India was piqued 
by the Russian expansion into Central Asia, a move that the British interpreted as potentially 
threatening their financial interests within the subcontinent.531 Collectively, these two events 
brought about Crown administration and signalled the beginning of the British Raj.  In 1858 all 
annexed territory was declared a Crown Colony and the governance of India rested on the 
British Parliament, with full responsibility of Indian Affairs being allocated to the Secretary of 
State for India and the Viceroy (Governor-General), who acted as the central administrative 
officer within the colony itself.532  
3. Imagining the Buffer and Spatialising the ‘Frontier’ 
One of the methods devised by the British to manage the impending Russian threat was to 
develop a buffer zone to create distance between India and Russia, and which would act as a 
politically-neutral barrier to Russian advancement through Afghanistan. While the idea of a 
buffer zone permeated Anglo-Afghan relations for much of the second half of the nineteenth and 
                                                             
527 Columbus, for example, tried to seek out India to exploit its spices and gold. See, Nicolas Wey Gomez, The Tropics 
of Empire: Why Columbus Sailed South to the Indies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).  
528 This, some have suggested, has always been the aim of British colonialism; in the sense that it has always been 
about commodities and the exploitation of natural resources rather than large-scale conquest and “subjugating and 
converting natives.” See, Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English World: The Legal Foundation of 
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529 Bernard S. Cohn, Law and the Colonial State in India, ed. June Starr and Jane F. Collier, History and Power in the 
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530 Also referred to as the ‘Sepoy Mutiny’. For a more detailed history about the Rebellion see,Christopher Hibbert, 
The Great Mutiny: India, 1857 (Allen Lane London, 1978).  
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532 Sandra Fullerton Joireman, "The Evolution of the Common Law: Legal Development in Kenya and India," 
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the early parts of the twentieth century, it wasn’t until 1919 that this buffer was politically 
recognised in the form of an international boundary called the Durand Line (with the space on 
the Indian side of the border being referred to as the ‘North-West Frontier’).533 The fixing of the 
Anglo-Afghan spheres of influence through the drawing of the Durand Line in 1893 was 
considered to be one of the most significant political developments of this period, and one 
which would become a point of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the next 
century. 
The ways in which the space delineated by the Durand Line was imagined and managed appears 
reminiscent of the Treaty of Tordesillas, whereby European political and military interests 
diverted attention away from all discussion about what the implementation of a buffer zone 
would mean to the people living along the frontier.534  Consequently, the Durand Line has 
produced a most unusual arrangement, in that it runs directly through Afghan tribal lands and 
divides key Pakhtun clans (Mohmands, Afridis, and Waziris), placing them on separate sides of 
an international boundary.535 Moreover, the Indian side the Durand Line runs parallel to a 
politically neutral zone that was accorded political autonomy from before Crown rule. Because 
of its formal status as politically neutral, this area, as I discuss further in the next few sections of 
the chapter, is misconceived as being emptied of British power and presence.    
A. Naturalising the Buffer 
Instead of looking to the people being affected by the Durand Line, the British turned to the 
natural landscape of the area to determine where the borders of the international boundary 
would be set. Beginning at the western end of the Himalayas, the Frontier was imagined in two 
parts. Composed of a landscape that was arid and barren, encompassing peaks that thrust 
upwards to 10,000 feet in height, the western part of the frontier lay almost entirely in the 
mountains between the administered border of India and Kabul.536 The mountainous 
environment and dry climate of the hills made the area largely uncultivable and thus 
economically unprofitable for the British. In addition, the rough terrain was difficult to navigate 
                                                             
533 An Anglo-Afghan buffer zone was an idea that was first attempted by the BEIC, to their own detriment, in the 
1840s, The British invasion of Afghanistan ended with the Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842) with over four thousand 
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form of the Durand Line. See,  
534 This oversight has caused some to remark that the Durand Line represents “a line without strategic, geographic, 
or cultural basis.” See, Dorothea Seelye Franck, "Pakhtunistan: Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land," Middle East 
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The Operation of Occidental Legality in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan Page 187 
  
and proved problematic in terms of subduing local uprisings.  The turbulent and haggard terrain 
was, however, optimal for providing a natural defence against external aggression. The second 
zone of the frontier plains was imagined more favourably.  Wedged in-between the ranges of the 
Hindu Kush and the Suleiman mountains, the valleys of the Indus were lush and fertile.537  
Containing plentiful deposits of nutrient-rich loam, this second area was agriculturally 
profitable and able to produce in abundance when given the right amount of rainfall. It was 
along the frontier plains that British settlements were readily established and it was along the 
more challenging landscape that the Durand Line was located so as to use the mountainous 
terrain along the Khyber Pass538 as a natural barrier. 
British presence was made increasingly visible within the valleys of the Indus through the 
implementation of European styles of law and governance, and by a strict patrolling of 
boundaries between the settled areas in the plains and the (unsettled) mountainous regions to 
the West.539 British political agents took great efforts to delineate these boundaries between the 
settled and unsettled areas and there was implementation of more structured spaces for the 
operation of politico-juridical and economic authority.540 Early Crown rule, as I had discussed in 
Chapter Three, adopted more fluid forms of legal administration, which often drew on Hindu 
and Muslim personal law alongside British common law.541 Disputes were managed using a mix 
of formal courts and informal forms of localised adjudication including the customary jirga and 
panchayats.542 As the buffer between Britain and its external enemy, the North-West frontier, 
however, was managed through stricter forms of colonial regulation that, as I will discuss later 
in this chapter, resulted in an Anglo-Pakhtun model of law based on a gross misconstruction of 
Pakhtun customary norms. The use of more stringent frameworks of military and political 
regulation was further bolstered by the fact that the hill tribes in the unsettled areas - now 
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Neighbouring Tribes on the North-West Frontier of India," ed. His Majesty's Stationary Office (British Parliamentary 
Papers, 1901), p 11, 13.   
540 Bernard S. Cohn, "From Indian Status to British Contract," The Journal of Economic History 21, no. 4 (1961): p 614-
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existing along one of the most strategically perilous spaces543 but commercially valuable 
areas544 of the subcontinent - were a constant source of harassment for the settled areas.545  
The tenuous nature of British rule in these regions was exacerbated by the fact that social life 
rarely complied with the colonial boundaries. The permeability of the border between the 
British-dominated and native-inhabited areas had the effect of blurring the transition from the 
‘tamed’ to ‘untamed’ spaces (and people) of the Frontier. The British officers were cognisant of 
the fact that their continued authority relied on being able to stifle expressions of resistance 
mounted within the untamed areas.546 In the eyes of the political agents, this consistent shift 
between the ‘tamed’ and ‘untamed’ rendered the tribesman untrustworthy and the space that 
he occupied dangerous. The uncertainty brought about through intermixing, the possibility of 
hybridity, was a constant source of British unease. These anxieties were further reinforced by 
the fact that many of the tribesmen’s’ tactics of resistance against colonial rule were strategies 
learned when fighting alongside the British during the three Anglo-Afghan wars.547 This 
suggested not only an unusual and unsettling ‘hybrid’ morphing of the Pakhtun, but in the eyes 
of the Europeans, confirmed Pakhtun deceitfulness. 
While the Durand Line had the effect of allocating the North-West Frontier to India, colonial 
administrators never thought of these areas as part of their Empire within the subcontinent.548 
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Parliamentary Papers, 1901), p 75. 
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As such, within the colonial social imaginary the North-West Frontier always wavered uneasily, 
often envisaged as spaces of shifting alliances and allegiances. The ways in which the Frontier 
was imagined had some very important consequences in terms of the manner in which the 
Pakhtun was conceived and colonial-Pakhtun (and later Pakistan-Pakhtun) relations ultimately 
understood and managed. 
B. Imagining the Pakhtun ‘Tribesmen’ 
Using the unruly and intemperate environment of the Frontier-space, the British typically 
imagined the Pakhtun tribesmen as violent, rebellious, and heady figures.549 These images of the 
Pakhtun contributed to judgments about their moral rectitude and trustworthiness.550 
Accordingly, tribal relations were typically characterised as having a lawless quality.551 
Described as engaging in violence and thievery as a ‘way of life’, 552 the Pakhtuns and their 
honour codes have frequently been admonished for encouraging and executing blood feuds 
between members of their own and other competing tribal factions.553 In these various reports 
of life within the North-West Frontier, the Pakhtun clansman stands as an exotic, yet primal and 
dangerous, figure, inhabiting a territory that is at once barren and bountiful;554 a perilous and 
law-evading place, where everyday life is described as being brutal and uncertain.555 The ability 
to ‘define’ Pakhtun personality allowed the British to implement particularly draconian policies 
within the Frontier, using the explanation of having to manage a group that was ‘ungovernable’, 
violent, and incorrigibly corrupt.  
i. Frontier Landscape and Pakhtun Temperament 
Frontier topography has figured prominently in the narratives that consider its Pakhtun 
inhabitants’ ungovernable character. Mythic accounts of Pakhtun life in the Frontier see the 
heartiness of the land as an extension of the character of the men that inhabit it - “the land was 
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made for the men in it, not men for the land.”556 The Frontier-space was fashioned as a 
dangerous space, a “hard country of hard men, who bore arms almost from the moment their 
mothers first set them on the earth.”557 These colonial narratives have shown a degree of 
continuity, appearing to influence more contemporary accounts of Pakhtun life. For instance, 
Omrani notes that because the Frontier-space is difficult to navigate, and lacks the advances of 
more modern and diverse economies, the hill tribes of the Frontier have been transformed into 
a ‘particular sort’ of peoples. 
In the absence of hedge funds or the financial services industry, what can the tribesmen do 
but turn to crime, raiding the more prosperous settled territories, preying on the merchants 
passing along the ancient trade routes towards Central Asia or Persia? Like many other 
mountain dwellers...they are fiercely proud of their independence. They hold in contempt 
the civilisation and governments of the settled world. They do not like to pay taxes, they do 
not have time for the conventional forms of law and law courts and they do not have any 
taste for laws imposed from distant capitals.558  
The remoteness of the tribesman’s location is said to have contributed to his ability to maintain 
an ‘uncivilised’ tribal society, and preserve the primitive codes of the Pakhtunwali.559 According 
to this view, the tribal area’s cultural ecology appears to contribute, quite directly in fact, to 
Pakhtun deviance and criminality.  
Conversely, there are also writers that suggest that perhaps Pakhtun ‘criminality’ was less about 
a history of seclusion translating into a passion for asserting continued independence, and more 
about a history of isolation leading to economic hardship.560 According to both scenarios, 
however, the natural environment is believed to have directly influenced the development of an 
identity for the hill tribes that sets them apart from the rest of the population as ‘outlaws’ and 
‘bandits’ that embrace a way of living that outsiders perceive as injurious and illegal.561 
While direct administration over the Frontier had its origins in European commercial interest 
and defence strategy, its exercise was heavily influenced by forms of cultural domination 
through projections of backwardness and primitivity. This explains, for one, why there are 
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settled and unsettled areas of the Frontier despite both places housing populations with a 
similar cultural and ethno-linguistic background. Yet, while the British were quite aware of 
these demographical similarities,562 the Frontier agencies (in comparison to the districts) were 
deemed ungovernable on account of their, allegedly, ‘barbaric’ and ‘culturally inferior’ 
character. This meant that, several times over the course of history the Frontier represented, on 
the one hand, “a tribe of ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians,’”563 while on the other, 
“...manliness...wit...good-fellowship...loyalty, even...heroism...”564 Pakhtun identity, like the 
buffer-space they occupied, wavered uncertainly between two distinct tropes: the independent, 
loyal, and intensely-honourable tribesmen565 versus the fanatical, violent, and lawless beast.566  
The hybrid identity of the Pakhtun cast him as someone unstable, mythical, and often 
dangerous. 
ii. Making the ‘Primitive’ Substantiating the Modern 
Socio-political struggles within the Frontier have always been presented as materialising along 
a temporalised (modern/traditional) trajectory that morphed into determinations about 
Pakhtun cultural inferiority. Many of these claims pivot on the relationship between autonomy 
and history, suggesting that the remoteness of the Pakhtun space has had the effect of shielding 
them from historical progress.  Some narratives assert that Pakhtun resistance to foreign 
occupation is tantamount to a rejection of modernity and a desire to maintain a traditional, read 
primitive, existence. In both situations, whether space has been used as a reason for, or as a 
solution to, their arrested development, the Pakhtun of the Frontier satisfies the colonial ‘search 
for the primitive’ against which to “define [the] primary human potential.”567 As Diamond states, 
without the ‘primitive’ “it becomes increasingly difficult to evaluate or understand 
contemporary pathology and possibility.”568 
Conflict between the Frontier Pakhtuns and the British has predominately been interpreted as a 
struggle between tribal tradition and modern values, and thus never a conflict between two 
morally equivalent political entities. Indian society was understood as being at a crossroads, 
where the British presence signalled a transition from Indian traditionalism to European 
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modernity; a choice between ‘regressing’ to the status of the ‘tribals’ or progressing to the 
standards of the British.  Representations of the ‘tribal’ Pakhtun, therefore, became a necessary 
accompaniment to the justification of colonial power, and the Frontier was thus divided and 
enclosed – to, purportedly, keep the savagery of traditionalism at bay. This rendering of 
Pakhtun-Frontier relations further maps onto ideas about law and legality, which construct 
Pakhtun normative orders as customary ‘honour codes’, while maintaining the universal 
supremacy of British law. 
 It is certain from correspondences between the Government of Great Britain and its agents in 
India that the political officers believed they were modernising and civilising Indians.  We can 
find evidence of this in the numerous letters written to the Parliament during the colonial 
period, many of which assert a “sincere interest in the welfare of the native community, and the 
desire to be in some degree instrumental in conferring upon them the blessings of our noble 
[juridical] institution.”569 However, while India was seen as distinctly separate from England,570 
the length to which British officers became involved in attempts to reconcile the British and 
native modes of dispute settlement and adjudication571 demonstrated an interest that was never 
extended to the way in which law and order was instituted within the Frontier. This implies 
that, at the very least, the British felt that the non-Frontier communities of India were capable of 
modernising, of converting aspects of their social life in accordance with the institutional 
models being proposed by their colonial masters.  
The potential for modernisation was never perceived as being within the realm of possibility for 
the Frontier. Many accounts of the Pakhtun community speak of their tradition of badal (the 
codes of the Pakhtunwali governing retribution for grievances) as an archaic response to 
dispute settlement. It is, therefore, not novel to find accounts that conveyed that, “feuds, 
estrangements, and affrays are of constant occurrence; the public roads and private property 
are alike unsafe...”572; or recollections of feudal violence which relay: “I have felt very suspicious 
of our strange, wild, assistants, with their hungry-looking knives and tulwars...long guns and 
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general thievish appearance.”573 The dehumanisation of Pakhtun clans to where they become 
capable of uncontrollable violence and unbridled greed,574 constructed the area as a tumultuous 
and perilous space, where the persistent threat of violent death made the efforts of the colonial 
officer even more heroic and commendable. In these sets of narratives we see the Pakhtun 
tribesman as both the shaper of space, as well as the product of the Frontier-space. 
In more contemporary narratives the Pakhtun’s dislike of ‘foreigners’ has been translated into 
an intense reverence of autonomy and self-reliance, that increasingly takes a ‘legal’ turn when it 
is understood to convey a sense of ‘lawlessness’ within Frontier. This suggests that a value for 
autonomy, most visibly manifested through exercises of resistance to alien (i.e. European) 
intervention, signals the absence of all the things we traditionally associate with a legal order – 
peace, predictability, good governance, social justice, equality. The colonial encounter is shaped 
by perceptions of the tribal areas’ “complete rejection of the twentieth century which in [the 
Pakhtuns] eyes the British represented.”575 These spaces are described as ‘closed systems’ 
emblematic of “not only a different world, [but] almost a different century.”576 To be ‘tribal’ 
therefore, was symbolic of a repudiation of all the things that not only make life predictable, 
just, and harmonious, but also signalled the absence of institutions and structures which 
represented European conceptions of the ‘good life’.577 
In positioning the Pakhtun outside the boundaries of legality, these constructions essentially 
undervalued, or completely ignored, the persistence of alternative forms of normative ordering 
which organised social and political life within the Frontier. The normative value and influence 
that the Pakhtunwali exerts on Pakhtun social relations is either minimised, completely 
discounted, or characterised as exceedingly barbaric. Instead, the Pakhtun-dominated Frontier 
is perceived as lacking legitimate structures of social regulation. 
C. Identifying Space and Spacing Identities and the Exercise of Power 
What is important about revealing the mutually-constitutive relationship between the Frontier-
space and Pakhtun identity is the fact that it has, throughout history, become the basis of 
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differential treatment and the implementation of heavy-handed and oppressive structures of 
governance within the Frontier. In the various ways by which the Frontier has been constructed 
and managed it is possible to identify the processes and effects of Occidental Legality.  
British administration of the Frontier relied heavily on an ‘Orientalist’ approach to tribal 
relations.  Adopting a strategy of non-interference, the British allowed the Pakhtun communities 
of the Frontier to exercise self-government and employ customary law for the resolution of 
inter-group disputes. The space was administered by indirect rule, where local chiefs or maliks 
acted as brokers for the British and spokesmen for the tribe-members. In order to maintain 
stability and peace within the area, the maliks were enticed with monetary subsides in return 
for keeping looting and protest at bay.578 In addition, authority over colonial-Frontier relations 
was entrusted to only those agents who knew the tribes and possessed expert ‘cultural’ 
knowledge (i.e. language and knowledge of traditional custom including the Pakhtunwali 
honour code).579 These relationships themselves reveal an internal differentiation within the 
category of ‘Pakhtun’, and reveal the dynamicity and complexities of a colonial experience that 
cannot be reduced to the simple binaries of coloniser/colonised. 
Lord Curzon, who became Viceroy in 1899, attempted to administer the Frontier by 
encouraging British interaction with Pakhtun tribes in an effort to tame the “lawless and 
predatory instincts of the hill men.”580 By encouraging dialogue between the Pakhtuns and 
European administrators, Curzon’s policies helped to further blur the lines between the settler 
and native populations. British policies for managing the Frontier during this time centred on 
forms of ‘cultural understanding’, where Political Officers were commanded to manage the 
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Frontier by respecting and learning about Pakhtun culture.581 Through these modes of ‘knowing 
the Pakhtun’, Curzon’s policies had the effect of dehistoricising and reducing Pakhtun culture “to 
component resources that can be appropriated” by anyone.582 The unsettling use of cultural 
knowledge as a form of control is further problematised by those narratives that genuinely 
perceived Europeans as patrons of Pakhtun identity and ways-of-being.583 In some particularly 
problematic instances, these convictions had the effect of spatialising Pakhtun ethnicity.584 
Belief in a ‘European revitalisation’ of Pakhtun culture at once represents a manipulation of the 
unequal distribution of power that characterised colonial-colonised relations, and a naive 
misconception about the parity of British-Pakhtun relations. These contrasting interpretations 
of colonial administration also reflect an enduring conflict that plagues modern understandings 
of the role of political power within heterogeneous societies. They reveal unease between the 
dual objectives of social regulation and cultural protection, and complicate the role of 
contemporary liberal law and forms of governance.  
In citing the challenging terrain and hearty landscape as one reason for establishing stricter 
designs of social control, colonial agents were able to conceal the progressive racialisation of the 
Frontier-space. The imagined separation between the Frontier and ‘natural’ Indian territory, 
was made real through the adoption of a colonial strategy of non-intervention in tribal affairs, 
reinforced by the implementation of the Frontier-Crimes Regulation (FCR). The FCR is a 
particularly brutal system of regulation that continues to operate within the Frontier provinces 
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exercise of self-government.  
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of Pakistan even today.585 There are several reasons why the FCR is problematic. First, it was 
implemented on the basis of respecting Pakhtun autonomy and self-government. Despite this, 
however, it uses a British model of codification which has the effect of “stunt[ing] the natural 
progression of customary practices and prevent[ing] its further growth.586 The FCR employs 
forms of communal punishment to hold maliks and all tribe members directly responsible for 
criminal actions where no offender can be found.587 
Second, the FCR was not used as a way of protecting Pakhtun culture, but often operated as a 
method for neutralising the Frontier of its normative content. Sections 31-33 of the FCR, for 
example, reveal a strong spatialisation of British power within the Frontier. These provisions 
banned the establishment of villages and township in the vicinity of British controlled areas, 
including centrally-managed roads that run through the Frontier, and completely prohibited the 
building or continued use of hujras or chauks.588 In restricting the place-making practices of the 
Frontier-Pakhtuns, these provisions of the FCR created distance between adjacently-located 
administered and non-administered places.  In essence, then, this practice of territoriality 
served to create a “conceptually empty space,”589 spaces devoid of social life, emptied of legal 
and political meaning. Wrongly giving the impression that the area being contained was 
somehow unregulated or neutral, the operation of the FCR diverted attention away from how 
the practice of ‘emptying,’ itself, represented an exercise of power.   
Throughout its colonial history the North-West Frontier has been administered through an 
exercise of colonial of power that relies on networking geography and identity. This has been 
illustrated by, for one, grounding Pakhtun temperament in the turbulent topography of the 
Frontier. In other instances we see Pakhtun identity being ‘partitioned’. For example, the 
artificial borders between the settled and unsettled areas of the Frontier have had the effect of 
defining an ethnically and linguistically homogenous population along two separate historical 
axis. While the Frontier-plains were selected for settlement based on its agricultural promise 
and its manageable geography, the British often represented its Pakhtun inhabitants as more 
                                                             
585 Brutal in the sense of authorising collective punishment for individual wrongs, and allows political authorities to 
blockade an outlaw’s village until he surrenders. The FCR has been described as instituting a system of law and order, 
rather than aiming to protect the due process rights of tribal members. See, Jules Stewart, The Savage Border: The 
History of the North-West Frontier (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2007), p 151-3. 
586 Shaheen Sardar Ali, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law: Equal before Allah, Unequal before 
Man? (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p 182. 
587 Ian Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 3rd Edition (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), p 59. 
588  Hujras or chauks can be most simply described as infrastructures established as communal or public meeting 
places. For a detailed description of a Pakhtun hujra and its social and political functions see, Mughal B. Khan, Abdul 
R. Ghumman, and Hashim N. Hashmi, "Social and Environmental Impact of Hujra," Environmental Justice 1, no. 4 
(2008). 
589 Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p 
33. 
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responsive to modernisation. Thus, a temperate environment becomes the basis of a more 
manageable and less rebellious construction of its people. In comparison, the hill-tribes were 
described as unruly and disagreeable. While the plains-people were ‘modernised’, the trans-
Indus tribes were perceived as static, inflexible, and attached to a traditional culture that incited 
brutality and malevolence. This view of the settled versus unsettled areas has been, as I will 
further discuss in Section (3) of this chapter, been institutionalised through the law and the 
structures of governance that prevail in modern-day Pakistan. The Pakhtun, therefore, 
embodies two separate and non-intersecting identities. This partitioning of identity is also 
illustrated by the myriad narratives that speak of Pakhtun hybridity and the ability of both the 
colonial agent to mimic aspects of Pakhtun culture, and the Pakhtun to espouse, and sometimes 
manipulate, aspects of European culture. Through these various narratives of the Frontier we 
are given the distinct impression that the Pakhtun, particularly the Pakhtun located within the 
mountainous (and thus difficult to settle) regions of the Frontier, represents an unstable and 
threatening figure, stubbornly consumed with maintaining an archaic tradition that defies the 
progressive thrust of modernity. In these instances, the Pakhtun is catapulted out of a dynamic 
European history, and represented as a relic of a bygone era that is worthy of both our contempt 
and pity. 
4. Postcolonial Law-Making & the Legal Status of the FATA 
The 1947 Partition freed India from colonial rule and produced two sovereign States: India and 
Pakistan. British India was carved up amidst great violence, displacement, and depredation.590 
As the population of the subcontinent scrambled to locate themselves on the side of the border 
that guaranteed them the greatest religious protection,591 authors remarked that the crumbling 
of the colonial Empire could be “defined in terms of reconciling the principles of freedom and 
unity, of preserving in freedom the unity that Empire had imposed.”592 
While the population of almost four hundred million remained largely unconsulted, the British, 
along with politicians from the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, negotiated the 
                                                             
590 Amtul Hassan, Impact of Partition: Refugees in Pakistan: Struggle for Empowerment and State’s Response Rcss 
Policy Studies 37 Rcss Policy Studies (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006).  Also see, I Ahmed, "The 1947 Partition of India: A 
Paradigm for Pathological Politics in India and Pakistan," Asian Ethnicity 3, no. 1 (2002). 
591 Amtul Hassan, Impact of Partition: Refugees in Pakistan: Struggle for Empowerment and State’s Response Rcss 
Policy Studies 37 Rcss Policy Studies (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006), p 12. 
592 R.J. Moore, "The Problem of Freedom with Unity: London's India Policy, 1917-47," in Congress and the Raj: Facets 
of the Indian Struggle 1917-47, ed. D.A. Low (London: OUP, 2006), p 376.  Moore’s work casts doubt on one of the 
prevailing explanations for partition, that it was an imperial policy aimed at ‘dividing and conquering’ once colonised 
populations. Moore’s historical narratives makes an attempt to “trace the British commitment to the principles of 
freedom.” See, ———, "The Problem of Freedom with Unity: London's India Policy, 1917-47," in Congress and the Raj: 
Facets of the Indian Struggle 1917-47, ed. D.A. Low (London: OUP, 2006), p 375. 
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new borders of the two post-partition States using methods of boundary-making that relied on 
census results to identify regions with majority Hindu/Muslim populations.593 This gave rise to 
a most illogical territorial configuration for Pakistan, where the Eastern and Western blocs of its 
land were bisected by over 6,000 miles of Indian Territory. In a matter of weeks, millions of 
Indians found themselves confined to the territories of a new State that was suddenly hostile 
towards their presence.594 The demarcation of State boundaries and border-politics became 
routine processes of enemy-making, with the consequence that significantly large numbers of 
individuals that found themselves ‘on the wrong side of the boundary’ packed up their 
belongings, left ancestral homes, and relocated to unfamiliar lands and unwelcoming 
communities.595  
The North-West Frontier was no stranger to the political battles engulfing the rest of the 
subcontinent. These conflicts, however, took an even more problematic turn as Afghanistan 
moved to contest Pakistan’s inheritance of the Frontier.596 Calls for Pakhtun autonomy had been 
gaining momentum since before the Partition,597 and only grew stronger after the negotiating 
parties failed to include a separate Pakhtun State as a potential option during the pre-partition 
referendum.598  With only the choice of joining either Hindu-dominated India or Muslim-
Pakistan, the predominately Muslim Pakhtuns of the North-West Frontier cast a majority vote in 
favour of the latter.599 
Also during this, we begin to see the legal institutionalisation of the settled versus non-settled 
areas of colonial rule along the Frontier. For example, under the West Pakistan Act of 1955, 
Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sindh, Balochistan, Karachi, Bahawalpur, 
Khairpur, the Balochistan States, Amb, Chitral, Dir, and Swat were all amalgamated into the 
single province of West Pakistan. However, the Frontier districts and agencies, sandwiched 
                                                             
593 As Khan notes, “borders [were]...devised from a distance; the land, villages and communities to be divided were 
not visited or inspected by the imperial map-maker...” See, Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition : The Making of India and 
Pakistan (New Haven Conn. ; London: Yale University Press, 2007), p 3. 
594 Seven million displaced Indian Muslims (mojahirs) were met with resentment in Pakistan, where the already 
settled populations saw their presence as both an economic burden and a security threat to a State still struggling to 
take its first steps. See, Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p 
89-158. 
595 Seven million displaced Indian Muslims (mojahirs) were met with resentment in Pakistan, where the already 
settled populations saw their presence as both an economic burden and a security threat to a State still struggling to 
take its first steps. See, Ibid. 
596 James Spain, The Pathan Borderlands (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), p 193. 
597 Ibid., p 196-200. 
598 This oversight was heavily criticised by the Khudai Khitmatgars, a Pakhtun political party operating within India 
prior to its balkanisation. See, Ibid., p 198-9. 
599 Though the results of this vote have, since, been heavily contested given that only 51% of eligible voters turned 
out for the vote, and it has been suggested that the remaining voters refrained from casting a ballot in protest for not 
being offered the possibility of secession. See, Ibid., p 200. 
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between the edges of the NWFP and the Durand Line, remained untouched by this Act, and the 
administration of these areas fell to the local political agents (see fig. 4.1).  More importantly, it 
was decided that the colonial laws governing the tribal districts and agencies, including the 
Frontier Crimes Regulation, would remain in force until sufficient amendments were made to 
either repeal or modify existing statutes.600 Furthermore, communal representation was 
prohibited within any of the regions, and the secessionist sentiments of the Frontier were 
dampened through the banning of political parties within this area and the criminalisation of 
political actors aligned with the ‘Pakhtunistan’ movement.601 The form of political organisation 
put in place by the West Pakistan Act was in operation till 1973, when Pakistan was formally 
declared a federal republic and subdivided into Sindhi-, Balochi-, Punjabi-, and Pakhtun-
majority provinces. The NWFP was comprised of three administrative units: the Settled Areas, 
the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (see 
4.2).  
                                                             
600 Alan Gledhill, "Pakistan; the Development of Its Laws and Constitution," in The British Commonwealth the 
Development of Its Laws and Constitutions, V. 8, ed. George W. Keeton (London,: Stevens, 1957), p 76. 
601 James Spain, The Pathan Borderlands (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), p 201-2. 






The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has an area of 74,521 km and a population of 
approximately 22 million.  It is composed of three administrative units: 
The Settled Areas (SA) The Provincially Administered 
Tribal Areas (PATA) 
The Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) 
Made up of the districts of: 
Abbottabad, Bannu, Battagram, 
Charsadda, Dera Ismail Khan, 
Hangu, Haripur, Kohistan, Karak, 
Lakki Marwat, Mansehra, Mardan, 




Made up of the districts of: 
Malakand Agency, Upper Dir, 
Lower Dir, Chitral, Swat, Buner, 
Shangla, Khala Dhaka, tribal areas 
of Kohistan, and the State of Amb 
(which is now submerged under 
Tarbela Dam Reservoir). 
Made up of the 7 tribal agencies 
of: 
Bajaur Agency, Orakzai Agency, 
Mohmand Agency, Khyber 
Agency, Kurram Agency, North 
Waziristan, and South Waziristan. 
 
And 6 Frontier Regions: 
F.R. Bannu, Central Kurram, F.R. 
Dera Ismail Khan, F.R. Kohat, F.R. 
Lakki, F.R. Peshawar and F.R. 
Tank. 
Figure 4.1 – Map of Pakistan Demarcating the FATA and NWFP (now known as the Khyber 
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A. The Constitutionally Anomalous Status of the Tribal Areas 
Constitution-making in Pakistan has been, to a tremendous degree, driven by the pressures of 
ethnopolitics.602  The federation’s arrangement was promulgated along ethnic lines, and thus, 
each province, to some extent, illustrates a degree of ethnic and cultural homogeneity.603  This 
way of conceptualising and organising the Nation – as an aggregate of different ethnicities – has 
largely divided loyalties based on ethnic interests and worked to essentialise ethnic identities. 
Creating disconnected and competing conceptions of group identity, each vying for greater 
political power over and within the State, these divisions have turned Pakistan into a hotbed of 
ethnic rivalries, where politics is approached not from the perspective of a shared respect for 
common political and social values, but based on the need to preserve the cultural integrity of 
one’s own ethnic community. As such, ethnic movements within Pakistan typically “take the 
form...of subnational movements, directed against the central power, demanding regional 
autonomy.”604 
The preamble and introductory articles of the 1973 Constitution include many of the same 
principles and aspirations as constitutions of other democracies around the globe. There is a call 
for the tolerance of diversity, and respect for equality and democracy. In Art.1 the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (previously the North-West Frontier Province) is included as part of the territory 
of the new State, and its inhabitants are recognised as Pakistani citizens. Citizens of the State are 
accorded important fundamental rights, including equal standing before the law, security of 
person (including safeguards against detention and the right to a fair trial), and freedom of 
association, assembly, and speech. Art.2 designates Islam as the State religion, though there is 
frequent mention of an acknowledgement of the equality of religious minorities.  The property 
rights of citizens are affirmed in Art.23 and 24, and the right to education and freedom from 
                                                             
602 As religion was identified as the primary axis of conflict, much of the literature on India has a tendency to divide 
its population along the Muslim/Hindu binary. This has the effect of projecting the subcontinent’s people as, 
otherwise, ethnically and linguistically homogeneous. While several authors have brought this inaccuracy into 
sharper focus by looking at the vast linguistic and ethnic differences amongst the population of Pakistan, they tend 
limit their focus to the particularities of the three major – and indeed the most powerful - ethnic groups: Sindhi, 
Baluchi, and Punjabi. I Talbot, "The Punjabization of Pakistan: Myth or Reality?," in A History of Pakistan and Its 
Origins, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot and Gillian Beaumont (London: Anthem Press, 2002). Also see, Shaheen Sardar Ali and 
Javaid Rehman, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan : Constitutional and Legal Perspectives, Nordic 
Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 84 (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001).  Also see, Feroz Ahmed, 
Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
603 The model of federalism prevailing in Pakistan is slightly different than other federations. While it is more 
common that a federalist political model entails several provincial units coming together to cede a degree of their 
power to one central authority in order to maintain stability within the State, in Pakistan the federalist model is 
somewhat inverted. This means that the central government devolves a degree of its own powers to “subordinate 
provincial units.” See, C Baxter, "Constitution Making: The Development of Federalism in Pakistan," Asian Survey 14, 
no. 12 (1974): p 1075. 
604 Hamza Alavi, "Politics of Ethnicity in India and Pakistan," in Perspectives on Modern South Asia: A Reader in 
Culture, History, and Representation, ed. Kamala Visweswaran (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), p 87. 
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discrimination in public spaces are both recognised. Interestingly, unlike the preceding 
Constitutions of 1956 and 1962, the current Constitution cannot be changed.  Instead, it has 
been stipulated that only amendments can be made to alter the effect of its provisions. For all 
intents and purposes, the Pakistani Constitution appears to be a legal instrument drafted 
according to the traditional liberal mould. Yet, there are certain aspects of the instrument, in 
particular the sections that both implicitly and explicitly concern the tribal areas of the State, 
which require further scrutiny. 
i. Tribal Rights of Autonomy 
Article 247 specifically deals with the tribal Frontier’s right of cultural autonomy, and extends 
this right to both the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).605 The Settled Areas of the Frontier, along with the five 
districts of the PATA, collectively make-up the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK).606 The 
area is administered by a Provincial Governor appointed by the President of Pakistan. The 
FATA, in comparison, is directly administered by the Federal Government, on the direction of 
the President.  
Borrowing extensively from the British Government of India Act (1935) - administered within 
the ‘Excluded Areas’ of Pakistan until the 1956 Constitution came into force - Art. 247 protects 
cultural autonomy by curbing the law-making powers of the legislative and judicial branches of 
the State. First, any Acts passed by the Majalis-e-Shoora (Parliament) are not applicable to the 
PATA and FATA unless authorised by the President (in the FATA) or the Governor of the 
Province (in the case of the PATA). Second Art.247 nullifies the jurisdiction of the Supreme and 
High Courts in relation to disputes originating within the protected areas.  Both the Governor of 
the Province and President are given wide scope for determining and implementing regulations 
for the “peace and good government” of the PATA and FATA.  Last and, perhaps, most 
disconcertingly, Article 247(6) also gives the President the power to abolish the protected 
status of all or any part of the Tribal Areas, which - because Pakhtun identity and juridical 
autonomy has a history of having been linked to the space that they occupy – essentially 
empowers an external authority to deny the distinctiveness of their identity altogether.607 
                                                             
605 I will refer to semi-autonomous regions of the FATA and PATA collectively as ‘Tribal Areas’. 
606 The Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province was formerly called the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Though this 
was changed  
607 Though this provision has the added stipulation that the President must consult with the tribal elite or jirga 
before such a measure is adopted, Pakistan has, in the past removed the tribal status of a protected area without 
consulting the tribesmen. See, Raja Tridiv Roy, The Departed Melody: Memoirs (Islamabad, Pakistan: PPA Publications, 
2003), p 195. Also see, Raja Devasish Roy, "The Ilo Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, 1957 and the 
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The Constitution further demonstrates a temporalisation of social difference, where several 
Articles on Fundamental Rights refer to the State’s duty to assist in the progress and protection 
of the “socially and educationally backward classes.” If we look at the Directive Principles of the 
earlier 1956 Constitution, we can find that this ‘backwardness’ refers to the inhabitants of the 
‘Special Areas’ (partly comprised of spaces that would later make up the ‘Tribal Areas’).608  In 
classifying these communities in an evolutionary manner, the State is essentially affirming its 
own historical continuity, a continuity that stems from the colonial encounter and goes forward 
unceasingly.  It speaks in reference to a direct dichotomy between the progressive and the non-
progressive or ‘backward’, and thus affirms more than a mere recognition of the State’s duty to 
‘help’, it emphasises the rest of the Nation’s superiority in relation to these groups. 
Thus, in many ways, the FATA fulfils Pakistan’s search for the primitive, a society against which 
the newly emergent State is able to construct its own ‘Europeanised’ (or ‘modernised’) identity. 
The FATA serves an important cultural purpose, an imagined geography of regress, which 
works to displace Pakistan’s own experiences with colonialism, and its own self-perceptions of 
alterity. Law undeniably works to further reinforce these characterisations of the FATA, and we 
see this quite clearly in how Pakistan understands its legal culture as firmly rooted within the 
European tradition.609 Thses perceptions operate to preserve the view that it was the Europeans 
that brought law to India, and effectively renders all native forms of normative ordering as alien 
and, essentially, unofficial law. 
B. Liminality and the North-West Frontier 
The Tribal Areas have, throughout both its colonial and postcolonial history, represented a 
liminal space. First, as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and India, the Frontier was politically 
integrated with the subcontinent but never quite made that leap within the colonial 
imagination. In referring to it is a ‘politically neutral zone’, the British minimised the Frontier 
inhabitants’ capacity for political agency.610 As a space ‘unclaimed’ the Frontier was effectively 
erased from the colonial map (see fig. 4.3).  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Laws of Bangladesh: A Comparative Review," in Project to Promote ILO Policy on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and 
ILO Office (Dhaka: Bangladesh, 2009), p 31-2. 
608 Art.3 states: “[t]he state shall endeavour to...promote the educational and economic interests of the backward 
classes and scheduled castes, the people of the special areas.” See, GW Choudhury, "The Constitution of Pakistan," 
Pacific Affairs 29, no. 3 (1956): p 249. 
609 See my discussion on p 34. 
610 A claim that is further bolstered by the fact that the State has prohibited FATA residents from organising political 
parties, effectively ensuring that its interests are represented by Islamist candidates. This further reconstructs the 
area as a space ‘steeped in tradition’ and irresponsive to political and social progress.  
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Now, as a ‘State frontier’ the Tribal Areas demarcate the end of one jurisdiction and political 
authority and the beginning of another.611 While, to some extent, still serving as a transitory 
‘threshold’ space, the Frontier performs a most interesting function as the gatekeeper of the 
nation.612 In this role its own normative richness is minimised. State borders give the 
impression that the power of the political entity located on one side of the border is sharply and 
precisely differentiated from the power of the political entity on the other.  Yet the Tribal 
Frontier operates as a transitory space that is, at once, incorporated into the territory of 
Pakistan, yet an outlier when it comes to imagining the Nation. This was, for example, illustrated 
by the fact that it was only in 1996 that the State extended full adult franchise to FATA 
residents.613   
The Pakhtun people’s liminality is further reinforced by the fixing of the Pakhtun body in space. 
This has been effectively achieved through a number of different strategies. For one, Pakhtun 
opportunities for mobility (social, political, and economic) have been marginalised by the State’s 
designation of only English and Urdu as the lingua franca of Pakistan.614 Other than 
demonstrating a reluctance to include Pakhtun culture and history within the national 
narrative,615 this move has effectively sidelined Pakhtuns from participation in national politics, 
and has restricted their employability and opportunities for education.616 If history is indeed 
intrinsically linked to language and communication,617 then the claim of an undocumented 
precolonial history, coupled with restrictions on communication within the postcolony, suggests 
that the Pakhtun people’s history both began and ended with the colonial encounter. While 
prior to colonisation the Pakhtuns were represented by a sea of shifting Empires (i.e. the 
                                                             
611 The liminality of the Frontier is made violently visible by Shane’s comment that the North-West Frontier of 
Pakistan “is no any map, but it’s where leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban both hide.” See, Scott Shane, "The War in 
Pashtunistan," The New York Times(2009), <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/06/weekinreview/06shane.html?> 
(accessed: 30 December 2013). 
612 In writing about the development of Asian frontiers during the period of decolonisation, Lamb notes that the 
frontier came to represent “a cell wall of the basic unit of national identity,” symbolising a psychological divide just as 
much as a politico-legal boundary. See, A. Lamb, Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1964), p 8. 
613 Ian Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 3rd Edition (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), p 3. 
614 Language can empowering because it not only “describes a pre-existing reality” but actually constitutes it; “it 
organises concepts, establishes relationships and networks, associations and disassociations  The language we use to 
apprehend the world around us is the residue of struggles of previous times; our vocabularies are crystallisations of 
specific historical confrontations and settlements.” See, S. Sayyid, "Dis-Orienting Clusters of Civility," Third World 
Quarterly 32, no. 5 (2011): p 981.  
615 Indeed the English language has been tied to a flourishing of ‘civilised’ culture within India, giving rise to a 
“‘cultivated class’, often at the forefront of sophisticated political philosophies on the subcontinent.” See, Akbar S. 
Ahmed, "Colonial Encounter on the North-West Frontier Province: Myth and Mystification," Economic and Political 
Weekly 14, no. 51 (1979): p 2092. 
616 Tariq Rahman, The Urdu-English Controversy in Pakistan (Cambridge Univ Press, 1997). 
617 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
p 11-3.  Also see, Sayyid’s claims about the reality-constituting function of language, S. Sayyid, "Dis-Orienting Clusters 
of Civility," Third World Quarterly 32, no. 5 (2011): p 981-2. 
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Mughals, the Durranis) decolonisation signalled their (formal) incorporation into the body 
politic of the Pakistani State. In both instances there is no formal recognition of the contribution 
of their separate and distinct history independently of colonial representations. In the 
precolonial and postcolonial settings, Pakhtun identity is made invisible, and treated as an 
extension of identities more stable, more dynamic, more political.  
 
Figure 4.3 – Colonial Map of British-India 
(The Frontier is represented by the ‘unnamed’, yet clearly ‘possessed’ (see the map’s legend), grey and pale yellow 
areas). Retrieved from: 
http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_2ZXSsLYde8U/TJuIxtVzLxI/AAAAAAAADgQ/WqbjEHLz0I0/s1600/british-india-map.jpg 
 
Another way in which the Tribal Areas’ liminality is reinforced is by the fact that many of the 
State-initiated post-partition land reforms and agricultural policies have had the effect of 
widening power disparities between the settled and unsettled regions of the Province. In 
manipulating the Frontier-space through these policies, the State has exposed the Khyber-
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Pakhtunkhwa Province to high rates of internal fragmentation. While the Province was said to 
have progressed more rapidly than any other Pakistani province in the years immediately 
following Partition, many of the large-scale irrigation, industrial, and educational projects were 
restricted to the settled areas of the Province.618  Moreover, by relying on land-distribution 
processes based on European systems of land-ownership, the State dispossessed many plot-
owners of their ancestral lands, and further exacerbated the already existing power-disparities 
between the settled and unsettled areas.619  
By directing our attention to the developmental successes of the entire Province, the State 
effectively obscures the plight of the unsettled Frontier agencies and diverts attention away 
from the fact that decolonisation has changed very little in terms of real political and economic 
opportunities for people living within the unsettled Tribal Areas. Furthermore, this data has the 
effect of presenting socio-economic imbalances as if they were a product of the environmental 
exigencies of the landscapes that these groups occupy. The fact that these groups have been, for 
centuries, contained and located within these ‘inhospitable’ environments as part of an 
expansive colonial strategy of political, social, and economic restructuring, is entirely concealed 
from us.  As a result, the Frontier’s fringe-status is reproduced within the national imaginary of 
the independent postcolonial State. This is achieved through policies which constrain politico-
economic advancement within the Tribal Areas, and then present the lack of educational, 
ecological, technological, industrial, and infrastructural developments as evidence of the group’s 
backwardness and revulsion of modernity.620  
C. Analysing Pakhtun Autonomy: Testing the Limits of Multiculturalism 
While the spatialisation of cultural difference has been a hallmark of Pakistani 
constitutionalism,621 the presumption that cultural autonomy is best exercised through the 
process of compartmentalising normative systems through space is certainly not unique to 
Pakistani politics. In Chapter Three I highlighted a similar linking of space and social difference 
in Australia and Canada as well, and argued that we can trace these ideological and political 
processes for ‘spacing’ difference to the time of Europe’s first encounters with foreign places 
and people. Consistent patterns of asserting power over people and things by controlling space 
                                                             
618 Statistics on education can be found in the Imperial Gazetteer of India. See, Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial 
Series: North-West Frontier Province (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1908), p 74-5.  As Ahmed 
notes, when Pakistan came into being the tribal agencies had only eight schools (primary, secondary, and high) in 
total. See, Akbar S. Ahmed, Resistance & Control in Pakistan (London: Routledge, 1991), p 99. 
619 James Spain, The Pathan Borderlands (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1963), p 213-9.  A new land resettlement system 
in 1947 opened up land ownership in the Tribal Areas to all Pakistani citizens whereas, in the past, the British had 
allowed the Pakhtun land distribution system to remain undisturbed. 
620 Shuja Nawaz, Fata--a Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009). 
621 Given that it is an ethnically-organised federation. 
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(through strategies to manage the anxiety provoked by cultural difference) has made it so that it 
is no longer possible to imagine concepts like political autonomy or independence, without 
simultaneously evoking space or territory. This is how we conventionally imagine the worlding 
of a society’s law, the application of differing ideologies and institutions to peoples contained 
within a particular geographic location. The geographic fixing of political power and legal 
regulation is how societies conventionally imagine jurisdiction - a concept that represents our 
attempt to systematise, what are otherwise, proliferating and intersecting legalities. 
One of the key chief challenges highlighted in Chapter Three and my study of Aboriginal rights 
in Australia and Canada was that claims for Aboriginal title obscured the fact that the major 
demand of Aboriginal groups revolved around the recognition of their coeval histories, 
identities, and social institutions.  Indeed, the last section of that Chapter highlights how an 
acknowledgement of coevalness requires recognition of the mutual and active presence, 
simultaneous coexistence, and reciprocal influence of the normative arrangements of the 
Aboriginal and European peoples. This is precisely what native groups are seeking that the State 
acknowledge and enforce through its law and institutions. 
However, Occidental Legality, and its processes of tethering territory to power, and geography 
to identity, has produced the view that exclusive access to geographic area equates to 
recognition and respect of one’s cultural identity. Despite the Aborigines access to space under 
the Reservation system, it is possible to identify deep asymmetries in political and economic 
power between the dominant and Aboriginal communities. The Reserve-space represents a 
racialised, cultural space that may promote and even, on some level, preserve Aboriginal 
difference, but it does so by requiring Aboriginal peoples to affirm the stationary nature of their 
culture. In defining their identity, and containing their presence, the Aboriginal Reserve hardly 
represents a system of protection that treats Aboriginal peoples as the moral equivalents of 
their European masters. The recognition of Aboriginal rights and title is heavily circumscribed 
by a whole host of ‘official’ regulation and forms of law-making and law-enforcement that are 
entirely alien to the Aboriginal community.   
In comparison, Pakistan’s granting of autonomy to the Pakhtuns living in the Tribal Areas 
appears more consonant with the aims of liberal multiculturalism, and its recognition that 
culture is a crucial component of autonomous decision-making.622 Tribal autonomy in Pakistan 
also sits well with the more radical variants of multiculturalism which claim that the liberal 
State must tolerate the illiberal practices of different cultures if it is to protect a thick conception 
                                                             
622 W Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, USA, 1996). 
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of cultural and legal pluralism.623 In limiting its legal jurisdiction, the State appears to be 
according the Tribal Areas’ a right of juridico-political autonomy, allowing them to live in 
accordance with their customary law and practices without external interference. The Tribal 
Areas of Pakistan, therefore, are legal geographies that appear to be entirely neutralised of 
liberal law. 
Yet, even in the absence of liberal law, the spaces of the Frontier have been racialised in ways 
that suggest a similar immobilisation of Pakhtun identity, body, and culture. For instance, while 
the constitutional provisions allude to a desire for higher unity, they do so while continuously 
drawing steep distinctions between ethnic groups that constitute the polity. Sometimes these 
distinctions take an evolutionary turn, where the modernity of the Nation is confirmed through 
the primitivity of its ‘backward classes’. As my earlier discussion demonstrates the Frontier is, 
in one section of the Constitution, confirmed as part of the political community of the State, 
while in another section, it is clearly defined as separate from and incompatible with the nation-
State. Sometimes these antithetical claims are made almost concurrently.  There are instances 
when the official law has been indignant in its pronouncement of the Tribal Areas’ inclusion 
within the political community of Pakistan, making its inhabitants eligible for the same rights 
and privileges as every other Pakistani citizen.624 In the same breath, however, these 
declarations are bracketed by a lack of interest in implementing legal procedures and political 
policies for an effective enforcement of those rights.625 
The autonomy accorded to the Tribal Areas is a right granted to the ‘space’ rather than its 
people. The policies through which this has been achieved have had the effect of preventing the 
intermixing of Pakhtun culture, institutions, and bodies, with those of the Pakistani Nation. 
Autonomy is granted on the condition that the ‘different’ do not try to influence, shape, effect, or 
relate to the dominant group. Like Canada and Australia, Pakhtun rights of cultural autonomy 
do not follow the Pakhtun body out of the PATA or FATA. Pakhtuns are unable to avail 
themselves of their cultural institutions or the normative structure of the Pakhtunwali outside 
of the Tribal Areas.626  
                                                             
623 Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," in Ethnicity and Group Rights, ed. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New 
York: New York University Press, 1997). 
624 Manzoor Elahi Vs. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1976, S.C. 66, p 73. See the majority opinion of Salahudin Ahmad, J. 
625 Ibid. See the majority opinion of Salahudin Ahmad, J. 
626 While some Pakhtuns argue that Pakhtunwali is a ‘way of life’ rather than a specific legal system, the legal 
legitimacy of tribal jirga and decisions made by this form of dispute settlement are strictly prohibited in non-FATA 
areas of the State. This, for some, has been a cause for rejoice, given that the patriarchal structuring of the tribal jirga 
often means that the marginalisation of women and forms of resolution that have the effect of violating women’s 
human rights. See, for example Mukhtar Mai’s case and the use of jirga to settle matters of tribal honour outside of the 
FATA. See, Mukhtar Mai, In the Name of Honour, trans. Linda Coverdale (New York: Washington Square Press, 2007). 
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Moreover, the Pakhtun body, as I suggested earlier, has been immobilised by the State’s 
unwillingness to incorporate the Pakhtun official language, Pashto, as a national language. This 
oversight is significant given that language rights are increasingly recognised as a precondition 
for the exercise of autonomy and citizenship.627  This unwillingness to accommodate Pakhtun 
culture and to implement more inclusive political and economic policies has severely limited the 
Pashtun people’s opportunities for education and employment outside of the Tribal Areas. 
According to recent literature the residents of the Frontier have the highest levels of illiteracy in 
the country, and lowest levels of economic and population growth.628 Only three percent of 
Pakhtun women in the FATA are literate and only 12-15 percent of men compared to the 
national average of approximately 50 percent.629 Thus, it is hardly surprising that a number of 
studies point to the particularly vulnerable position of Pakhtun women living within the Tribal 
Areas.630 Free movement into and out of the Frontier has also been limited by the State’s failure 
to support development projects within the Frontier-space, including a lack of interest in 
developing proper infrastructure in the form of roadways leading into and out of the Tribal 
Areas.631 
The Pakhtun’s bodily integrity has been further compromised by the laxity with which the State 
has managed the recent American drone attacks within the FATA.  While the Peshawar High 
Courts have condemned these attacks as a violation of international law and Pakistan’s 
                                                             
627 Denise Réaume, "The Group Right to Linguistic Security: Whose Rights, What Duties," in Group Rights, ed. Judith 
Baker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).  Also see, Stephen May, "Uncommon Languages: The Challenges 
and Possibilities of Minority Language Rights," Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 21, no. 5 (2000). 
628 Between 1973 and 1981, the population of the FATA dropped dramatically by -12.6 percent while Punjab, 
Balochistan, and Sindh increased between 25 and 75 percent. Additionally, a 1981 census revealed that no percent of 
FATA residents were urban dwellers given the low levels of urban development in the Tribal Areas (compared with 
approximately 20 percent of Sindh and Punjab). Ian Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 3rd Edition (London: Hurst & 
Co., 2009), p 32.  While many Pakhtuns of the Tribal Areas migrated to Karachi (the most populous of Pakistani 
cities), there are claims which suggest that their migration has been connected with greater drug and crime problems 
in Karachi. In 1986 this culminated in “the bulldozing of the largely Pashtun/Afghan-inhabited north Karachi slum 
area of Sohrab Goth...in search of legal arms and drugs...” See, ———, Pakistan, a Modern History, 3rd Edition (London: 
Hurst & Co., 2009), p 45. 
629 Ahmed Rashid, "The Situation in Pakistan," Asian Affairs 41, no. 3 (2010): p 372.Another draft report in 2003 has 
reported the Provincial average as 30 percent for men, and 17 percent overall (the average for women remains the 
same at 3 percent). See, Shuja Nawaz, "Fata - a Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror 
in the Federally Adminsitered Tribal Areas of Pakistan," Center for Strategic and International Studies(2009), 
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/15/15557_081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf. 
630 Arab Naz et al., "State of Women's Empowerment and Community Perception in Rural Pakistan (a Case Study of 
Malakand Division)," Asian Journal of Empirical Research 3, no. 3 (n.d.). Also see, ———, "The Dormancy of 
Empowerment: An Analytical Study of Various Impediments to Women’s Education in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province 
of Pakistan," Available at SSRN 2082988 (2012). 
631 Imtiaz Sahibzada, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Tribal Areas, Federally Adminstered Tribal Areas (Strenthening 
and Rationalisation of Administration Draft Report 2006, Islamabad p 63-65. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (0.13) and 
FATA (0.17) have almost half as many roads per square km as compared to Pakistan (0.26)  Also see,  Shuja Nawaz, 
"Fata - a Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Adminsitered Tribal 
Areas of Pakistan," Center for Strategic and International Studies(2009), 
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/15/15557_081218_nawaz_fata_web.pdf. Nawaz notes that“[n]ewly constructed 
roads may be laid in directions that accord with particular economic interests, rather than for the public good of 
entire villages, as political agents, surveyors, and contractors are paid off or intimated into compliance.” 
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territorial sovereignty,632 they have sought to do so by further distancing the State from the 
Tribal Areas. Over the course of the High Court’s judgment the residents of the North and South 
Waziristan Agencies of the FATA were referred to as “Pakistani Nations of North and South 
Waziristan.”  While the statement appears to acknowledge cultural heterogeneity, it spatialises 
tribal identity in such a way that the victims of these attacks appear as a distinct social group 
separate from the State and its national body. The court’s racialisation of the Pakhtun body is 
further supported by its claim that the drone attacks were to be considered akin to genocide.  
Directly quoting the Geneva Convention, the Court contended that the drone strikes were “[a]cts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group;”633 In speaking on behalf of the Pakhtun communities of the Tribal Areas the Court was 
confirming their status as citizens, but citizens of a different nature, of a separate kind. An 
emphasis on Pakhtun social difference was ‘front and centre’ in the Court’s judgment of the filed 
petition.  
While the recognition of the Pakhtun community as a Nation may be welcomed by members of 
the group, the State’s construction of the drone attacks as an issue of social genocide absolves 
the State of all accountability for geographically locating and fixing the Pakhtun community 
within that region. The State is, essentially, failing to acknowledge the reality that the Tribal 
Areas fall within their jurisdiction, eschewing the possibility of jurisdictional overlap, normative 
interpenetration. The Courts seem more intent on reiterating the cultural distinctiveness and 
jurisdictional division between the Nation and its tribal people. In so doing the institutions of 
the State displace the plaintiff’s attempts to hold the State responsible for failing to exercise its 
sovereignty over an issue that has dire implications for many of its citizens.  
In the direct aftermaths of the attacks, the Prime Minister’s Office released a statement 
criticising the attacks in the North Waziristan Agency of the FATA, claiming that “such attacks 
will bode very negatively on our joint [Pakistan and US] efforts to eliminate the menace of 
terrorism in this region.”634 The President’s declaration suggests that he perceives himself as an 
ally of the ‘West’, against the fundamentalism and traditionalism of the ‘East’. This, as I discuss 
in Section (4) of this chapter, poses some very interesting challenges for how we rethink the 
                                                             
632 The case was brought by a resident of the North Waziristan against the Pakistani State, demanding that the State 
exercise its sovereign right to prohibit these attacks and to provide some sort of monetary compensation for victims. 
See, Malik Noor Khan Vs. Federation of Pakistan through Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & 5 Others, (W.P. No. 1551-
P/2012)(2013). 
633 Ibid., Section 13(a), p 11-2. 
634 Press Information Department, "Pr No. 172 Press Release: Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani Strongly 
Condemns Drone Attack in Datta Khel,"  2011. 
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Orientalist tropes that have, for quite some time, structured our understanding of culture, 
history, and questions of modernity.  
i. Fragmentary Solutions for Cultural Diversity 
While the exercise of Occidental Legality has produced a situation in which the Pakhtun 
communities of the Tribal Areas may indeed have ‘space’ for the exercise of cultural autonomy 
and the operation of their own normative structures and institutions without State 
encroachment, the above noted issues of economic inequality and political disempowerment 
have been largely obscured by the use of this ‘space as autonomy’ model of colonial (and now 
postcolonial) governance. To claim that respect for cultural diversity rests on the use 
geographic space as a way of containing different cultural and racial groups, appears to 
contradict the very essence of pluralist ideology. An appreciation of diversity seems entirely 
misplaced in a world ordered through the implementation of cultural cleavages and racial 
dichotomies, where different groups are given their ‘own space’ to live and act away from the 
spaces of others.635 In establishing forms of governance by implementing legal geographies 
which impede cultural and racial interpenetration, States are effectively negating the very basis 
for pursuing pluralist policies in the first place. Though this piecemeal arrangement gives the 
impression that societies are “liv[ing] together in harmonious relations and all the people fully 
realise their privileges as citizens of the modern world,”636 these already fragile relations are 
cast into disorder and perpetuate violence at the first sight of hybridity, of intermixing, of ‘black 
and white bodies, touching one another.’ In Chapter Three I discussed how this intermixing is 
managed through, for example, biodiversity discourse and the implementation of ‘protected 
areas’ of national parkland.  Ecological protection policies empty certain spaces of their human 
content so that they can act as a sort of barrier or buffer between the dominant population and 
the racialised Other.  
These perspectives on social pluralism as the presence of a co-existing medley of people - living 
‘side-by-side’ yet separately - has been criticised by a number of contemporary pluralists for 
two key reasons. First, some of these commentators argue that such a view focuses too heavily 
                                                             
635 Which appears consonant with Furnivall’s pioneering study of economic pluralism within the colonial Far East 
observes a society incorporating a “medley of people”, with “different sections of the community living side-by-side, 
but separately within the same political unit.” See, John Sydenham Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A 
Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (CUP Archive, 1948), p xv. Furnivall draws on tropicality 
discourse to marginalise and subordinate the Burmese in comparison to their European colonisers. Thus, one could 
argue, his view of plural society is one underwritten by claims of racial hierarchy and European cultural superiority. 
See, ———, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (CUP Archive, 1948), p 
xv-xvi. 
636 John Sydenham Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (CUP 
Archive, 1948), p xvi. 
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on forms of social difference, rather than focusing on the aims and features that unite members 
of contemporary society.637 Others claim that this fragmentary vision of pluralism produces 
essentialist definitions of race and culture that place very little value on the potential of human 
agency, the possibility of intercommunication and mutual-influence, and also minimises 
intersectional forms of inequality.638 As a result social scientists end up producing fixed and 
unyielding conceptions of culture and cultural identity which then inform law and politics in 
very problematic ways. I discussed some of these in my earlier discussion of Aboriginal title 
jurisprudence in Chapter Three. According to both critiques the aim of pursuing forms of 
cultural protection and the recognition of normative diversity goes beyond mere tolerance or 
accommodation of cultural difference. This has led many theorists to argue in favour of 
dialogical processes for protecting plurality.639 I assess these methods of protecting and 
promoting pluralism in Chapter Five, and discuss their potential for deracialising the Tribal and 
Aboriginal places of confinement within Canada and Australia, along with Pakistan. 
ii. Places of Legal Excess 
Living in a single political unit and under one overarching legal system would certainly limit the 
Pakhtun peoples’ exercise of self-government. However, this does not mean that the Tribal 
Areas, in the way that they have been legally constructed, are entirely neutralised of State 
regulation. For all the claims about the ‘lawlessness’ that prevails within the Tribal Areas,640 the 
Frontier is the most regulated of all the spaces comprising the territory of Pakistan; it is a space 
subject to, not a lack of law, but an overabundance of law.  The work of law, as such, is most 
invisible at the exact location of its greatest omnipresence.  Colonial, customary, State, and 
Islamic Law, formally and informally, intersect within the Frontier-space.  The jirga enforce 
                                                             
637 A charge often levied against multiculturalists. See, Evelyn I Légaré, "Canadian Multiculturalism and Aboriginal 
People: Negotiating a Place in the Nation," Identities Global Studies in Culture and Power 1, no. 4 (1995). 
638  Ali Rattansi, "The Time-Spaces and Subject-Objects of the Raced-Body," in Racialisation: Studies in Theory and 
Practice, ed. Karim Murji and John Solomos (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005). Also see, Paul Gilroy, Against 
Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line (U.S.A: Harvard University Press, 2000). This is also a charge 
levied by postcolonial writers like Bhabha and Spivak, who reject ‘foundational’ narratives (gender, class, capitalism) 
and are more interested in creating dynamic, shifting, and overlapping subjectivities based on localised relationships 
rather than notions of a universalised categories like nation or race. See, Homi Bhabha, "The Other Question...Homi K. 
Bhabha Reconsiders the Stereotype and Colonial Discourse," in Black British Cultural Studies: A Reader, ed. Houston A.  
Baker, Manthia Diawara, and Ruth H. Lindeborg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Also see, Gayatri Spivak, "Can 
the Subaltern Speak?," in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg 
(London: MacMillan, 1988). 
639 In Tully’s case it is a dialogical model of constitutionalism See, J Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an 
Age of Diversity (Cambridge Univ Pr, 1995). For Taylor, it is a recognition of the dialogical process of identity-making. 
See, Charles Taylor, Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Guttman, Susan Wolf, and Michael Walzer (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992). For Madood and Meer it is the pursuit of intercultural dialogue to produce and given voice to 
cultural hybridity. See, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, "How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism," 
Intercultural Studies 33, no. 2 (2011).  
640 Lal Baha, N.W.F.P Administration under British Rule 1901-1919 (Islamabad (Pakistan): National Commission on 
Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p 4.  Also see, Sarfraz Khan, "Special Status of Tribal Areas (Fata): Illegal 
Becoming Licit," Central Asia 63(2008). 
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both the Pakhtunwali and Shariat law, State officials administer the FCR, and the Federal Shariat 
Court supervises the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances.641 In addition, the newly 
amended FCR has now permitted the establishment of a second judicial body, the FATA 
Tribunal, to oversee the judgments of the Political Agent and the Deputy Commissioner. 
Amendments have also been made to allow for a Quami Jirga made up of tribal elders who are 
able to adjudicate over FCR offences. The Superior and High Courts have even overridden 
s.247(7) of the Constitution - which restricts the Courts’ jurisdiction over the Frontier-space – 
hinting at the Court’s future potential to develop law within the Frontier. This interpenetrating 
matrix of normative systems, particularly within the realm of criminal law, has had the effect of 
making over-regulation invisible in its ubiquity. The Pakhtun space becomes lawless not 
because it is unregulated and ungoverned, but because it is exposed to numerous systems in 
parallel so that the work of each is rendered unrecognisable to itself.  
By alleging a scarcity of legal regulation within the tribal regions, the State has been able to 
mask its use of a more stringent set of controls over, and surveillance within, the area. The 
extent of the State’s power, and certainly the extent of the asymmetry of power that 
characterises the Pakhtun-State relationship, is reflected quite prominently within the clause of 
the 1973 Constitution that authorises the President to order that “the whole or any part of a 
Tribal Area...cease to be Tribal Area.”642 If the space that the Pakhtuns occupy is an essential 
component of the unique identity that they possess then, in entitling the President to revoke the 
tribal status of the Frontier, the Constitution appears to empower an external entity the right to 
renege on not only the cultural autonomy of the Frontier Pakhtuns, but to deny their cultural 
identity as a whole.  
iii. Space for Opposition 
While Pakistan incorporates a very different liberal approach to minority protection, one of its 
most problematic effects is that it leaves no room for cultural engagement or the expression of 
opposition. It is certain that, in incorporating the very principles and doctrines that were 
historically used to subjugate and dispossess native populations, State law is engaging in a form 
of cultural domination. Yet, to prohibit the extension of a legal framework to 
peoples/individuals on the basis of its compromised and convoluted history is to largely 
foreclose that group’s opportunity to engage with and, perhaps, transform that framework. 
Undoubtedly, liberal law has a very complicated, and not always equitable and inclusive history. 
                                                             
641 Legal framework established for the adjudication of offences under Islamic Law. Include four offences: those 
against property, the offence of adultery, rape, and fornication (zina), the offence of false accusations of zina, and the 
offence of failing to obey the prohibition on alcohol (hadd). See,   
642 1973, "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan," Section 247(6). 
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Despite this, however, it has provided some opportunity for redress and compensation, and has 
further entrenched forms of minority protection.643  
In Canada and Australia, some Aborigines have found access to the official law and domestic 
courts empowering.644 To the extent that these interactions produce transformations in the law, 
provide forms of monetary and political redress, and work to dismantle pre-existing 
conceptions of Aboriginal cultural inferiority or ‘backwardness’, the opportunity for 
engagement that legal discourse and processes provide cannot be entirely dismissed. This, 
however, is an opportunity that remains largely unavailable to the Pakhtun communities of 
Pakistan living in the Tribal Areas.  
If we are to understand recognition and celebration of diversity as the basis for a more inclusive 
political order, then there needs to be space and opportunity for the expression of diversity in 
the language and voice of the subaltern her-/himself. I agree that liberal law often hems in that 
voice, forcing the subaltern to articulate and express their sense of self using the language and 
actions most intelligible to liberal law and its attendant institutions. However, in a society 
structured by defined boundaries between law and politics, where the official law of the State is 
often hailed as the ‘only law’ and recognised as one of the most legitimate forms of regulation 
and emancipation, there is much to be said about having a voice within this ‘official discourse’. 
Thus, while much of this thesis has been devoted to critiquing this official discourse, pointing to 
the numerous instances in which it collapses subjective experience with objective knowledge, 
and gives rise to forms of cultural domination and differential treatment, an engagement with 
this discourse is, I argue, nonetheless important if only to draw attention to and in some way 
trigger the possibility of transforming, its most oppressive tendencies. I will explore this issue 
further in Chapter Five to suggest that coeval recognition is best achieved from dialogue 
between minority and official discourses.  
                                                             
643 For example, the ability to seek redress and compensation for past wrongs such as the gross misconduct and 
physical and sexual violence that took place in residential school system. See, Shauna Troniak, "Addressing the Legacy 
of Residential Schools," ed. Federal Government of Canada (Ottawa: Library of Parliment Research Publications, 
2011). Also see, National Aboriginal Law and the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Sections of the Canadian Bar 
Association, "The Next Logical Step: Reconciliation Payments for All Indian Residential School Survivors,"(2005), 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/Sections/pdf/residential.pdf> (Date Accessed: 2 January 2014). This has become 
important for the more vulnerable members of minority communities (i.e. women and children). See, Katrina Harry, 
"The Indian Act & Aboriginal Women's Empowerment: What Front Line Workers Need to Know,"(2009), 
<http://www.bwss.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/theindianactaboriginalwomensempowerment.pdf> (Date 
Accessed: 27 December 2013). 
644 For many Delgamuukw presented a victory for Aboriginal groups in terms of the courts reliance on Aboriginal oral 
history for evidence of Aboriginal prior occupation of Crown lands. Some Aboriginal groups perceive the courts’ 
decision in Delgamuukw as a major victory for Aboriginal groups in terms of the State’s recognition of their rights to 
and on their land. See, Satsan (Herb George), "Delgamuukw: Ten Years Later (Celebrating the 
Delgamuukw/Gidsay'wa Decision),"(2007), 
<http://fngovernance.org/news/news_article/delgamuukw_ten_years_later>  (Date Accessed: 26 December 2013).   
The Operation of Occidental Legality in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan Page 215 
  
5. Pakistan and the Dislocation of ‘the Orient’ 
Before moving on to the next chapter, it is worth emphasising that this particular case study 
disrupts the prevailing view that the globe can naturally be divided into two internally-coherent 
and separate hemispheres. Connected to this view is the idea that these two separate 
hemispheres, the East and the West, the Orient and the Occident, embody a specific and timeless 
set of characteristics, values, aims, and ideologies. Cultural domination and oppression has 
almost always been conceptualised as a West/East problem, where the former is often 
understood as the ‘dominating’ and the latter as the ‘oppressed’. How does Pakistan’s exercise 
of cultural domination, in the form of its political and legal structures of governance rattle this 
enduring conception? More importantly, how does the continued prominence of Occidental 
Legality - the spatialising impulse of colonialism integrated into the (now postcolonial) political 
and legal structures of governance – complicate our pre-existing notions of Orientalism and 
Occidentalism? Pakistan’s use of a spatio-legal outlook throws Occidental Legality into disarray 
precisely because Pakistan (as a non-settler State) epitomises that very entity that has inspired 
processes for spatialising power in the first place: the hybrid.  
While the Imperial power has physically retreated from the territory of Pakistan, what is left in 
the wake of this departure are a set of institutions and structures which are linked to the 
geographic space and its people by a brutal and oppressive history.  Pakistan’s legal and 
political structures of governance emerge from a history of racial and ethnic discrimination and 
subordination. The violence with which Partition took place and the fact that political interests 
are still heavily influenced by ethnopolitics,645 points to the fact that these structures continue 
to ‘speak the language’ of the colonisers.  This disorientation of identity, the mixing of the Orient 
and Occident to produce a ‘hybrid’, is a reality that has plagued the State as much as it has the 
Pakhtun community.  
The miscegenation of identities, the production of ways being that are ‘in-between’, is a reality 
that complicates the traditional view of the ‘post’-colonial representing a historical rupture. 
Indeed, the intellectual and discursive processes of colonialism did not cease at the moment of 
decolonisation and emancipation. “Such societies”, as Sökefeld claims, “continue to remain 
under the ‘gravity’...of colonial history.”646 Through both Chapter Three and Four I reveal the 
ways in which Occidental Legality stubbornly and problematically persists in both settings, 
creating cultural difference and racial and legal hierarchies. As the FATA example demonstrates, 
                                                             
645 Whereby ethnicities have been spatialised through the formation of ethnically-homogeneous provincial units. 
646 Martin Sökefeld, "From Colonial to Postcolonial Colonialism: Changing Modes of Domination in the Northern 
Areas of Pakistan," The Journal of Asia Studies 64, no. 4 (2005): p 939. 
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the postcolonial situation is indeed unique, for it points not only to the dislocation of identity, 
but an appropriation of aspects of the colonial mentality by the very groups that were once its 
subjects. Whether these emerge as a product of native empowerment, or a mere ‘mimicry’ of 
European ideology and thus a source of further subjugation, is an area that deserves further 
exploration, beyond the confines of this particular thesis.  
While the history of the Frontier suggests that it was constructed as a means to create distance 
between the colonial Self (British India), and its perceived Other (Russia), the inclusion of the 
Frontier into the State-space of Pakistan has had the effect of compressing the referential 
distance between the new colonial self (Pakistan) and one of its perceived Others (Pakhtuns). As 
the new criteria for membership in the political community is to be domiciled within the State’s 
territory, previously isolated and adversarial social groups now find themselves as ‘part of the 
same side’. At once a traditional and archaic zone of cultural and legal autonomy, as well as a 
constituting territorial unit of the modern nation-State, the Frontier is both primitive and 
modern. It is in society’s inability to come to terms with this difficulty in ‘locating’ the Frontier – 
what Perrin refers to as the “splitting and doubling that the nation exhibits”647 - that we can 
identify an anxiety which dislocates the Pakhtun in its aim to “place” the tribal space. 
The State appears to continuously define its own modernity against the immodernity of the 
tribal space, by simultaneously eschewing forms of tribal law (i.e. the FCR) as incompatible with 
modern liberal principles, yet failing to officially invalidate it.648 This suggests two things.  First, 
by using liberal law’s principles to vitiate forms of tribal regulation, the Court appears to be 
recognising the nation’s transition from its primitive colonial past to a modern liberal present. 
Yet, by failing to revoke the application of the contravening law they are simultaneously 
acknowledging the Tribal Areas’ temporal immobility. In so doing they give the impression that 
the FCR, as a barbaric primitive instrument, is well-suited to the barbaric primitive ways of the 
Frontier.  Though the legal validity of the FCR is denied, this sort of blind compliance with the 
Constitution suggests that it is ‘colonial law’, and not its advocates, that are doing the 
controlling.  
This ‘legal nonsense’, by which I mean its contradictory claims, may in fact, symbolise the law’s 
“recognition of an anxious contradictory place between the human and non-human, between 
                                                             
647 Colin Perrin, "Approaching Anxiety: The Insistence of the Postcolonial in the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People," Law and Critique 6, no. 1 (1995): p 57. 
648 See,  Manzoor Elahi Vs. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1976, S.C. 66.  where the court disavowed the FCR as ‘law’ 
under the rule of law principles espoused in Art.4 and Art.9 of the Constitution, while, at the same time, upheld its 
application under the existing-law principles of Art. 26. Where the courts. Article 268 calls for the application of 
colonial law until appropriate amendments are made by the legislature. 
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sense and nonsense.” 649 This, Bhabha notes, is the ‘enunciatory disorder of the colonial present’, 
where a once clearly-defined Orient begins to speak the language of the Occident.   
Once, itself the object of difference, Pakistan may thus be experiencing a dual anxiety – one of 
constructing some sort of cultural difference (of the Pakhtun versus other Pakistanis) against 
which to define itself as an extension of European modernity,650 at the same time as 
experiencing an anxiety in using the language of Empire (in the form of liberal law) to give voice 
to that difference. In the process of doing so, the emergent Nation itself recognises its hybridity, 
“a colonial otherness which can neither be established nor disestablished.”651 The colonial 
present therefore, represents “the persistence of a present which, by rights, ought to have 
passed...an insistence of the past in the present,”652 a place of uncertainty between the self and 
the Other, of broken and reconfigured identities, of identities in-between.  Accordingly, as Perrin 
notes, in the “failure of distance and in the anxiety of proximity, coherence and consistency are 
undermined rather than underlined.”653 
The case study of Pakistan as a postcolonial independent nation-State, suggests an unsettling of 
the Orient/Occident divide. It highlights not only the tenuousness of this dichotomy, but draws 
attention to the presence of ambivalence. This case study reveals to us the power of Occidental 
Legality as a hegemonic discourse that is readily acceptable and adaptable to societies 
regardless of their cultural, normative, or historical particularities or even their status as an 
independent national State that has freed itself from colonial rule and its ordering of space. The 
coalescence of law and geography, the production of the spatio-legal, has become thoroughly 
cemented within the social imaginary. So much so that contemporary societies cannot fathom 
questions about legal jurisdiction, sovereignty, autonomy, and governance without 
simultaneously invoking and explaining those concepts by reference to geographies that display 
the features of being owned, enclosed, and culturally-divisible. Territory has become the 
preeminent form by which contemporary societies order and regulate social relations between 
themselves and their perceived Others.  
                                                             
649 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), p 178. 
650 We find evidence of this in a variety of cases that draw on European philosophies within which to ground 
contemporary Pakistani judgments. See, T. K. K. Iyer, "Constitutional Law in Pakistan: Kelsen in the Courts," The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 21, no. 4 (1973). 
651 Colin Perrin, "Approaching Anxiety: The Insistence of the Postcolonial in the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People," Law and Critique 6, no. 1 (1995): p 56. 
652 Ibid. 
653 Ibid. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I draw on the case study of Pakistan for two reasons. First, it is to provide a clear 
example of the reciprocal relationship between space and identity. The Tribal Areas have been 
interpreted in a particular way so as to meet the purposes of Pakhtun identity-construction. The 
landscape and geography of this area naturalised the external development of a bestial and 
heady Pakhtun identity.  I examine the legal and political history of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan 
from the time of colonial India to the present-day Pakistani State, and suggest that the cultural 
identity of the Pakhtun has been shaped through the challenging and turbulent landscape of the 
space that they occupy. Suggesting that this fusion between identity and topography has been 
incorporated into the current model of legal and political governance, I show how space 
continues to play a leading role in the marginalisation of Pakhtun identity and distancing of the 
tribal body from the rest of the Nation.  
The second reason this case study was used, was to study a form of liberal autonomy that 
appears to ‘go further’ than the rights of self-government that have been accorded to the 
Canadian and Australian Aborigines by their respective governments. Yet, in studying the 
situation in Pakistan, it is clearly evident that the State’s protection of Pakhtun autonomy, as it 
was granted by the colonial governments in India, has failed to translate into the genuine 
economic and political empowerment of Pakistan’s tribal community. The postcolonial situation 
in Pakistan, including the way in which State-tribal relations are structured, can be read as an 
extension of colonial governance. In both instances the governing entity’s relationship with the 
tribal community is one based on paternalism and ordered through a focus on law and order, 
rather than a protection of rights and an acknowledgement of the tribal peoples as political 
equals. The FATA’s liminality has been cemented within postcolonial law by the fact that 
intercommunication between the normative system of the tribal peoples and the State has been 
entirely foreclosed by the State’s failure to extend its institutions into the FATA and to make 
available its protections to the people residing there. The Pakhtun community of the Tribal 
Areas have been socially marginalised and remain politically and economically underdeveloped. 
This raises many questions about the State’s intention to use territorial autonomy as a form of 
minority protection as it relates to the Tribal Areas.  
It is largely believed that in according the FATA territorial autonomy the State has permitted 
them the right to live in accordance with their normative systems and structures, free from 
State intervention. However, I examine how, through an engineering of the Frontier as a “hostile 
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landscape”654, a lawless place, Pakistan has continued the colonial legacy of endorsing a heavily 
circumscribed form of tribal autonomy all the while subjecting the Frontier-space to legal 
excess.  It is clear that the Tribal Areas are not a place lacking law but a place experiencing an 
overabundance of legal regulation, where several coexisting systems of normative ordering are 
involved in the co-management of everyday-life.  As a place of legal excess often understood as 
‘lawless’, the Tribal Areas possess a fractured identity. This fracture is mirrored by the State, 
and expressed through the law in the form of ‘legal nonsense’ which erupts when the courts aim 
to affirm the State’s moral existence as a ‘modern’ entity. This framing of the State, however, is 
challenged by the presence of subaltern groups and colonial processes that bring the State face-
to-face with its own alterity.  
The processes of Occidental Legality, expressed through the spatialisation of social difference, 
divert our attention away from the issues that lie at the heart of minority demands for cultural 
autonomy. Contemporary claims for territorial autonomy by minority communities follow a 
long historical process, and ground themselves in and through frameworks of knowledge, that 
confirm that space and particularly ownership over space (i.e. territory and property relations), 
equates to power and, more importantly, equates to a recognition of a community’s humanity. It 
is this connection between spatial ownership and a confirmation of one’s humanity that should 
be the primary focus of legal critique when managing issues of cultural pluralism. Yet, in 
Chapters Three and Four, I demonstrate how contemporary legal discourse evades this issue, 
instead opting to confirm this problematic relationship through a focus on territorialising 
cultural (and legal) autonomy.  
Despite this, however, I suggest that liberal law has an equal potential to be both emancipatory 
and regulatory in this respect. While much of this thesis has focused on its regulatory aspects, 
with significant modification, including a focus on the idea of coeval recognition, the 
emancipatory potential of liberal law can be maximised. I also make the claim that this space for 
dialogue and the potential to express opposition and resistance is largely foreclosed in the 
Pakistani example because of the State’s unwillingness to extend the liberal law and its 
attendant institutions of negotiation and dialogue (i.e. its Constitution and courts). In grounding 
autonomy in territory, liberal law suggests that an exclusive access to land is an end in itself, 
rather than a means to an end; the end, in this sense being, an appeal for dominant elites to 
recognise the equal moral worth of historically marginalised groups. I develop this conceptual 
framework further in Chapter Five, where I consider the opening up of liberal institutions and 
                                                             
654 A space whose “encompassing scale of [rebellion] appears to thwart attempts to manage [it] securely.” See, 
Michael Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 
p 18. 
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law to better represent subaltern voices and diverse historical and cultural perspectives 
through the notion of coeval recognition.   
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Chapter Five 
Coeval Recognition of Plurality 
Operationalising the Emancipatory Potential of Liberal Law  
1. Introduction 
Through the analysis undertaken over the course of the last four chapters, I have revealed how 
territory is a cultural artefact, produced through European signs, symbols, and narratives, and 
reproduced through the common law implemented in Britain’s overseas colonies. In Chapter 
Two I critically analyse how the first images of territory as an owned, bounded, and culturally 
divisible view of space was produced through the technologies of cartography, ethnography, 
and travel writing. I explain how social difference was envisioned through the discourses of 
tropicality and the pristine wilderness, and how both served to legitimate the colonial 
encounter and the subsequent dispossession and oppression of native peoples. In Chapter 
Three I expose how these views were further reproduced through legal enactments within 
colonial India, Australia and Canada.  In particular I expose how the bounded, owned, and 
culturally-divisible conceptualisation of space that emerged during the first Imperial-
Indigenous encounters was encoded through legal doctrines like terra nullius, the doctrine of 
discovery, and Vitoria’s notion of jus gentium and the right of sojourn.  
Drawing a comparison between the territorial conception of space that emerged during the 
colonial period, and the cultural geographies that are produced in contemporary liberal 
societies that have the aim of protecting the cultural autonomy of minorities, I argue that both 
are representations of jurisdictional struggles between distinct normative communities.  I 
further evaluate how these conceptions of space conflict with subaltern perspectives, namely 
Aboriginal peoples’ understanding of land and geography. Through this comparison I reveal 
how land and geography have been employed to not only naturalise native dispossession, but 
also help to conceal what lies at the core of native quests for autonomy. The central issue that is 
at stake in these struggles is not merely the retransfer of and/or jurisdiction over territory, but 
how the State’s “culturally exclusive vision of geography” has denied indigenous “knowledge 
and experience...[from] contribut[ing] to the formulation of institutions and ideas to better live 
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with our environment.”655 Demands for autonomy are, according to Aboriginal peoples, 
synonymous with demands for recognition of their status as sovereign, self-governing nations. 
In the analysis that I undertook in Section (5) of Chapter Three, I demonstrated that the political 
aspirations of Aboriginal peoples cannot merely be equated with greater property rights over 
their ancestral land. Certainly that is part of the solution, but a precondition of that is that the 
State recognises them as coeval partners, as morally equivalent nations. Instead, what appears 
to be happening within liberal societies with Aboriginal national minorities, like Australia and 
Canada, is that legal recognition of Aboriginal rights of autonomy and self-determination are 
offered up on the terms of Occidental Legality. Spatial possession, environmental development, 
appropriate land-usage, permanent settlement, land as property, biodiversity protection – the 
vernacular of ‘territory’ – space as bounded, possessed, and culturally divisible - has become the 
primary analytic through which the political rights of Aboriginal peoples are validated or 
denied.  The intense focus on territory minimises the fact that Aboriginal peoples’ claims are not 
about their prior occupation of land and the legal rights that flow from that, but about 
acknowledging the fact that before the arrival of Europeans, the Aboriginal peoples possessed, 
unique and complete political and legal institutions, doctrines, and forms of organisation. In 
essence, what they are challenging is the very idea that the Imperial-Indigenous encounter 
brought with it forms of organisation and systems of ordering to indigenous groups. For States 
like Canada and Australia it is this claim to civilisation that primarily legitimises their legal and 
political authority over the Aboriginal peoples. To suggest, as Borrows and Chartrand have, that 
these communities possessed highly advanced, comprehensive, and dynamic legal and political 
systems prior to contact, therefore, is to challenge the basis upon which their political 
subjugation and legal control has been legitimised for centuries. 
I use these ideas in another context in Chapter Four, where I analyse the colonial construction of 
the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and the colonial formulation of Pakhtun identity through references 
to their natural environment. I demonstrate how these images of the Pakhtun tribesmen were 
further encoded through legal instruments like the Frontier Crimes Regulation, and how they 
continue to have significance for the people of the Tribal Areas today. I use the case study of 
Pakistan to argue that the aim of liberal law should not be the creation of cultural geographies 
distinguished by the replacement of State law with native custom. Instead, liberal societies 
should opt to focus on adopting strategies of co-operation and co-regulation. From my analysis 
in Chapters Three and Four it is clear that geography and the environment have played an 
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important role in not only setting jurisdictional boundaries as they pertain to legal authority, 
but have also advanced the limits of political subjectivity – differentiating between who we 
consider human (and thus the subjects of modern legal jurisdiction) and inhuman (the subjects 
of ‘tribal’ or ‘cultural’ jurisdiction).     
Demands for cultural autonomy in liberal States like Canada and Australia have been managed 
through the concept of legal recognition. As it stands, the relationship between territory and the 
recognition of native peoples’ rights has been wrongly conceived. Currently, it is believed that 
Aboriginal peoples’ demands for access to and jurisdiction over territory are appropriately 
managed through the idea of legal recognition. Recognition is perceived as the approach 
through which political rights are sought. In this Chapter I argue that the relationship is actually 
the inverse. Demands for recognition need to be seen as struggles in their own right – not for 
land, nor territory, nor special political rights, nor an affirmation of political and legal difference. 
Struggles for recognition are, partly, an acknowledgement of the fact that the language, 
institutions, ideologies, and doctrines of the dominant political and legal systems are not only 
ill-equipped, but do not have the requisite authority to shape the everyday lived realities of 
those seeking recognition. This is an idea that James Tully has touched on quite extensively in 
his book Strange Multiplicity. But, apart from this, contemporary struggles for recognition, 
particularly as they involve colonised peoples, are also demands for the recognition of hybridity, 
of miscegenation, of identities in-between. They are demands that the State recognise the 
intermixing between cultures. They represent calls for an awareness of the absolute 
impossibility of maintaining some sort of ‘cultural purity’ or distinctness, upon which much of 
the litigation related to legal recognition of Aboriginal rights relies. The ‘stamp’ of Aboriginality 
upon liberal law has been discussed in length by Borrows’ in Recovering Canada, when he 
considers the many ways in which the Aboriginal-colonial relationship was characterised by 
mutuality, diversity, and a reciprocal respect for the sovereign and equal status of one 
another.656 From a slightly different perspective, liberal law’s incorporation of Aboriginal 
perspectives has also been hinted at by Chartrand and Monture-Angus, both of whom express 
anxiety over their fractured identities as Aboriginal legal practitioners and their involvement in 
upholding a legal tradition that has, historically, worked to subjugate their people. For Monture-
Angus, as I explained in Chapter Three, this unease has produced a need to retreat into the 
Aboriginal Reserve as a way of reconnecting with her cultural identity.657  Their situation brings 
to the forefront one of the most unfortunate consequences of the Imperial-Indigenous 
encounter, which is the inability, even today, for once-colonised peoples to reconcile their 
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cultural and citizenship identities. The problem, as I argue throughout this thesis, is that the 
Imperial-Indigenous encounters were defined by polarised identities and strict cultural 
dichotomies – settler/native, primitive/civilised, brutal/peaceful, European/native. The effects 
of this oppositional discourse continue to have tremendous implications for colonised peoples 
even today. 
In this Chapter I put forth the theory of coeval recognition as an alternative theory of 
recognition that addresses some of the more significant weaknesses of the prevailing models of 
mutual and legal recognition. My theory of coeval recognition draws on the work of Charles 
Taylor and James Tully, but makes a crucial modification by suggesting that recognition, as it 
relates to colonised peoples, must be sensitive and open to respecting and acknowledging 
hybrid identities. Recognition cannot simply be thought of as a reciprocal acknowledgement of 
cultural difference, distinctness, and the presence of unique forms of political and legal 
organisation. It must be understood as a reciprocal affirmation of active coexistence, normative 
interpenetration, and legal and political intermixing.  
To be clear, I do believe that liberal law does have the potential to support forms of coeval 
recognition, and can reasonably do so without recognising cultural difference and segregating 
different normative communities to separate and divided spaces.  Certainly Chartrand’s and 
Borrows’ work, as discussed in Chapter Three, points to the fact that liberal law is sourced from 
diverse perspectives already, though it often does not seem to acknowledge this. Tully’s work 
on pluralistic constitutionalism, which I discuss later in this Chapter, also expresses optimism in 
relation to liberal law’s potential for incorporating a range of voices and worldviews. In each of 
these instances, from the perspectives of both those working within the dominant liberal 
tradition and those that appear to straddle the State-/Indigenous-law divide, liberal law is 
perceived as having an emancipatory potential. The aim, therefore, is to reveal how its capacity 
for emancipation may be better realised by traditionally marginalised groups. 
2. The Emancipatory and Regulatory Function of Law 
In jurisdictions like Canada, Australia, and Pakistan the official law of the State tells us that it 
gives voice to and protects pre-colonial forms of social and cultural difference, and does so 
through the recognition that socially-different communities have separate, and often conflicting, 
normative structures and behaviours that cannot reasonably be expected to ‘co-operate’ with 
the dominant structures of the State. This reality, the law often claims, requires the demarcation 
of separate spatial domains for the operation of distinct forms of legal normativity (i.e. the 
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Reservation, the Tribal Area, the private sphere). These discussions appear to be alluding to the 
emancipatory function of law.  
However, the belief that these separate spatial domains remain normatively unconnected and 
legally and politically distinct is inaccurate. In Chapter Three and Four I discuss how the 
Aboriginal Reservation and the Tribal Areas, though they are constructed as separate cultural 
enclaves and legally distinct regions are not entirely ‘neutralised’ of State law, but actually 
represent spaces of legal excess, in which a number of different normative structures, 
institutions, and ideologies shape the day-to-day-social relations of life ‘on the ground’. 
Moreover, I have also argued that colonial (and later postcolonial) law does not merely 
recognise pre-existing difference, but is actually intimately implicated in creating, reproducing, 
and circulating perceptions and imaginations of difference. This reading of law suggests that in 
these contexts, law has a regulatory function as well. I distinguished between the 
emancipatory/regulatory reading of liberal law in my earlier discussion and suggested that it 
has been stretched between the opposing aims of modern governance, that of regulation (i.e. its 
preoccupation with categorising, classifying, and containing difference), whilst also pursuing 
the more emancipatory goal of recognising and safeguarding plurality. For example, liberal law 
has had an emancipatory function for settler and mainstream societies, who have used it as a 
vehicle for defining and containing Aboriginality by producing legal geographies (patterned on 
their subjective experiences of foreign space and people) in order to immobilise and contain 
native communities. This emancipatory use of liberal law, in turn, has had a regulatory effect on 
immobilising the native body and compelling native communities to remain segregated in 
racialised ‘designated’ spaces of native presence (i.e. the Reservation).658  
As a source of regulation and a discourse of emancipation liberal law aims to preserve stability 
within contemporary societies through the use of rules that make individual actions predictable. 
At the same time, it is an enabling discourse, used by individuals and groups to exercise 
resistance, appeal for greater political inclusion, and demand economic, social, and political 
transformation. Thus, law does not only have an emancipatory and regulatory function, but also 
exists as a site of social conflict, where the emancipatory struggles of some are set against the 
regulatory designs of others. 
Santos develops this idea further and suggests that a mutually constitutive relationship exists 
between law and social conflict. This means that, while law may often be the source of social 
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Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition (London, UK: Reed 
Elsevier, 2002), p 1-3, 439-45. 
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discontent, it is itself also produced and reproduced through the exercises of power and 
counter-power that inform these episodes of social conflict and political dissatisfaction. This is 
demonstrated by reference to a myriad of political and legal transformations that have taken 
place in Canada, for example, through native acts of resistance materialised through their 
challenging of the dominant legal discourse. Legal recognition of Aboriginal pre-contact 
occupation of Canadian territory, through the granting of native title, is one such example of 
how emancipatory challenges have produced changes in the law.   
However, the counter-claim is that, while these acts of native opposition may represent some 
very important political victories for Canada’s Aboriginal community, they do not necessarily 
trigger radical changes to the source and legitimacy of liberal law. In fact, it could be argued that 
Canadian Aboriginal title jurisprudence does little else but reconfirm the sovereignty of the 
State and the inviolable authority and legitimacy of colonial law as the law par excellence.659 I 
illustrated this in my discussion in Section Five of Chapter Three when I considered how 
Aboriginal demands for recognition of their sovereignty are usually misinterpreted as claims for 
land tenure, or property rights in land.660 According to this view, then, the regulatory and 
emancipatory challenges which both inform law and are shaped by law, are unceasing struggles.  
Santos confirms this in his claim that once emancipatory struggles achieve their intended aim, 
they then become the regulatory designs against which new emancipatory challenges are 
launched.661 He states that: 
[t]he success of emancipatory struggles is measured by their capacity to constitute a new 
political relationship between experiences and expectations, a relationship capable of 
stabilising the expectations on a new and more demanding and inclusive level. Put 
differently, the success of emancipatory struggles resides in their capacity to transform 
themselves into a new form of regulation, whereby good order becomes order. It is however, 
typical of the paradigm of modernity that such success should always be fleeting: once the 
new form of regulation becomes stable, new aspirations and oppositional practices will try 
to destabilise it on behalf of more demanding and inclusive practices...The tension between 
regulation and emancipation is therefore unsolvable.662 
Liberal law, therefore, can operate as a vehicle of emancipation so long as it increases the 
discrepancy between past experience and future expectations by “calling into question the 
                                                             
659 In that it does not recognise this right of title as a ‘proprietary’ right that strips Canada of its territorial claim and 
thereby complicates its claims of sovereign political authority. Motha makes this claim in relation to Aboriginal title 
jurisprudence in Australia as well. See, Stewart Motha, "The Sovereign Event in a Nation's Law," Law and Critique 13, 
no. 3 (2002). 
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status quo,” including the prevailing institutions, ideologies, and practices which inform the 
dominant legal discourse. Thus, if we understand liberal law as including the aim of developing 
norm-setting social institutions that regulate an individual’s understanding of themselves and 
their expectations of others, then the emancipatory function of law is maximised when it 
disputes and disrupts the prevailing identities and assumptions that people have about others 
around them. 
A discussion of the emancipatory and regulatory potential of law becomes important for our 
analysis precisely because the processes of Occidental Legality have produced territory as a 
regulatory design which has, throughout history, reduced the emancipatory potential of law for 
native communities. One fundamental way in which this was achieved was by constructing 
racialised or culturally-homogeneous spaces of native presence that robbed the native subject 
of its agency. In ‘spacing’ native difference (i.e. placing the native subject to a disconnected 
spatial and temporal domain which is presented as neutral and beyond political 
contestation),663 contemporary societies divest these communities of a coeval space for 
opposition. Thus, we are given the impression that the language of the dominant legal discourse 
is incompatible and unable to address native claims for emancipation because the former 
speaks from a space of ‘modernity’ (linked broadly to secularism, liberalism, and notions of 
individual rights vested in the possession of property), while the latter is understood as 
speaking from the space of ‘pre-modernity’ (linked to religion and traditionalism, a focus on 
communal identities, and notions of land held in common). Consequently, in these instances, 
law and space are mobilised as antithetical discourses of cultural difference. When law has been 
activated as a mechanism of emancipation, spatial designs often works to temper these 
challenges, and vice versa. For example, in Chapter Three, I discuss how the Aboriginal women 
of Yankunytjatjara, Antikarinya, and Kokatha regions of Australia664 used their connection to the 
Earth to express resistance to politico-legal decisions to label their space ‘desert-lands’ fit for 
atomic-weapons testing. Two very different classifications of the same space – as ‘desert-lands’ 
versus ‘mother Earth’ – helped to mobilise the antithetical discourses of regulation and 
emancipation. Conversely I also discussed how the Reservation, as a demarcated and racialised 
production of space, worked to depoliticise Aboriginal claims for self-government.665  In this 
instance, the racial and cultural categorisation of the Reserve-space had the effect of moderating 
Aboriginal claims for autonomy.   
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Within the colonial setting, as I argue through my analysis in Chapter Three of biodiversity 
discourse and the legal production of ‘protected areas’, and my discussion of the settled/non-
settled areas of Pakistan in Chapter Four, the operation of law was crucial for maintaining 
distance between settled and unsettled areas of the colonial space666 and to prevent any 
‘misunderstanding’ about the native’s possession of an equivalent moral status to that of the 
European settler.667 The law-space nexus, therefore, reveals law as a relationship of power that 
historically materialised as a struggle to put distance between native and settler communities 
and to prevent racial intermixing. From this we are given the impression that the regulatory 
function of law can be disrupted through a questioning of the legal geographies that are 
produced through law’s focus on maintaining native-State or native-settler distance.  
The intense focus on defining, othering, and immobilising the native body has, according to 
theorists like Bhandar, fundamentally reduced contemporary prospects for recognising the 
native as the political and moral equivalent of the settler. Bhandar’s work challenges the 
common assumption that legal recognition can be sufficient to secure emancipation for the 
native communities of once-colonised lands. More specifically, her analysis allows us to 
understand that there are potential impediments to native quests for legal recognition that need 
to be addressed if liberal law is to be mobilised as a vehicle for the emancipatory struggles of 
those that it has historically marginalised. I analyse Bhandar’s notion of plasticity and the native 
body in the section on mutual recognition below. 
3. ‘Recognising’ the Native and Producing the ‘Subaltern’ 
In this section of the Chapter I critically analyse some of the more significant literature on the 
topic of recognition and identity-formation. I draw on the work of Charles Taylor, Brenna 
Bhandar, and James Tully to assess competing views of the conceptual framework of 
recognition. Over the course of this discussion I highlight points of convergence and assess 
areas of disagreement. I build on this work to explain the current trajectory of legal recognition 
in multicultural societies and, later, to advance my own theory of coeval recognition, which 
addresses some of the oversights in the existing literature and therefore represents an 
important contribution to the existing literature on recognition and minority protection. 
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A. Theorising ‘Recognition’ 
One of the enduring contributions of Hegel to contemporary social and political philosophy has 
been his concept of ‘recognition’. Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser have described the concept of 
recognition as “proving central to efforts to conceptualise today’s struggles over identity and 
difference.”668  Fraser suggests that the concept of recognition underlies the formation of a 
“difference-friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is no 
longer the price of equal respect.”669 For them, political or legal recognition represents an 
affirmation of differently constituted identities and the equal moral worth of diverse 
worldviews.    
Similarly, Taylor also perceives recognition as an integral component of social relations, de-
describing it as a “vital human need.”670 However, his understanding of recognition is more 
prescriptive, in that he believes that recognition is constitutive of our sense of self. He claims 
that our identity is “partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by misrecognition of 
others...[we are] always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our 
significant others want to see in us.”671  Taylor insists that threats to one’s self-identity not only 
emerge from a failure to recognise, but more importantly, from wrongful recognition or 
misrecognition; projecting an image of the Other that is “somehow inferior, ‘uncivilised’.”672 
Through forces of domination, he claims, these images are imposed on the Other himself, 
shaping his own self-identity. Based on this, he argues, that our sense of self, therefore, “can 
suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people around [us] mirror back to [us] a confining, or 
demeaning, or contemptible picture of [ourselves].”673  According to Taylor, recognition 
becomes constitutive of subjectivity (the inter-subjective nature of identity-formation). To 
prevent the harm that may be produced through potential misrecognition, Taylor advances the 
idea of a dialogical process of recognition, based on “self-discovery” and “self-
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affirmation...undefined by a social script.” To be just, he believes, recognition must be mutual 
and equal, and the only way to ensure mutuality is by allowing the Other to speak for himself.674  
Bhandar’s work builds on Taylor’s and presents an important critique against forms of minority 
protection grounded in the recognition of cultural difference. She relies on an understanding of 
recognition advanced by Fanon in Black Skins White Masks. Disputing Hegel’s application of 
mutual recognition to the colonial setting, Fanon argues that within the context of colonial 
domination, the terms of recognition are set by the colonising forces and often internalised by 
colonised peoples.675 In the end, recognition does little more than affirm the political authority 
and legitimacy of the colonising State. Likewise, Bhandar also argues that contemporary forms 
of cultural recognition misrecognise Aboriginal identities precisely because it compels these 
communities to reinterpret their sense of self using Euro-Western ideologies, principles, and 
traditions’. This was perhaps best illustrated in Chapter Three over the course of my discussion 
on Aboriginal rights and title litigation and how communities seeking recognition of their status 
as equal and sovereign nations must reinterpret their relationship to the land in ways that are 
incommensurable with their own worldviews.676   
In Strange Multiplicity Tully advances a similar thesis. In this book he proposes a scheme for the 
application of mutual recognition in multicultural societies. For him, all struggles for recognition 
under liberal law – which he describes as “jointly compris[ing] the ‘politics of recognition’ – are 
underwritten by peoples’ simple “longing for self-rule.”677 He argues that this desire to govern 
oneself according to one’s own conception of the good is perpetuated by the belief that the basic 
laws and institutions of the State are unjust and “thwart the forms of self-government 
appropriate to the recognition of cultural diversity.”678  In Tully’s view, contemporary 
governments can satisfy minority aspirations for self-rule not by being ‘difference-blind’ - trying 
to “transcend the cultural dimension of politics” - but by recognising and incorporating 
numerous cultural perspectives through joint constitutional discussion.679  
The significant difference between Tully’s thesis and the arguments advanced by both Taylor 
and Bhandar is that Tully perceives struggles for recognition as one dimension of political 
struggles and not struggles in their own right, and states as much in his article Struggles over 
                                                             
674 ———, "The Politics of Recognition," in New Contexts of Canadian Criticism, ed. Ajay Heble, Donna Palmateer 
Pennee, and J.R. Struthers (New York: Broadview, 1997), p 104. 
675 F. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (Pluto Press, 1986). 
676 See Section Five, of Chapter Four beginning at p 214. 
677 J Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge Univ Pr, 1995), p 4. 
678 Ibid., p 5. 
679 Ibid., p 6. 
Coeval Recognition of Plurality Page 231 
  
Recognition and Distribution.680  For him, recognition is perceived as a necessary condition for 
exercising forms of self-rule within the political arena. Conversely, Fanon, Taylor and Bhandar 
perceive recognition more intimately, as an integral component of identity-formation. We know 
who we are when our sense-of-self is validated through recognition by others. Therefore, from 
their perspective the right of self-rule does not suddenly become legitimate when it is legally 
recognised by governments. The right of self-rule for colonised peoples is perceived as flowing 
from their status as morally-equivalent political and legal communities and the dignity of their 
status as persons, not based on their ‘difference’, or by their capacity to conform to the Euro-
Western model of the ‘rational political subject’. Struggles for recognition, as such, are not 
instrumental, but perceived as struggles in their own right.   
i. Legal Recognition 
Within the context of Aboriginal claims for self-rule, legal recognition typically involves 
acceptance of indigenous peoples’ history of colonial dispossession, and legal support for their 
claims for cultural autonomy based on their assertion of a separate and unique cultural 
identity.681 Recognition has become an important conceptual framework through which 
struggles for political rights and cultural autonomy have been mediated. As Markell asserts, 
under multiculturalism, the politics of recognition differs from the Hegel’s master/slave 
dialectic in that the State plays a primary role in moderating claims for recognition. Markell 
states, “in Hegel’s parable the politics of recognition is played out face to face. In the 
contemporary political world, by contrast, struggles over recognition are paradigmatically 
struggles over the shape and behaviour of encompassing political institutions.”682   
In jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia, Aboriginal rights to self-rule offered on the basis 
of legal recognition often rely on validating the group’s pre-contact occupation of and ties to 
portions of Canadian territory. As I argued in Chapter Three, this has had the effect of reducing 
their demands for recognition to the components of land and property relations, essentially 
denying Aboriginal peoples’ appeal that the State acknowledge the political and legal parity of 
Aboriginal normative structures. In many cases this has meant that legal recognition and the 
accommodation of Aboriginal cultural practices have been granted without questioning the 
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legitimacy of the Crown’s own claims to sovereignty,683 and often at the expense of genuinely 
affirming Aboriginal peoples’ inherent right to self-determination. 
The politics of recognition, as they are currently expressed in liberal States like Canada and in 
relation to once-colonised peoples, reiterates the legal and political validity of the ‘sovereign 
event’, the event that actually produced native cultural alterity and multiplicity, and did so 
through various processes of “displacement and exteriorisation” whereby the “co-existence of 
others, and the specification of difference, are recognised through the process of their being set 
aside [through an] imagination which, in spite of itself, starts from the ‘One’ and which 
constructs negatively both plurality and difference.”684 The concept of territory is precisely that 
‘imagination’ which facilitates ‘setting aside’ the coexistence of difference. This has become 
evident through the numerous expressions that legal recognition of Aboriginal peoples has 
taken in liberal societies – the recognition of cultural autonomy on the basis of prior occupation, 
the recognition of Aboriginal title, the implementation of the Reserve system. The concept of 
recognition has been integral to the continued displacement and exteriorsation of native 
peoples. Thus, to the extent that legal recognition purports to acknowledge pre-existing 
plurality and difference, it also tends to reproduce them through these new forms of ‘spacing’ 
native identity and culture (grounding native difference in geographic space).  
In spatialising recognition, the State works to deny the simultaneous presence of a “plurality of 
sovereignty, law, and community,”685 by displacing it, locating it somewhere ‘over there’ so what 
we are left with a number of ‘singular events’ and entities which deny the presence of 
multiplicity within and cross-pollinations between.  Legal recognition, as it currently stands, is 
not a viable political solution for Aboriginal peoples for two reasons. First, it articulates native 
sovereignty as emanating from the act of colonial recognition, while constructing colonial 
sovereignty as an inherent entitlement of the colonising power. As such, it fails to adopt the 
nation-to-nation understanding the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian 
State. Secondly, the doctrine of discovery which legitimises State sovereignty (and confirms 
native inhumanity) forecloses the opportunity for native communities to articulate their (non-
propertied) relationship to the land and natural environment. As I argue in Chapter Three, this 
inability to independently determine the course of their lives is what lies at the heart of 
Aboriginal demands for recognition. For Aboriginal peoples, the emancipatory prospects of legal 
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recognition are severely undermined by its failure to sufficiently disrupt the pre-existing 
cultural boundaries which define native peoples as being stuck in time and rooted in space.  
ii. Legal Recognition and Mutuality 
Within the context of Aboriginal claims for self-government, the emancipatory potential of legal 
recognition is undermined by the fact that recognition is not offered on the basis of mutuality or 
reciprocity. The State and its legal institutions are entitled to recognise (or not recognise, or 
even misrecognise) Aboriginal peoples as separate and unique political entities and to do so 
through the use of colonial notions of spatial possession and ownership as the basis of legal and 
political subjectivity. This, as I revealed throughout Chapter Two, Three and Four, unfairly and 
unjustly reproduces the native subject as categorically subordinate to the sovereign nation-
State, whose claims of territory and sovereignty (the grounds on which its bases its own 
political authority) remain uncontested because the terms and meaning of that relationship 
have been set by the colonial State itself.  
In Recovering Canada, Borrows perceives liberal law’s disregard for Aboriginal institutions and 
ideologies as having had a profound influence on the weakening of Aboriginal relations with 
their environment. He writes, “[t]he culture of the common law has imposed a conceptual grid 
over both space and time which divides, parcels, registers, on peoples and places in ways that is 
often inconsistent with Aboriginal participation and environmental integrity.”686 For him, liberal 
law’s inability to recognise those aspects of the natural environment, “forests, fields, roads, or 
settlements,” which embody forms of Aboriginal settlement and use of land, has helped to 
conceal the fact that the “early possibility and pattern of settlement in North America often 
depended upon an appropriation or a systematic erasure of Indigenous environmental use.”687 
Borrows argues that any solution to Aboriginal peoples continued marginalisation requires that 
that they be involved in planning and designing the forms of governance under which they live. 
And Aboriginal peoples’ relationship to the land and environment, he writes, figures 
prominently in the way they envisage questions of political and legal governance.  
These erasures of indigenous presence about which Borrows speaks were essential for 
advancing the colonial State’s own claims of legitimacy and sovereignty under the doctrine of 
discovery. Under this doctrine, land that is ‘discovered’ (in the sense that its presence was 
unknown to other European empires) automatically gave its discoverers the power and 
property rights to prevent other imperial governments from laying claim to that land. The 
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country to have discovered the land in question also gained sovereign powers over its 
indigenous occupants. In the common law courts of some postcolonial States, like the U.S., 
property rights over discovered land have been defined as “absolute ultimate title.”688 
In Chapter Two I illustrate how ‘discovery’ was declared by the presence of pristine wilderness 
and the lack of infrastructural and agricultural development.689 While the European powers’ 
property rights were ensured through its finding and settling of land, the imposition of its laws 
to native inhabitants had to be justified further. The legitimacy of replacing indigenous forms of 
governance with the common law of European colonies was predicated on the view that pre-
contact Aboriginal cultures had little in the way of political and legal organisation. The 
Europeans, therefore, were perceived as having brought order and civilisation to the native 
communities already present on the land. This, of course, is disputed by a number of Aboriginal 
scholars. As Lindberg reveals, the Aboriginal peoples who lived on land appropriated by 
European settlers had complex legal regimes produced through their intimate relationship with 
the land. She writes, “it would be accurate to say that in occupying our traditional territories, 
colonisers broke and continue to break Indigenous laws...our mother [Earth] cared for us, we 
must care for our mother...It may be elementally stated but make no mistake, this is a complex 
legal regime comprised of responsibility, obligations, reciprocity, and interrelationships.”690  
Similarly, Borrows’ Canada’s Indigenous Constitution traces a long and rich Aboriginal legal 
culture, drawing on the legal traditions of a number of different bands, and evidencing 
similarities – particularly in terms of their relationship to the environment – between them.691 
He highlights how these contributions to the Canadian legal culture are all but effaced through 
the consistent reiteration of a myth about the pre-contact legal and political underdevelopment 
of Aboriginal peoples. 
While the Supreme Court has affirmed that Aboriginal peoples do possess traditional law and 
customs that can be traced to their ancestral heritage,692 there has been a failure to address the 
implications of this reality. As a result, liberal law denies the pre-existence of an intricate and 
dynamic system of Aboriginal political and legal relations by continuing to compel Aboriginal 
peoples to make claims for cultural autonomy based on the terms set by the common law. These 
terms are inherently unfair precisely because they force Aboriginal peoples to demonstrate 
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their autonomy by reference to their pre-contact occupation of a land that the Courts never 
question as being outside the jurisdiction of the Crown. From this perspective, the Aboriginal 
peoples are forced to recognise the legitimacy of the colonial encounter and the intrusion of an 
alien legal system in Aboriginal affairs. The act of ‘recognition’, in this context, is shaped by the 
signs, symbols, and processes of Occidental Legality, which remain not only exterior to the 
Aboriginal communities seeking recognition, but are thoroughly implicated in their historical 
representation as subaltern Others.  
From Fanon’s perspective, this desire of the ‘black man’ to want to be “recognised as White”, to 
be recognised on the terms of White settler society, proves problematic for the Hegelian 
conception of mutual recognition.693 In recognising the native as a subject dependent on liberal 
law for recognition of her/his legal subjectivity means that the native’s own recognition of the 
State is not true recognition at all; for the native is not a self-determining agent. These 
conditions, Bhandar asserts, arrests the actualisation of human freedom. She argues that “the 
native subject, a creation of the settler, was (and remains) caught within relations of 
dispossession, alienation, and ownership that do not allow, in the absence of a dramatic rupture, 
for mutual recognition.”694 The racialised body of the native shatters the political possibilities of 
mutual recognition precisely because of liberal law’s reliance on Occidental Legality and the 
attendant modalities through which the ‘blackness’ of the native body is reproduced. The 
production of racial degeneracy becomes all the more complete in those instances when the 
native man, himself, internalises the reality of his condition so that ‘becoming white’, as Fanon 
suggests, is not even an intelligible option. As Fuss argues, “the [native] man under colonial rule 
finds himself relegated to a position other than the Other...Black may be a protean imaginary 
other for white, but for itself it is a stationary ‘object’; objecthood, substituting for true alterity, 
blocks the migration through the Other necessary for subjectivity to take place.”695 
Yet, the dramatic rupture that Bhandar refers to is, also, not simply the absence or wholesale 
abandonment of liberal law. In my case study on the Tribal Areas of Pakistan I demonstrate how 
the absence of liberal law from the spaces and places in which native/tribal law operates has 
not given rise to more inclusive or socially just forms of tribal autonomy or protection of 
cultural diversity. Perhaps this is because, as my discussion of legal excess argues, Occidental 
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Legality conceals the omnipresence of liberal law so that ‘tribal’ and ‘native’ spaces are 
misconstrued as neutralised of other forms of normative ordering in order to make their over-
regulation invisible to us. Equally likely, however, is the possibility that Occidental Legality 
misrepresents spaces of legal multiplicity so as to mask the interconnection and cross-
fertilisation that occurs between liberal and native law (and culture).696 This may be pursued 
with the intent of reinforcing difference, as conceptions of social difference become harder to 
sustain in instances where one can point to cross-penetration between the self and the Other 
(i.e. where is no pre-colonial evaluative criteria to which it is now possible to return – either for 
settler communities now trying to be free of their ‘history’, or former colonies such as Pakistan 
who now have independence). Accordingly, while liberal law does not accord the native a space 
for mutual recognition, the aim should not be the erasure of liberal law altogether. This is 
partially because a space saturated by native law also does not afford that possibility, itself 
being a representation of culture that maximises the voices of some by minimising the voices of 
Others (e.g. women, off-reserve Aboriginals).697  
More importantly, the act of relegating the native to another spatial and temporal domain (i.e. 
territorial autonomy on the basis of cultural difference) problematises mutual recognition as 
well. This is because it fails to acknowledge that the recognition of liberal law is dependent on 
the presence of conflict (or, using Foucault’s notion of power, the presence of counter-exercises 
of power); of two normative systems coming into contact with and struggling against one 
another (i.e. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic upon which Bhandar’s reading of recognition is 
based) for mutual recognition698 or mutual exercises of power.  Accordingly, to recognise by 
eliminating that potentiality for struggle and conflict also compromises the conditions for 
mutual recognition and mutual-empowerment, and the realisation of human freedom.  
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The impossibility of mutual recognition necessitates that societies devise new ways of being and 
becoming. Bhandar notes that one way in which this could occur is through an 
acknowledgement of corporeal experience and lived reality – an ‘embodied’ subjectivity – that 
“precedes and exceeds the constitution of colonial subjectivities...that receives and gives form, 
that has the capacity to explode and shatter existing forms of reason and sense.”699 The body 
represents a site of instability precisely because of its ability to transgress, to act ‘illicitly’, 
unexpectedly, and improperly.  The body becomes a modality of protest. In a way then, I 
interpret Bhandar’s work as an acknowledgement of human agency, expressed most violently 
through the acts of the body, and the presence of a precolonial subjectivity.  
The risk that the native body represents, as a mode of transgression, resistance, and violence, 
has preoccupied the processes of Occidental Legality since the first Imperial-Indigenous 
encounter. The intense anxieties that arose from the settlers’ proximity to the racialised bodies 
of the native are what initially triggered the distance-making strategies of Occidental Legality. 
These techniques attempted to contain and restrict the native body’s mobility out of specific 
spaces (e.g. the Reservation and the Tribal Areas), devised ways in which its presence could be 
erased (e.g. biodiversity discourse, national parks, and ‘blank spaces’ on a map), and employed 
stable categories like landscape and climate to render the actions of the native body more 
predictable (e.g. describing native temperament as an extension of the landscape he/she 
occupied). Occidental Legality gave rise to a range of norm-creating institutions (courts, law 
enforcement bodies, even hybrid forms of indirect rule that used native agents, e.g. the maliki 
system)  that maintained, circulated, and perpetuated these self-/Other-identities and rendered 
calculable the settlers’ (and later the postcolonial political community’s) expectations of the 
native.  
These marked and coded spaces appeared to condition native life in ways that respect their 
demands for cultural autonomy. However, on closer examination, it was revealed that these 
spaces created distance between the national community and its perceived Others. These 
cultural geographies are symbols of the worlding of both native and State law, artefacts of a 
jurisdictional competition. While these cultural spaces are projected as areas of native 
autonomy, places subject to native legal jurisdiction, their presence and architecture continues 
to be subject to the laws of the State; laws that have, to a large extent, excluded native 
perspectives and worldviews.  
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Yet, to limit the jurisdictional reach of native law to the confines of these geographies, created 
through State law, is an unacceptable solution for native people. As I discussed in Chapter 
Three, in seeking recognition these communities are not demanding accommodation – tolerant 
acceptance of their unique normative structures and institutions and the right to exercise 
jurisdictional authority in separate and divided spaces. Instead they desire full integration of 
their structures and institutions with those of the State, within one overarching liberal law, 
under conditions of intersubjective recognition. These communities are, as my earlier 
discussion on treaty rights and obligations in Chapter Three suggests, seeking the 
implementation of interlegal pluralism. My analysis in Chapter Four further iterates the 
necessity of joint mechanisms of regulation and shared jurisdiction, particularly in relation to 
the citizenship rights of particularly vulnerable native peoples (women in the tribal areas of 
Pakistan, and off-Reserve Aboriginal peoples). This desire for shared jurisdiction suggests that, 
though mutual recognition may appear impossible given the circumstances, it may also 
represent a sub-optimal solution to native demands for self-government. A more suitable 
solution considering the realities of postcolonial multicultural societies may be a form of 
recognition that encourages and respects not cultural difference, but rather cultural melding or 
hybridity. It is with this idea in mind that I propose the conceptual framework of coeval 
recognition. 
B. Coeval Recognition 
 In the opening preface of their book, Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, McVeigh and Dorsett write, 
“without an account of jurisdiction, jurisprudence would be left speechless, left without the 
power to address the conditions of attachment to legal and political order.”700  Through this they 
suggest that the value and meaning of law and legal regulation lies in its application in space, 
involving a number of devices and technologies through which law materialises in space and 
place. Space, in this context, need not necessarily be land or geography (though that is the 
subject of focus in this particular thesis). In fact, in the introduction to this thesis I discuss how 
Haldar, Godden, and McVeigh all analysed the manifestation of jurisdiction through the 
application of law on the body and the regulation of bodily functions and desires. Jurisdiction is 
the symbolic marker of how law ‘comes into being’, how it is exercised, by having an effect on 
something (whether that be the body or geography).  It is also symbolic of who has the “power 
and authority to speak in the name of law.”701  As such, jurisdiction is always produced through 
conflict, and often expressed as the melding of normative struggles into a dual expression of 
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regulation and emancipation. Jurisdictional struggles emerge when conflicting normative 
structures are simultaneously wrestling for control over the same ‘space’ (e.g. body, geography). 
The term ‘allochronism’ has been used in social science literature to refer to a form of 
ethnographic documentation by which anthropologists deny the “common, active, ‘occupation’, 
or sharing, of time.”702 A ‘denial of coevalness’ therefore, represents a “persistent and systematic 
tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a time other than the present of the 
producer of anthropological discourse.”703  As Fabian explains, the consequences of this denial is 
that it forecloses the possibility of communication between the subject and object. He states 
“social interaction presupposes intersubjectivity, which in turn is inconceivable without 
assuming that the participants involved are coeval...for human communication to occur, 
coevalness has to be created. Communication is ultimately about creating shared Time.”704 What 
is further interesting about Fabian’s concept of allochronism is that he understands it not as a 
tendency but as an “existential, rhetoric, political” device.705 He argues that as anthropology’s 
complicity with the colonial encounter is revealed, it is the denial of coevalness – or 
allochronism – which continues to preserve Western dominance.706 For Fabian, therefore, the 
subject’s denial that the Other occupies the same moment in time is a way in which to protect 
his own ‘modernity’, and thus superiority.  
Recognising the coevalness of the Other has also been written about from the perspective of 
space rather than time. The concept has been introduced in literature analysing the current 
state of postcolonial critique.707 This literature highlights how recognising the simultaneity of 
‘pre-colonial’ native and European history redirects our gaze to the question of hybridity, the 
intermixing between European and native histories which happened to take place during the 
moment of colonisation.708 Accordingly, the simultaneous presence of different histories, in the 
same moment and space, gave rise to cultural exchanges that, invariably, led to the development 
of new identities. The encounter itself produced an Orientalised ‘pure’ image of pre-colonial 
culture that colonised peoples are forever chasing, and colonial masters are consistently 
referring to in legitimising conquest. In theorising the ‘pre-’ and the ‘post-‘, postcolonial critique 
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either misrepresents or entirely evades the question of the ‘is’ and the ‘now’.  For O’Reilly, this 
tendency reveals a postcolonial “incapacity to contend with the shared nature of postcolonial 
cultural histories and responsibility in the contemporary era.”709 Drawing on Sebbar and Ali 
Behdad, O’Riley suggests that postcolonial critique can maintain itself as an ‘oppositional praxis’ 
through a form of self-reflexivity; as long as it continues to “maintain a coeval recognition of its 
own historicity, its own worldliness, and makes use of its historical consciousness to critique 
the cultural conditions that continue to produce unequal relations of power today.”710  
Throughout this thesis I have illustrated how the natural environment and geography represent 
devices through which otherness and alterity are understood, categorised, and ultimately 
regulated. In Chapter Two I suggested that the first Imperial-Indigenous encounters from the 
fifteenth century onwards were documented, recorded, and arranged through the technologies 
of cartography, travel-writing, and imperial correspondence. These cultural narratives helped to 
map the foreignness of never-before encountered spaces and peoples as relics of a ‘time passed.’ 
The temporalisation of these groups – their emplacement ‘back in time’ – helped to legitimise 
the colonisation of their societies and the appropriation of their land. In Chapter Three, I move 
to how the nascent images of colonial peoples were further entrenched through the legal and 
political structures and forms of organisation that were being implemented within the British 
colonies in India, Australia and Canada. Land and geography played an important role in 
resolving the jurisdictional struggles that emerged during this time between the European 
settlers and the native populations. Land emerged as territory, terrestrial spaces mapped by 
rules of access and diversity. These produced cultural spaces with concentrated native presence 
– the Tribal Areas, the Aboriginal Reserve – and spatial discourses – biodiversity discourse, the 
public/private divide – both of which served to create distance between closely located, 
consistently overlapping, and often intercommunicating normative communities. In Chapter 
Four I develop this idea even further by demonstrating how native spaces themselves are 
colonial constructs. In so doing, I question whether these cultural geographies can ever 
appropriately address issues of diversity, the presence of interlegality, and the encouragement 
of cross-cultural dialogue. Through these four chapters I have highlighted how the construction 
of space has served to create the illusion of cultural incommensurability and a lack of 
intercultural penetration.  
And yet, in Chapter Three I draw attention to the many ways in which colonial and settler 
populations interacted to produce joint systems of social regulation and political organisation. I 
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highlight, for example, how the native and common law interacted to create new strategies for 
managing the issue of inheritance between native/settler communities. In Chapter Three, I also 
draw on a sample of Aboriginal literature to spotlight the ways in which indigenous 
architectures are consistently challenging the jurisdiction of the Canadian State. While Canada 
has failed to recognise the colonial conception of territory and the Aboriginal peoples’ views on 
space and geography as morally equivalent, cases like Delgamuukw are significant precisely 
because they demonstrate the openness of the common law to, perhaps one day, move towards 
this form of recognition. My intention in Chapter Four was to illustrate how protecting 
normative autonomy through the creation of cultural geographies is not what liberal societies 
should be aiming for.  I draw on Aboriginal literature, particularly on Borrows and Chartrand, to 
argue that this is also not the solution that indigenous communities are striving for.  
In the previous two sections of the current chapter I reveal how the current framework of legal 
recognition is inspired by tendencies to colonise and compartmentalise culture.  They are 
driven to recognise difference and, thus, end up producing unilateral forms of recognition that 
satisfy neither the Crown’s demand for native acknowledgement of its supremacy, nor native 
peoples’ demands that the Crown affirm native sovereignty. The current models of recognition 
do not suffice. And there are at least two important reasons why these existing theories of 
recognition need revisiting, and which relate to the arguments that I have presented through 
this thesis. 
The first relates to how Taylor conceptualises recognition. Taylor’s view of recognition is 
attractive because it addresses one of the most crucial weaknesses of the late liberal practice of 
legal recognition, which is that, to be recognised by the dominant legal discourse, Aboriginal 
communities must frame their quests for autonomy and self-government in language cognisable 
to Euro-Western liberal law. As I discussed in the last section of Chapter Three, this often results 
in a distortion of their own worldviews and a misinterpretation of their cultural practices and 
ongoing relationships. For Taylor this is of concern because it has the effect of misrecognising 
the Aboriginal peoples.  
However, one of the problems with Taylor’s view of recognition is that it operates from the idea 
that recognition involves two existing identities and the “assumption that adequate recognition 
of the other’s true identity will bring about reconciliation.”711 One of the problematic 
consequences of the colonial encounter was that it rarely left distinct, pre-contact, identities 
intact. In colonial India there was constant shifting of identities as European political agents 
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were told to adopt native and tribal practices and language in order to rule more effectively.712 
Tribal leaders like the mullah and maliks also often alternated their loyalties between their 
kinship community and imperial agents.713 Similarly, Aboriginal communities in Canada also 
embody fractured identities as they move off-reserve and work within the very Euro-Western 
liberal legal system linked to their historical marginalisation.714 It is these nuances of the State-
native relationship that Taylor’s recognition does not quite capture, and which warrants the 
development of a new theoretical model. While the framework of recognition advanced by 
Taylor is based on the reciprocal acknowledgement of each other’s identities, a more 
appropriate form of recognition would take as its focus the overlap between identities that are 
constantly being made and re-made through intercultural interaction. Unless this potential for 
hybridity and intermixing is acknowledged, political and legal solutions proposed by liberal 
societies can never fully live up to the aspirations of native communities.  
The second reason why the current theories require modification is more pronounced in Tully’s 
work in Strange Multiplicity. As I indicated earlier, Tully considers struggles for recognition as a 
component of native struggles for political rights.715 Struggles for recognition, particularly in the 
context of Aboriginal struggles in Canada, are not merely about political rights, meaning the 
exercise of greater political power through the existing institutional structures of the State. 
They are far more. They are fundamentally about the State recognising that the prevailing 
system is, in itself, skewed against Aboriginal peoples and must be reformed through the 
incorporation of Aboriginal histories, and indigenous ideologies and institutions. As Asch notes, 
collapsing demands for political rights with recognition struggles gives credence to views that 
suggest that “the legitimacy of Canada’s sovereignty and jurisdiction arises independently of the 
fact that indigenous peoples were already living here when they first arrived.”716   
Canadian jurisprudence in relation to Aboriginal peoples suggests that Aboriginal rights are 
political rights that allow Aboriginal peoples to engage in cultural and traditional practices that 
pre-existed European contact. Since self-government, in Western political theory, is perceived 
as having a spatial element (i.e. in terms of territorial jurisdiction), it is believed that 
adjudicating claims to Aboriginal title and allocating land for the exclusive use and occupation of 
Aboriginal people, essentially resolves both claims for recognition and self-determination.  By 
converting struggles for recognition into quests for political self-rule, the Courts are failing to 
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acknowledge the nation-to-nation view that Aboriginal peoples have of their relationship with 
the Canadian government. As the Dene nations in Canada assert: 
What we the Dene are struggling for is the recognition of the Dene nation by the 
governments and peoples of the world. What we seek then is independence and 
self-determination within the country of Canada. This is what we mean when we call 
for a just land settlement for the Dene nation [emphasis added].717  
The legal misrecognition of the aspirations of Aboriginal peoples have taken the form of 
constructing and applying Aboriginal rights of self-rule through the group’s positioning ‘back in 
time’ and in separate and divided spaces.718  
In advancing a theory of coeval recognition, therefore, I accentuate the idea that Aboriginal 
struggles for recognition are not solely, or merely, about political rights. They are about 
compelling the government to recognise alternative, morally equivalent, (and frequently 
overlapping) systems of political authority and legal jurisdiction within the territorial borders 
of the State. The objective of Aboriginal rights and title litigation is not to foster greater 
“reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies with the Sovereignty of the Crown.”719 
As Asch explains, the Court’s reading of Aboriginal struggles for recognition as the pursuit of 
reconciling Aboriginal rights with Crown sovereignty, limits “the open-ended process” of 
negotiation by erecting the “singular pre-condition: the agreement on the part of indigenous 
peoples that the scope of their political rights, and in particular their right to self-determination, 
is circumscribed by the fact that, at the end of the day, whatever rights they may have are 
subordinate to the legislative authority of the Canadian State.”720  This reading of Aboriginal 
struggles for recognition takes the “view that with [European] settlement of Canada the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the political societies who were already here was nullified.”721  In 
these instances the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction is constructed as if it were a zero-
sum practice; the legal and political authority of the Crown must be acquired by extinguishing 
the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the prior occupants of the land. There appears to be a denial 
of the potential of normative co-existence and institutional overlap between the two 
communities.  
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The conceptual framework of coeval recognition addresses this impasse by drawing attention to 
how the colonial encounter was unique in its production of novel identities, new forms of 
governance, and unexpected legal and political developments. All of this newness emerged out of 
the interactions that took place between two, morally equivalent, and simultaneously present, 
normative communities. I highlight the importance of taking into account this interweaving of 
institutions and doctrines by emphasising three important facets of this relationship that point 
to and preserve relational simultaneity - the ‘common, active, occupation’ of a shared time and 
space. These are: the need to acknowledge the reality of hybrid identities and ways of being, the 
need for self-reflexive intercultural dialogue, and the discontinuation of policies aimed at 
immobilising (in space and time) the native body.  
It is certain that dispute between the State and native communities, including the Aboriginal 
peoples of Canada, need to be settled through negotiation. Both Tully and Taylor advocate a 
dialogical process of recognition, and appear to be suggesting that the politics of recognition is 
too heavily focused on an acknowledgment of difference. Tully goes as far as to argue that this 
focus on difference overlooks the fact that the groups exemplified by the politics of recognition 
have similar aspirations, in that they all appear to be seeking “appropriate forms of self-
government.”722  In Strange Multiplicity he proposes a new constitutional design, claiming that 
modern constitutionalism has been too narrowly structured around “two main forms of 
recognition: the equality of independent, self-governing nation States and the equality of 
individual citizens,”723 which fails to incorporate groups, like Aboriginal peoples, who do not fit 
these two very strict recognition models. What Tully’s work appears to be suggesting is that a 
proper framing of that negotiation becomes necessary to ensuring that the rights and 
aspirations of these communities are not made subservient to those of the State. 
While crucially modifying Taylor and Tully’s conception of recognition by emphasising 
hybridity, my conceptual framework of coeval recognition also builds on Taylor and Tully’s 
designs in its claim that the politics of recognition are currently too stringently focused on forms 
of cultural protection through recognition of difference. Over the course of this thesis I have 
explain how this recognition of difference has been spatialised in the form of cultural 
geographies like the Tribal Areas, the national parklands, and the Aboriginal Reservation. In 
many areas related to Aboriginal law, a concentration on recognising difference has produced 
the need to ‘authenticate’ Aboriginal culture by reference to knowledges gathered using Euro-
                                                             
722 J Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge Univ Pr, 1995), p 4. 
723 Ibid., p 15. 
Coeval Recognition of Plurality Page 245 
  
Western standards of research and forms of documentation.724 My analysis of Van der Peet and 
Delgamuukw evidenced ways in which the authentication of Indigeneity and the affirmation of 
what constitutes a valid Aboriginal right has had the effects of misrecognising and 
misinterpreting Aboriginal culture.725 From these discussions it is apparent that the current 
model of legal recognition leaves much to be desired in the way of minority protection.  
In suggesting a model of coeval recognition, therefore, I am proposing that liberal law refrain 
from adopting the fixed and ahistorical idealisation of the native self “whereby the constitution 
of oneself as an ‘authentic’ indigenous self has been conflated with specific ahistorical 
assumptions concerning the nature of indigeneity.”726 Instead, the core focus of coeval 
recognition is the acknowledgement and celebration of hybridity; the possibility of 
miscegenation, and the creation of new entities that cannot easily be defined through 
conventional dichotomies like civilised/uncivilised, modern/primitive, native/settler, pre-
contact/contact.  
To recognise an entity as ‘coeval’ is to acknowledge one’s own positioning within spaces of 
heterogeneity, accepting the presence of multiple, simultaneously, co-penetrating, coevolving 
historical and spatial trajectories that, at times, have the tendency to converge. It involves 
recognition of the self and Other’s simultaneous ‘being’ in time and space. Coeval recognition 
accepts the impossibility of mutual recognition (because a history of hierarchical power 
relations have entrenched representation in key power structures such as law, politics, and 
culture) and instead advocates for a position of multiplicity that allows the native to speak from 
his place and space of alterity. This understanding of recognition champions one’s acceptance of 
the radical Otherness of the Other (i.e. the settler’s recognition of the native’s Otherness), with 
the condition that one accepts the possibility of the native’s recognition of the settler’s 
Otherness as well. It is this form of recognition that allows cultural communities to exercise the 
greatest possible agency in determining their self-identity. It is these ideas that I explicate more 
formally in the proceeding several sections. 
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C. Coeval Recognition and the Plasticity of the Human Body 
Coeval recognition can give expression to the ‘plasticity’ of the body727 if the intellectual 
architectures and political structures that inform our current ways of thinking about the 
realities of pluralism allow the native body to move and speak for itself as this is precisely what 
the processes of Occidental Legality have impeded. Liberal law, in many ways, is equipped to 
handle the integration of coeval recognition, and it has demonstrated its capacity to do so by 
allowing social groups to challenge hegemonic structures of knowledge in advancing claims for, 
among other things, greater political and legal autonomy, access to natural resources,728 better 
political representation, and recognition of historical dispossession.729 Yet, as the numerous 
critiques of liberal law discussed in Chapter Three and Four demonstrate, there is a need for 
crucial modification. Liberal law’s emancipatory potential can be maximised through three 
transformations in our ways of thinking about the role, function, and processes of law in 
contemporary society. I summarise them briefly here, before moving on to discuss them in 
greater detail in Section (4), (5) and (6) of this chapter.  
The first idea of acknowledging the potential for hybridity draws on a central theme of this 
thesis, that law is a cultural product. It is a product of social interaction that reflects our pattern 
of life and thus, to some extent, must be thought of as a ‘living and breathing entity’.730 This view 
of law stands in stark contrast to the idea, especially positivist notions, that law is 
unproblematically to be understood as a universal, neutral, and stable system of regulation. 
While the law certainly provides the conditions that allow individuals to adopt a particular 
cognitive attitude and patterns of action (i.e. law as a norm-setting social institution), it is also 
constructed, reinforced, and transformed by patterns of transgressive behaviour and previously 
unanticipated and unexpected ways of thinking. If law is a cultural product then it has the 
potential for transformation, and is thus susceptible to being reshaped through the shifting 
attitudes and sensitivities that characterise our on-going social interactions.  
As a social institution, law frequently reflects the values, ideologies, and principles of the society 
within which it is embedded. In the multicultural and globalised societies of today an 
emancipatory law should seek to reflect the interests and values of not only those who have 
power and whose viewpoint is often represented as a neutral viewpoint, but also minority 
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communities that have been excluded and marginalised. One way in which contemporary 
societies can nudge liberal law in that direction is to acknowledge the potential of hybridity 
within the law, as well as the hybridity of the modern legal subject(s). Thus, the emancipatory 
potential of liberal law increases when it incorporates State law, native law and others forms of 
normativity that exist in the in-between spaces of what I have termed ‘liminality’, and it is 
maximised when liberal law remains consistently and forever open to the possibility of 
incorporating and synthesising these spaces of liminality. 
A second way in which I suggest that coeval recognition can be actualised is through an 
eternally open-ended form of recognition that relies on continuous intercultural dialogue.731 My 
notion of coeval recognition insists on a conditioning of this dialogue so that it becomes ‘self-
reflexive’. What I mean by ‘self-reflexive dialogue’ is communication that takes place through a 
conscious decision to remain open to having one’s own pre-existing bodies of knowledge and 
points of reference being questioned, revised, and rejected. Encouraging and promoting the idea 
of intercultural self-reflexive dialogue is how societies can maximise the emancipatory potential 
of law.  
And third, contemporary societies must recognise the plasticity of the body, particularly the 
native body, and should take steps to alleviate the structural inequalities that limit the (physical 
and imagined) mobility of the body and thus its free exercise of human agency. At the same 
time, the transformations that needs to occur in order for the emancipatory potential of liberal 
law to be realised – in order for liberal law to challenge our horizon of expectations – is also, 
partially, the responsibility of the native subaltern, who must consistently transgress, defy, and 
reject the traditional discourses through which his movements and expressions have been 
impeded.732   
4. Acknowledging the Potential of Hybridity 
The notion of hybridity has long interested scholars in postcolonial and critical race theory.733 
Adopting, what I refer to as, a culture-as-construct approach,734 many of these commentators 
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have employed hybridity to elaborate race and culture as categories of difference that emerged 
through the colonial encounters. Using the term hybridity to complicate the idea of race and 
culture as distinct, easily differentiated, and self-contained identities, the notion of hybridity 
was used by writers to speak of conditions of ‘in-betweenness’.735 Hybridity, therefore, denotes 
an ‘inner dissonance’ that speaks to the often patchy and heterogeneous nature of an outwardly 
singular and unified self that is projected (but which is in reality more complex because it is less 
singular and unified than the projection assumes). Simultaneously a representation of 
completeness and fracture, the hybrid entity embodies a “heterogeneous composite of 
contradictory elements”;736 a union that is continuously on the verge of rupture. The usage of 
hybridity points to the complex dynamicity of human identity and behaviour. As a category (or 
perhaps symbolic of a lacking category) of analysis, the notion of hybridity is useful to my 
analysis because it reveals the limits of the human need to classify, categorise, and organise 
human behaviour and people’s sense of self by pointing to how these purportedly stable 
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categories are fleeting and open to transformation by the very agents upon whom this distorted 
identity is being projected as singular and unified. 
Hybridity becomes crucial for maximising the political potential (i.e. the exercise of agency) of 
the native body through its acknowledgment of the possibility of cultural intermixing and 
miscegenation. The body is understood as having the potential to break-free from the 
preconceived categories and classifications of identity and culture, to form ways of becoming 
and being that waver between previously distinct, inflexible, and static categories of identity 
and difference. Furthermore, the concept of hybridity also recognises the coeval existence of the 
native and settler by acknowledging their potential to intersect in space and time; a criterion 
that must be met for the hybrid to exist. 
Accepting the presence of hybridity within the law makes visible previously undetected social 
interactions,737 namely those that take place within the ‘liminal spaces’738 of the law. This means 
that we are more readily able to identify and accept the legal character of social interactions 
occurring in places like the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan – held in place by 
the more stable political units of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The notion of hybridity creates a 
more complete picture of Pakhtun identity. The FATA is revealed as a place characterised by 
tribal law, incorporating Pakistani citizens, who hold cultural and ethnic identities that are 
consistent with Afghan tribal communities located on the other side of the Durand Line (now an 
international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan). In recognising the hybridity of the 
Pakhtun individual, an identity that bridges a number of cultural, political, and legal divides 
provides space for renegotiating the disconnect between imposed and self-identities. 
Furthermore, in accepting the potential for hybridity, Pakistan secures conditions for bargaining 
political and legal accommodations and solutions that shy away from adopting essentialised 
understandings of what it means to be a ‘Pakistani’ and what it means to be ‘Pakhtun’. An 
awareness of hybridity may provide the necessary impetus for governments to properly 
question and fully evaluate territorial solutions to normative diversity,739 instead focusing on 
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designing structures of governance that better address and shelter multiple dimensions of 
human identity and ways of being. 
The notion of hybridity also further complicates the distinct categories of ‘law’ and ‘culture’, by 
throwing up the possibility that multiple legalities and cultures have the capacity to fade into 
one another,740 and co-constitute peoples sense of self.741 This is a view that has acquired much 
validity and authority in the work of legal pluralists, who have argued that legal-centralism 
unnecessarily limits the emancipatory potential of law by privileging forms of legal normativity 
that can be traced back to the State.742 It is also a view of law that has been advanced by those 
studying and living Aboriginal law. According to Borrows and Chartrand, for example, the 
Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian State are bound to one another by legal agreements, such 
as land treaties and legal judgments related to Aboriginal rights and title.743  
Constructing the postcolonial State as a colonial institution,744 partially perpetuated by the 
dispossession and oppression of native communities,745 many pluralists advocate for a vision of 
law and legal normativity that accepts multiple sites of law-construction746 and triggers for legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
territorial rights and territorial autonomy by pointing to how these rights should be derived by looking at other, non-
territorial aspects of Indigenous treatment and experiences. See, Avery Kolers, Land, Conflict and Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p 32-3. 
740 Paul W. Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999), p 2. Also see, Sally Falk Moore, "Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-1999," 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 7(2001). Also see, Sally Engle Merry, "Legal Pluralism," Law & Society 
Review 22, no. 5 (1988). As Stoler notes, colonial cultures were almost always an amalgam of “European food, dress, 
housing, and morality [which were] given new political meaning in specific colonial social orders.” See, Ann Laura 
Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2002), p 24. 
741 Carol J Greenhouse, "Legal Pluralism and Cultural Difference-What Is the Difference-a Response to Professor 
Woodman," J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 42(1998): p 65. 
742 Griffiths focuses on the idea of State recognition as the basis of non-State legal normativity and its implicit 
advocacy of the ideology of legal centralism.  John Griffiths, "What Is Legal Pluralism?," Legal Pluralism & Unofficial 
Law 24(1986).Benda-Beckmann suggests that traditional pluralists have spent too long focusing on the law-State 
link, which has had the tendency of diminishing other equally important aspects of understanding legal complexity 
which may be useful for the theoretical and conceptual project of legal pluralism.  See, Franz Von Benda-Beckmann, 
"Who's Afraid of Legal Pluralism?," Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 47(2002). 
743 Borrows epitomises this melding of legal cultures and perspectives in his narrative of the Nanabush or Trickster. 
See, John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2007), p 57-60.   
744 In the sense of inheriting colonial political, legal, intellectual and economic structures and institutions.  John 
Griffiths, "What Is Legal Pluralism?," Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law 24(1986). Also see, Daniel PS Goh, "From 
Colonial Pluralism to Postcolonial Multiculturalism: Race, State Formation and the Question of Cultural Diversity in 
Malaysia and Singapore," Sociology Compass 2, no. 1 (2008). 
745 Some writers have argued that the entire division between ‘official law’ and ‘customary law’, which lies at the 
heart of traditional theories of legal pluralism, has been invented through the colonial encounter in order to 
subordinate precolonial forms of rule-making and rule-enforcement. Francis G. Snyder, "Colonialism and Legal Form: 
The Creation of 'Customary Law' in Senegal," Journal of Legal Pluralism 19(1981). 
746  Also see, Robert M. Cover, "The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Forward: Nomos and Narrative," Harvard Law Review 
97, no. 4 (1983). Also see,  Kleinhaus and Macdonald have identified not only legal institutions as having creative 
value for the law, but legal subjects as well through their attachment of normative value to events and relationships. 
See, Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick A. Macdonald, "What Is a Critical Legal Pluralism?," Canadian Journal of 
Law & Society 12(1997). 
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behaviour.747 Some pluralists that adopt a culture-as-reality748 approach to theorising law, 
champion the idea that contemporary societies should strive to protect and permit the co-
operation and co-existence of a number of normative systems within the political territory of 
the State.749 More critical variants of pluralism counter-claim that societies need to, in actuality, 
move away from systemic notions of law, instead focusing on preserving and nurturing the 
intersections and cross-fertilisations between normative structures, institutions, ‘legalities’, and 
ideologies (i.e. that we focus on the liminalities within the law that defy categorical 
definitions).750 Others also highlight how our normative behaviour is shaped not only be legal 
discourse, but by a variety of other discursive structures that shape and influence our cognitive 
behaviour. Our perceptions of ‘the legal’ are therefore, produced through both the official law 
and institutions of the State, along with a variety of other intellectual structures.751 Collectively 
many of these theorists appear to be suggesting that law and culture, law and society, should be 
understood as phasing into each other. They seem to be implying that our law is a reflection of 
our conventional practices, so that often distinctions between different laws and different 
cultures cannot be easily differentiated and identified.752 At the same time, however, some 
pluralists are weary of recognising non-State law as ‘law’, precisely because it conceals the 
                                                             
747 RM Cover, "Violence and the Word," Yale LJ 95(1985).Griffiths and Moore believed that legal normativity was 
shaped by a number of intersecting social bodies that were both capable of producing and enforcing norms. Yet these 
bodies were understood as partially-closed (‘semi-autonomous’) normative “venues that are also sites of cultural 
solidarity.” See, Carol J Greenhouse, "Legal Pluralism and Cultural Difference-What Is the Difference-a Response to 
Professor Woodman," J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 42(1998): p 66. 
748 See FN 734. 
749 Indeed Kymlicka claims that our liberal, democratic values demand that we respect and protect the presence of 
cultural diversity. See, W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Also see, Chandran Kukathas, "Cultural Toleration," in Ethnicity and Group 
Rights, ed. Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (New York: New York University Press, 1997). 
750 Boaventura de Sousa  Santos, "Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law," Journal of 
Law and Society 14, no. 3 (1987). Also see, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction 
and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada," Law & Society Review 12, no. 1 (1977). Also see, Sally Falk Moore, "Law 
and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study," Law & Society Review 7, 
no. 4 (1973). Also see, John Griffiths, "What Is Legal Pluralism?," Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law 24(1986). Also see, 
Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 
2009).  
751 Gunther Teubner, "The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism," Cardozo Law Review 13(1991). 
752 Santos refers to this as conditions of legal ‘porosity’.  See, Boaventura de Sousa  Santos, Toward a New Legal 
Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition (London, UK: Reed Elsevier, 2002), p 437.  
Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 
2009). Also see, Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (Surrey, England: 
Ashgate, 2006).    Carol J Greenhouse, "Legal Pluralism and Cultural Difference-What Is the Difference-a Response to 
Professor Woodman," J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 42(1998): p 65. Tamanaha offers this up as a critique of legal 
pluralist thinking, suggesting that it often inappropriately collapses law and culture so that law becomes, virtually, 
‘everywhere’.  Brian Z. Tamanaha, "The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism," Journal of Law and 
Society 20, no. 2 (1993).Teubner is also critical of the view the social sciences view that discourses external to the law 
should be permitted and recognised as having the capacity to design and redesign the boundaries of the law. See, 
Gunther Teubner, "The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism," Cardozo Law Review 13(1991).For a 
challenge to Teubner’s methodology see, Simon Roberts, "After Government? On Representing Law without the 
State," The Modern Law Review 68, no. 1 (2005). 
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power that State law is able to exercise.753 Whatever else may be considered law, there is little 
doubt that the official law of the State is law, and thus it enjoys a degree of legitimacy and 
authority that other forms of normative ordering do not. 
In being receptive to opening up our social institutions to the possibility of human and 
ideological miscegenation, contemporary societies can more appropriately develop solutions 
that do not conceptually equate legal pluralism with cultural pluralism (i.e. in the sense that we 
understand that law is intimately involved in the way that we understand and, in many ways, 
operationalise our understanding of our sense of self; but also that normative difference is often 
used by those external to a group to make decision about ‘belonging together in a cultural 
group’).754 Essentially that we do not make a priori judgments about cultural 
inclusion/exclusion based on legal difference. 
Being more sensitive to the potential for hybridity that people and ideas have may reveal the 
many ways in which liberal law currently shapes identity and culture in the image of the more 
dominant classes whose values and ideologies the law reflects, and how the processes of doing 
so may be injurious to those whose sense of self the law fails to integrate, incorporate, and 
protect. This was, for example, illustrated through my discussion in Chapter Three about the 
Delgamuukw case, and the court’s interpretation of Aboriginal identity and colonial treaty 
obligations in ways that were inconsistent with the plaintiff-community’s self-definition.755 An 
understanding of hybridity within law-making – the possibility of superimposition and 
interpenetration between the once-stable categories of official and non-official law – may better 
recognise hybrid conceptions of legal subjectivity; that people may still perceive themselves as 
legal subjects and their practices as having legal legitimacy and validity even in the absence of 
the normative criteria set by official State-law (e.g. possession of property through ‘appropriate’ 
usage and continuous and historical occupation). This requires opening up the criteria of how 
we define legal categories and the way and terms on which we allow these subjects to access 
law, legal remedies, and legal institutions. This may reveal the inadequacies of a model of 
autonomy centred on recognition, which does not overcome the problem of Occidental Legality 
precisely because it ties autonomy to the idea of territory, which is, itself, part of the problem.756  
                                                             
753 Brian Z. Tamanaha, "The Folly of the 'Social Scientific' Concept of Legal Pluralism," Journal of Law and Society 20, 
no. 2 (1993). 
754 Carol J Greenhouse, "Legal Pluralism and Cultural Difference-What Is the Difference-a Response to Professor 
Woodman," J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 42(1998): p 65. 
755 Dimitrios Panagos, "The Plurality of Meanings Shouldered by the Term 'Aboriginality': An Analysis of the 
Delgamuukw Case," Canadian Journal of Political Science 40, no. 3 (2007).  Also see, p 142-3. 
756 As I demonstrate in my earlier discussion of the Reservation in Chapter Three See, p 146.  Also see my discussion 
of the Tribal Areas in Chapter Four. See, p 196 
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Hybrid identities, hybrid cultures, and hybrid law thus tend to acknowledge the potential inter-
mixing between ‘differently-constructed’ peoples, which is precisely what Occidental Legality 
made unimaginable for us. These conceptions of the ‘interlegal’757  an acknowledgement that 
there is no stable, singular, autonomous, and sacred category of ‘law’ (as liminal spaces like the 
Tribal Areas indicate), opens up new possibilities for interaction between previously divided 
and conceptually incompatible societies. In so doing we begin to recognise the artificial 
construction of these once-enduring intellectual (and later, institutionalised) categories of legal 
and cultural difference as having been perpetuated for the purposes of exercising power over 
those whom are being defined through its gaze.  
5. Self-Reflexive Intercultural Dialogue 
The notion of hybridity provides the necessary groundwork to build a more emancipatory 
liberal law by enhancing prospects for intercultural self-reflexive dialogue. Recognition of both 
hybridity and the capacity of once culturally incommensurable758 communities to engage in 
dialogue is necessary for coeval recognition because it accepts the Other’s presence within the 
same temporal and spatial domain. Native-State dialogue was shaped, often limited, and in the 
case of Pakistan completely foreclosed, by the discursive traditions that placed the native and 
settler (or the native and the political community of the State) in different historical epochs and 
territorial units. Occidental Legality compelled the native to engage with the State/settler on the 
terms set by the colonial experience,759 consistently forcing the native to jam his sense of self 
into the pre-made categories of culture that had previously dispossessed the native of his land 
(and by extension, political and economic power). The property-relations of colonialism, carried 
forward into the postcolonial period through liberal law’s design of Aboriginal title, 
territorialised forms of self-government, and spatial expressions of cultural autonomy that, as I 
argued in Chapter Three and Four, made liberal law’s unequal application invisible to us. The 
dialogue through which native/State interactions emerged was one-sided, skewed in the favour 
of the settler-State, and often misrepresented the native in ways injurious to his identity, 
integrity and, most importantly, claims to humanity.760 Accordingly, when liberal law recognises 
                                                             
757 I borrow the term from Santos to suggest that social life is constructed through the intersubjective interactions by 
multiple legalities (State, custom, religion, etc). See, Boaventura de Sousa  Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: 
Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition (London, UK: Reed Elsevier, 2002), p 97. 
758 This idea finds resonance within Kukathas work, which essentially argues that group rights are a political (rather 
than cultural) construct, and thus we need to acknowledge the fluidity and similarities of human behaviour. See, 
Chandran Kukathas, The Liberal Archipelago (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p 90. 
759 Kleinhaus and Macdonald refer to this tendency of official law as having manipulated “the points of reference of 
the officious legal ‘language game.’” See, Martha-Marie Kleinhans and Roderick A. Macdonald, "What Is a Critical Legal 
Pluralism?," Canadian Journal of Law & Society 12(1997). 
760 I discuss this in Chapter Three and my discussion of Vitoria’s work.  See, p 115. 
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its own potential for hybridity (and that of its subjects), the possibilities for coeval dialogue and 
recognition are heightened.  
An awareness of legal/cultural hybridity opens up the opportunity for dialogue to become self-
reflexive and intercultural. Self-reflexive intercultural dialogue further emancipates the native 
body by recognising not only the simultaneity of native/settler existence, but the possibility that 
such simultaneity has the potential to radically transform both the settler and native in ways 
that challenge the stability and coherence of their identity and give rise to new ‘hybrid’ ways of 
being and becoming that involve an intermeshing of minority and dominant perspectives.  
From my earlier discussion about the political possibilities that critical theories of pluralism 
open up through their articulation of an interactive and interrelational conception of legal 
normativity, it becomes possible to imagine the value of communicative processes to developing 
and expressing legal/cultural hybridity. Patterns of communication, particularly as they occur 
within the Canadian and Australian legal context, have largely been structured through 
reference to colonial conceptions of difference and alterity. Often this has robbed the subaltern 
of her/his voice by forcing her/him to articulate their sense of self through the political and 
legal language and institutions tied to their historic dispossession (i.e. they are having to adopt 
the language of Occidental Legality, reproducing their identity so as to be recognised as subjects 
worthy of engaging with the law).  
More problematically, in the Pakistani example this communication is further impeded by the 
State’s refusal to extend the language and institutions of the official law to its Pakhtun 
community within the FATA.  This has, as I argued in Chapter Four, entirely foreclosed the 
possibility of opposing, contesting, resisting, and reconstructing the tribal identities imposed on 
the Pakhtuns of the North-West Frontier by their colonial masters and which have become the 
basis for the uneven and oppressive application of contemporary State-law (e.g. the continued 
operation of the Frontier Crimes Regulation).  
I submit that coeval recognition, and acknowledgement of hybridity, requires processes of 
communication that take place outside of the historically inherited hierarchies (of law and 
culture) produced through determinations of (cultural, social, legal) difference and expressed, 
largely, through territorial/spatial distancing. As words and sentences, whether they are 
communicated through writing or orally, have no meaning in themselves, “[w]e cannot 
determine [their] meaning in isolation from the meaning of our other conceptions,”761 it is only 
through dialogue that contemporary societies can create a common ‘reality’ – the product of 
                                                             
761 Reidar Edvinsson, The Quest for the Description of the Law (Berlin: Springer, 2009), p 68. 
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agreement between participants762 - incorporating the legal signs, symbols, and representations 
unique to their respective historical and normative perspectives (the intercultural component 
of dialogue). Furthermore, the dialogue must also be open to the possibility of shifting both 
minority and dominant perspectives in new ways through the incorporation of the Other’s 
perspective(s) (the self-reflexive component of dialogue). I further discuss each of these 
components below. 
A. Intercultural Dialogue 
Some of the most prominent calls for intercultural dialogue have emerged from within the 
movement of multiculturalism (and cultural recognition and diversity more broadly), 
suggesting perhaps a growing sensitivity and receptiveness to hybridity within multicultural 
politics as well.763 Modood and Meer suggest ‘interculturalism’ as a possible hybrid alternative 
to the theory of multiculturalism, and suggest that it has a greater potential to recognise the ‘in-
betweenness’ of cultural identities and the complexities of social interaction within a 
‘multicultural’ world.764 The focal point of interculturalism is interaction and dialogue between 
cultural groups that emphasises commonality and prevents the solidification and 
essentialisation of cultural categories. Dialogue that is, intercultural, therefore is focused less on 
maintaining group identity and integrity (i.e. manipulating the dialogue so as to reflect their 
own cultural norms and practices) and far more committed to discovering points of 
convergence that provide more inclusive definitions of the political community without 
minimising the fact that the Other exists (and should be appreciated as existing) beyond the 
intelligibility of the Self.765 Maximum plurality is recognised only when societies take into 
                                                             
762 This idea of truth borrows from correspondence theory. See, Hilary Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences 
(London: Routledge Revivals, 2013). 
763 This is, of course, recognising that multiculturalism as a concept is diversely interpreted, and can sometimes be 
used to both adopt and reject similar positions or approaches to cultural diversity. See, H.K. Bhabha, "Culture's in-
Between," in Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay (London: Sage, 1996). Also see, Nasar Meer 
and Tariq Modood, "How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism," Intercultural Studies 33, no. 2 
(2011): p 178-80. Also see, Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in Democracy 
and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1996), p 67-94.  Young points out the deficiencies of Benhabib’s deliberative framework democratic legitimacy by 
pointing to its cultural-bias. Instead, she puts forth a more ‘intercultural’ option that “understands differences of 
culture, social perspective, or particularist commitment as resources to draw on for reaching understanding in 
democratic discussion...” See, Iris Marion Young, "Communication with the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy," in 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), p 120-36. 
764 Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, "How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism," Intercultural Studies 
33, no. 2 (2011). 
765 An act which is ultimately, Levinas argues, injurious to the Other (i.e. the self’s reduction of the Other to something 
that is ‘the same’ as the self). Thus, the aim is not to create a universal and abstract subject modelled in the image of 
the self (the aims of mutual recognition), but a recognition that the self and other are both constructed categories that 
unfairly singularise multiplicity and hybridity. Thus, plurality exists through the co-presence of the two (hybridised) 
subjects, the self-identities of whom are shaped by the Other’s presence.  See, Emmanuel Levinas, Michael Bradley 
Smith, and Barbara Harshav, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other (Cambridge Univ Press, 1998). 
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account and negotiate discontent between radically different perspectives,766 and essentially 
recognise each other’s Otherness.  
What is important about his form of dialogue, however, is that it encourages, even promotes 
conflict and disorder, in the sense of continuously emerging challenges to embedded and 
entrenched forms of cultural knowledge.767 From this view, intercultural dialogue should 
involve strategising models of social cohesion and inclusive national citizenship768 that resist 
the urge to implement permanent and one-fits-all solutions. In more pragmatic terms, this 
should, for example, translate into the State’s rejection of the criterion of cultural continuity as 
manifestations of Aboriginality and expressions of native pre-contact customs. Coeval 
recognition would require societies to acknowledge the simultaneous presence of radically 
different, and continuously shifting historical and spatial trajectories. This means that ‘native 
culture’ does not simply end at the very exact moment of the ‘sovereign event’ and colonial 
claims over native space. It is possible, in fact it is a reality that native and settler cultures 
coevolved and often intersected (and continue to do so),769 within the same space (though the 
processes of Occidental Legality have defined these spaces in distinct and incompatible ways in 
order to create distance between communities and maintain perceptions of cultural difference). 
Thus, intercultural dialogue should be focused on maintaining and continuing this 
intercommunication with the aim of nurturing cultural/legal co-evolution.  
Santos describes interpenetration and cross-communication between multiple social networks 
as evidence of ‘legal porosity’, and argues that the analytical potential of these interactions “is 
maximised, once it is made self-reflexive.”770  The aim, he believes, is not to be merely 
performative in these encounters – “emphasising the contemporaneity...the uniqueness of the 
encounter”; but to be self-reflexive – “emphasising the non-contemporaneous roots of what is 
brought together.”771  
                                                             
766 Because a recognition of the ‘radically different’ also recognises the many cultures/identities/legalities in-
between the self and the radically different.  
767 Evidence of, perhaps, the dual emancipatory and regulatory functions of the law. 
768 Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood, "How Does Interculturalism Contrast with Multiculturalism," Intercultural Studies 
33, no. 2 (2011): p 177.  
769 Craig Proulx, "Blending Justice: Interlegality and the Incorporation of Aboriginal Justice into the Formal Canadian 
Justice System," Journal of Legal Pluralism 51(2005).  Proulx uses the Santos’ notion of interlegality to explain how 
Aboriginal law has shaped the Canadian legal system. Also see, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "The Heterogeneous State 
and Legal Pluralism in Mozambique," Law & Society Review 40, no. 1 (2006). 
770 Boaventura de Sousa  Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic 
Transition (London, UK: Reed Elsevier, 2002), p 418. 
771In a sense, acknowledging the historical temporalisation of native difference, yet also simultaneously 
understanding it to have been powerful construct that was meant to impede the bringing together (in dialogue) of the 
native and settler perspectives/perceptions/imaginations/bodies. There is an acceptance that the ‘native’ is 
conceptually anchored in a temporal dimension forever structured by the Imperial expansion, but that such 
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B. Incorporating the ‘Self-Reflexive’ Component 
In being self-reflexive, dialogue between social groups incorporate the possibility self-
confrontation, which would, in some cases, require a self-limitation of relationships, processes, 
and sources of meaning that threaten the core precept of a (thought-to-be) stable society.772 
From this view, a notion of self-reflexive dialogue would suggest communicative processes 
based on a society’s openness to reformulate, restrict, and/or thwart those constituting 
relationships, processes, and sources of meaning that threaten it foundational principles. For a 
liberal democratic society that may include the principles of autonomy and liberal equality, but 
it may also include the possibility of incorporating perspectives that challenge our current 
systems of thought,773 including the dominant perspective that law and territory need each 
other in order to properly operate and exist. Self-reflexive dialogue has value precisely because 
it compels groups to reappraise the benefits and impediments of their prevailing intellectual 
frameworks and ways of life, and to potentially reevaluate the principles that they hold most 
dear. As Parekh notes: 
Since human capacities and value conflict, every culture realises a limited range of them and 
neglects, marginalises, and suppresses others.  However rich it may be, no culture embodies 
all that is valuable in human life and develops the range of human possibilities.  Different 
cultures thus correct and complement each other, expand each other’s horizon of thought 
and alert each other to new forms of human fulfilment.  The value of other cultures is 
independent of whether or not they are options for us…inassimilable otherness challenges 
us intellectually and morally, stretches our imagination, and compels us to recognise the 
limits of our categories of thought.774  
Accordingly, the value of diversity relates back to the fact that a human being is enriched when 
she has more opportunity to experience and access different modes of self-expression.775 Thus, 
to argue for a system of self-reflexive intercultural dialogue, is to argue for a form of dialectic 
communication between normative regimes, which remains open to the possibility of social and 
political uncertainty, self-evolvement, and self-redefinition.  A system of interaction based not 
on maintaining a society of coexisting normative orders that are tolerated and accommodated by 
official legalities, but on societal networks that recognise the interpenetration and 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
conceptual limitations can be overcome through dialectical processes that allow the native to enter ‘the here and 
now’.   Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic 
Transition (London, UK: Reed Elsevier, 2002), p 418. 
772 Ulrich Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernisation," in Reflexive 
Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, ed. Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and 
Scott Lash (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007), p 1-7. 
773 Alluding to the emancipatory potential of liberal law and its capacity to challenge prevailing knowledge and 
institutional structures. 
774 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 
775 Charles Taylor, Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Guttman, Susan Wolf, and Michael Walzer (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), p 32. 
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superimposition of different voices within the social (and legal) arena, each having an 
opportunity to shape the social and political outlook of others. In this sense, for the potential of 
this interaction to be maximised, the participants must be open to a radical reshaping of their 
own worldview (hence, the ‘intercultural’ aspect) by ‘alternative modernities’.776 
C. Forums and Strategies for Intercultural Self-Reflexive Dialogue 
Self-reflexive intercultural dialogue is aimed at securing conditions in which a range of different 
social groups have a say in the development of the political and legal structures and institutions 
to which they will be subject. There can be a number of different (official/unofficial, 
formal/informal) forums in which this form of dialogue can take place. 
One of the current forums in which intercultural dialogue occurs are the domestic courts, 
though it could be argued that the dialogue that takes place in the courts needs to, in many 
ways, be made more self-reflexive. Chapter Three of this thesis provides many examples that 
illustrate how the language of liberal law (pronounced through the courts) is often Occidental. 
This means that, frequently, in attempting to define native law and culture, the native subject is 
constructed through the use of Orientalist tropes of cultural difference and an over-reliance on 
colonial property relations (and its attendant notions of occupation, possession, sovereignty, 
and jurisdiction). These instances are examples of both the regulatory aspects of liberal law and 
the emancipatory challenges (in the form of native claims for title, recognition, and autonomy) 
that are brought against it.   
Nonetheless, I submit that the emancipatory potential of liberal law can be maximised if the 
courts are more willing to accept prospects of hybridity and acknowledge the creative capacity 
of the native voice. This form of recognition can be expressed by, for example, moving away 
from the tradition of using ‘expert knowledge’ (in the form of empirical studies of 
anthropologists and sociologists trained in the Western-European tradition) to determine the 
authenticity and meaning of native culture. This involves not only a recognition that the native 
subject be permitted to speak for her-/himself unencumbered by external impositions of 
identity, but an acknowledgement of the fact that the concept of ‘authenticity’ is itself an 
artificial construction that unnecessarily limits the plasticity of the native body by denying it 
agency and rejecting its capacity to act in unanticipated and undocumented ways.  
Domestic courts can further give voice to hybrid identities/cultures/law by recognising that 
there are numerous other, often informal forums, in which intercultural dialogue can take place 
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– literature, academia, and politics to name a few. Thus, in some respect, this would be asking 
the courts to accept a critical pluralist vision of ‘law’ as a social institution produced through a 
number of different sources and across a variety of discursive planes. This means that the courts 
should remain receptive to incorporating minority and subaltern perspectives from non-
traditional sources, grounded in culturally-diverse discursive traditions.777 This is a largely 
uncontroversial recommendation, given that judges already draw on Anglo-European 
scholarship in the areas of philosophy, qualitative sociological research, historical texts, and 
literary theory over the course of their decision-making.778 Furthermore, as Chapters Two and 
Three of the thesis demonstrated, the common-law itself is founded on subjective forms of 
Imperial witnessing (i.e. travel narratives, letter-writing, and cartography).  What I am 
suggesting, therefore, is that a similar opening up of liberal law be extended to, and be mobilised 
by, non-European literary, historical, academic, philosophical, and artistic sources and 
perspectives as well. While it can be argued that replacing current models of testimony with 
these other sources may heighten the instability and unpredictability of the law, this is a 
critique that adopts a Eurocentric perspective precisely because the failure to incorporate these 
sources severely destabilises the expectations of the law that minority communities have. Thus, 
this criticism works to prioritise Eurocentric expectations of the law and legal discourse over 
minority perspectives. Furthermore, the incorporation of multiple perspectives and sources of 
testimony maximises the emancipatory model of liberal law, because it further increases the 
discrepancy between our past experiences and future expectations – and thus provides greater 
possibility for a radically different future.  
Apart from domestic courts, contemporary societies can nurture forms of coeval recognition by 
acknowledging that there are numerous settings through which legal normativity is generated.  
This means that communities should be open to the resolution of disputes using native, 
Indigenous, tribal, and/or religious law and institutions (and perhaps even ones that escape 
discrete definitions). Indeed there are States that have established religious frameworks of law 
and adjudication in parallel with their common law systems (e.g. Pakistan and Indonesia), and 
there are a number of jurisdictions (United States and Britain) that integrate religious 
arbitration and tribunals into their legal system.779 One crucial modification that coeval 
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recognition demands is that contemporary societies devise ways to rethink the space-law nexus 
so as to allow minority communities to draw on different legal structures and institutions 
outside of their ‘designated spaces’ of operation (e.g. Tribal Areas, the Reservation). In essence, 
contemporary societies need to take to heart the critique that law ‘despatialises space,’780 that it 
robs space of its emancipating function by regularising it and extracting from it its divesting 
space of its spatial characteristics of simultaneity, juxtaposition, disorientation, and materiality, 
all the features of space that leave our shared futures open to reformulation and reconstruction. 
It is these very features of space – its mutability, its disorientation, its chaos - that contribute to 
its potential to act as a setting for emancipatory human interaction. Minimising the desire to 
predict, reify, stabilise, and map space allows for the exercise of greater human agency because 
the potential for interaction is less burdened by the imposition of boundaries, borders, and 
enclosures. Social interactions (and thus, identity processes) are no longer bound by the ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ of spaces and places. To give an example, in despatialising claims of autonomy – 
refraining from compelling normative communities to assert their autonomy through space (i.e. 
demonstrating prior occupation) - would allow social groups to live and interact with one 
another in accordance with their existing normative convictions, rather than trying to 
manipulate them to satisfy the spatio-temporal criteria set by the dominant legal discourse.781  
In so doing, contemporary societies enable the mobility of the native body to move beyond its 
racialised space of existence. This shift in thinking would, for example, inspire policy changes 
that would limit the disability to off-reserve Aborigines who clearly possess self-identities that 
bridge the native/citizen dichotomy by which they are currently defined and limited. 
There are some commentators that have suggested that State-deference to legal cultures 
grounded in, for example, fundamentalist religious norms may have the adverse effect of further 
oppressing traditionally vulnerable groups such as women and children.782 My focus on 
removing social, political, and material ‘constraints’ on the native body to encourage the 
exercise of human agency and autonomy, would require a liberal law oriented away from the 
non-interventionist approach advocated by some pluralists.783 This means that members of a 
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particular social group be allowed to select the institutions and structures to which they will 
submit their disputes and that specific measures be put in place to evaluate and oversee that 
those decisions are made with the greatest preservation of individual autonomy and integrity. 
Indeed, this lack of oversight in maintaining people’s autonomous decision-making capacity to 
choose forums for the resolution of disputes, has had particularly deleterious consequences for 
the human rights of Pakhtun women living within the FATA. This is largely the result of FATA 
women not having the choice to submit their disputes to non-tribal forums like the domestic 
courts of the State. What is important to this overall process of protecting the most vulnerable 
members of society is that communities develop a system through consultation and dialogue 
that takes into account the perspectives and experiences of these vulnerable groups and 
implements mechanisms to prevent their further marginalisation. As to the details of what these 
mechanisms may entail, that is something that requires further review and necessitates context-
specific design and development.  
Another area that has already been identified as potentially benefitting from intercultural 
dialogue between indigenous and State institutions is the field of environmental protection as it 
relates to land-use experience and knowledge of Aboriginal peoples. As indicated in Chapter 
Three, Aboriginal peoples base their relationship to the land on respect and the obligation to 
protect, rather than rights and title. As Kapashesit and Klippenstein write, “Aboriginal 
environmental ethics reflect this sense of unity by emphasising balance and sustainability.”784  
They go on to argue that because Aboriginal ecological management systems may provide 
valuable and workable models for sustainable environmental relations, and because these are 
an integral element of the Aboriginal-land relationship, their environmental practices should 
receive recognition and protection as group rights through s.35 of the Canadian Constitution Act. 
Indeed, the need to integrate Aboriginal and Euro-Western environmental protection schemes 
has also been highlighted by Borrows as an important component of Aboriginal peoples’ right to 
self-government and recognition of the equal authority and jurisdiction of native law. For him, 
an acknowledgement of Aboriginal relationships to the Earth is integral to the exercise of legal 
pluralism precisely because these relationships represent morally equivalent voices about how 
to best “theorise, practice, and order our association with the Earth.”785 While both Borrows and 
Kapashesit and Klippenstein see Aboriginal peoples’ ecological relationships and frameworks as 
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integral to the exercise of Aboriginal cultural autonomy, they each understand these rights very 
differently. While, the latter constructs them as aspects of a broader set of legally protected 
collective rights, Borrows conceives of them as an inherent right of Aboriginal peoples as self-
governing nations.  
The belief in Aboriginal peoples’ inherent right to self-government further supports newly 
emergent ideas about the development of dialectical constitutionalism, which Tully most 
eloquently elaborates in Strange Multiplicity.786 Approaching the issue of normative pluralism 
from the simple question of whether contemporary constitutional dialogue is properly 
equipped to recognise and accommodate cultural diversity, Tully argues that modern 
constitutionalism too often relies on the view that political stability requires cultural uniformity. 
Advocating for an alternative solutions for recognising pluralism, Tully suggests that 
contemporary societies develop systems of direct negotiation and mediation that speaks to the 
particular interests of the parties involved. He thus puts forth the idea of a constitutional design 
developed through public discourse and intercultural dialogue which better recognises 
subaltern perspectives.787 Tully’s scheme of, what appears to be a ‘hybrid’, constitutionalism 
provides one important avenue for recognising joint sovereignty.  
Similarly Borrows highlights how recognition of shared sovereignty, through his concept of 
‘multijuridicalism’, may require that the State take positive steps to undo the prevailing legal 
conception of Aboriginal rights as practices and traditions relevant to the exercise of a distinct 
pre-contact culture. This, he writes, “deprives [Aboriginal people] of protection for practices 
that grew through intercultural exchange, and minimises the impact of Aboriginal rights on non-
Aboriginal peoples.”788 Thus, while the Crown’s sovereignty imposes a burden on Aboriginal 
people to conform to Euro-Western conceptions of rights and title, a similar burden is not 
imposed on the Crown to respect and regulate in accordance with Aboriginal doctrines. The 
relationship between the State and the Aboriginal peoples’ appears to be unilateral. Like Tully, 
Borrows also draws attention to how Canada may be able to adequately recognise Aboriginal 
legal traditions through the “embedding of Indigenous diversity in Canada’s central legal 
texts.”789 In his view the common law system prevailing in Canada does not fully acknowledge 
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Indigenous contributions which included the proliferation of advanced systems of diplomacy, 
treaty-making exercises, and frameworks for environmental protection and resource allocation. 
Borrows, therefore, argues that the Canadian legal culture continues to perceive and portray 
Aboriginal peoples as never having had such comprehensive and detailed systems of political 
and legal organisation. It also does not appropriately reflect the level of native dissent and 
opposition the early European settlers encountered. It is certain that the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada had passionately defended their land and rights to the use own political institutions and 
laws. This, he believes complicates the common law’s doctrine of ‘reception’.790 Consequently, 
Borrows asserts that, in order to recognise the Aboriginal peoples as a nation, Canada’s legal 
culture needs to adequately reflect the histories of Aboriginal peoples. What exact design this 
may take in the future remains to be seen, and is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss in 
any great length. However, both Tully and Borrows’ work presents some exploratory options 
that may well serve future research into developing exercises of joint-sovereignty through 
forms of hybrid constitutionalism.  
6. Contesting the Political and Economic Immobilisation of the Native Body 
One of the most important aims of Occidental Legality was to stabilise, indeed immobilise, the 
movement of the native body so as to alleviate the perceived physical and psychological threats 
that the native body posed to the now proximally-located settler. Historically, these mobility-
preventing strategies took the form of creating cultural spaces through the positioning of 
garrisons between the settled and unsettled districts of colonial space, the use of topographical 
features to shield the settler from native advancement, the construction of fences around the 
homes of settlers, and encasing the native by positioning lands reserved for their exclusive use 
amidst a sea of settler-dominated areas.791   
Strategies for exteriorsing and displacing native communities contributed to the political, social, 
and economic underdevelopment of native-majority areas.792 As I discussed in Chapter Four and 
my case study of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, at times this underdevelopment was deliberate,793 
symbolic of the polity’s desire to sustain the impoverished status of its tribal community. In 
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Canada native displacement was also meant to prevent their mobilisation against State 
institutions.794 The use of deliberate strategies for the social and political depression of 
Aboriginal communities has been a widely documented, and heavily criticised, aspect of 
Canadian and Australian governance,795 with many likening these technologies to acts of social 
and cultural genocide.796 
The postcolonial State’s preservation of similar conditions of impoverishment within the 
Reservation and the Tribal Areas continue to perpetuate forms of economic, political, and social 
marginalisation. It has been widely acknowledged that the Pakhtun residents of the FATA do not 
possess the same rights and entitlements of citizenship as the members of the polity living in all 
of the other provinces.797 The State has, in many instances, failed to provide an adequate level of 
healthcare, education, and opportunities for employment within the FATA and this has 
tremendously limited their enjoyment of citizenship rights.798 From my earlier discussion of the 
Reservation, I demonstrated how the State has made it extremely difficult for Aborigines to 
move off the Reservation, and it has done so by limiting their off-Reserve treaty rights, and 
interpreting their mobility as acts of reneging their Aboriginality.799  
In each of these instances, the limitations placed on the psychological and physical mobility of 
the native body limit the possibility for coeval recognition precisely because the native is 
prevented from engaging, dialoguing, and communicating with the political community from a 
position of equality (i.e. as space is used as a form of coercion and containment). Moreover, 
economic and political constraints also impede the exercise of human agency by forcing native 
peoples to make choices that they would not necessarily make in a situation where such 
constraints were removed. For example, perhaps more of the Aboriginal population would 
move off the Reservation if they remained in possession of their treaty rights or, perhaps more 
off-Reserve Aborigines would exercise their right to vote in band elections if they were not 
forced to be physically present in order to do so.800 These protections and accommodations also 
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become important in order to maintain individual rights of ‘group-exit’.801  This means that, in 
places like the FATA, the State should ensure an adequate level of education and employment so 
as to better the position of the more vulnerable members of a cultural community so that they 
have the option, should they choose, to leave these designated spaces of cultural autonomy and 
pursue a life within mainstream society.   
While recognising that the native is denied a degree of equality by being partially the construct 
of the settler imagination, and while fully accepting that native communities may see spaces of 
cultural autonomy (like the Reservation, and the Tribal Areas) as crucial and valuable aspects of 
their identity, when I speak of eliminating structural inequalities, I do not necessarily call for the 
elimination of these spaces. What I suggest is that societies reevaluate current processes which 
render these places sites of unequal and discriminatory treatment rather than (as a first step) 
challenge the discourse that these spaces are emancipatory (i.e. about granting rights and 
recognising diversity). This means that, first and foremost, States must recognise and take the 
fundamental steps necessary to ensure the full protection of their native community’s 
citizenship rights (just as they would for all other members of their political community).  
For Pakistan this must take the form of extending the State’s law and courts to the Pakhtun 
communities of the FATA. This, I argue, is necessary for maximising the emancipatory potential 
of Pakhtun struggles because it allows them greater opportunity (and access to more forums) to 
challenge hegemonic intellectual and political structures - many of which locate the Pakhtun in a 
separate epoch of history and leave him unable to converse in the language of the dominant 
discourse - and enhances their access to modes of self-expression. In Canada and Australia this 
must include, amongst other strategies, recognising (and operationalising that recognition) that 
one’s rights cannot be bounded by space in order to deny carrying them through to participate 
in mainstream processes in the areas of education, employment, and legal and political 
discourse.  
While the growing fear amongst Canadians is that Aboriginal people  are leaving rural areas and 
Reservations, opting instead to live and work within the urban city-centres previously 
dominated by the ‘White’ settler, a study of net migration flows between 1986 and 1996 
revealed a growth in Reserve populations and a net outflow of Aborigines from city-centres.802 
This suggests that, even as Aborigines are choosing to move to cultural spaces reserved for their 
exclusive occupation, mainstream society is becoming more anxious about an ‘imagined’ 
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decompression of distance between themselves and the Other.803 Peters suggests that part of 
this can be attributed to the fact that the small minority of Aborigines living within the urban 
areas are becoming increasingly significant for other reasons. She notes that, in 1991, almost 
fifty percent of the Aboriginal population in Ottawa-Hull had some post-secondary education,804 
thus, possibly further straining an employment market already saturated by too few jobs and 
too many over-qualified applicants. In many instances a limited job market and/or economic 
crises commonly gives rise to unsubstantiated finger-point (that are nonetheless powerful in 
terms of heightening social anxieties) that often has the effect of transforming the racialised 
Other into a scapegoat for the ills of society.  These ideas are further reinforced by Peter’s 
revelation that the employment rate amongst Aboriginal peoples in the areas of the country 
with a higher than average population of Aborigines is significantly higher (in some cases five 
times higher) than those areas with a lower number of Aborigines (she compares Toronto to 
Saskatoon).805 Anxieties of proximity do not seem to dissipate, but only increase as the 
concentration of native bodies in mainstream spaces rise.  This could possibly explain the 
reasons why a larger percentage of the native population remains unemployed in those areas in 
which they are most concentrated. In these cases the Canadian State may need to evaluate and 
assess hiring procedures to ensure that Aboriginal applicants are not unfairly discriminated 
against by employers and perhaps incorporate processes whereby Aborigines are consulted as 
to their employment experiences and potential spaces for improvement. 
Despite these somewhat gloomy reports, there have recently been some important 
transformations that appear to better incorporate native perspectives and address their 
experiences of economic and political inequality.  In Canada and Australia the recognition of the 
Aboriginal community’s history of oppression and marginalisation has given rise to some very 
interesting and innovative ways of incorporating Aboriginal voice into social and political 
institutions. For instance, legal education in both countries now integrates courses in Aboriginal 
law and custom.806 Similarly, there have been policies implemented that encourage Canadian 
employers and educational institutions to prioritise Aboriginal applicants in their hiring and 
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acceptance procedures.807 While these processes present some interesting ways of recognising 
Aboriginal culture and history as an integral component of the contemporary political 
community, and promoting their economic flourishing, there is still much work to be done. For 
example, some authors suggest that academic institutions, being political institutions that that 
exercise power through knowledge-control and dissemination, should adopt policies to enhance 
the cultural diversity of their faculty and ensure that minority cultures are better 
represented.808 Indeed the policies that are implemented to alleviate structural inequalities 
between native communities and mainstream society will need to depend on the specific 
contexts in which they are being implemented, and they must, to some degree, be implemented 
through consultation with the groups that are being affected. 
My concern with the unequal economic and political position of the native arises from a desire 
to better enable the exercise of native agency. Through various (implicit and explicit) policies 
native mobility has been fundamentally limited which, I argue, affects her/his capacity for 
coeval recognition and engagement in self-reflexive intercultural dialogue. Liberal law’s 
emancipatory potential is, therefore, limited by the native’s inability to strongly resist and 
question the prevailing discursive and institutional structures (i.e. engage in the exercise of 
counter-power) which shape and influence everyday social realities of, and interactions 
between, native and mainstream societies. Insofar as liberal law fails to increase the 
discrepancy between our past experiences and future expectations, allowing prevailing power 
structures to operate unchallenged, it does a disservice to not only the native, but also to the 
rest of the political community by limiting the transformative potential of a number of political 
and social institutions that both constitute, and are themselves constituted by, Occidental 
Legality and its regulation and representation of space in ways that reproduce native alterity 
and work to further fragment the political community. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I discuss how liberal law can serve as a vehicle of emancipation for previously 
marginalised native communities. While much of this thesis has been devoted to discussing the 
regulatory aspects of colonial and later postcolonial law, I suggest that liberal law has the 
potential to address issues of native inequality and injustice. However, in its current form, 
liberal law’s protection of cultural diversity is largely operationalised through the concept of 
legal recognition. In the early sections of this Chapter I critically assess the many ways in which 
legal recognition fails to adequately address the essential issues that underlie issue. Essentially, 
legal recognition produces a flimsy solution to the issue of minority rights, and fails to fully 
acknowledge the self-governing aspirations of Aboriginal peoples. In response to its two main 
deficiencies: its focus on cultural difference rather than hybridity and its emphasis of 
recognition struggles as one dimension of political struggle more broadly, I advance a new 
conceptual framework through which indigenous rights may be better articulated and 
protected. This is my theory of coeval recognition. Through this chapter I argue that coeval 
recognition can be operationalised through an acknowledgement of legal/cultural hybridity and 
the pursuit of intercultural self-reflexive dialogue. I further suggest that these two devices need 
to be supplemented by a focus on alleviating the structural inequalities that prevent the 
mobility of the native body.  
As the processes of Occidental Legality have always been preoccupied with increasing the 
referential distance between the native and settler body, it is precisely this immobility that 
needs better addressing if contemporary societies are interested in creating more inclusive 
policies and institutions. These processes must be pursued with one’s awareness of the radical 
alterity of the Other, while also recognising the Otherness that one represents to the native. In 
understanding that dialogue between the self and Other has the possibility of producing 
identities/cultures/legalities in-between, or hybrids, in being receptive to one’s own 
miscegenation along with the miscegenation of the Other, political communities are better 
equipped to implement institutional designs that incorporate subaltern perspectives and 
experience and give rise to a ‘living’ liberal law that continues to operate as a positive and 
innovative vehicle of political and social change. 
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Conclusion 
Counteracting the Processes of Occidental Legality 
 Coeval Recognition and Pluralism 
1. Occidental Legality and the Production of a Territorial Vision of Space 
This thesis set out to unravel how territory is the culmination of a number of smaller micro-
level social processes connected with how we envision and experience our surrounding 
environment and the people within it. It emerges as a landscape to be observed and 
documented; an imagined plane of human interaction; and a spatial area to be owned and 
regulated. While territory is often presented as a static and neutral setting upon which history 
unfolds, this thesis reveals the partial and political nature of territory.  There is a reciprocal 
relationship between the ways in which people observe and experience land, climate, and 
topography, and how they envisage their relationship to others sharing that same space. The 
natural features of our environment influence how we relate to others in a shared location. At 
the same time, how we imagine and depict our environment is informed by how we perceive the 
people that reside within it.  
Consequently, a central argument that this thesis makes is that the concept of territory 
materialises out of struggles for political power. I use the term ‘Occidental Legality’ to refer to 
how these conflicts for power have become spatialised, grounded in land and geography.  This 
thesis highlights how territory is an ordering of space that originates from the Imperial-
Indigenous encounters of the early fifteenth century, and continues to be reproduced through 
the law of contemporary liberal societies. Indeed, when we think of ‘territory’, as a concept, we 
are immediately drawn to a conception of space that is bounded, owned, and culturally-
divisible.  
As space and distance were compressed – first through the advent of overseas technologies and 
later through the consolidation of nation-States – societies devised a number of cultural, 
political, and legal technologies to continuously reproduce this bounded, owned, and culturally 
divisible view of space. This conversion of space into ‘place’ helped to preserve the illusion of 
cultural homogeneity and reduced anxieties over ‘black and white bodies touching one another’. 
Over the course of this thesis I examined at least a few of these technologies, which included 
cartography, ethnography, and the legal reinforcement of cultural geographies (i.e. the 
Reservation, the Tribal Areas). While we are given the impression that the territory of 
Conclusion Page 270 
 
contemporary liberal societies encompasses, even encourages, social pluralism, it is possible to 
identify many ways in which it disciplines, and often, sequesters cultural difference. For this 
reason I argue that territory is a powerful optic through which we can examine the politics of 
difference to expose the inconsistencies that underlie contemporary liberal responses to 
cultural pluralism. These responses, I argue, continue to demonstrate liberal societies’ 
discomfort with the possibility of cultural and racial intermixing. The law that emerges to 
manage issues of diversity and regulate the relationship between cultural communities in 
liberal societies, is as uneasy about cultural (and by extension legal) hybridity as the forms of 
legal regulation that materialised during the first colonial encounters.  
However, legal and cultural hybridity is a reality of the postcolonial condition that liberal 
societies must come to terms with if they are genuinely interested in preserving and 
encouraging social pluralism. One of the key preconditions of this recognition of hybridity is 
that societies unpack and address how the traditional conception of territory silences hybridity, 
how it gives us the impression that recognition of diversity requires that cultural communities 
be quarantined within their own, non-intersecting, spaces of existence. I examine two of these 
cultural spaces - the Aboriginal Reservations in Canada and Australia and the Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan – to reveal how they challenge liberal principles related to cultural diversity. Similarly, 
I also identify several discursive strategies by which societies ‘neutralise’ other spaces of their 
normative content to expand the referential distance between once-separated cultural 
communities. Specifically I discuss wilderness and biodiversity discourse as two examples of 
this.  
Through each of these strategies a bounded, possessed, and culturally-divisible conception of 
space is reproduced. This territorial view of space re-establishes the distance that has been 
progressively diminished as once-divided cultural communities are forced to interact with one 
another. As such, territory materialises out of jurisdictional challenges. It is the artefact of 
normative conflict between minority communities who long for self-rule, and the dominant 
political elite who wish to maintain the totality of their power within the political and legal 
dimensions of social life. These conflicts express themselves as struggles for recognition. The 
concept of territory, therefore, represents the specific terms according to which these struggles 
for recognition are legitimated, and while they appear neutral towards (sometimes even 
empowering) minority interests, they are terms that are stacked heavily in favour of the modern 
nation-State.  
Consequently, I develop the argument that contemporary liberal societies need to attend to the 
divisive effects of territory in order to properly address the demands of indigenous peoples. 
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These demands are not merely for property rights in land. To interpret and administer 
indigenous demands for self-rule as demands for territorial autonomy is to misrecognise 
indigenous peoples. I spend the last section of Chapter Three discussing what indigenous 
demands for recognition entails. Specifically, it requires recognition of their inherent right to 
sovereignty; a right that the Aboriginal people argue was initially recognised at the time 
Aboriginal land was transferred to the British Crown. Chapter Three clarifies some of the ways 
Aboriginal peoples believe that the State can better recognise their sovereignty, and I explain 
how territory forecloses this possibility by framing the terms of this recognition so as to 
delegitimise the claims of Aboriginal people. The argument that I make is that territory prevents 
coeval recognition between the State and Aboriginal peoples. In particular, I highlight how it 
preserves the perception of cultural difference and political and legal incommensurability 
between the two and, as such, conceals from us the many ways in which the dominant and 
minority cultures intersect, intercommunicate, and mutually-influence one another.  
While I spend the first three chapters critiquing how the law of liberal societies fails to properly 
recognise and address the demands of its native communities, my objective is not to replace 
liberal law with native institutions and forms of regulation. I specifically address why this is the 
case in Chapter Four, where I show how the spatialisation of native law – in the form of Pakhtun 
territorial autonomy in Pakistan – has also failed to produce acceptable political, legal, and 
social conditions for the management of ethnocultural diversity. Consequently, Chapters Two, 
Three, and Four build towards my overarching argument that minority recognition in liberal 
societies must take the form of coeval recognition, a form of recognition that acknowledges the 
active simultaneity of State and native histories and relations. Coeval recognition is premised on 
accepting and celebrating the presence of cultural and legal hybridity. To this end, Chapter Five 
contextualises and more seriously expounds the theory of coeval recognition. I end Chapter Five 
by introducing some ways in which contemporary liberal societies can overcome the divisive 
tendencies of territory by acknowledging the descriptive and normative value of hybridity. I 
identify two processes which collectively nudge contemporary societies towards coeval 
recognition: self-reflexive intercultural dialogue and the implementation of political and 
economic policies which have the effect of mobilising the native body in space. 
An acknowledgment of hybridity informs self-reflexive intercultural dialogue. This process 
recognises that the minority and dominant communities simultaneously occupy the same time 
and space, and that both have the capacity to radically restructure their ways of thinking and 
being (i.e. capacity for hybridity). Self-reflexive intercultural dialogue can stimulate dialogue and 
negotiation that transcends the cultural boundaries that convey cultural incommensurability  
and that have become entrenched through the processes of Occidental Legality. Third, I 
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highlight the need for accepting the plasticity of the body,809 which enables coeval recognition in 
contemporary societies by providing a better technique for acknowledging the potential of 
complex human agency and multiple subjectivities.  
One of the most important ways in which societies can actualise this recognition is by positively 
implementing policies and processes that allow the movement of the once immobilised native 
body. This, in turn, requires taking specific measures that allow for the option of movement out 
of designated ‘native spaces’ (i.e. the Reservation and the Tribal Areas), and the possibility of 
migrating between spaces. In Canada and Australia this would mean (among other things) 
upholding the treaty rights of off-Reserve Aborigines. In Pakistan this would mean better access 
to basic social and political institutions (i.e. education, the right to vote, healthcare). In both 
contexts of Australia and Canada, which are settler societies now liberal democracies, and 
Pakistan which is a colonised country now an independent nation-State, plasticity of the body 
would also mean negotiating ways in which liberal law can incorporate disempowered voices 
and normative frameworks.  For example, I discuss the possibility of opening up liberal law to 
unofficial or informal forums for dialogue, which can include tribal courts and religious 
tribunals, but also informal sources of normative authority (i.e. cultural texts and non-European 
literary narratives). This last suggestion is particularly important because I have argued that the 
spatio-legal discourse of territory continues to reproduce and entrench European cultural and 
literary narratives. According to which European institutions and ideologies have greater 
political significance and legal value than their indigenous counterparts. 
2. Unsettling the Foundations of Territory 
This thesis develops a more comprehensive narrative of territory by challenging assumptions of 
stable (and neutral) and coherent structuring of space and social ordering, and linking them to 
images, narratives, and accounts that were sometimes incoherent,810 and sometimes 
fantastical.811 I demonstrate how these imagined geographies represented social and political 
life in ways that tended to distort reality.812 I introduce an approach that highlights how 
territory is produced through an imaginary authenticated by structures of political and legal 
                                                             
809 See my discussion of Bhandar’s work in Chapter Five, p 228-9. 
810 See my discussion of tropicality discourse, which often defined spaces that were not located in the ‘tropics’ as 
having the climate and topography of the tropics, so as to create an imagined geography of pestilence and 
contamination. See, p 93.  
811 See my discussion of the narratives and mappings of the (non-existent) Kong Mountains and India Tertia, in which 
foreign places were made mystical through stories relaying the presence of ‘dragons’ and incredible riches. See, p 85. 
812 See my discussion of the aesthetics of mapping, which portrayed native/settler relations in a positive light, 
relaying European benevolence and native invitation. See, p 94.  Also see my discussion of narratives of pristine 
wilderness which had the effect of emptying foreign spaces of their normative contents, and relaying it as unoccupied 
(i.e. terra nullius).  
Conclusion Page 273 
 
governance.  This imaginary, I argue, is focused on maintaining not only social difference, but 
distance between communities that find themselves to be suddenly located very near to each 
other during the colonial period in the past and under conditions of diversity in the present. 
More importantly, a focus on this relationship allows me to examine and clarify how this 
preoccupation and anxiety with proximity between the self and Other continues to influence 
many of the political and legal geographies that emerge through societies’ attempts to manage 
social pluralism even today.  Thus, I problematize the claims of liberal society that it welcomes 
authentic cultural diversity, respect and recognition, and seeks a more ‘inclusive’ regulation of 
social diversity. 
3. Broader Debates of Human Geography 
A. Imagined Geographies and Discursive Power 
The methodological approaches used in this thesis draw on human geography. I also use literary 
analysis to study the spatial history of a legal concept (i.e. territory). These approaches suggest a 
mutually constitutive relationship between law and imagined geographies. This method draws 
heavily from Said’s work in Orientalism and the imagined geographies of the Orient and 
Occident, as well as Haldar’s approach which examines how European perceptions of Eastern 
excess were encoded in Western conceptions of legal subjectivity.813  
While there is notable literature that develops the idea that law shapes human relationships by 
controlling access to geographic space.814 Much of this work studies the contemporary political 
and legal manifestations of territory. There is another set of literature that looks at the history 
of political geography, with authors like Agnew focusing on the geographic distributions of 
power and how changing political and social situations transform these distributions.815 Some 
authors also study the geographic distribution of colonial power, examining how non-European 
spaces were settled and regulated as part of the colonial project.816 Yet both of these bodies of 
work emphasise the political and legal structuring of the natural environment to shape human 
behaviour and political action (through both texts and practice), and neglect how the making of 
space is as much an imaginary and discursive process, that relies on fantasising the very 
relationships and identities, even the environments, that the spatialities being produced are 
                                                             
813 P. Haldar, Law, Orientalism and Postcolonialism: The Jurisdiction of the Lotus Eaters (London: Routledge Cavendish, 
2007). 
814 Sack idea of ‘territoriality’. See, Robert D. Sack, "Human Territoriality: A Theory," Annals of the Assocation of 
American Geographers 73, no. 1 (1983): p 5-6. Also see, David Storey, Territories: The Claiming of Space (New York: 
Routledge, 2012). 
815 John Agnew, Making Political Geography (New York: Arnold Publishers, 2002). 
816 Tracy Banivanua Mar and Penelope Edmonds, eds., Making Settler Colonial Space: Perspectives on Race, Place, and 
Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2010).- 
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meant to control. Essentially, these studies are consistent with the traditional separation within 
human geography literature between material processes and relations of space-making on the 
one hand, and the discursive processes of producing, communicating and making sense of these 
processes on the other.817  
This ‘imagined’ element of space-making has found some resonance in the work of Benedict 
Anderson,818 Sherene Razack,819 and Tuan,820 all of whom discuss how spaces have meaning for 
people based on their (racialised, gendered, nationalised) histories, through the use of legal 
categories and imagined emotional connections. Yet, these authors appear to accept the 
‘naturalness’ of our environment as a setting that simply ‘lies there’, and which we saturate with 
meaning (through nationality discourse, through law, through emotional and human 
attachments). This same literature also discusses subaltern imagined geographies, how 
disempowered groups recreate their space as ‘places’ of comfort. While this last body of 
literature certainly moves closer to the key themes of this thesis it fails to question hegemonic 
spatialities, like territory, in ways that move outside the traditional ‘truth’ discourses of law and 
politics.  
Indeed legal and political processes are powerful, in the sense that they often work as 
discourses of authentication. Stories, narratives, histories, are verified and validated through 
their incorporation into, and circulation through, in particular, law. Law is perceived as an 
objective, neutral, and universal discourse of truth. Consequently, through the methods 
employed in this thesis I cast into doubt law’s production of categories such as territory and 
culture by drawing a strong connection between law and subjective experience. Thus, this thesis 
simultaneously unsettles conventional perceptions of both legal regulation and spatial 
organisation, by revealing how they are both intimately related with one another, but also how 
they are connected to the land as well as communications of subjective human experiences.  
B. Timeless Geographies, Progressive Geographies & Hybrid Geographies 
This thesis also contributes to and challenges debates which inform social science’s interest in 
the ‘spatial turn’. In particular, it adds to literature in socio-spatial studies which argues that, for 
too long, we have focused on the idea of time and neglected the significance of space.821 While 
                                                             
817 Sarah Whatmore, "Hybrid Geographies: Rethinking the 'Human' in Human Geography," in Human Geography 
Today, ed. Doreen Massey, John Allen, and Philip Sarre (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p 23-4. 
818 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Rev. ed. (London: 
Verso, 2006). 
819 Sherene Razack, ed. Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the 
Lines,2002). 
820 Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1977). 
821  Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, "Of Other Spaces," Diatrics 16, no. 1 (1986): p 22. Also see, Edward W. Soja, 
Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989), p 14. 
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this is certainly true, in the sense that history has been the predominant category of analysis in 
the social sciences, this thesis exposes both time and space as aspects of one another by 
producing a ‘historical geography’.822 It does this by revealing how spaces are historicised (i.e. 
temporalised), and how time, in turn, has the potential to be spaced.823 Moreover, the 
persistence of a territorial model of space – space as owned, possessed, and culturally-divisble – 
from the fifteenth century until today, proposes the possibility that geographies can be fixed, 
and rendered outside the paradigm of time by the continued processes of Occidental Legality. 
The analysis of Aboriginal title jurisprudence relays time as relational, as open to reformulation 
through space. This was demonstrated by how the Aboriginal tradition was determined by 
reference to the bodily presence of Aboriginal people in the same space as Europeans, but also 
before Europeans. Their presence in the claimed areas had to be continuous from time 
immemorial in order to justify colonial rule and its concomitant political and legal authority 
over native non-European subjects.   
Revealing the complex inter-weavings of space and time raises some interesting questions, and 
opens up the conversation to those who argue that the nation-State or the territorial space of 
the State represents a progressive geography.824 To imagine the territory of the State as 
categorically progressive essentialises its many spaces, and assimilates all these numerous 
mappings of space-time (the Reservation, the Aboriginal title, the Tribal Areas) to, what Motha 
has referred to as a single and unitary ‘sovereign event’.825 As such, these space-times, at once, 
become progressive yet stagnant, visible yet concealed through processes of Occidental Legality 
that present these spheres of power as ‘neutral’. In assimilating these spaces to the ‘progressive’ 
realm of the State, these processes cast doubt on the emancipatory potential of legal and 
political geographies like the Reservation by repudiating the presence of multiple sovereignties. 
This is problematic because, as Motha claims, it is essentially what legal recognition of 
Aboriginal title is meant to convey.826 
By pointing to the imaginative geography of territory, and by referring to the numerous time-
spaces which have been modelled on its vision of geographic space (i.e. the Reservation, Tribal 
Areas), I cast doubt on geographic categories that have previously been perceived as stable, 
                                                             
822 Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowiec, "Of Other Spaces," Diatrics 16, no. 1 (1986). 
823 See my discussion about the North-West Frontier as a space that was, essentially, in-between time and space (i.e. 
the settled areas were defined as more modern, or modernisable, than the unsettled areas, and the Frontier’s 
designation as a buffer zone essentially constructed it as a non-place between the two spaces of Russian Afghanistan 
and British India). See, p 202. 
824 As can be seen by Ratzel’s use of Darwinist understanding of the State as an ‘organic’ and continually developing 
geography. See, Friedrich Ratzel, "The Territorial Growth of States," Scottish Geographical Magazine 12, no. 7 (1896). 
825 Stewart Motha, "The Sovereign Event in a Nation's Law," Law and Critique 13, no. 3 (2002). 
826 Ibid. 
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neutral, and passive. For example, I discuss how climate and tropicality, while assumed to be 
naturalised, coherent and consistent classifications of the natural environment, produce feelings 
of marvel when applied to certain spaces at certain times, but also of fear and anxiety in other 
contexts and situations.827  
Similarly, in my discussion of the pristine wilderness I reveal how designations of wilderness 
led to processes for protecting the environment on the one hand (i.e. parkland), while at the 
same time causing political agents to determine that the space had not been sufficiently 
developed (and thus open to European occupation and possession) on the other. This analysis 
reveals geographic space as both fluid and active, being produced in different forms at different 
times. In some cases, as Whatmore discusses, this draws attention to the idea of hybrid 
geographies. “The hybrid geographical literature” she claims “is concerned with studying the 
living rather than abstract spaces of social life, configured by numerous, interconnected agents – 
variously composed biological, mechanical and habitual-properties and collective capacities – 
within which people are differently and plurally articulated.”828 The discourse of geographic 
hybridity further opens up the possibility for dialogue and negotiation between differently 
situated communities and leaves the future open to less oppressive reconfigurations of space. 
Geography, in this instance, emerges as a site for politics. Geographic hybridity, therefore 
provides an interesting possibility to consider when drawing connections between the many 
time-spaces mapped onto the territory of the State. 
C. Disembodied Identities and Native Subjectivity 
The methods of law and geography reveal the ways in which territory is both a measure of 
power as well as an artefact of power. It is a measure of power because of the political, 
economic, social, and cultural processes that it enables (or regulates). For example, in the case 
of Aboriginal title jurisprudence, the ability to demonstrate a cultural identity that reproduces 
an owned, bounded, and culturally-divisible vision of space, effectively confirms the Aboriginal 
claimant’s legal subjectivity and rights to land (and here I draw attention to the wealth of 
resources that land makes available) and self-government. Territory is a discourse of power. 
Yet, the thesis demonstrates that territory is also the product of various subjective exercises of 
witnessing – including map-making, travel accounts, and letter-writing. Consequently, it is 
possible to argue that these exercises of witnessing are also exercises of power because they are 
able to recreate (or represent) the observed objects in ways that are suited to the interests of 
the observer. 
                                                             
827 See p 93. 
828 Sarah Whatmore, "Hybrid Geographies: Rethinking the 'Human' in Human Geography," in Human Geography 
Today, ed. Doreen Massey, John Allen, and Philip Sarre (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p 25-6. 
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These are examples of exercises of power that are related territory because the document what 
is being observed and thus, in some way, recreate (or represent) the observed objects in ways 
that are most suitable to the interests of the observer. The chronicling of an event, the reporting 
of a personality or practice, are not objective observations, but, as I argue in Chapter Two, often 
involve making moral judgments about what is being ‘witnessed’. Accordingly, these witnessing 
narratives produce the object or entity being observed, and the capacity for that production 
empowers the observer to make and convey judgments about what is being represented.  
To think that discursive power operates in the subconscious, in the sense that we are not aware 
of its productive and creative capacity, is to neglect the extent to which the urge to represent 
has been a deliberate and calculated political policy. I reveal this in my analysis of Lord Curzon 
and Hastings’ policies in ruling India.829 Both political administrators were keen to rule India 
and the North-West Frontier through a policy of cultural appropriation. This involved learning 
the traditional practices and language of their Indian and Pakhtun subjects, and then using this 
knowledge to shape colonial-native relations. They believed that, by appropriating these aspects 
of native culture they would be able to eliminate forms of indirect/proxy rule, and foster more 
amenable relations with the native on the basis of a ‘shared culture’.  
This brings us back to the idea of disembodied identities and a denial of the significance of 
corporeal emplacement and experience. As I argue in Chapter Three, this form of rule through 
‘cultural knowledge’ is essentialistic and fails to accept the significance of native agency. It also 
forces us to consider how native culture can be embodied by someone who does not share the 
native’s corporeal experiences. This suggests that native identities are static and impermeable 
to active exercises of agency. Moreover it also conveys the idea that the settler (and later the 
State) is both equipped and authorised to speak for the native and define his culture.  
The problems associated with this assumption of being able to speak on behalf of the native are 
numerous. Here I refer back to my reading of Merleau-Ponty in Chapter One, where I consider 
the issue of corporeal emplacement and how the act of perception (or observation) imposes 
spatial and temporal restraints on the object being observed. The observer automatically 
presupposes the object as having been ‘discovered’, as not existing before the act of observation 
(at least for him and everyone else that has never seen the object but who he will tell about 
seeing the object).830 Thus, Curzon’s and Hastings’ acts of ‘witnessing’ native culture, and the act 
of ‘defining’ (by adopting what is believed to be part of native culture), ultimately reproduces 
                                                             
829 This is also revealed as a strong policy choice that Caroe adopted while he was Governor of the North-West 
Frontier Province. See, Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 550 Bc--Ad 1957 (London: Macmillan and Company Limited, 1958). 
830 See, p 46. 
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that culture through the perception of the observer. What is ultimately produced is no longer 
‘Indian culture’, but something ‘in-between’.  
This claim is significant precisely because we can identify a similar thread of reasoning within 
contemporary law in relation to Aboriginal title jurisprudence. The law and its institutions (i.e. 
courts) rely on the idea of ‘discovery’, demonstrated by the colonial agent and conveyed through 
mapping and letter-writing. This is the idea that supports the State’s underlying claim to 
sovereignty (i.e. the idea of ‘discovery’). Second, the law also appropriates native culture, and it 
does this by telling the native how he must articulate his identity in order to be considered a 
legal subject (i.e. demonstrating a temporally and spatially fixed cultural identity). Third, the 
law reproduces the native through its own ‘culture’, demonstrated by the fact that the native 
now understands his own subjective, identity, and culture through the law (i.e. the native 
accepts that he has certain claims to his land and behaves in ways consistent with that claim). 
This analysis is interesting because it suggests that, while the native appears to become 
successively more empowered, meaning that he is progressively given greater voice to articulate 
his identity, the processes for doing so become further regulated and so the articulation of his 
identity through the law has the effect of misrepresenting him. This was, for example, revealed 
in my analysis of Delgamuukw in Chapter Three, in which the State’s claims of sovereignty and 
absolute political authority meant that it could not recognise the claimants as ‘nations’ (which is 
how they saw themselves). This also demonstrates how the processes of Occidental Legality 
become more invisible to us in the very moment that an owned, bounded, and culturally-
divisible view of space is adopted and mobilised by the very groups that it is meant to control 
and contain.  
D. Law as a Cultural Process 
This thesis also develops inter-connections between the legal, the social, the temporal, and their 
involvement in the production of geography. As social processes – debated broadly through the 
vernacular of human geography – these aspects of space cannot be studied in isolation from one 
another, or as sub-fields that have ‘an effect’ on geography. Drawing on Delaney and Blomley’s 
discussion of the splicing and braiding of law and geography,831 I suggest that the study of 
geographic space and, in particular, of the history territory, reveals to us the strong 
interconnections between law and culture. This revelation unsettles the conventional positivist 
view of law as a neutral and universal system of rules. Law is not a distinct social and cultural 
entity. Instead, it is informed by a number of different social and cultural processes and 
                                                             
831 David Delaney, The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-Making (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010), p 
23. Also see, Nicholas Blomley, Making Space for Law, ed. Murray Low, Kevin R. Cox, and Jennifer Robinson, The Sage 
Handbook of Political Geography (London: Sage, 2008). 
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discourses. I reveal a number of these through my idea of Occidental Legality and law’s 
production, or rather reproduction,832 of space as territory.  Yet, that does not mean that law can 
simply be reduced to an inevitable tool of those with power and in positions of authority. To 
accept this reductionist vision of law as equivalent to Occidental Legality is to deny law’s 
potential as a vehicle for emancipation for minority communities. 
Accordingly, if law is thought to be informed by culture, then the emancipatory potential of law 
is maximised when multiple voices and perspectives are allowed to inform the category of 
‘culture’. One of the ways in which I argue that contemporary societies can open up liberal law is 
by intercultural self-reflexive dialogue, by ensuring that the law is open to being shaped by 
numerous perspectives engaging with one another. An important step in this process is to shift 
away from compartmentalising cultures through space (i.e. spatially and temporally distancing 
social groups from one another) and thus preventing the possibility for opposition, dialogue, 
and conflict. I further develop this idea of dialogue through the idea of self-reflexivity because 
the parties to the dialogue must be open to a radical reshaping of their own cultural 
perspectives and worldviews by other participating cultural communities. This, I argue, creates 
the conditions (or protects the conditions) for legal, social, and cultural hybridity.  
4. Prospects for Further Research 
This thesis has developed a historical narrative of territory, as a space that is owned, possessed, 
and culturally-divisble and explored its significance for law and the regulation of minorities in 
liberal democracies. While the primary objective of this thesis was to draw attention to how 
geographic space (and its inhabitants)are structured and ordered by the correlative 
relationship between law and the social imaginary, I have also developed ideas for how 
contemporary societies can move forward to identify, address, and overcome the oppressive 
exclusionary effects of Occidental Legality.  
One promising idea is that of developing legal and political processes for coeval recognition 
which accept the reality of hybridity.  This, in turn, also requires embracing intercultural self-
reflexive dialogue, and conscious policy-making that reduces the economic, political and social 
inequalities between native and mainstream societies.  My focus on coeval recognition has 
evolved from Bhandar’s work on the inplausibility of mutual recognition within a postcolonial 
setting in which the native is largely constructed through the signs, symbols, and language of a 
                                                             
832 In the sense that it is produced through the social imaginary and authenticated and circulated through law. 
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colonial (racialising) discourse.833 I discuss crucial modifications and suggest some possible 
avenues that can go beyond mere recognition towards a more authentic ‘coeval recognition’. A 
more robust framework for the protection and recognition of diversity requires a more 
thorough, and contextual, analysis of how these ideas can be put into practice within 
contemporary societies. Indeed the political, social, and legal contexts informing different 
societies will have an effect on how coeval recognition is pursued. Nonetheless, it is important 
to this process that minority communities are consulted and included in the decision-making 
processes.  One of the problems that must be addressed by contemporary societies is how to 
bring in the perspectives of more vulnerable members of minority communities (i.e. women, 
children, sexual minorities, etc). Thus, what may be of value to consider would securing 
conditions of dialogue by, also, collaborating with human rights and non-governmental 
organisations ,who may be in a better position to represent minorities and be better equipped 
to assist with their participation in the process. 
I relation to hybrid geographies, future research in the area of Aboriginal Reservations and 
tribal spaces can draw attention to how spaces are active constructions that do not simply ‘lie 
there’, but are effectively produced and reproduced through social interaction.834 What may be 
crucial to new exploratory projects is a reflection on how activity and network-building 
between the inhabitants of Reserve-space and the State-space (and I use those terms loosely 
and for the sake of clarity more than as absolute categories) can further maximise the 
emancipatory potential of liberal law, and also the emancipatory potential of the political and 
legal geographies that are created through it. This, as I suggested in Chapter Five, locates the 
exercise of power on the individual(s) and their productive and creative space-making 
capacities.  
Perhaps one of the more contentious aspects of this thesis has been its claim that territory and 
notions of autonomy grounded in spatial differentiation further perpetuate the effects of 
Occidental Legality. For many multiculturalists this may be an alarming claim given that, at first 
glance, it appears to veer away from the idea of territorial self-government. However, as I 
discussed in Chapter Five, the intent is not to reject forms of territorial autonomy, if that is 
precisely what autonomy-seeking groups want. My concern is that a focus on territorial 
solutions conceals what lies at the heart of these demands, the appeal for coeval recognition. 
What is necessary, however, if societies are interested in maintaining territorial autonomy as 
potential solutions for recognising diversity, is that they consult with minority groups to 
develop robust policies which make the option for exit or the potential for greater hybridity (i.e. 
                                                             
833 See my discussion in Chapter Five, p 229. 
834 This may go back to my earlier discussion in Chapter One about spaces as performances. See, p 56. 
Conclusion Page 281 
 
identities that bridge the spatial divide between mainstream spaces and native spaces) 
realisable. I discuss some of these policies in Chapter Five, but certainly there can be many more 
ways in which societies develop this idea further. One of these is a focus on language rights, 
which is something I consider in Chapter Four and my case study of Pakistan.  
Researchers interested in the intersection between law and imagined geographies may also 
usefully employ a historical literary analysis of subaltern geographies. A focus on constructions 
of space through Aboriginal cosmologies, or tribal conceptions of space and place may present 
interesting ideas of how to construct more inclusive hybrid geographies. Furthermore, this 
study can help inform the conventional ideas about ‘traditional’ worldviews and the persistence 
of underdeveloped geographies. Further research may be necessary to reveal whether these 
may or may not be misconceptions. Certainly there are studies that claim that, according to 
some Aboriginal cosmologies, the human being is imagined as an extension of the natural 
environment, and thus forms of industrial development sit at odds with this sacred view of 
space.835 Yet, at first glance, much of this literature appears to essentialise native cosmology and 
holding these worldviews as ‘fixed’ representations of native identity and their relationship 
with geography.836 So in some way a historical analysis of these views of space and geography 
may be able to inform our understanding of how Aboriginal law operates today. 
I end this thesis by re-stating the quote which I used at the start of this thesis: 
i]f myth and fantasy touch on levels outside the conscious mind, then simply to point out the 
falsity of one’s imagination leaves untouched the psychic investments which determine the 
formation of the fiction that sustains the world we live and act within. To recognise the 
instability of the divide between fantasy and reality, fiction and facts is to begin the difficult 
and painful task of constructing alternative futures.837 
This thesis has uncovered the ways in which territory is, as it stands, a disempowering 
discourse for minority communities. It is also an imagined geography that emerges through the 
blending of fact and fiction, subjective experience and objective knowledge. Nonetheless, how to 
‘undo’ territory is not the only or main question we should be asking.  It is debatable whether 
such an expectation is even reasonable, given the State-centred orientation of global politics. By 
                                                             
835 Nurit Bird-David, ed. Tribal Metaphorisation of Human-Nature Relatedness: A Comparative Analysis, 
Environmentalism: The View from Anthropology (London: Routledge,1993). 
836 For example, Elkin’s title on a study of Aboriginal cosmologies and identities is simply ‘Elements of Australian 
Aboriginal Philosophies’, which appears to minimise the fact that the Australian Aboriginal community has persisted 
for over 50,000 years and speaks 200-300 different dialects. And thus, it is appears highly unlikely that, in response 
to these facts you could have an article that considers ‘Australian Aboriginal’ philosophies in totality. See, Adolphus 
Peter Elkin, "Elements of Australian Aboriginal Philosophy," Oceania 40, no. 2 (1969). 
837 Gail Ching-Liang Low, White Skins/Black Masks: Representation and Colonialism (London: Routledge, 2004), p 2. 
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relating these methods to the problems of Indigenous rights and cultural diversity I introduce a 
more ‘spatially-aware’ discourse of pluralism. Through this discourse we are able to recognise 
how the law has worked to conceal the hybridity of people-in-contact with one another by fixing 
and locating things in space and through space. I also explore how ‘imagined geographies’ and 
space have been used to conceal the hybridity of law through processes of territorialisation. 
While the processes of Occidental Legality continue to shape the everyday social interactions of 
contemporary society, this thesis has suggested some important ways in which its most 
oppressive tendencies can be addressed, challenged and, perhaps, counteracted. 
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